

LATER MUGHALS



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EDITED AND AUGMENTED WITH
The History of Nadir Shah's Invasion

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Mughal India, &c.*



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THE LATER MUGHALS

CHAPTER VI

MUHAMMAD SHAH: TUTELAGE UNDER THE SAYYIDS, (1719-1720).

SEC. I.—ACCESSION.*

During the few days which elapsed between the death of Rafi-ud-daulah and the arrival of his successor, the *Wazir* and his brother made their usual daily visit to the imperial quarters and returned with robes of honour, as if newly conferred on them, thus deceiving the common people into the belief that the Emperor was still alive.*

At length on the 11th Zul Qada 1131 H. (24th September, 1719), Ghulam Ali Khan arrived in the camp at Bidyapur, a village three kos to the north of Fathpur Sikri. He brought with him Prince Roshan Akhtar, the son of the late Khujista-Akhtar, Jahan Shah, fourth son of the Emperor Bahadur Shah.† The death of Rafi-ud-daulah was now (26th September, 1719) made public, his bier brought out, and his body despatched for burial to Dihli. Arrangements were at once made for the enthronement of his successor.‡ •

This enthronement took place at Bidyapur§ on the 15th Zul Qada 1131 H. (28th September, 1719) and Roshan Akhtar

* Shiu Das, 32b. A newly-conferred *khilat* was worn for twenty-four hours, and nothing was allowed to be put on over it.

† Rustam Ali, *Tarikh-i-Hindi*, fol. 237a, says the Prince was brought from Dihli in three days, travelling in a boat down the Jamuna.

‡ Kamwar Khan, 211; Khafi Khan, ii. 840.

§ From the *tahsildar's* report kindly obtained for me by Mr. Reynolds as already stated, I find that there is a place Tajpur, four miles west of Bidyapur. From the name, and the fact that the village is a perpetual *muafi*, I infer that Tajpur may be the actual place of enthronement.

was proclaimed under the titles of Abul Fath,* Nasir-ud-din, Muhammad Shah, Badshah, Ghazi. He was a handsome and, at that time, fairly intelligent young man, and having been born at Ghazni on the 23rd Rabi I. 1114 H. (16th August, 1702), was now in his eighteenth (lunar) year. Coin was issued and the *khutba* read in his name; and it was directed that the commencement of the reign should be antedated, and fixed from the removal of Farrukh-siyar from the throne. All other arrangements were continued as in the last two reigns, and no new appointments were made. All the persons surrounding the sovereign were as before the nominees of the two Sayyids, and Himmat Khan continued as before to act as tutor and guardian. Muhammad Shah deferred to him in everything, and asked of him permission to attend the public prayers on Friday or to go out shooting. On the march men in the confidence of the Sayyids surrounded the young Emperor and prevented any access to him.†

SEC. 2.—TERMS MADE WITH JAI SINGH.

It was now given out that the Emperor, after worshipping at the tomb of Shaikh Salim Chishti, in Fathpur, would march on to Ajmer and visit the shrine of Muin-ud-din Chishti. The hidden motive was to overawe Rajah Jai Singh who, since the removal of Farrukh-siyar, had been at little pains to conceal his hostile intentions. He had received some aid in money from the Rana of Udepur, as is shown by his letter to that Prince's minister, dated the 4th Bhadon Sambāt 1776 (9th August, 1719), wherein he asserts that Nizām-ul-mulk had started from Ujjain and Chabela Ram had crossed the Jamuna at Kalpi, both of which statements were false.‡ When he learnt of the rising at

* *Tarikh-i-Muzaffari*, 166. But Ghulam Ali Khan, *Muqaddama-i-Shah Alam-nama*, 45a, states that on the 3rd Jamadi II. 1134 H. (20th March, 1722), the style was changed from "Abul Fath" to "Abul Muzaffar."

† Kamwar Khan, 213; Khush-hal Chand, Berlin MS. No. 495, fol. 995a has, for date, "middle of Zul Qada."

‡ He was further encouraged in his hostility by Tahavvar Khan Turani, Salabat Khan, the late *Mir Atash*, Ruhullah Khan, and the other refugees from Dihli already referred to.

Agra, he came out from his capital, Amber, with much ostentation. Following the Rajput custom when resolved on death or victory, he and his men had clothed themselves in saffron raiment and sprinkled their heads with green grass.* He announced publicly that he had bestowed the city of Amber on the Brahmans as a sacred gift (*dan* and *arthan*). He had marched as far as pargana Toda Tank, about eighty miles south-west of Agra, and there waited to see which way events would turn. He was watched by a force under Sayyid Dilawar Ali Khan, which barred his further advance northwards. [Qasim 294, Tod i. 380.]

Maharajah Ajit Singh had offered himself as mediator, but his leisurely procedure, protracted in the way usual to him and his fellow-rajahs, did not accord with the fiery temperament of Husain Ali Khan. It was with a view to bring this matter to a head that an advance from Fathpur Sikri towards Ajmer was proposed. A few marches were made to places in the neighbourhood, but no real start was attempted. The camp was between Malikpur and Muminabad on the 24th Zul Qada (7th October, 1719) and here Husain Ali Khan came in from Fathpur to pay his respects. Another stage was travelled on the 26th (9th October).†

On the 1st Zul Hijja (14th October, 1719) the Emperor's mother, now styled Nawab Qudsiya, and other women of the harem, who had been sent for from Dihli arrived in camp. The Begam had acted most warily, avoiding everything that could arouse the suspicions of the Sayyids. When the messengers of the Sayyids came to Dihli to fetch her son, she bestowed on them, on the men who were to accompany him, and on all

* I read *gyahe*, "grass," in Muhammad Qasim, but Tod, i. 506, speaks of their wearing on such occasions the *maur* or bridal crown, which is probably much the same thing in other words—John Christian, *Behar Proverbs*, p. 197, No. 426, tells us that the bridegroom's head-dress "is made of talipot leaves and in some places of date (palm) leaves." That it is sometimes actually made of *grass* may be inferred from W. Crooke's *Tribes and Castes of the N. W. Provinces*, ii. 62.

† Qasim, 294. There is a Malikpur about five miles east of Fathpur, *Indian Atlas*, sheet 50; Muminabad, I am unable to trace.

office-holders at Dihli, the customary dresses of honour. But learning that this assumption of authority had displeased the Sayyids, she sent away all subsequent applicants. In the same manner, when she arrived in camp, she warned all persons who had any connection with her late husband, Jahan Shah, to abstain from appearing on the road to greet or escort her. She studied the susceptibilities of the Sayyids in every particular. A sum of fifteen thousand Rupees monthly was set apart for her expenses and those of the other women. [Kamwar 214, K. K. 841.]

As the negotiations with Jai Singh were still in progress and no satisfactory terms could be arranged, Ajit Singh, who was extremely anxious to return home, offered to visit Jai Singh in person on his way to Jodhpur. Accordingly he was dismissed to his home, and on the 2nd Zul Hijja (15th October, 1719) the report came in that three days before (12th October), Jai Singh had quitted Toda on his return to Amber. The fugitive nobles, Tahavvar Khan, Salabat Khan, and Ruhullah Khan, were at his request pardoned and left with him unmolested. The great persuasive in his withdrawal was the large sum of money that he received. Some say the amount was as much as twenty lakhs of Rupees. This money was paid to him on the plea that it was required to buy back Amber from the Brahmans. To the public it was announced as a gift on his marriage with the daughter of Ajit Singh, to whom he had long been betrothed. As part of these negotiations Rajah Ja' Singh obtained the government of *sarkar* Sorath (*subah* Ahmadabad). But the rest of Ahmadabad remained under Ajit Singh, with the addition of the whole of Ajmer. That Rajah's formal appointment to the latter *subah* was announced on the 23rd Zul Hijja (5th November, 1719). In this way the country from a point sixty miles south of Dihli to the shores of the ocean at Surat was in the hands of these two rajahs, very untrustworthy sentinels for the Mughals on this exposed frontier.*

* Kamwar, 214, 216; Khafi Khan, 838; Qasim, 297; Shiu Das, 32a.

SEC. 3.—THE EMPEROR MOVES FROM FATHPUR TO AGRA.

From the date of his arrival in camp, 11th Zul Qada (24th September, 1719) until the 20th Zul Hijja, Muhammad Shah had never moved far from Fathpur Sikri. He kept the *Id* festival (10th Zul Hijja) in his tents at Fathpur, and visited the tomb of Shah Salim Chishti, at that place on the 14th of the same month. On the 20th he started for Agra, and three days later (5th November, 1719) he camped at Talab Khela Nath. On the 15th Muharram 1132 H. (27th November, 1719) quarters were taken up for a few days at the palace within the fort of Agra, but on the 2nd Safar (14th December, 1719) the Emperor returned to his tents at his former encampment. At this time Sayyid Dilawar Ali Khan, *Bakhshi* of Husain Ali Khan's army, was sent towards Jalesar and Sadabad in the *Duaba* to punish the Jats, who had lately carried off over one hundred of the imperial camels.*

SEC. 4.—CAMPAIGN AGAINST BUNDI.

As already mentioned, there had been for several years a dispute between Budh Singh Hada, and his relation Bhim Singh, about the country of Bundi in Rajputana. Budh Singh, who was in possession, had thrown in his lot with Farrukh-siyar and Rajah Jai Singh Sawai. Bhim Singh had sided with the minister and his brother. As a reward his restoration was now decided upon, Budh Singh having recently added to his former iniquities by himself assisting Girdhar Bahadur, the rebellious governor of Allahabad, and instigating Chhattarsal Bundela, to do the same. On the 5th Muharram 1132 H. (17th November, 1719) Bhim Singh was sent on this enterprise and Dost Muhammad Khan Afghan† of Malwa was, at the rajah's request, given a high *mansab* and placed under his orders. Sayyid Dilawar Ali Khan, *Bakhshi* of Husain Ali Khan's army, who had lately returned from his expedition against the Jats, received orders to proceed to Bundi with a well-equipped force of fifteen thousand

* Kamwar Khan, 215; Qasim, 2nd recension, 402.

† Founder of the Bhopal State. At this time he was on bad terms with Nizam-ul-mulk, then *subahdar* of Malwa.

horsemen. Gaj Singh of Narwar was also ordered to join. In addition to the avowed object of their march, they carried with them secret instructions to remain on the borders of Malwa until it was known whether their services might not be required in that direction. Bhim Singh had been promised the title of Maharajah and the rank 7,000 (7,000 horse), with the fish standard, if he took part in a successful campaign against Nizam-ul-mulk in Malwa.*

On the 3rd Rabi II. 1132 H. (12th February, 1720) the report was received that Rao Bhim Singh and Dilawar Ali Khan had fought a battle with the uncle of Rao Budh Singh, in which their opponent was defeated and slain, along with five or six thousand of his clan. [K. K. 851, Kamwar 218.]

SEC. 5.—CHABELA RAM AND GIRDHAR BAHADUR AT ALLAHABAD.

Chabela Ram Nagar owed his fortunes entirely to Azim-ush-shan, fighting for whom his brother, Daya Ram, was killed in 1124 H., 1712, at Lahor. He had been one of the earliest to declare himself in Farrukh-siyar's favour, after that Prince's cause had been espoused by the Sayyid brothers. In reward for this zeal he had obtained high rank and various important appointments. He had never been well affected to the Sayyids, and had made a good deal of underhand complaint about them to Farrukh-siyar. At the time of that Emperor's deposition, he was governor of the Allahabad province. The downfall of his patron was distinctly opposed to his interests; but, as the saying is, "the earth is hard and the sky far off." From that moment he stood aloof from the Sayyids, in an attitude not far removed from rebellion; and his name was mixed up with all the rumoured projects having for their object the rescue of the late sovereign from the hands of the Sayyid ministers. His declared revolt against them may be dated from the middle of Ramzan 1131 H., (August 1719), just a little before the time that Agra fort was re-captured and the movement in favour of Nekusiyar suppressed. Troubles raised by Jasan Singh, zamindar of Kalpi, instigated by Muhammad Khan Bangash, and his agent, Rustam

* Khafi Khan, ii. 844; Kamwar Khan, 216; Khizr Khan, 41.

Khan Afridi of Mau-Shamsabad, had kept Chabela Ram busily occupied within his own province, and had prevented his marching to Agra. As the fort at that place had now been recovered and Jai Singh Sawai bought off, it was necessary to deal next with Chabela Ram, more especially as his contumacy barred the road to a remittance from Bengal, which had been detained at Patna. [Khush-hal Berlin MS. 999a.]

His nephew, Girdhar Bahadur, son of the late Daya Ram, had been summoned to Dihli just before Farrukh-siyar's removal from the throne; and after that event, Chabela Ram's discontent becoming known, Girdhar Bahadur was detained at the capital in a sort of honorable captivity. When the *Wazir* started for Agra with the Emperor, Rafi-ud-daulah, Girdhar Bahadur was placed in charge of Lutf-ullah Khan Sadiq, and by him entrusted to his son, Hidayat Ali Khan. This custodian visited his prisoner daily. On one occasion he happened to mention that Husain Ali Khan would soon march to Allahabad, and put an end to Chabela Ram and his opposition. That very night Girdhar Bahadur fled, having bought over his guard. At dawn fifty horsemen started in pursuit, but no trace of the fugitive could be discovered. Soon it was learnt that he had reached Allahabad and joined his uncle, Chabela Ram. [Siwanih, 7.]

Girdhar Bahadur was sent out from Allahabad with a fresh force against Jasan Singh of Kalpi; and after that rebel had been repeatedly defeated, the parties came to an agreement and Girdhar Bahadur returned to Allahabad. This place was already seriously threatened. Sayyid Abdullah Khan had detached Abdun-nabi Khan against it with six thousand horsemen; and on Husain Ali Khan's part, Daud Khan, deputy of Muhammad Khan at Gwaliyar, was ordered on the same service at the head of three thousand men, with whom he marched through Karra to Allahabad. Diler Khan, a slave of the Bangash chief, joined Abdun-nabi Khan at Etawa with fifteen hundred men. [*Ibid* 8.]

Chabela Ram, leaving his nephew in charge of Allahabad fort, came out several kos and entrenched himself. The two forces were not yet in sight of each other, when Chabela Ram

was seized with paralysis and died before he could reach Allahabad.* His death took place in Zul Hijja 1131 H. (November 1719). The two brothers looked on this death as a special interposition of Providence, receiving the news with every demonstration of joy ; and they at once sent off a robe of honour for Girdhar Bahadur, with a request for the surrender of the fort of Allahabad. Active hostilities had meanwhile been suspended. Abdun-nabi Khan, as soon as he heard of Chabela Ram's death, halted at Shahzadpur† for further orders, and conveyed to Girdhar Bahadur the *Wazir's* offer that if he would come peaceably out of Allahabad, he should forthwith receive the province of Oudh with the *faujdar*-ships of Lakhnau and Gorakhpur.

Girdhar Bahadur, however, rejected all overtures. His excuse, an obviously insufficient one, was that he had not yet finished the funeral obsequies of his uncle, which could only be completed at the holy Tribeni (that is, Allahabad, *alias* Pryag), where the Ganges, Jamuna and Sarsuti are supposed to meet. For one year he would not be at liberty to leave the place. He employed this breathing space in active preparations for a siege, and in the accumulation of ample supplies within the fort walls. He is said to have dug a trench from the Ganges to the Jamuna and filled it with water from those rivers, thus protecting the fort on its most vulnerable side, that towards the west. Outside this channel he erected a number of small earthen forts.‡

At this time the Bundelas were active and troublesome, both to the south of their country on the borders of Malwa, and to the north of it between Allahabad and Agra. With regard to the first of these outbreaks, Nizam-ul-mulk, the *subahdar* of Malwa, was written to. For the protection of the country near

* Khush-hal Chand, Berlin MS., No. 495, fol. 999a, reports that some men suggested foul play. Their story was that "a letter arrived from the Sayyids, and as soon as he (C. R.) had opened the envelope, he gave up the ghost."

† In the Cawnpore district, Lat., 26°77', Long. 80°2', Thornton, 881.

‡ *Siwanih-i-Khizri*, p. 8; Kamwar Khan, entry of 25th Zul Hijja; the *Tarikh-i-Muhammadi* places the death of C. R. "at the end of the year 1131"; Qasim 300, 301, 302; Shiu Das, f. 33a.

the Jamuna, a force was ordered to assemble under Muhammad Khan Bangash, Aziz Khan Daudzai, Hasan Khan, *faujdar* of Kora Jahanabad, and other *jagirdars*. They were to await orders on the south of the Jamuna. Saadat Khan, Burhan-ul-mulk (who had been recently, 6th October 1719, appointed *faujdar* of Hindaun and Biana) was designated as commander of the imperial vanguard. About this time Mir Jumla Tarkhan, who had lately made his peace with the Sayyids, had been nominated (8th Zul Hijja 1131 H., 21st October 1719) to the office of *Sadar-us-sadur*, or superintendent of endowments, but found a difficulty in obtaining the issue of his patent of appointment, owing to the obstructive action of Rajah Ratan Chand. Mir Jumla invoked the aid of Saadat Khan who spoke to Husain Ali Khan. Ratan Chand was displeased, and soon succeeded in alienating Abdullah Khan from Saadat Khan. The command of the vanguard was taken from him and given to Haidar Quli Khan.*

With reference to Ratan Chand's interference, even in matters belonging to other departments, they tell the following story: One day Ratan Chand brought to Abdullah Khan a man whom he wished to be made a *Qazi*. Abdullah Khan said with a smile to a bystander: "Ratan Chand now nominates the *Qazis*." The courtier replied: "He has got everything he wants in this world, why should he not now look after the other world?" Or, as Fakhr-ud-din Khan, son of Shaikh Abdul-aziz, remarked one day to Abdullah Khan: "Now-a-days, through your favour, Ratan Chand is as great a man as was Himu, the shopkeeper."†

Haidar Quli Khan started for Allahabad on the 1st Muharram 1132 H., 13th November 1719. On the way he was joined

* Kamwar Khan, entries of 23rd Zul Qada and 8th Zul Hijja 1131 H.; Khizr Khan, p. 10; Shiu Das, 33. Kora Jahanabad is in the Fatehpur District; Thornton, 522; Hindaun (in Jaipur territory), Lat. $26^{\circ}41'$, Long. $77^{\circ}16'$; Biana (in Bharatpur territory), Lat. $26^{\circ}57'$, Long. $77^{\circ}20'$, Thornton, 387, 119.

† *Tarikh-i-Muzaffari*, Irvine MS., p. 167, Khush-hal Chand, Berlin MS. 495, f. 1,000b. Himu Dhusar, *Wazir* of Adil Shah Sur, was defeated and taken prisoner in Muharram 964 H., November 1556, Beale, 160.

by Sher Afkan Khan Panipati, *faujdar* of Karra.* After a halt near Karra, they advanced to a place twenty-five *kos* from Allahabad. At this stage Shah Ali Khan arrived, bringing with him Daud Khan, an officer sent by Muhammad Khan Bangash. Shah Ali Khan was a Barha Sayyid who had been deputed by the *Wazir* and his brother to represent their interests.† Muhammad Khan Bangash excused himself from personal attendance, the Rajput clan of the Bamtelas having risen and tried to destroy the newly-founded town of Farrukhabad. But he vouched for the zeal and energy of his officers, Daud Khan and Diler Khan. [*Siwanih*, 11.]

By this time, at the instigation of Budh Singh Hada, of Bundi, a large number of Bundelas had taken the field. These men harassed Abdun-nabi Khan and Diler Khan in their advance. One day Abdun-nabi Khan was taken prisoner, but rescued by Diler Khan after a severe struggle. Before the fight could be renewed on the following morning, Tahavvar Ali Khan marched in with two thousand men sent by Dilawar Ali Khan. The Bundelas now avoided a renewal of the engagement, but Tahavvar Ali Khan, out of bravado, disregarding Abdun-nabi Khan's advice, took the initiative. Diler Khan, scorning to be left behind, followed in his wake, and Abdun-nabi Khan felt bound to support them. The Afghans, when near enough, began to shout out abusive words until Bhagwant Singh, the Bundela leader, stung by these taunts, broke off his holy thread, put it on the point of his sword, and swore an oath to die or be revenged. Spurring his mare into the space between the armies, he selected Tahavvar Ali Khan as his opponent. Riding up to that officer's elephant, he brought down the driver with one arrow and pierced Tahavvar Ali Khan's arm with another. Diler Khan now attempted to take the Bundelas in the rear. Bhagwant Singh with two hundred men turned to face him. Diler Khan did not flinch, and after three-quarters of an hour's

* This man was the brother of Lutf-ullah Khan Sadiq. The *Tarikh-i-Muzaffari*, 170, has *Kora*, instead of Karra.

† According to Khush-hal Chand, Berlin MS. No. 495, f. 999a, this man had been promised the succession to the governorship, if successful in ejecting Girdhar Bahadur. He had 4,000 men with him.

desperate fighting, Bhagwant Singh was cut down by the Pathan. The Bundelas dispersed and were pursued for two or three kos by the Afghan horse. Abdun-nabi Khan and his companions then rejoined Haidar Quli Khan by forced marches. [Khizr Kh. 11.]

All the reinforcements having now reached him, Haidar Quli Khan divided his army into three divisions: one under his own orders; one under Sher Afkan Khan Panipati, Bahadur Khan and Daud Khan; one under Shah Ali Khan Barha and Abdun-nabi Khan. An advance was then made. When the imperialists were five kos from the fort, the Chandela zamindars who had joined Girdhar Bahadur came out to oppose them, and a sharp engagement ensued. The Chandelas forced their way into the ranks of the second division, and the newly recruited men gave way, Shah Ali Khan being so severely wounded that he fell from his elephant. His troops fled in disorder. But Daud Khan, calling on his Afghans, maintained the struggle as long as there was any daylight, and during the night the third division reached the spot. The enemy being now outnumbered, took to their heels and retreated within shelter of the trenches outside the fort. [Khush-hal 999b, Khizr Kh. 13.]

Haidar Quli Khan hurried up with his own division, and two days were spent in restoring order in the force. On the third day he marched close up to the entrenchments with his whole army. As soon as they came in sight, they were received with a heavy fire of cannon and rockets, and from afternoon to sunset the fight continued. Girdhar Bahadur in person issued from his trenches and created a diversion by a bold attack. At length, owing to the darkness, they could no longer distinguish friend from foe, and each army returned to its own quarters. Fighting went on daily for two or three days. One night an attack was made on Abdun-nabi Khan's camp, and great damage was done before Sher Afkan Khan could arrive, when they jointly drove back the assailants to the very ditches of their entrenchments. Two men were taken alive. Their story was that within the fort there were food and supplies enough to last for ten years; Girdhar Bahadur's own men numbered ten thousand, and there were as many more belonging to Budh

Singh Hada, Chhattarsal Bundela, and the Hindu landholders of the adjacent country. Haidar Quli Khan reported all this to Husain Ali Khan, and asked for reinforcements. [*Siwanih*, 14.]

Nor did the commanders of the investing force act in unison. Abdun-nabi Khan declared that he would behead the two prisoners in retaliation for the loss of men that he had suffered. Haidar Quli Khan refused his consent. He said that he required these men in order to find out from them the condition of the fort and its defenders, subsequently, whatever order was given in regard to the prisoners by Husain Ali Khan, Amir-ul-umara, would be carried out. Beginning with civil words, the discussion was prolonged until they spoke harshly to each other. Abdun-nabi Khan thereupon withdrew his troops from the investment of the northern bastion, and that very night a reinforcement sent by Budh Singh Hada, passed through the abandoned post and entered the fort without let or hindrance.

As already stated, Husain Ali Khan, as soon as he learnt of Budh Singh's encouragement of the Bundelas and of Girdhar Bahadur's resistance, detached Dilawar Ali Khan and others into the Kota-Bundi country. At the same time Muhammad Khan Bangash, who had obeyed the command to proceed to Allahabad by sending some of the officers, was pressed to take the field in person. Accordingly, he soon arrived at Allahabad, and occupied the position vacated by Abdun-nabi Khan. One night, shortly after his arrival, two thousand men, an hour or two before dawn, made a sudden attack on him. The Nawab, whose eyes were inflamed, was unable to take the command himself, but Diler Khan, for whom an urgent message had been sent, was soon on the spot. In the confusion and darkness, some two hundred of the retreating enemy lost their way and fell into the river ; while Salim Singh, their leader, was wounded and made a prisoner by Nur Khan Khatak. But before he was recognized, he yielded up his accoutrements, his sword, his turban, and all that he had of value, and was allowed to go his way. Diler Khan received two severe wounds in the back, but escaped with his life. [*Ibid*, 17.]

The morning after this night surprise, Haidar Quli Khan ordered a general assault from two directions. One force he

took command of himself, the other was led by Sher Afkan Khan, Daud Khan Bangash, and Shah Ali Khan Barha. After repeated attacks, Haidar Quli Khan cleared the enemy out of the entrenchments at the foot of the north side of the fort. In the same way, Shah Ali Khan and the leaders with him drove those in front of them back to the very foot of the walls. Daud Khan, accompanied by Sher Afkan Khan, brought up the scaling ladders, hoping to make an entry, but after much struggle and effort he was compelled to abandon the attempt. Since the river flows close under the fort, and a number of boats were moored below the walls, it was feared that if the enemy saw the day going against them, they would use this means of escape. To prevent this manoeuvre, Muhammad Khan sent out his men and took possession of all the boats.

For three days the fighting continued. By the fourth day the imperial army had worked its way close to the fort and began to mine under the walls. Girdhar Bahadur, believing the day was lost, made overtures through Muhammad Khan ; in these negotiations a long time was consumed. Girdhar Bahadur then found out that Muhammad Khan had received a promise of the Allahabad province, if he, Girdhar Bahadur, could be ousted from it. Ceasing to believe any longer in that noble's impartiality, Girdhar Bahadur said he would treat through no one but Ratan Chand.

The retention of Allahabad in hostile hands was most detrimental to the Sayyids' power. It formed a centre round which disaffection could rally and grow troublesome. In itself it was as strong a fortress as Akbarabad, but in other ways many times more difficult to overcome. Instead of a revolted garrison having no competent leaders, it was held by a well-trying and valiant soldier at the head of a well-disciplined force ; instead of a miserably provisioned stronghold there was one with sufficient supplies for many years. Obviously some great effort must be made.

Husain Ali Khan ordered a bridge of boats to be thrown across the Jamuna at Agra, and sent his troops to the other side as a preliminary to his own advance down the Duaba. He had no reverence for the prognostications of astrologers, saying :

"Whatever is chosen by the Eternal Felicity is felicitous ; whatever is not adopted by Him is devoid of felicity." On the 3rd Safar (15th December 1719) he quitted his camp at Bagh Dahr-Ara, and proceeded by boat to the garden of Jahan-ara Begam. Negotiations continued at Allahabad ; day and night camel-riders came and went. But Girdhar Bahadur persisted that he had no faith in the Sayyids and could not trust their honour, or give up the place of refuge that he held. Several months elapsed, but no settlement was arrived at. [Qasim, 303.]

At length, on the 23rd Jamada I. 1132 H. (1st April 1720), Husain Ali Khan resolved to march on Allahabad ; and quitting the garden of Jahan-ara, his tents were put up on the grazing grounds of Bagh Buland.* But Abdullah Khan did not approve of this move. A few weeks before this, on the 1st Rabi II. 1132 H. (10th February 1720) the Emperor's advance tents had been sent off towards Dihli, but no start followed ; and on the 1st Jamada I. (10th March 1720), they were brought back from Sikandra Itala.† About this time the quarrel over the Agra booty broke out afresh between Abdullah Khan and his younger brother, and it was only through the strenuous exertions of Ratan Chand that a settlement was made ; and these differences were prevented from reaching the public ear. Still sore at the rôle played by his brother at Agra, Abdullah Khan, directly Husain Ali Khan moved towards Allahabad, swore that he would not be defrauded a second time. If Husain Ali Khan had appropriated the booty of Agra, he would take that of Allahabad. In short, he insisted on his right as *Wazir* to assume the supreme command. At length, a middle course was hit upon, both brothers remained at Agra, and Ratan Chand went as their emissary to Allahabad. [Qasim 306, K. K. 845, Kamwar 220.]

On the 25th Jamada I. 1132 H. (3rd April 1720) Ratan Chand started with many nobles in his train, taking sixty large guns each drawn by one hundred to two hundred oxen and three or four elephants. On his way the *fauj-dars*, the agents of the *jagirdars*, and the *zamindars* flocked to his standard. The

* Khush-hal calls it Moti Bagh, across the river, opposite the fort.

† Apparently the place west of Agra, and the site of Akbar's mausoleum, is intended.

rajah camped two *kos* from Allahabad fort and sent a message to Girdhar Bahadur that he had come thus far to see him, and was anxiously awaiting an interview. Rajah Girdhar Bahadur returned answer that to meet him was pleasure, but the period set apart for mourning on account of Chabela Ram's death not having yet expired, he must trouble his visitor to come and see him, which would also accord with the usages observed at condolences upon a death. Rajah Ratan Chand, leaving everybody behind him except Muhammad Khan Bangash, Haider Quli Khan, and one or two of his most trusted subordinates, went into the fort. Rajah Girdhar Bahadur came as far as the door of his dwelling, and Ratan Chand on meeting him offered the usual condolences. Gifts were brought forward, of which Ratan Chand accepted an elephant and two horses ; then, having sat a moment, he left for his quarters. Next day Girdhar Bahadur came in full state to return the visit. Ratan Chand met him at the tent door and seated him on the right hand upon his own carpet (*masnad*), offering one elephant and five horses with rich trappings. Girdhar Bahadur, too, refused all except the elephant and two horses. [Kamwar 219, Shiu 34a, Khush-hal 1000b.]

After they had exchanged some conciliatory words in public, they sat apart and consulted. The terms offered were the Government of Oudh with all the divisions (*sarkars*) dependent thereon, and the right to appoint all the military and civil subordinate officers (*i.e.*, the *faujdars* and *diwans*), Mir Mushrif, the former governor, and the other officials being removed. To these appointments was added a gift of thirty *lakhs* of Rupees, payable from the Bengal treasure remittance, to replace the expenditure on his army and the defence of the fort, together with a jewelled turban ornament, a special dress of honour and an elephant from the Emperor. This conference took place upon the 25th Jamada II. 1132 H. (3rd May 1720). [Siwanth 19, K. K. 846, Shiu 35a.]

After binding oaths on Ganges water had been exchanged, Girdhar Bahadur accepted the above terms, and, with all his family and their belongings, his treasure and his goods, marched out of the fort on the 4th Rajab (11th May 1720) ; whereupon

Ahmad Khan, a brother of Muhammad Khan Bangash, entered with five hundred men and occupied the place. Leaving Shah Ali Khan in charge of Allahabad, Ratan Chand started on his return to Agra. The Bengal treasure, until now delayed at Patna, was sent for, orders being left that out of the total sum thirty *lakhs* should be paid over to Rajah Girdhar Bahadur, and the balance sent on to head-quarters.

On the 9th Rajab, upon the receipt of Ratan Chand's report, Abdullah Khan attended audience, where he had not been for some time, and received the Emperor's permission to beat the drums in honour of a victory. On the 16th Rajab (23rd May 1720) Husain Ali Khan recrossed the Jamuna and took up his old station in Bagh Dahr-Ara as before. Ratan Chand, on his arrival on the 2nd Shaban, 8th June 1720, was warmly congratulated by the two brothers and promoted to 5,000 *zat*, 5,000 horse, receiving a special robe and a very valuable pearl necklace. Haidar Quli Khan received 50,000 Rupees and a robe of honour; Muhammad Khan Bangash and Sher Afkan Khan, each twenty-five thousand Rupees and a necklace of pearls. During this period the Emperor had moved once (14th Jamada II. 22nd April 1720) to the village of Mumtazabad, in order to pay a visit to Shah Jahan's tomb; on the 17th of the same month (25th April 1720) the camp was brought back to Talab Khela Nath.*

SEC. 6.—FLIGHT OF NIZAM-UL-MULK FROM MALWA TO THE DAKHIN.

Between Nizam-ul-mulk and the Sayyids there were many reasons for mutual distrust. Spoiled in earlier years by the exceptional favour with which he and his father were honoured during the last part of Alamgir's reign, Nizam-ul-mulk was ever afterwards discontented with the treatment he received from that monarch's successors. In Bahadur Shah's reign he served grudgingly, more than once sending in his resignation. It was the same in Jahandar Shah's reign. His services to Farrukh-siyar at the time of Jahandar Shah's overthrow secured

* Kamwar Khan, 220; Shiu Das, 33b; *Bayan-i-waqi* 406; Khush-hal Chand, 1,000b; Khizr Khan, p. 20. Seventy-five *lakhs* of treasure from Bengal were received at Agra on the 19th Rajab (24th May 1720).

him the Government of the Dakhin, a region in regard to which, as there can be no doubt, he had cherished secret projects ever since the death of Alamgir. Nizam-ul-mulk, like his father, had won his spurs in the Dakhin campaigns, and, as Zulfiqar Khan unquestionably did, he must have seen that it offered a splendid opening for acquiring partial, perhaps even complete, independence of Dihli and its sovereign. He had held the six *subahs* for hardly more than two years, when he was superseded by Husain Ali Khan.

Apparently this supersession rankled in his mind, for he withdrew to his new appointment at Muradabad, and only returned to the capital at Farrukh-siyar's urgent request. Unable to work with Farrukh-siyar, he went over nominally, as we have seen, to the faction of the *Wazir* and his brother. Being anxious to secure his absence from Dihli, they offered him the Government of Bihar, a difficult charge which they hoped would fully employ, even if it did not exhaust, his strength. Before Nizam-ul-mulk had started for Patna Farrukh-siyar had been dethroned, and Malwa being then vacant was offered to him. The brothers thought that as their own nominees and relations held Akbarabad on the one side, and the Dakhin on the other, any danger from this able man's intrigues would be obviated by thus placing him between two fires. Remembering how short his tenure of the Dakhin had been, Nizam-ul-mulk made his acceptance of Malwa conditional on a solemn agreement that he should not be removed again. The promise was given and the Nawab started for Ujjain on the 24th Rabi II. 1131 H. (15th March 1719), a few days after the accession of Rafi-ud-darjat, taking the precaution to remove the whole of his family and possessions, thus leaving no hostages behind him in the Sayyids' hands.

Ever since his departure rumours had been rife that he had helped to instigate the abortive rising at Agra. Although he was guilty of no overt act of hostility, he failed in some matters to study the susceptibilities of Husain Ali Khan. Owing to a slight offered by him to Husain Ali Khan, Marahmat Khan had been superseded in his command at Mandu by Khwajam Quli Khan. Difficulties arose about giving over that fort, and after

these had been overcome, Marahmat Khan, instead of being removed by Nizam-ul-mulk, was employed in ejecting Jai Chand Bundela from Ramgarh. The Nawab then applied for the offender's pardon. Husain Ali Khan disregarded these requests in favour of Marahmat Khan. Soon afterwards the news-writers reported to head-quarters that Nizam-ul-mulk was enlisting men and collecting *matériel* of war in excess of his requirements as a provincial governor.

On receipt of these reports, Husain Ali Khan sent for the agent who represented Nizam-ul-mulk at Court, and, after abusing him and his master, told him to report to his employer what had been said to him ; the grievances alleged being the above-mentioned matter of Marahmat Khan, the removal of a *zamin-dar* in *pargana* Nalam,* and some other disputes about lands. Nizam-ul-mulk acknowledged the letter by writing direct to Husain Ali Khan. After complaining of the enmity of the official reporters, he points out that people who had never been in Malwa, could not know its condition ; but Husain Ali Khan having lately passed through it must know the facts well. The Mahrattas, with over fifty thousand horsemen, were harrying it ; if troops in large numbers were not entertained, what hope was there of defending the country from their ravages ? For this reason he had added to his resources in men and *matériel*. He also objected to giving up Malwa just as the instalments of the *Rabi* harvest were falling due, this being the time when most of the revenue was paid, forming his only hope of getting back his heavy expenditure. None but his evil-wishers could have accused him of intending adverse action. If that had been his wish he could have gratified it when at Agra, where several times messengers came to him from Nekusiyar. He had no such purposes in his heart, and his detractors ought to be silenced. The allusion to what he could have done at Agra, if he had chosen, only incensed Husain Ali Khan still more against him. [K. K. 851, T. Muz. 174.]

A *farman* was now issued to Nizam-ul-mulk recalling him from Malwa, on the plea that it was necessary for the protection

* Probably a misprint for Talam, *sarkar* Sarangpur, *Ain* ii. 203.

of the Dakhin that Husain Ali Khan should take charge of that province. He was offered the choice of any one out of the four provinces of Akbarabad, Allahabad, Multan, or Burhanpur. • This was a distinct breach of faith, and no doubt confirmed Nizam-ul-mulk in the belief that he was to be destroyed. He had already some reason for apprehension, due to the movements of Husain Ali Khan's *Bakhshi*, Dilawar Ali Khan, who was hovering on the western border of Malwa, attended by Rajah Bhim Singh of Bundi, Rajah Gaj Singh of Narwar, and other chiefs. The secret instructions of these generals were that after they had settled the matter of Salim Singh who, with the connivance of Rajah Jai Singh Sawai, had attempted to usurp Bundi, they should keep the proceedings of Nizam-ul-mulk under observation and await further orders. Dilawar Ali Khan was told to announce publicly that he had a commission to proceed to Aurangabad in the Dakhin, to conduct thence the family of Nawab Husain Ali Khan.

This movement could not be construed otherwise than unfavourably by Nizam-ul-mulk. Nor was other instigation to action wanting. His cousin, Muhammad Amin Khan, wrote from Agra that the Sayyids were only waiting for the suppression of the Nekusiyar party and the recovery of Allahabad, when their next task would be to uproot and destroy him, Nizam-ul-mulk. With his own letter Muhammad Amin Khan sent one written by Muhammad Shah's own hand, and one bearing the seal of that Emperor's mother. These letters complained of the Sayyids, of their entire usurpation of authority, of their leaving no personal liberty to the Emperor; and called on Nizam-ul-mulk to espouse his cause and effect his deliverance. [K. K. 850-852, Qasim 307.]

Further details of Nizam-ul-mulk's stay in Malwa are obtained from another source. The night following his arrival at Ujjain there was heavy rain; "this was, indeed, to him God's gracious rain, for from that day he never ceased to prosper." Ujjain became to him in fact as well as name the *Dar-ul-fath*, the Abode of Victory. After the rains (of 1719) had ended, he set out to reduce his province to order. It was then that the friends of Husain Ali Khan wrote alarming letters

about the strength of his army and complained that mischief was brewing, as he was tampering with the Court intelligencer's reports. Upon hearing this Husain Ali Khan broke out into strong language. He asserted that Nizam-ul-mulk should never have been allowed to leave the Court, and now one "Nizam-ul-mulk" had multiplied into a thousand ; it would be found as difficult to deal with him as to tackle a young tiger in an open plain.

To this Qutb-ul-mulk (Abdullah Khan) replied with the saying, "The past is beyond remedy, fate does its own pleasure." Some way must be devised. After many consultations, a *farman* of recall was despatched by the hands of mace-bearers, while a force was moved across the Chambal. If the governor submitted, all would be well ; if not, they could still fight or negotiate. If he fled to the south, their general could pursue. Alim Ali Khan at Aurangabad was warned to be on the alert. Thus Nizam-ul-mulk would inevitably be caught between two fires.

It had already been a subject of remark at Nizam-ul-mulk's *darbar* that disturbed times were at hand, that probably the first difficulty would arise in Malwa. Nizam-ul-mulk began to prepare for an emergency, as the only hope of being left undisturbed. He argued that, though in position a great noble, Husain Ali Khan was in character a mere soldier, who, as soon as he hears anything unfavourable, burns with anger and becomes at once an enemy. In that case, "the Lord be our keeper." There is nothing for it but to make ready to fight.

When the advance of Sayyid Dilawar Ali Khan was announced, Nizam-ul-mulk consulted his most trusted officer, Muhammad Ghiyas Khan. This man said there was no use in losing one's head, the matter could easily be carried through. Fortune had always been favourable, and to resist was best. The Nawab rejoined : "Why speak thus ! Still, I am in perplexity ; that I have done no wrong is plain, nor need I feel ashamed. I have lived respected from the days of the late Alamgir until now, and for the few more days that may be vouchsafed me, I trust I may be saved from dishonour. Why do these *parvenus* try to harm me, merely because they are puffed up by their

sudden elevation. Such an attitude is becoming in an Emperor ; if others gain a little rise in life, why need they lose their heads. Thanks to God on High, who is there that shall not himself receive what he has done to others? But it is not for me to begin. If in spite of my quiescence they attack me, there is no help for it. After all, I am human. What man is there holding my high station who would not defend his honour? Victory lies hidden from us, it is the gift of the Most High, and is not gained by the greatness of a host. I swear by the God that made me, that they may bring all Hindustan against me and I will still resist undaunted. If longer life has been decreed me, no harm will arrive ; if the hour of departure is at hand, nothing can avail me."

Ghiyas Khan approved these words, pointing out that he had only meant to suggest that preparation was necessary, "a blow after the fight" meant mere dishonour. The Nawab's kinsmen approved, and preparation was decided on. Ghiyas Khan proposed a march from Mandeshwar to Ujjain, where they should await the *farman* and leave in safety their superfluous baggage. The *farman* ought to be received with outward honour, to be followed by a march towards the capital. If they were to fight, they could fight as well there as here ; nay, at Court the position was better. When men have once resolved on death they can fight even against heaven ; as to any other low wretches, of what account were they? The Sayyids were not angels having wings and able to take flight ; men with bodies, however much fenced in, can be reached. Right was on their side. If a gracious God shielded them, Right would triumph. If, before they reached the vicinity of Sironj, things took another turn, what would it matter? On hearing of their ostensible return to the capital, would not their opponents be forthwith put off their guard. Muhammad Amin Khan, Hamid Khan and others at Court should be addressed, as also Iwaz Khan and others in the Dakhin. The commandant of Asirgarh should be gained over, money might be offered him for the cession of that fortress. That place could be easily reached from Sironj, "and when Asir is ours, God has given us the key of the kingdom of the Dakhin." Reayat Khan, Abdur-rahim

Khan, Qadir Dad Khan and Mutawassil Khan supported Muhammad Ghiyas.

Letters were written in all directions, as agreed on, and after a delay of two or three days they started in the direction of Dihli. Of this move the news-reporters immediately sent off announcements to the Court. Stage by stage they advanced as far as Doraha. Letters came from the chief men in the Dakhin, but no fresh orders were issued, and the soldiers rejoiced at being on their way to Hindustan. Suddenly they were marched back by the way that they had come ; the men were amazed, but the secret was well kept, and at last, by a night march on the 8th May 1720, they reached and crossed the Narmada. [*Ahwal* 155b.]

Nizam-ul-mulk had heard that mace-bearers were on their way to enforce his return to the capital. A *farman* to this effect had indeed been sent, in which it was added that the province of Akbarabad would be given to him as soon as he arrived. On the 9th Rajab 1132 H. (16th May 1720), news came to Agra that he had left Malwa. It was then reported that in the middle of Jamada II. 1132 H. (about the 23rd April 1720), at the head of five or six thousand horsemen, and attended by Abdur-rahim Khan, Marahmat Khan, Reayat Khan, Qadir Dad Khan Raushani, Mutawassil Khan, grandson of Sadullah Khan, *Wazir*, Inayat Khan and others, Nizam-ul-mulk had left Mandeshwar and marched back to Ujjain. There, giving out that he was on his way to Sironj, one or two marches were made as far as the village of Kayath ; thence he made straight for the Narmada, which he crossed on the 1st Rajab 1132 H. (8th May 1720) by the ford of Akbarpur. [K. K. 852, 860 ; Qasim 308 ; Kamwar 221.]

Husain Ali Khan was for immediate action ; he wished to go in person. On the other hand, Abdullah Khan and Samsam-ud-daulah (Khan Dauran) counselled delay ; for, as the saying is, "Delay is of God ; haste, of the Devil." Sayyid Dilawar Ali Khan and the officers with him, in one direction, and Alim Ali Khan, in the other, would suffice to retrieve everything. Even if Asir fort had been taken, there had been no time to

place it in a state of defence and it could be easily recovered ;
"cleverness is a good thing, be you as strong as Rustam."

Husain Ali Khan continued unappeased and blamed his brother's want of energy. The latter stuck to his own opinion and protested that it was not adopted through want of courage. He was surprised at being called a coward. "Am I not your brother? Am not I, too, a Sayyid?" Let his brother be a little reasonable, and he would agree to anything. He had said over and over again that the imprisonment of Farrukh-siyar was a mistake. But his words were put aside, and his brother had done his own pleasure. They could but reap what they had sown, and this rising of Nizam-ul-mulk was only the first-fruits. In the end the brothers sent off urgent orders to Sayyid Dilawar Ali Khan to follow instantly in pursuit, taking with him Rao Bhim Singh Hada, Rajah Gaj Singh Narwari, Dost Muhammad Khan Afghan, and others. In anticipation of some such movement, these men were already close to the borders of Malwa, and were thus able to start without delay. Alim Ali Khan, a youth about twenty years of age and a nephew of the Sayyids, who was acting at Aurangabad as deputy governor of the Dakhin, received orders to bar the way to the Nawab's advance. [*Ahwal* 157b, *Kamwar* 221.]

One of Nizam-ul-mulk's first acts was an attempt to buy over the garrison of the strong fortress of Asirgarh, which lies about forty-five miles south of the Narmada and not far from Burhanpur. Khusrau, one of his slaves, had a friend in the garrison named Usman Khan Qadiri, to whom he was sent with overtures. The very day that the Nawab crossed the Narmada, Khusrau came back with Usman Khan, who stipulated that he should be appointed to the command of the fort. Money for paying to the garrison the arrears of two years' pay was provided, and Usman Khan, accompanied by Hifz-ullah Khan, *Bakhshi*, and the Nawab's eldest son, Ghazi-uddin Khan Firuz Jang, returned to Asirgarh. Nizam-ul-mulk followed as quickly as possible by way of Bijagarh Kahsgaon. The fort was delivered up on the 13th Rajab 1132 H. (20th May 1720), and the commandant, a very old man named Abu Talib Khan, was made a prisoner. About this time Rustam

Beg Khan of Kahrgaon and Fath Singh, Rajah of Makrai, came in and joined. Ghiyas Khan was sent on to occupy the town of Burhanpur, lying at a distance of about twelve miles. After a visit to Asirgarh, to the top of which he ascended, Nizam-ul-mulk, leaving behind him his two sons and his spare baggage, followed to Burhanpur and encamped in the Lal Bagh at that place.*

Hearing that Nizam-ul-mulk had crossed the Narmada, Alim Ali Khan sent off Anwar Khan, Qutb-ud-daulah, *faujdar* of Burhanpur, who was then on leave at Aurangabad. With him was joined Rao Rambha Nimbalkar, a Mahratta leader who owed his release from imprisonment at Dihli to the intercession of that officer. They were at Adilabad,† twelve *kos* south of Burhanpur, when they heard that Ghiyas Khan was already there and preparing to invest the town, of which Nur-ullah Khan, *diwan* of the province and brother of Anwar Khan, was in charge. Ghiyas Khan tried to intercept the relieving force by sending troops across the Tapti; but, favoured by the darkness of the night, they evaded his men and taking to by-paths passed in to the town, their litters (*palkis*) and other property falling into the hands of plunderers. Soon after the *faujdar's* arrival, the citizens assembled and protested against a resistance for which they alone would suffer. The walls would be escaladed by Ghiyas Khan, their lives endangered, and their property destroyed. The *faujdar* was advised by them to fight outside in the open, for, if he did not, the city would be surrendered by the citizens to his

* Khafi Khan, ii. 853, 865; *Tarikh-i-Muzaffari*, p. 180, and *Siwanih-i-Dakhin* by Munim Khan, Aurangabadi, Irvine MS. No. 396, ff. 131 and 152. The *Burhan-ul-futuh*, 1676, gives Islami-ullah Hazari, as the name of the man who was treated with, and that of Sharf Khan as the new commandant. According to this author the surrender took place on the 15th Rajab. Kahrgaon is about 55 miles n. w. of Burhanpur, and Makrai is about 70 miles n. e. of the same place. Lal Bagh, about two miles north of the town, is close to the present railway station, *Bombay Gazetteer* (Khandesh), pp. 589, 591.

† It is in the Khandesh district, and is spelt Edilabad in *Bombay Gazetteer*, xii. 447; it lies about 15 miles n. e. of the Bhusawal station of the G. I. P. Railway.

opponents. Anwar Khan, who was far from courageous, lost his head altogether, and on the 16th Rajab (23rd May 1720) applied to Ghiyas Khan for terms. The next day Nizam-ul-mulk arrived in person. Anwar Khan and Nur-ullah Khan, with all the officials and citizens, attended and made their submission. The town and citadel were then occupied. By the acquisition of Asirgarh and Burhanpur, Nizam-ul-mulk's position was rendered very strong.*

At this time the mother of Sayyid Saif-ud-din Ali Khan Barha, younger brother of the *Wazir*, had reached Burhanpur with her grand-children on her way from Aurangabad to rejoin her son at Muradabad, *subah* Dihli, where he was now *faujdar*. When Nizam-ul-mulk appeared and occupied the town, the men of her escort were overcome with terror, and proposed to send to the Nawab all the jewels and valuable property which they had in their charge, on condition that the family honour was saved and their lives guaranteed. Nizam-ul-mulk refused to accept the offer of the property, spoke kindly to Muhammad Ali, the Begam's agent, conferred on him a dress of honour, and sent him back with a present of fruit for the children. The Begam was then allowed to depart, an escort of two hundred horsemen going with her as far as the banks of the Narmada. [K. K. 873.]

As soon as Alim Ali Khan received at Aurangabad the letters sent by his uncles, Abdullah Khan and Husain Ali Khan, he set to work to collect an army of Mahrattas and of new men. All the neighbouring *faujders* were called in to the capital. His idea was that when Dilawar Ali Khan appeared from the north, he would march from the south, thus taking Nizam-ul-mulk between two fires. To encourage his men he gave liberal promotions, and tried in every way to win over the people of town and country. Alim Ali Khan then reported to headquarters at Agra that he had seven thousand cavalry of his old establishment, two to three thousand men brought in by the *faujders* and zamindars, and more than six thousand newly

* Khafi Khan, 853, 871, 872; *Burhan-ul-futuh*, 168a, *Tarikh-i-Muzaffari*, p. 181.

entertained men. In addition he counted on the aid of about fifteen to sixteen thousand Mahratta horsemen sent by Rajah Sahu. Amin Khan, late governor of Nander, i.e., Berar, although he had previously expressed great enmity towards Husain Ali Khan, was bought over by gifts of money, elephants and jewels.* Altogether Alim Ali Khan reckoned his army at thirty thousand horsemen, of whom he intended to take command in person. He commenced his march early in Shaban (1st=7th June 1720). [K. K. 874.]

On his side Nizam-ul-mulk had proposed to suspend further active operations until the cessation of the rains, the interval being passed at Deogarh in an attempt to gain over or conquer the zamindars of that place. But, as it was pointed out, it would be difficult to keep the troops together for four months without more money than was available. In consequence, immediate action was resolved on. When Nizam-ul-mulk heard that Alim Ali Khan had sent his tents out from Aurangabad, he marched from the Lal Bagh on the north of Burhanpur, crossed the Tapti, and pitched his camp on the east side of the town. But at the end of Rajab (30th=6th June 1720) he learnt that Dilawar Ali Khan, following in hot pursuit, had crossed the Narmada somewhere about Handiya.† Dilawar Ali Khan had got as far as Husainpur in the Handiya *sarkar*, about fourteen *kos* from Burhanpur. Considering this opponent to be the more formidable, Nizam-ul-mulk decided to encounter him first. [K. K. 875, *Ahwal* 160a.]

It seems that the Sayyids had sent their general a letter in which they accused him of cowardice. Stung by the imputation, he wrote to Nizam-ul-mulk when drunk, as he often was, in the following strain: "What manly virtue is there, nay is it not a death-blow to honour, thus to flee from death; and for the sake of saving this paltry life, to climb so many moun-

* Amin Khan was a brother of Khan Alam Dakhini; he was killed in 1137 H. (1724), fighting under Mubariz Khan against Nizam-ul-mulk. *M. U.* i. 352.

† In the Hoshangabad district, on the south bank of the Narmada, about 92 miles n. e. of Burhanpur. It is on the old high road from the Dakhin to Agra, *Central Provinces Gazetteer*, 201.

tains and cross so many deserts? Would it not be well to confide in the All Powerful and come out to meet the writer, so that side by side we might return to the Presence, where exceeding exertion will be made for the pardon of that exalted one. Otherwise, be it thoroughly understood, this slave at the head of twenty thousand horsemen thirsting for blood, follows like a wind that brings a destructive tempest ; and if imitating a deer of the plains you escape and flee to the mountains, this pursuer will, like a panther, spring on your back and make wet the teeth of desire with the blood of his enemy." Unable to bear the provocative language of this letter, Nizam-ul-mulk had begun to retrace his steps. [Warid, 1596.]

Nizam-ul-mulk marched northwards early in Shaban (1st = 7th June 1720), sending his family and dependents together with his heavy baggage for safety to Asirgarh.* Ahead of him went his artillery under Ghiyas Khan and Shaikh Muhammad Shah Faruqi ; he soon followed in person (9th Shaban, 15th June). When they had gone sixteen or seventeen *kos* from Burhanpur, and were within two or three *kos* of Ratanpur, belonging to the Rajah of Makrai,† he encamped. Dilawar Ali Khan's camp was then at a distance of two or three *kos* from him. Nizam-ul-mulk proposed an amicable arrangement, but Dilawar Ali Khan rejected all his overtures.‡

Dilawar Ali Khan's force, although not a very large one, consisted of thoroughly tried and well-equipped men. As he was the *Bakhshi*, or paymaster, he knew the quality of all the Sayyid's troops ; and when he was sent on this enterprise, he had selected six thousand of the best armed and best mounted horsemen out of seventeen or eighteen thousand who were present with the Sayyid. They were mostly Barha Sayyids,

* Or to Burhanpur, as stated on fol. 132b of the *Gulshan-i-ajalb*.

† A small independent chieftainship in the Handiya sub-division of the Hoshangabad district; its present area is 215 square miles. Makrai itself is about 30 miles s. of Handiya, *Central Provinces Gazetteer*, 256.

‡ Khafi Khan, 875; Khush-hal f. 1002a; Qasim, 311; *Bayan-i-waqi*, Irvine MS., f. 406. The *Siwanih-i-Dakhin*, p. 163, says the site of the battle was near Raipur in pargana Charda of *sarkar* Handiya, and twelve *kos* to the south of the Narmada.

Hindustanis, and Afghans. Two of the chief men placed under him were Babar Khan and Sayyid Shamsheer Khan,* cousin of the two Sayyids. There were also the mail-clad Rajputs of Maharao Bhim Singh, of Bundi, and Rajah Gaj Singh, son of Anup Singh, of Narwar. The latter chief brought between two and three thousand men. Dost Muhammad Khan Rohela (afterwards of Bhopal),† also joined with three thousand five hundred men. The total force could not have been less than thirteen thousand, and may have amounted to eighteen thousand men. [K. K. 877.]

SEC. 7.—DEFEAT AND DEATH OF DILAWAR ALI KHAN.

On the 13th Shaban 1132 H. (19th June 1720), Nizam-ul-mulk marched four *kos*, then drew up his army ready to give battle. Ghiyas Khan was placed in command of the vanguard, having under him Shaikh Muhammad Shah and his brother, Nur-ullah Faruqi, heads of the artillery. In the right centre was Iwaz Khan, *nazim* of Berar (Ilichpur) and the Nawab's uncle by marriage, with his son, Jamal-ullah Khan, Anwar Khan, Hakim Muhammad Murtaza and others. Marahmat Khan, Fil Jang, was on the left centre. To the right wing was posted Aziz Beg Khan Harisi; and to the left, Abdur-rahim Khan (uncle of Nizam-ul-mulk) and Qadir Dad Khan Raushani; while Mutawassil Khan (grandson of Sadullah Khan), Ismail Khan Khweshgi, Kamyab Khan and Darab Khan, Sad-ud-din Khan and Mir Ahsan, *Bakhshi*, took their place in the centre. Reayat Khan, Nizam-ul-mulk's first cousin and the brother of Muhammad Amin Khan Chin, was left in charge of the town of Burhanpur, while Rustam Beg Khan was told off to protect the rear of the army. Fath-ullah Khan Khosti, and Rao

* Elsewhere, p. 879, Khafi Khan has "Sher Khan," which is also in the copy of Nizam-ul-mulk's *tumar* (despatch) in Sahib Rai, *Khujistakalam*, where the name of Farhat Khan is added.

† The *Burhan-ul-futuh*, f. 168a, calls him the "Zamindar of Bhakra." This is a place in *sarkar* Kanauj, *subah* Malwa, *Ain* ii. 200. On the other hand Malcolm, *Central India*, 1st ed., 231, says Mir Muhammad Khan, a brother, was in command and was slain.

Rambha Nimbalkar, the Mahratta, with five hundred men, acted as skirmishers.*

The site of the battle, as we are told, was in the hilly country called Pandhar† between Burhanpur and the Narmada, and Nizam-ul-mulk himself says that he had marched forty *kos* from Burhanpur. He moved out four *kos* from his last camp before he met the enemy, and the battle did not begin until the afternoon (13th Shaban 1132 H., 19th June 1720). Dilawar Ali Khan had occupied a rising ground to the east of the Nawab. Leaving his baggage at the foot of this hillock, Dilawar Ali Khan sent out his advanced guard, consisting of some three thousand horsemen and about eight thousand matchlockmen, under the command of Sayyid Sher Khan and Babar Khan. Then, surrounded by his principal officers on their elephants, he followed in person at the head of the main body. [K. K. 876, Kamwar 223.]

The action began after midday with artillery fire and the discharge of rockets. Ghiyas Khan and Iwaz Khan advanced from two different directions to attack Dilawar Ali Khan. They were unable, however, to effect a junction, and Iwaz Khan was left to meet alone the full force of the Sayyid, Rajput, and Afghan onset. In spite of his elephant turning round and the flight of many of his men, Iwaz Khan kept the field manfully until he was severely wounded and forced to retire. With shouts of exultation, Sayyid Sher Khan and Babar Khan, riding

* Khafi Khan ii. 876; *Masir-ul-umara*, iii. 877; *Ahwal-ul-khawaqin*, 154b; Kamwar Khan, entry of 17th Shaban; *Gulshan-i-ajalb*, 132b. The date is the 11th (17th June) in *Khush-hal* ? 1002a, and in *Burhan-ul-futuh*, f. 168a.

† For the position of Pandhar, and its possible connection with the Pindharies, see my article in the *Indian Antiquary* for May 1900. Rustam Ali, *Tarikh-i-Hindi*, 240b, says the battle was fought near Qasba Khandwa, which is not far from Asir. This place was about 32 miles n. of Burhanpur and about 60 miles s. w. of Handiya. It is now the civil station of the Nimar district of the Central Provinces (*C. P. Gazette*, 383). The *Tarikh-i-Muzaffari*, p. 181, has "Husainpur, 14 *kos* from Burhanpur," which is also the name in the *Asiatic Miscellany* (1785), an account of Asaf Jah (Nizam-ul-mulk) translated by Henry Vansittart (the younger) from a Persian work, of which the title is not given.

rein to rein, started in pursuit. Qadir Dad Khan in spite of his wounds fought on. Aziz Beg Khan and his brother were also wounded. Then Azmat Khan, one of the principal officers under Iwaz Khan, dismounted and continued the contest on foot. Mutawassil Khan now brought up reinforcements. Thus one attack followed another and the fortunes of the day varied at every turn. At length, both Sayyid Sher Khan and Babar Khan were cut down.*

Dilawar Ali Khan in person now led an attack on the centre. Here he was struck in the chest by a bullet and killed, many of the Barha Sayyids losing their lives at his side. Rao Bhim Singh and Rajah Gaj Singh still kept the field. Soon Bhim Singh was shot.† Then Gaj Singh of Narwar, a fine-looking young man, dismounted with forty or fifty of his brethren, and attacked at close quarters. Taking sword and shield in hand, they pressed the Nawab's vanguard very hard. But Marahmat Khan charged them vigorously from the left. In the end, after the death of the remaining Rajput chief, four hundred Rajputs and many Barha officers, and in all some four thousand soldiers, fell a prey to the arrows, spears, and swords of their opponents. The broken remnant of survivors, among them Dost Muhammad Khan Afghan, withdrew from the field and made good their retreat into Malwa, pursued and plundered by the Mahratta auxiliaries of Nizam-ul-mulk. This somewhat unexpected victory gives an opening to one author to quote the lines :

* Farah Khan was killed off Dilawar Ali Khan's side. See *Ahwal-ul-khawaqin*, 159a; it is "Farhat" Khan in *Gulshan-i-ajajib*, 132b.

† Tod's account of Bhim Singh's death, ii. 487, affords us a more than usually noticeable instance of his flagrant inaccuracy. The fight is made out to be undertaken by Bhim Singh without allies, while the scene is laid in the broken ground along the Sind river, near the town of Korwai Borasu. An additional touch of grotesque error is given by the assertion that Jai Singh Kachhwaha, of Amber, gave the order to Bhim Singh and Gaj Singh to bar Nizam-ul-mulk's road! The town referred to is evidently Kurwai in Malwa (Thorton, 520) on the right or east bank of the Betwa with Borasu immediately opposite. A slight misreading of Khandwa, the true place, may have given the hint to connect the battle with Korwai Borasu.

*Bakht bawar gar bavad,
sindan zi dandan bi-shkanad,
Tali-i-bargashtah ra
faludah dandan bi-shkanad.*

"The fates aiding, you may bite a bit off an anvil,
With the stars against you, your teeth break over flummery."*

Nizam-ul-mulk ordered his drums to beat for victory. On his side the losses were few, the only men of any note who fell being Badakhshi Khan and Diler Khan, an officer serving under Iwaz Khan. Among the wounded were Iwaz Khan himself and Ghiyas Khan. In addition to the guns and elephants appropriated by Nizam-ul-mulk to his own use, much booty fell into the hands of the soldiers and plunderers. The victors encamped where they were, the night being disturbed by a false alarm caused by an unruly elephant which broke from his chains and rushed about the camp, destroying as he went, until his progress was arrested by an arrow from the bow of Mutawassil Khan. [K. K. 881.]

The above is the official account and is, no doubt, the one most favourable to Nizam-ul-mulk and his army. Other writers describe the event differently and tell us of an ambushade. Such a device would not only accord with Nizam-ul-mulk's scheming habits, but would also more satisfactorily account for the great loss sustained by the other side, more especially among its leaders. From these other sources we learn that between the two forces lay deep ravines where a large army could have been effectually concealed. Nizam-ul-mulk sent out his guns and placed them in position so as to command from both sides the only road across this ravine. His advanced guard was concealed in the hollows on each side. Then two or three men, closely resembling the Nawab in beard, features and age were dressed up, placed on elephants, and sent out to represent Nizam-ul-mulk at the head of his main body, which showed itself beyond the entrance to the ravine. Dilawar Ali Khan's

* *Tarikh-i-Muzaffari*, f. 183. We have Nizam-ul-mulk's official report or *tumar* of the battle in Sahib Rai's *Khujista-kalam* (Irvine MS., p. 323). A copy was sent to Muhammad Khan Bangash of Farrukhabad, under cover of an exulting letter. *M.U.* iii. 370.

men came straight at their foe, and were drawn on and on by a simulated retreat. Anxious to slay or capture the opposite leader, who, as they believed, was in command, they pursued steadily, disposing on their way of several of the pretended Nizam-ul-mulks. When Sayyid Sher Khan at length brought his elephant close to that of Iwaz Khan, the Mughal, by a sign, caused his elephant to kneel, and by this trick escaped with his life. The ravine having been reached, the guns did their work; and their leaders having been killed, the rest of Dilawar Ali Khan's army dispersed. [Shiu 37b, Qasim 314.]

The morning after the battle the bodies of Dilawar Ali Khan and of Sayyid Sher Khan were prepared for burial and despatched to Aurangabad, where the sons of the former were serving with Alim Ali Khan. The same day a report was brought in that Alim Ali Khan had arrived at Talab Hartala,* seventeen kos to the south of Burhanpur, and Mutawassil Khan was sent off at once with three thousand horsemen to reinforce the garrison and protect that town, where the families of many of the men had been left. Mutawassil Khan marched forty kos in one day and thus prevented the surprise of Burhanpur. Alim Ali Khan, who had not anticipated such a prompt movement, was perplexed and therefore halted where he was. [Qasim 318, K. K. 881.]

NOTE.—*Another version of the fight taken from the "Aḥwal-ul-ḵhawaqin," f. 162a.*

Dilawar Ali Khan, after crossing the Narmada, made four or five marches till he was near to Nakti Bhawani. As the *Shab-i-barat* (14th Shaban,* 20th June 1720) approached, they made three or four halts, intending to resume their advance when that festival was over. But hearing of Nizam-ul-mulk's movement in their direction, the Sayyid came out and ranged his men in battle order one kos from his camp.

Nizam-ul-mulk's scouts reported that the Sayyid was facing eastwards, with his guns in front. Nizam-ul-mulk thinking a

* Hartala, a lake of 440 acres on a tributary of the Tapti, four miles s. w. of Edilabad in the Bhusawal sub-division, Khandesh district. Edilabad is about 30 miles south of Burhanpur, *Bombay Gazetteer*, xii. vi. 142, 449.

frontal attack dangerous, enquired if the rear could be reached. The scouts said that by a *détour* of six *kos* this could be effected ; the sun was not yet in the meridian, they had time to make the movement. Changing direction they arrived at the Sayyid's rear in about three hours and were then at a distance of one *kos*.

When Nizam-ul-mulk's standards began to show faintly in the distance, Sayyid Dilawar Ali Khan was amazed and accused his head spy of treachery. This accusation the man, an old Barha Sayyid, vigorously repudiated. As there was no help for it in this sudden emergency, the artillery was left behind, and the front changed to meet the enemy. The artillery was ordered to follow as quickly as it could.

Ghiyas Khan, commanding Nizam-ul-mulk's vanguard, was attacked by Bhim Singh, Gaj Singh, and "Be-dost Rohela" (Dost Muhammad Khan) ; while Sayyid Sher Khan, Babar Khan and Farah Khan turned against Iwaz Khan. Gaj Singh and Bhim Singh Hada dismounted and at the head of two thousand Rajputs fought hand to hand, breast to breast. Quresh Beg, Khwaja Masum, and a few others resisted, but they were hardly more than a pinch of salt in flour. Against two thousand mail-clad Rajputs what were forty men ! Bhim Singh and Quresh Beg fought in single combat ; then some forty Rajputs attacked the latter. In spite of these odds the Beg succeeded in killing Bhim Singh before he fell himself under numberless wounds. The bodies of the Rajputs lay piled on the top of each other.

Meanwhile Iwaz Khan was engaged with Sher Khan and Babar Khan. The fighting was so hot that it was like the coming of the Day of Judgment. It went on for two hours, and the Sayyid's men did their best, until he and four thousand five hundred of his men were killed. Dost Muhammad Khan Rohela was the only one who turned and fled.

Nizam-ul-mulk was not even wounded, but Khwaja Masum, Mirza Naim and others of his men were killed. Sayyid Musafir Khan especially distinguished himself in repulsing an attack on Ghiyas Khan, in which he was greatly aided by Yalras Khan, Khwaja Abdul-haman, Mir Qutb-ud-din, Khwaja Ibrahim and

some others, one hundred and twenty-five men in all. Some of the Panni Afghans, too, were killed and wounded while defending Iwaz Khan. Altogether some thirty men were killed and about one hundred wounded on that side ; while of the Sayyid's army four thousand five hundred were killed and the number of wounded was not known.

Nizam-ul-mulk's officers asked for orders to pursue, but he refused. He collected the wounded near his tent and sent them surgeons, healing salves and clothes. For some he provided horses, for some palankins, for some litters. On their recovery he asked them to enlist with him. As their master, Husain Ali Khan, was still alive, they refused ; their road expenses were then paid and they departed. The body of Dilawar Ali Khan was decently buried ; those of the Hindus were burnt under the supervision of Rajah Indar Singh. Nizam-ul-mulk and his troops returned to Burhanpur.

SEC. 8.—PERPLEXITY OF THE SAYYID BROTHERS.

By the end of Shaban (29th=5th July 1720) Abdullah Khan and his brother received intelligence of the disaster which had befallen them in Khandesh. Not only had they failed to arrest Nizam-ul-mulk's progress, not only had they lost a general and an army, but the whole of Husain Ali Khan's family was likely to fall into the victor's hands. Saif-ud-din Ali Khan's children had been intercepted, as we have seen, at Burhanpur, though they were passed on in safety ; but Husain Ali Khan had left his wife and family behind him when he quitted the Dakhin, and they were still at Aurangabad. At all hazards, the family name and fame must be preserved. Both brothers agreed to write again to Alim Ali Khan and also try to pacify Nizam-ul-mulk. To the former they wrote ordering him to delay any decisive action until the women were safe and Husain Ali Khan had arrived.

As we learn from a statement of Diyanat Khan, once *diwan* of the Dakhin, but at this time a semi-prisoner in the custody of Husain Ali Khan, overtures to Nizam-ul-mulk were very reluctantly undertaken. On the day that the disastrous news

arrived, Husain Ali Khan professed to seek Diyanat Khan's advice in this difficult conjuncture. This noble, referring to a Hindi proverb, which tells you to draw your hand out gently if it is caught beneath a stone, said that in this case the Nawab's own head was in danger, for was not his family in peril? They should, without an instant's delay, issue a patent for the Government of the whole Dakhin in favour of Nizam-ul-mulk and thus conciliate him, leaving warfare and revenge until a better opportunity.

Glancing towards Rajah Ratan Chand with a sneering smile, Husain Ali Khan said: "I have sent sums of money to the East. From this place (Agra) to the Dakhin, crowd after crowd of swift horses will be laid out at every stage. I will have ready twelve thousand torch bearers. Not for one instant, neither by day nor by night, will I stay my course or cease to gallop on." Diyanat Khan admitted that the Nawab's strength would enable him to undergo even more than that exertion, but in this hasty advance how many troops would keep up, and even then, what strength would be left in man or horse? Knitting his brows, Husain Ali Khan replied: "The summit of a soldier's ambition is to die. Alas for us! when a leader with a reputation like yours speaks cowardly words, and is like a man who has lost all heart." The Khan retorted with an Arabic saying equivalent to "Man proposes, God disposes." In the end these heroics were seen to be out of place, and other means were tried. To Nizam-ul-mulk they enclosed a *farman* in a long letter, both of which I proceed to give. [M. U. ii. 75.]

The *farman* began by expressing His Majesty's surprise at hearing that the Nawab had left Malwa without orders. What could be the cause? What apprehensions had he? Why had he not submitted a representation to the Throne, and acted according to the reply that he might receive? In what matter had his requests ever been refused? If he longed to travel and shoot in the Dakhin, how was it possible that such a request should not be granted, or if he had asked for it, the Government would have been made over to him. A patent would have reached him, so that he might not be exposed to censure from evil-speakers. His Majesty was in no way ill-disposed towards

him, but he should have avoided the appearance of offence. "As the disorders of the Dakhin are frequently reported to him, His Majesty contemplated making over to you all the *subahs* of that country. Praise the Lord ; this purpose has come to pass of itself, and by God's help, His Majesty's intention and your desire will both be satisfied. 'Heart finds its way to heart under this vault of heaven.' A formal patent is in preparation. When you have taken charge you will send off Alim Ali Khan and the family of the *Bakhshi-ul-mamalik*, *Amir-ul-umara*, from whom he has been long separated, granting them a proper escort and seeing to their safety." [Shiu, 33b.]

With the *farman* was a letter from Husain Ali Khan. He wrote that Dilawar Ali Khan had been sent to Aurangabad to escort the writer's family to Hindustan. It was now reported that, pretending orders for which there was no foundation, the said Dilawar Ali Khan had interfered with Nizam-ul-mulk, but, the Lord be praised, had only received what he deserved. It was also said that several persons, led by love of mischief-making and devilish devices (*shaitanat*), had written untruly of several matters in a manner likely to sow discord between them. Alas ! that such suspicions should arise between old friends ! Envious persons, by sowing dissension, hope to open a way for themselves. If, which the Lord forbid, the writer had a grievance, he would have written direct. "No doubt, many things had been brought up, which might have angered His Majesty ; and short-sighted men had tried to impress him unfavourably, but the writer, knowing your loyalty, made a detailed representation. By this means, I am thankful to say, your enemies were cast down and your friends made happy. His Majesty has graciously resolved to issue to you a patent for the Government of the Dakhin. Accept my congratulations. • Alim Ali Khan, my (adopted) son, and my family propose to return to this country ; kindly furnish them with an escort and see that they are not molested on the way." [Shiu 39a.]

Such was the state of consternation into which the Sayyids had been thrown, that every day produced some new plan of action, only to be discarded in its turn for one still more new. First, they resolved to march together to the Dakhin with the

Emperor ; then, that Husain Ali Khan should go with Muhammad Shah, while Abdullah Khan returned to Dihli ; next, that Muhammad Shah should return with the *Wazir* to the capital. At another time, they thought they would make terms with Nizam-ul-mulk, as in the letter just quoted, and postpone an attack upon him to a more favourable opportunity. According to these varying decisions, the advance tents of the Emperor and of the two ministers were sent out first in one direction and then in another.

SEC. 9.—ATTACKS ON MUHAMMAD AMIN KHAN.

One of the Sayyids' main difficulties was the strength of the Mughal element in their own army. They did not know what to do with Muhammad Amin Khan, cousin of Nizam-ul-mulk and head of the Mughal soldiery. At one time they thought of leaving him behind, at another of taking him with them. By some accounts they tried to poison him. However much Muhammad Amin Khan may have rejoiced inwardly at the troubles now accumulating on the luckless Sayyids' heads, he continued to attend their *darbars*, and spoke there freely of the wickedness of Nizam-ul-mulk's conduct. [K. K. 882, Shiu 45a, *Bayan* 319.]

It is said Muhammad Amin Khan had taken the Sayyids' part for fear of losing his great wealth. He also had a very high idea of his own superiority to everybody else, and his power of finally coming out the victor. After he had become very intimate with Husain Ali Khan, the latter's friends warned him that Muhammad Amin Khan was acting in a double-faced manner. The Sayyid answered : "What power has he to fight against me ! And at the worst, I shall easily escape from his clutches."

Muhammad Amin Khan carried at once to Husain Ali Khan every insulting story he heard, hoping that the Sayyid, being put off his guard, might give him a chance of plunging a dagger into him. But Husain Ali Khan was suspicious of his covetous Mongol eyes. In spite of this, Muhammad Amin Khan continued assiduous in his attendance. Those who prided themselves on their strength of understanding said, over and over again, that he was at the root of all the trouble and the real

cause of Farrukh-siyar's deposition. "The truth or falsehood of this rests on the relater! The author must record the essential facts, though his enemies may taunt him. If he should turn evil into good, the whole story would become faulty, but only the Knower of all hidden things can reveal the true kernel of the matter." [*Ahwal*, 146b.]

But at length the Sayyids were supposed to have decided to rid themselves of this "old wolf," also of Abdus-samad Khan, governor of Lahor, another strong pillar of the Mughal faction, and connected by marriage with Muhammad Amin Khan. Abdus-samad Khan they intended to exile to Balkh or Bukhara. Informers told Muhammad Amin Khan of his danger, and one day his soldiers thought he had been seized or killed in the *darbar*. They raised a disturbance, which was not allayed until they saw their general come forth unmolested. He was spared chiefly on the advice of Ikhlas Khan, whose opinion had great weight with both brothers, but more especially with Husain Ali Khan. Ikhlas Khan argued that his removal would stir up a spirit of revenge among a set of men who were not easy to appease. The clan of which he was the head was a large one, and if this "wasps' nest" was disturbed, there would be no one left to pacify or soothe them after Muhammad Amin Khan was killed.

But before a reconciliation in accordance with this advice had been effected, the Sayyids attempted to fight the matter out with the Mughals. The dispute was brought to a crisis by the news of Sayyid Alim Ali Khan's defeat and death, under the circumstances which will be related presently. Camel-riders brought the news of this catastrophe to Agra on the 22nd Shawwal (26th August 1720), sixteen days after the date of the battle. In their rage the Sayyids resolved to wreak their vengeance on Muhammad Amin Khan. At once M. Amin Khan fortified the house which he occupied in the quarter of Rajah Bhoj in Agra city. On one side of it the Jamuna flowed; on the other three sides he dug a ditch. Husain Ali Khan held his troops in readiness for an attack, but was dissuaded from carrying the idea into execution. Then Muhammad Amin Khan, when he heard this, came out at the head of his men and sent

a challenge to the brothers, that if they wanted him he was there and willing to meet them. But the Sayyids now denied that they had intended to harm him. [Shiu, 45a.]

On another day they planned to send the Emperor to the Taj accompanied by a large force, the house occupied by Muhammad Amin Khan being not far from Tajganj. They gave out that His Majesty had only come to visit the tombs and spend a day or two in recreation. As is well known, it was the custom for nobles to take it in turn to mount guard. The brothers agreed that when their turn came they would proceed to Tajganj with their troops, ostensibly upon this duty only, but in reality with the intention, after having placed the Emperor in safety within the mausoleum, of leading their troops against Muhammad Amin Khan. That noble must have received some hint of what was in the air, for, seizing all the boats to be found on the Jamuna, he crossed the river and camped on the other bank, leaving enough men to defend his house. More moderate counsels now prevailed, Ikhlas Khan was listened to, and Abdullah Khan dissuaded his brother from further violence, pointing out the danger to themselves that might result. Muhammad Amin Khan was invited to a feast, they all ate together, and an understanding, at any rate outwardly, was arrived at.

SEC. 10.—NIZAM-UL-MULK'S CONTEST WITH ALIM ALI KHAN.

Having disposed of Sayyid Dilawar Ali Khan and his army, Nizam-ul-mulk reached again the Lal Bagh at Burhanpur on the 21st Shaban 1132 H. (27th June 1720). In regard to his negotiations with Alim Ali Khan, we are told that Nizam-ul-mulk informed him that as he refused to yield him possession, he would go instead on a pilgrimage to Mecca. Accordingly he had turned off towards Surat and pretended to have discharged his men, leaving two to three hundred of them behind him at every town or village. By a public order he directed his cavalry to go wherever they pleased and take service where they could. But secretly they were instructed to halt where they were or go over to the enemy. When he wanted them they must either return to his standard, or desert him in the

battle. He proceeded on his journey like a mere traveller or the member of a caravan. Induced by reports that Nizam-ul-mulk was almost alone, Alim Ali Khan came out to bar his way. Nizam-ul-mulk admonished him, writing that his heart was now cold for worldly things, he knew nothing of public place or power, and only dreaded the unjust shedding of Muhammadan blood. At length when these remonstrances were not listened to, he determined to fight and recalled his troops. [Yahya, 126a.]

As already stated, Alim Ali Khan, when he heard of the approach of Sayyid Dilawar Ali Khan, set up his tents in the Muhamdi Bagh on the 12th Rajab (19th May 1720) and left the city of Aurangabad at the head of thirty thousand horsemen. He marched *viâ* Phulmari.* Early in Ramzan (May 1720) on reaching the pass of Fardapur,† which is half-way between Aurangabad and Burhanpur, he provided for the transport of his artillery through the pass, and sent an advance guard beyond it. The Mahrattas and some troops under Tahavvar Khan, with half his guns only, were through the pass, when two thousand or more Barha Sayyids, fugitives from the late Dilawar Ali Khan's army, made their appearance, bringing the disturbing intelligence of that officer's defeat and death. Most of the Mahrattas and some of his own officers counselled Alim Ali Khan, under these circumstances, to retreat to Aurangabad or even Ahmadnagar, there to await the arrival of Husain Ali Khan, leaving the Mahrattas outside to harass Nizam-ul-mulk's army by the methods of which they were such perfect masters.‡

Alim Ali Khan, looking on a retreat as a disgrace, brought the rest of his army through the pass. Nizam-ul-mulk, on hearing of this movement, sent him the biers of Sayyid Dilawar Ali Khan and Sayyid Sher Khan; and along with them a letter advising him to cease resistance and march off to join his two

* A town 16 miles n. e. of Aurangabad, see Hossain Bilgrami and Willmott, *Sketch of Nizam's Dominions*, ii. 705.

† A village at the northern foot of the Ajunta *ghat*, 20 miles south of Pachoda station on the G. I. P. Railway; see S. Hossain and C. Willmott, ii. 467, and Constable's *Hand Atlas*, plate 31.

‡ *Barhan-ul-fatuh* 166a; *Ahwal* 165b—170a; K. K. 885.

uncles with the ladies of the family. This communication produced no effect. After this Nizam-ul-mulk marched out of Burhanpur to the banks of the Purna river, which flows some sixteen or seventeen *kos* to the south and south-east of Burhanpur. There he encamped. From the other direction came Alim Ali Khan and pitched his camp at Talab Hartala, which is not far from the same river. [K. K. 886, Kamwar 226.]

They remained in these positions for several days. The constant rain, the muddy roads, the flooded river and the absence of means to cross (a bridge of boats having been swept away) made it impossible for either side to move. Then Nizam-ul-mulk finding it necessary to change his place of encampment, made several marches up the stream towards Malkapur* in Berar, with the hope of finding a ford. At length, after eight marches, Iwaz Khan succeeded in obtaining through some neighbouring landlords information of a crossing-place at a distance of about fourteen or fifteen *kos*, in the direction of the district of Balapur† in *subah* Berar. Alim Ali Khan had followed along the other bank, and shots had been exchanged daily across the river. In the middle of Ramzan (15th=20th July, 1720) Nizam-ul-mulk crossed with his whole army to the opposite or south side of the river. Although in places the water was up to the men's waists, or even to their chests, no lives were lost or baggage swept away by the current. For one day they encamped on the river bank to allow the camp-followers to assemble. Then the following day they started to find a favourable position for giving battle. The camp was pitched and entrenched in a precipitous position full of thorny scrub close to Seogaon, a village in *subah* Berar.‡

* Malkapur lies about 40 miles south of Burhanpur. It is on the Nagpur branch of the G. I. P. Railway, and some miles south of the Purna.—Constable's *Hand Atlas*, plate 31.

† Balapur is 16 miles west of Akola, 16 to 18 miles south of the Purna river, and about 72 miles east (up stream) from Edilabad. The field of battle lies between the villages of Kolhari and Pimpri Gauli, about 65 miles s. e. of Burhanpur and about the same distance n. e. of Aurangabad.—*Berar Gazetteer*, 163.

‡ Seogaon is in the Akola district; it is now a station on the Nagpur branch of the G. I. P. Railway, and is about ten miles south of the left

Exposed to incessant rain and living in the middle of deep black mud, they passed several days in extreme discomfort. First, owing to the heavy rain and the swollen streams, no supplies could arrive from either Khandesh or Berar. Secondly, the Mahrattas of Nagpur, who had crossed over from Alim Ali Khan's army, were plundering all round the camp; not a single camel or bullock could be sent out to graze, much less could any supplies be brought in. Prices rose until for thirteen or fourteen days there was nothing left to feed the cattle but the leaves and young shoots of trees, which were pounded with stones and given them as forage. "The smell even of grass or grain did not reach the four-footed animals." Many of them, standing up to their shoulders in mire, starved to death. As for food, it could only be obtained by the wealthy, who paid one Rupee for two to four pounds of flour. Many soldiers of small resources left the army and returned to their homes. [K. K. 888, *Ahwal*, 166b.]

Many things contributed to the confusion in the camp—the rising of the streams, the hunger of the soldiers, the falling of tents, and the incursions of the Mahrattas, who ventured themselves as far even as the edge of the camp market. Seeing that their soldiers were worn out and dispirited, the officers made complaints. Accordingly, when the rain held off for a little, the army marched to a deserted village three *kos* from Balapur, and there encamped again. As the Mahrattas had become exceedingly troublesome, Iwaz Khan, Ghiyas Khan and Rambha Nimbalkar, were sent against them. After some fighting the Mahrattas were driven off, leaving behind them many of their mares, spears and umbrella standards. They were pursued for three or four *kos*. [K. K. 888.]

The festival of the *Id* (1st Shawwal 1132 H., 5th August 1720) was celebrated at this new place, where supplies of grain arrived in sufficient quantity; but grass could not be got for the horses. It was as dear as saffron; if any camp-follower went out to gather it, he came back with his nose cut off. A further march became imperative. Before they moved away,

bank of the Purna, and 11 miles n.w. of Balapur, *Berar Gazetteer*, 164; K. K. 887; Kamwar 226; *Burhan-ul-futuh*, 168a; Qasim, 327.

several large cannon were buried here, the muddy roads and the bad condition of the draught oxen rendering their removal an impossibility. The next camp was at Balapur itself, where supplies were plentiful. A halt of three days was made to allow the troops to rest and recruit their strength. [K. K. 889, *Ahwal* 167a.]

[ALIM ALI KHAN'S PREPARATIONS.]

Instructions had been received by Alim Ali Khan from his uncles to collect a strong force, and prevent their family and dependents from falling into Nizam-ul-mulk's hands. Money, they wrote, must be liberally spent, and rank and promotion accorded freely. The measures he took to carry out these orders had soon resulted in the assembling of a large army round his standards.

As he had been married to a young girl nearly related to the late Daud Khan Panni, the partisan leaders of that clan, who were very numerous in the Dakhin, readily joined him ; even Umar Khan, the nephew or cousin of that deceased noble, attended, although Daud Khan's blood still cried for vengeance. Other leaders of note were Johar Khan and Muhamdi Beg. The latter had long been deputy *faujdar* of Gulshanabad [Nasik], and when Nizam-ul-mulk previously held rule in the six *subahs*, he had been put in fetters and imprisoned by that governor as a punishment for his exactions. Subsequently he was pardoned and appointed to a subordinate post in the Nawab's army. At this time Alim Ali Khan bought him over with an absurdly high title, the rank of 5,000, and the right to beat kettle-drums. Others gained over in a similar manner were Matti Khan, his brother Latif Khan Banwar, and his nephews Sayyid Wali Muhammad and Muhammad Ashraf of Nandurbar. These were all promoted to the rank of 5,000, and were placed under Tahavvar Khan, commanding the vanguard. Ghalib Khan, son of Rustam Khan, whose family had been for generations in the Dakhin, joined along with Apa Pandit, his *diwan* or chief official. [Shiu 40, Qasim 325, K. K. 890.]

Others were Mirza Ali, a noted warrior, and Sayyid Alam Barha. Among the rest came Amin Khan, the brother of Khan

Alam Dakhini. This man was very ill-disposed towards the Sayyids, owing to the injury caused to him a few years before, at the time he was deputy governor of the Bidar *subah*, when at Husain Ali Khan's instigation, he was suddenly attacked by the adopted son of Rajah Sahu, the head of the Mahrattas. Amin Khan, propitiated by the gift of money and of two or three elephants, now became a doubtful ally in the campaign. Other half-hearted adherents were Turktaz Khan and Fidai Khan, *diwan*, both secret adherents of Nizam-ul-mulk. Among the other leaders were Ashraf Khan, *Bakhshi* of the Dakhin, Rafihat Talab Khan, Khwaja Rahmat-ullah Khan (Shujaat Khan), commander of Alim Ali Khan's artillery, and Shamsheer Khan. The Mahratta commanders were Santaji Sindhia, Khanduji Dhabariya, the *senapati* or Mahratta commander-in-chief sent from Satara, Shankraji, Mulhar,* Kanhuji and others. Rajah Sahu had sent some of these men at the head of seventeen to eighteen thousand horsemen, and they all proclaimed themselves sworn friends of Husain Ali Khan. Anwar Khan, acting the part of a double traitor, wrote to Alim Ali Khan from Nizam-ul-mulk's camp, pointing out that the latter's strength being as yet unconsolidated, now was the time to strike a blow, and the sooner it was done the better. The letter was intercepted and the result was the disgrace of Anwar Khan, followed by his imprisonment and the confiscation of all his property.†

* The *Burhan-ul-futuh*, 167a, and Khush-hal Chand, Berlin MS. 495, f. 1,003a, say that all power in the Dakhin under Alim Ali Khan had centred in Shankraji, who had lately come back from Dihli. Grant Duff, 206, says he was at Aurangabad as the envoy of Rajah Sahu. He was originally a clerk (*harkun*) under Shiyaji, subsequently in 1690 appointed by Ram Raja to be *Sucheo* (formerly called *Surnis*). This was one of the eight principal offices of the Mahratta State, with the duties of record-keeper and examiner of letters. He retired from office during the siege of Jinji 1698, and went to Benares. Although an old man, he grew tired of this idle life and entered the service of Husain Ali Khan when he came to the Dakhin, Grant Duff, 105, 164, 171, 197, 198.

† *Tariqh-i-Muzaffari*, 186; Khafi Khan, ii. 899. The *Gulshan-i-ajajib*, 130b, adds some other Mahratta names: Babaji (Baji Rao) son of Balaji Bishwanath, the Peshwa; Tukuji Gujar; Pila Jadu; Dawalji Sombanshi; Chimmaji Damodar; Mankaji Dana. The names in Khush-hal, 1003a,

[NIZAM-UL-MULK REPLIES TO THE LETTERS FROM AGRA.]

Nizam-ul-mulk, with his usual ability in such matters, soon sowed dissension and distrust in the huge but badly wielded force opposed to him. The letter from Husain Ali Khan, forwarding a patent for the Government of the Dakhin, was received with all due form and ceremonial ; a special enclosure was erected, the Nawab rode out to meet the bearer of it, and it was publicly read with the proper observances and the beating of drums. These documents were at once put to a use that had not been foreseen when they were despatched. A copy of the *farman*, duly attested by a *Qazi's* seal, was sent to Alim Ali Khan, and a letter informed him that, since Nizam-ul-mulk was now appointed governor, it was useless for him to keep in the field. He ought to disband his troops at once and relieve himself of that unnecessary expense. Should he desire to return to Hindustan, Nizam-ul-mulk would furnish him with as many men as were necessary. The news of Nizam-ul-mulk's appointment took the heart out of the local leaders and the newly enlisted soldiers, who sought their own safety either by flight to their homes or by joining the new *subahdar*. Or, as one writer puts it: "On the way many of the idle boasters and valiant trencher-men deserted." In short, Nizam-ul-mulk, up to this time a fugitive and a rebel, henceforth assumed, in full reliance on the *farman*, the attitude of a legally appointed governor, loyally fighting for his sovereign's rights. [Shiu 40b, Qasim 327.]

Long answers were sent to the Emperor's *farman* and to Husain Ali Khan's letter. As usual in such cases, the comedy of outward deference was played through unblushingly to the end. After thanks for his new appointment, he met the accusation that he had left Malwa without orders, by the audacious assertion that his action was due to the disorders caused by the Mahrattas round Aurangabad, which led him to fear for the safety of Burhanpur and even of Malwa ; still more, for the safety of the family of the Amir-ul-umara, Husain Ali Khan.

are Kanhaji, Balaji, Pilaji and Sankara Brahman. Grant Duff, 206, has in addition Haibat Rao Nimbalkar.

The great distance precluded his asking for orders or awaiting an answer, and for this reason he had marched at once, and the Mahrattas had dispersed at his approach. His acts had been misrepresented. Newly-risen men, who had not yet learnt the reverence due to His Majesty's high rank, might be guilty of such things ; to ancient servants like himself, whose every limb and very bones were built up of the salt that he had eaten, they were impossible. His Majesty knew the disordered state of the Dakhin, in spite of all that the Dweller in Paradise (Alamgir) had done. As it was now devoid of a ruler, what more likely than that some disaster should happen there? The only remedy was a hasty advance. It had been his desire, for many a day, to make a pilgrimage to the holy *Kaba*, and he had meant, as soon as he had defeated the Mahrattas, to ask for leave of absence. But now, his appointment to the Dakhin having been sent, he could not dream of disobeying orders ; to carry out his sovereign's wishes he held to be far above the worship of God, he would soon be on the spot, and by God's help and His Majesty's good fortune, would carry out the necessary measures. [Shiu, 41a.]

To the Amir-ul-umara, Husain Ali Khan, after quoting the letter sent to him, in which he was told that Dilawar Ali Khan had been sent only to fetch the Sayyid's family from Aurangabad, he wrote : "Nawab Amir-ul-umara ! May you be preserved ! In spite of his knowing your kindness and friendly feeling, and of my writing several times and my sending trusty messengers, the said Khan (Dilawar Ali) would not listen to reason, and in the end brought on himself what happened to him. My feelings of friendship to you remain unchanged." He then repeats the story about marching to the Dakhin merely to protect Aurangabad and save the Amir-ul-umara's family from dishonour, the latter involving the suggestion, a very galling one to a proud and high-placed man like Husain Ali Khan, that he was too weak to protect them himself. "Praise be to God ! all has passed off harmlessly. As soon as my troops arrived the rebels, making no stand, fled in all directions. The envious have represented the matter contrary to the truth and induced His Majesty to be displeased with me. I thank

God that the truth has been re-established and my word accepted. A report in answer to the *farman* is enclosed, and I trust it may be brought forward at a proper moment. By God's aid I will soon reach Aurangabad, whence I will forward your family and your other belongings with the greatest care." [Shiu, 42a.]

[THE BATTLE WITH ALIM ALI KHAN.]

On the 5th Shawwal (9th August 1720), leaving his baggage in Balapur, Nizam-ul-mulk ranged his army in order of battle at a distance of two or three *kos* from that town.* To the advanced guard were appointed Mhd. Ghiyas Khan, Muhammad Shah, commanding the artillery, Shaikh Nur-ullah, his brother, Yalburz Khan Aghariya, Anwar Khan and others. On the right, where the opposing Mahrattas showed in the greatest strength, were posted Iwaz Khan and Jamal-ullah Khan, his son. With the main body and left wing were Ghazi-ud-din Khan, the Nawab's eldest son, Marahmat Khan, Nimat-ilahi, Abdur-rahim Khan (Reayat Khan), Mutawassil Khan, Sad-ud-din Khan, Qadir Dad Khan, Darab Khan and Kamyab Khan (two sons of Jan Nisar Khan), Ikhtisas Khan (grand nephew of Khan Alam, Dakhini), Ruhullah Khan, Mutahavvar Khan, with many other nobles and Rajput chiefs. The command of the rearguard, with charge of the baggage, was made over to Rambha Nimbalkar, and Antaji, the *deshmukh* of *pargana* Sanesar. [K. K. 889.]

On the other side Alim Ali Khan, mounting his elephant and taking his own place in the centre, with Ghiyas-ud-din Khan in the seat behind him, sent forward his artillery, supported by fourteen or fifteen thousand horsemen from the Karnatik. The battle began on the 6th Shawwal 1132 H. (10th

* The *Berar Gazetteer*, 163, says the battle-field lies between the villages of Kolhari and Pimpri Gauli, close to Balapur town (Akola district), Long. 75°80', Lat. 20°40'. The *Siwanih-i-Dakhin*, 133, describes it as in the *taluqa* of Pain Ghat in subah Berar. Kamwar Khan, 226, says it was *dar sawad-i-Balaghat*. According to the *Berar Gazetteer*, Berar Balaghat is the country above the Ajanta ridge, sloping down south to the *ghats* or passes which lead up to it, while Berar Painghat lies between the Gaurigarh hills on the north and the outer scraps of the Ajanta hills on the south.

August 1720), the first movement being made by Nizam-ul-mulk. Alim Ali Khan replied by two or three shots from his guns, which fell to the ground without hitting any one. The first shot returned by Nizam-ul-mulk fell close to the elephant on which Latif Khan was riding, the *howda* was upset and the rider thrown to the ground. Before the smoke could disperse, Mutahavvar Khan, who commanded Alim Ali Khan's vanguard, followed by seventeen or eighteen elephants and fourteen to fifteen thousand horsemen, fell suddenly on Nizam-ul-mulk's vanguard and caused many of the Mughals to give way. When Muhammad Shah, Nizam-ul-mulk's general of artillery, saw the day going against them, he, his brother Nur-ullah, and his other officers, following the usage of Hindustan, dismounted and continued the contest on foot. Nizam-ul-mulk's vanguard had been thrown into great disorder. Shaikh Nur-ullah was slain and Muhammad Shah wounded. Muhammad Ghiyas Khan, who commanded it and was already blind of one eye, received a wound in his other eye. Yalburz Khan Aghariya and other leaders were also wounded. The division retreated. [K. K. 891, 893.]

At this moment the other divisions from the right and left of Nizam-ul-mulk's army advanced to the attack and closed upon the enemy. Alim Ali Khan, with the chiefs immediately under his orders, hurried forward the centre of his army with such rapidity that a portion of his division was outstripped and left behind. Iwaz Khan, Marahmat Khan, and Qadir Dad Khan met and repelled him wherever he turned. But Alim Ali Khan though wounded kept the field. Then Mutawassil Khan, a youth of Alim Ali Khan's own age, drove his elephant to close quarters with that of the Bafha leader. He assailed Johar Khan,* and the other eight or nine chiefs on elephants who accompanied Alim Ali Khan. He fought on until compelled to retire by wounds and loss of blood. Qadir Dad Khan supported him bravely in this *mêlée*. [K. K. 894.]

* According to the *Ahwâl-ul-khawâqin*, f. 168, this man had borne the first brunt of the attack, the first shot knocked over his elephant-driver and carried away half his *howda*.

Alim Ali Khan's elephant-driver, who was the brother-in-law of Mutahavvar Khan, was killed ; Ghiyas-ud-din Khan commanding his artillery had fallen ; so also had Ghalib Khan and Apaji, that officer's *diwan*, Shamsheer Khan, Sayyid Wali and Sayyid Alam Barha : in all eight or nine of the chief men. The Mahrattas, however, had reached Nizam-ul-mulk's baggage and carried off some of his treasure of gold coins. At one time Alim Ali Khan's elephant had stuck in a marshy place, from which it extricated itself with great difficulty and came out on the farther side alone. The first thing its rider saw was the dead body of Mutahavvar Khan. Then between thirty and forty Barha Sayyids, sword in hand, forced their horses through the mud and rejoined their leader.

Soon afterwards the elephant ridden by Alim Ali Khan turned tail, unable to bear any longer the rain of arrows. But Alim Ali Khan, his wounds dripping blood, persisted and turning round in his seat continued to face his foe, exclaiming : "The elephant may turn to flee, but I do not." Three times did he succeed in renewing the attack, seeking everywhere for the invisible Nizam-ul-mulk ; and unsuccessful in his search, was forced to beat a retreat. His stock of arrows being exhausted, he drew out those sticking in his face or his body or in the elephant trappings, and shot them resolutely at his opponents. At length Ikhtisas Khan disabled him by a sword stroke, which cut to the bone the fingers of his right hand. A fourth time he renewed his challenge to Nizam-ul-mulk, calling out how strange it was that the leader kept out of the way. Nizam-ul-mulk drew his bow to the full and shouting, "I am Nizam-ul-mulk," let his arrow fly. Alim Ali Khan was again wounded, he was surrounded, and Ikhtisas Khan cut off his head. Thus at the age of twenty-two he bravely gave up his life a sacrifice on behalf of his two uncles.*

* Khafi Khan, 894 ; *Tarikh-i-Muzaffari*, 189 ; *Muqaddama* by Ghulam Ali Khan, 34b ; Khush-hal f. 1005a. Yahya Khan, f. 126b, says the Sayyid was struck in the forehead by a musket ball. His head was laid before Nizam-ul-mulk, and after being identified and displayed in public, it was forwarded to the Emperor.

Altogether seventeen or eighteen noted chiefs, "riders on elephants," and a large number of men fell in the battle ; while many more were wounded. Amin Khan, Umar Khan, Turktaz Khan, Fidai Khan, *diwan* of the Dakhin, and some other men of note transferred their services at once to Nizam-ul-mulk. Shankraji, the chief officer of Rajah Sahu Mahratta, was wounded and taken prisoner. The elephants and artillery of the defeated army became the property of the victorious general ; the rest of their equipage was given up to plunder. The drums were then beaten to announce the victory. Muhammad Qasim Aurangabadi thinks that Nizam-ul-mulk's case was desperate, if Alim Ali Khan had not been killed. The Mahrattas were in his rear, and against his ten thousand were ranged fully eighty thousand men. Six hundred and thirty-four Mahrattas were killed. [K. K. 895, *Ahwal* 169a.]

Except Sayyid Sulaiman (known as the grandson of the saint Ghaus-ul-azam) Shaikh Nur-ullah, and two or three less important men, no one was killed in the army of Nizam-ul-mulk. Iwaz Khan was slightly wounded, and the other principal men among the wounded were Mutawassil Khan, Qadir Dad Khan, Mhd. Ghiyas Khan, Muhammad Shah and Kamyab Khan. When the fatal news reached Aurangabad, the ladies of Husain Ali Khan's family and those dependent on Alim Ali Khan became afraid, and asked for shelter from the commandant of the Daulatabad fortress, some ten miles north-west of the town. This man was descended from Murtaza Khan and Sayyid Mubarik, relations of Sayyid Jalal of Bukhara ; and the appointment had been in his family from the reign of Shah Jahan (1627-1658). In spite of the fact that Husain Ali Khan had reduced him in rank and appointed others in his place, this officer gave the ladies a refuge with all their property. A few days after the battle, Mubariz Khan, governor of Haidarabad, and his brother, Dilawar Khan, who had announced that they were marching to the aid of the Sayyids, came in and joined Nizam-ul-mulk. With their adhesion to his cause ended all possibility of further danger to the usurper, so far as any opponent in the Dakhin itself was concerned. [K. K. 896, *Warid* 161a.]

SEC. 11.—THE NEWS FROM THE DAKHIN REACHES AGRA.

Swift camel-riders reached Agra on the 22nd Shawwal (26th August 1720), bringing information of the defeat and death of Alim Ali Khan near Balapur. Four days before this date Husain Ali Khan's advance tents had gone out to Kuraoli, seventeen or eighteen miles from Agra, as a preliminary to his starting for the Dakhin. One encampment was formed at the village of Sihara near Sarai Khoja, five *kos* from Agra, there being a good supply of sweet water from a masonry tank or reservoir.*

The new disaster threw the Sayyids into a state of consternation. When the letters were put into Abdullah Khan's hand, he was so agitated that he was unable to read them, and could do no more than gather the facts from the oral statements of the messengers. He then broke forth into lamentation. Husain Ali Khan bore the blow with more outward calm, though he was not completely successful in suppressing all signs of grief. Both brothers at once quitted their public audience room. Husain Ali Khan really felt the blow more acutely than his brother, nor did he recover his equanimity until he heard about a week afterwards that his women with their property had received a refuge in the fort of Daulatabad. Consultation now succeeded consultation, plan followed upon plan. As already described, they had made an attempt to rid themselves of Muhammad Amin Khan, head of the powerful clan to which Nizam-ul-mulk belonged. But finding that they were not strong enough to effect their purpose, they did their best to make friends with this important chief. On his side, Muhammad Amin Khan had endeavoured to lull their suspicions to sleep by talking loudly in *darbar* of the baseness of Nizam-ul-mulk's conduct and his wickedness generally. [K. K. 896, Kamwar 226, Qasim 319, *Ahwal* 171b.]

At length it was decided that Muhammad Shah in person, with the imperial artillery and all head officials, should proceed to the Dakhin in charge of Husain Ali Khan ; while Abdullah

* Sihare ki sarai, *Indian Atlas*, sheet 50, about $7\frac{1}{2}$ miles from the city on the way to Kuraoli and Fathpur.

Khan returned to Dihli to maintain order in the northern half of the Empire. Husain Ali Khan, who had quite outstripped his elder brother in real power, had insisted on taking with him the offices and establishments of *diwan*, *Bakhshi*, and *Sadar-us-sadur* for all the twenty-two provinces, with the two head *diwans*, leaving to Abdullah Khan only a small office staff. Abdullah Khan objected, but the dispute was kept secret, and at last it was arranged that the complete establishment of four *subahs* only in Hindustan, that is Akbarabad, Ahmadabad, Ajmer and Malwa, and of all the six Dakhin *subahs*, with a small staff for the other provinces, should accompany His Majesty and Husain Ali Khan. [K. K. 897, Qasim 322, Yahya 127b.] Taking his imagery from the game of draughts, Yahya Khan's comment on this separation of the two brothers is that, in the general opinion, the player had made a wrong move by scattering his men, and thenceforward his piece could not be protected ; and so it turned out in the end.

Instead of the more direct road through Gwaliyar and Narwar, the longer route through Ajmer was chosen, with the object of meeting Rajah Ajit Singh and reinforcing the imperial army by his Rajputs. Accordingly the imperial tents were sent out to Sarai Sihara on the 1st Zul Qada 1132 H. (3rd September 1720), and on the 9th (11th September) the first march was made. On the 10th they moved to Kuraoli, the camp being pitched on a high mound beside a sheet of water. Here Abdullah Khan had his audience of leave-taking and departed for Dihli, Rajah Ratan Chand remaining at Court as his agent and representative. The nobles who accompanied Abdullah Khan to Dihli were : Sayyid Salabat Khan *Bakhshi*, Ghazi-ud-din Khan Ghalib Jang, Hamid Khan, Hamid-ud-din Khan, Nimatullah Khan, Bairam Khan, Qilich Muhammad Khan, Baqir Khan (son of Ruhullah Khan, deceased), Hifz-ullah Khan, Murid Khan, and Amir Khan.

Outwardly the Sayyids strove to preserve an attitude of unconcern. When any one condoled with them on the loss of their young nephew, they would say, "Praise be to God ! no one of any importance has been lost," and express their joy that the youth had borne himself in a way to uphold the Sayyid

name. But some of their chief men began to lose heart, and on pleas of sickness or other lame excuses declined to go on active service, among these being Sayyid Firuz Ali Khan, uncle of Alim Ali Khan. Husain Ali Khan, still full of confidence, thought nothing of these desertions, holding that his troops and those of his near relations were sufficient for every emergency. It was intended to raise the total numbers to 100,000 men ; and urgent letters were sent by the hand of Sayyid Muhammad Khan, son of Asad-ullah Khan, to the most noted of the Barha Sayyids and the Afghans, calling upon them to join the column at once. But the numbers did not rise beyond fifty thousand men, including both the old and the new troops. [K. K. 897, Qasim 328.]

SEC. 12.—THE EMPEROR'S ADVANCE TO THE DAKHIN.

On the 13th Zul Qada (15th September 1720) the camp was at a place between Mahaur and Gopalpur ; next day it was moved on to between Kanwari and Muminabad. Four days (15th to 18th) were spent in celebrating the anniversary of Muhammad Shah's enthronement, and on the 19th (21st September) a visit was made to the shrine of Shah Salim Chishti at Fathpur Sikri. The succeeding marches were Jalwa (21st), Nabahra (23rd), Salihabad (26th), Bajahra (28th), Bahadurpur (29th). At Qasba Bahadurpur, about four miles north of Hindaun, the camp was under the shade of pleasant trees and the water was sweet and wholesome. In the two previous marches the rough country, full of thorny shrubs, and the want of water, had caused great suffering. Two days for rest were allowed. They marched thence on the 2nd Zul Hijja (4th October 1720), and arrived at a place between Mahwa and Muhkampur. Next they passed through the Lakhi darra (or pass) and encamped at the foot of some hills in a very lonely and desolate country. Thence they marched on the 6th Zul Hijja (8th October 1720) to a position between Jiund and Biund, about two kos to the east of Toda Bhon (or Bhim), a place now in Jaipur territory, about seventy-five miles south-west of Agra and about sixty miles east of Jaipur.*

* Kamwar; Qasim 345, 346. Mhd. Qasim was with the army and serving under Rai Surat Singh Multani. The map of the *Rajputana States*,

During these marches there were, to all outward appearance, agreement and friendship between the Mir Bakhshi and his principal rival. Muhammad Amin Khan tried to procure terms for Nizam-ul-mulk, offering himself as security that the Sayyid ladies and children would be brought home in safety. He offered to send his own son, Qamar-ud-din Khan, to act as their escort. The proposed campaign would then be unnecessary. But Husain Ali Khan's pride debarred him from assenting to these proposals. Then Mhd. Amin Khan brought up the objection that the army, especially his division, was full of soldiers who had served for years under Nizam-ul-mulk. No loyal service could be looked for from these men, they would do harm instead of good, and it would be better to leave him and them behind. In secret, however, Muhammad Amin Khan said to his confidants that, in any case, he meant to strike at the Sayyids. If he were ordered to go on to the Dakhin, he would either seek an opportunity on the way, or withdraw from the battle-field when victory was trembling in the balance. If left behind, he would make certain that the two brothers never joined forces again. Husain Ali Khan, who was not altogether blind to the difficulty in which he was placed, for to take the Mughals on or to leave them behind was equally dangerous, exerted himself to the utmost to keep Mhd. Amin Khan in good humour, addressing him whenever they met as "Respected Uncle." A large sum of money was advanced to him by way of pay for his Mughals. [Qasim 324.]

Haidar Quli Khan was also taken into special favour, and on the 4th Zul Qada (6th September 1720), he replaced Sayyid Ghulam Ali Khan as *Mir Atash*, or general-in-chief of the imperial artillery, of which there was a very large display, some sixteen hundred cannon, large and small, besides *gajnal*, *shutar-nal*, *kaharwal* and rockets.* This man professed to be devoted

1859, marks the pass as Kurrailee Ghaut, possibly the same as the Kariti of the *Indian Atlas*. Mahwa is on sheet 50 of the *Indian Atlas*, as Mhow, six miles west of Bahadurpur, on the Gambhir river. Jiund (Jond) is shown five miles n. w. of Mhow, Biund (Bond) about three miles n. w. of "Jond" and Toda Bhon (Toda Bhim) seven miles w. of "Jond."

* Khafi Khan, 898, says the previous incumbent was Sayyid Khan Jahan. He had just died. Perhaps Ghulam Ali Khan was only his deputy.

heart and soul to the Sayyids, and Husain Ali Khan had formed a high opinion of his ability as an artillery officer. The men about the Mir Bakhshi hardly shared his fancy for this man. They spoke scornfully of his "low stature but high fortune" and afterwards the line was applied to him, "Who would have thought this tempest could arise from an empty oven." Muazzam Khan Afghan, Sayyid Ghairat Khan, Mir Mushrif, and others bade the Nawab beware, for there was a plot on foot among the Mughals. He ought not, they said, to allow their officers to attend audience with a crowd of armed men. Husain Ali Khan retorted angrily that they were thwarting him in his effort to win over Mhd. Amin Khan, adding: "Who is there who could raise a hand against me, what plot is there, what reason for my assassination?" It only meant that they did not like to see the artillery pass from the hands of a Sayyid into those of a Mughal. Then he would launch forth in praise of Haidar Quli Khan. The new general justified his appointment in the eyes of the army by the alterations which he at once introduced. Among other things he re-established the practice of former reigns, adopted from European models, of firing off a salute of ten to twenty field-pieces (*rahqalas*) whenever the Emperor entered his quarters from a march or a hunting expedition. In this way notice of His Majesty's movements could be communicated to the whole camp. [Qasim 344, Kamwar, Khush-hal 1007a.]

Another new favourite was Saadat Khan, a Persian from Naishapur, then chiefly known as a relation of Ganj Ali Khan, lately deceased; he had been appointed a few weeks before to be *faujdar* of Hindaun and Biana, some fifty to sixty miles south-west of Agra, and as the route of the army lay through his district, he remained in attendance. He paraded his troops daily before Husain Ali Khan and made such a great show of

According to Rustam Ali, *Tarikh-i-Hindi*, 242b, Haidar Quli Khan was appointed during the halt at Bhosawar, but that does not agree in date or place with Kamwar Khan. Warid, 161b, calls Haidar Quli Khan a *Shirazi*. He was really a native of Isfarain, a town in Khurasan; but he may have been for a time at Shiraz on his way to India. In one place he is called an Isfahani.

zeal that his requests for more money and new *jagirs* were willingly complied with. Perhaps, in spite of the many favours now conferred by the Sayyid, he may have retained in his heart a grudge for the way in which he had been reprimanded only a little time before. A poor man's buffalo had been taken from him, the only thing he had in the world. On the march a report of this was brought to Husain Ali Khan. The *faujdar's* agent at Court was sent for and warned that if an acquittance were not produced from the owner of the buffalo, it would not go well with his master. Saadat Khan thereupon told the peasant to take his buffalo and write his receipt. The man replied: "You took it forcibly, I am not content." "Take two buffaloes then." This offer also was refused, and in the end fifty buffaloes were given him before he would sign any paper. This interference may possibly have been rankling in Saadat Khan's heart; otherwise, being a Sayyid, a Shia and protégé of the Mir Bakhshi, it is surprising that he should have gone over to the other side. But being a pushing, energetic man, with his way still to make, he may have thought that there was more to gain on the side of the malcontents in the commotion attending a change of regime. [Rustam Ali 234b.]

SEC. 13.—ASSASSINATION OF HUSAIN ALI KHAN.

During this time, between the 9th Zul Qada (6th September 1720), the date of starting from Agra, and the 6th Zul Hijja 1132 H. (8th October 1720), a plot had been hatching for the destruction of Husain Ali Khan. The chief conspirators were Muhammad Amin Khan, Haidar Quli Khan, Abdul-ghaffur and Mir Jumla. It would be thought that the last-named, after his unfavourable experience in Farrukh-siyar's reign, would have declined to enter into any more projects of this sort; and he does not figure as a very active sharer in the plot.* Sayyid Muhammad Amin Saadat Khan, the new *faujdar* of Biana, was also entrusted with the secret. A willing instrument was found in the person of Mir Haidar Beg Dughlat, a man from Kash-

* Khafi Khan, 903, 905, denies that Haidar Quli Khan, Qamar-ud-din Khan, or the Emperor, knew anything; but this is more than doubtful.

ghar.* Muhammad Amin Khan is reported to have made an appeal to the loyalty of his Mughals. Unable as they were to overcome Husain Ali Khan's army, would any brave man devote his life to the Mir Bakhshi's removal? If the assassin survived, the Nawab would be his slave for life; if he were killed, his family should be liberally cared for. At first no one spoke. Then Mir Haidar Beg offered himself: "I am a Sayyid and he is a Sayyid: if brother kill brother what matters it?" [K. K. 902, *Ahwal* 175a.]

Communications were opened with Muhammad Shah's mother through Sadar-un-nissa, head duenna of the harem, the intermediary being one Shah Abdul-ghaffur, a faqir from Tattha in Sind, who passed to and fro disguised in woman's attire as a seller of milk. We shall hear more of this man later in the reign. Muhammad Amin Khan also made hints several times to Muhammad Shah in the Turki tongue, which they both understood. Once this was done in Husain Ali Khan's presence. He asked what had been said. Muhammad Shah replied that the noble had asked for leave to withdraw as he had a pain in his stomach. As Muhammad Shah thus kept his secret, Muhammad Amin Khan inferred that he was not unfavourable to the plot. Once after they had left Fathpur Sikri behind, Saadat Khan, in the darkness of night, came to the tent of Mhd. Amin Khan, and it was decided that an attempt upon the life of Husain Ali Khan should be made next day while they were on the march. Bringing up their divisions on his right hand and on his left, they were to envelop him and his retinue, and slay him. Qamar-ud-din Khan supported this proposal warmly. But the next day it was found that Husain Ali Khan had descended from his horse and had mounted an elephant. An attack was thought inadvisable; and another plan was now devised. [K. K. 903, Warid 42, Yahya, Khush-hal 1009a.]

* The brother of Shapur Khan (Kamwar Khan, 230). Khafi Khan, 903, calls him of Chaghatai race. His family bore the epithet of *Mir-i-shamsher*, and he was commonly called Mir Haidar Beg. Mirza Haidar, governor of Kashmir and author of the *Tariqh-i-Rashidi*, is said to have been his great-grandfather.

The day before his assassination Husain Ali Khan uttered a foolish speech about making an Emperor of any one on whom he chose to cast his shoe. That night Muhammad Amin Khan and Haidar Quli Khan met, and it was decided that the next morning their plot should be carried into execution. It is said that when Mhd. Amin Khan had left, Husain Ali Khan chanced to come on a visit to Haidar Quli Khan, and began to ask his advice on some point. Haidar Quli Khan, who was by nature a man of cunning, saw an opening for securing his own safety whatever happened. He told Husain Ali Khan that as a rumour prevailed through the camp of his (the speaker's) supersession in the command of the artillery, Mhd. Amin Khan proposed to come to his (Haidar Quli's) tent next morning. After he, the Mir Bakhshi, had escorted the Emperor to the door of the female apartments, he could on his way to his quarters call at his, the *Mir Atash's*, tents, and there through someone ready to risk life for him could procure the assassination of Mhd. Amin Khan. This plan having been agreed on, Husain Ali Khan departed. Haidar Quli Khan's idea was that whichever side got the upper hand, the winner would be grateful to him for his suggestions and take him into special favour. [Yahya, 128a.]

It was the custom for Nawab Husain Ali Khan to present himself before the Emperor at the end of every march and make his morning obeisance. The ceremony was known by the Hindi name of the *Juhar*. Accordingly on the morning of the 6th Zul Hijja 1132 H. (8th October 1720), on reaching the new camp pitched two *kos* to the east of Toda Bhim,* Husain

* Toda Bhim (*Indian Atlas*, sheet 50) lies about six miles west of a pass through the hills. Khafi Khan, ii. 903, calls the place Tora, and says it is 35 reputed *kos* from Fathpur Sikri. It is really about 45 miles s. w. in straight line from that town. The British Museum MS. No. 1746, (Elliot collection) fixes the site at Ghat Karbali (*query*: Karkari or Kareli), near the village Jonda (*query*: the Jon Bond of the *Indian Atlas*), in the district of Bhusawar. This must be the village Kareli to the east of the pass (see *Map of Rajputana States*, 1859). The *Indian Atlas*, sheet 50, has Kariti quite close to the pass, and the village Kharela about five miles north-east of it. Khush-hal f. 1008a, speaks of the *darra* or pass of Lakhri. This name may be taken from the Laker ke pura of the *Indian Atlas*, which lies about two miles south of Karela. Bhusawar was a *pargana* in

Ali Khan and other great nobles followed Muhammad Shah as usual to the entrance of his tents, made their bow, and departed to their several camps. Husain Ali Khan entered his litter within the imperial enclosure (*jali*), having in attendance seven or eight servants and two relations. Muhammad Amin Khan, Saadat Khan, and several others were present. Then Muhammad Amin Khan, who is said to have filled his mouth beforehand with raw blood, put his fingers into his mouth, simulated vomiting, and complained of vertigo. He laid himself down at full length on the ground. Husain Ali Khan sent for rose-water and a preparation made from an odoriferous willow (*bed-mushk*), supposed to be a restorative; and after these had been administered, Muhammad Amin Khan made signs that they should carry him into Haidar Quli Khan's tent, which by reason of his office of *Mir Atash* was close to the imperial gateway. Round Husain Ali Khan there then remained no more than two or three persons. The time was about midday. [Shiu 49b.]

As the palanquin issued from the imperial precinct, Haidar Beg Dughlat, with one or two other Mughals, appeared on one side shouting, "A complaint! a complaint!" and drew from his sleeve a paper in the nature of a petition. As the *Bakhshi* knew the man by sight, he was allowed to approach, when he launched forth into imprecations upon Muhammad Amin Khan, the second *Bakhshi*, who bore the deserved reputation of being exceedingly harsh and miserly. Coming closer, the man said that their general embezzled their pay and, with this Dakhin campaign before them, they were dying of hunger and their horses were at the last gasp. Would not the Nawab, as chief *Bakhshi* and noted for liberality to his troops, do something to help them? A body-servant advanced to take the petition, but the Mughal made a gesture of refusal. Husain Ali Khan, in his usual considerate way, said: "Come here and give it." The petitioner came close and put the paper into his hands.

sarkar Agra of *subah* Akbarabad, Jarrett, *Ain*, ii. 132. The town lies about 13 miles north-east of the pass (*Indian Atlas*, sheet 50). Toda Bhim was itself the chief town of a *pargana*, Jarrett, 133; Khush-hal *f.* 1009a, says that after leaving *pargana* Bhusawar, camp was at Qasba Paota, which is eight miles north-east of Toda Bhim, and five miles north of the pass.

A pipe-bearer appeared at the other side of the palanquin ; the Nawab turned his head that way, took hold of the mouthpiece of the pipe-snake and began to read the petition. The *Bakhshi's* attention being given to the reading of the paper, the assassin in an instant drew from his waistband a long dagger-like butcher's knife, and plunged it into Husain Ali Khan's side. The wounded man struck with his feet at his murderer's chest, so that he fell and his turban tumbled off ; then exclaimed : "Bring a horse ! I must mount." Recovering himself Haider Beg laid hold of the Nawab's feet, dragged him from the palanquin to the ground, sat on his chest, and began to cut off his head.*

On foot near the palanquin was Sayyid Nur Ali, entitled Nur-ullah Khan, a boy of fourteen or fifteen years of age. He was the son of Asad-ullah Khan Bahadur, called Nawab Auliya, and one of Husain Ali Khan's cousins. As soon as he saw what had happened, the boy shouted out, "The wretches have killed the Nawab," quick as lightning drew a pistol from his belt and with a shot from it wounded Haider Beg. Then, with three blows from his sword, he stretched the murderer on the ground dead at the side of his victim. But, before the boy could escape, he was attacked by the other Mughals, and fell lifeless across the mangled body of his cousin. Husain Ali Khan's head was borne in triumph to the small tent (*rawati*) of Haider Quli Khan, whence he and Mhd. Amin Khan had hurriedly emerged barefoot when the shouting began. [K. K. 904, Qasim 349, Khush-hal 1009a, Shakir 106.]

Muhammad Amin Khan made his way at once to the imperial quarters, and called on the Emperor to come out and take command of his troops.* The head of the murdered *Bakhshi* was thrown at his feet in the space before his private tents. Muhammad Shah, whether he had been in the secret or not, now showed some inclination to draw back, and began to remonstrate. His mother, too, though she had no doubt intrigued to get her son freed from the galling tutelage of the Sayyids, was now afraid for his personal safety and drew him

* Qasim, 347 ; K. K. 903 ; Khush-hal, 1008a, 1009b ; Warid, 162a.

back within the women's apartments. Then Sayyid Ghulam Ali Khan, cousin of the *Wazir* and of the *Bakhshi*, and superintendent of the privy audience chamber, who had come inside the private enclosure with Islam Quli, a slave, and some gunners (*hazari*) in his pay, cut through the canvas walls and tried to obtain possession of the Emperor's person. Muhammad Amin Khan and some Mughals drove them back, and Saadat Khan then captured and confined them.

Further delay was dangerous. Brushing aside all the restraints of etiquette, Saadat Khan threw a shawl over his head, pushed his way into the harem, took Muhammad Shah in his arms, and dragged him by force to the scene of the assassination. It was still free of men. Elephants were called for and they mounted, Muhammad Shah on Qamar-ud-din Khan's elephant, Buland Bakht, with Mhd. Amin Khan in the seat behind him. They took up their station at the gateway of the street of shops dependent on the guardhouse where the kettle-drums were played. Husain Ali Khan's head was held aloft on the end of a long pole.

Orders were given for the general plunder of Husain Ali Khan's tents and treasure. There were at first only forty or fifty of Mhd. Amin Khan's cavalry and some artillerymen present, between one and two hundred men altogether. Haidar Quli Khan sent urgent messengers to collect elephants, horses, and men, while Mhd. Amin Khan busied himself in writing urgent notes to the various commanders. "Now is the time to display your friendship. He who comes now will do a great service and obtain great rewards." No man of any rank appeared; there were only Muhammad Amin Khan himself, Qamar-ud-din Khan, his son, Haidar Quli Khan, and Saadat Khan. The imperial artillery began to play upon the Sayyid's camp. Just before the fight was over Khan Dauran appeared on the scene with some troops, but Zafar Khan, Turra-i-baz, continued to keep discreetly out of the way of danger.*

Unconscious of what was happening, the officers and

* Qasim, 350, 351; Khush-hal f. 1010a, *Bayan-i-waqi*, 424; Kamwar 231; Warid, 162b; K. K. 906, 908; Shakir Khan, 10b.

soldiers of the Sayyid's army were engaged in putting up their tents or obtaining their supplies for the day. The sound of firing did not alarm them. It was, they assumed, nothing more than the usual salute notifying the Emperor's arrival at his quarters. The first intimation of the assassination was brought to Sayyid Ghairat Khan, the nephew* of the victim, just as he had taken off his weapons and had begun to eat his breakfast. Putting back into the dish the morsel he had just taken up, and not even washing his hands, but wiping one hand upon the other, wearing nothing but a thin cotton coat, he ran out and mounted his elephant. He was followed by a few men, not more than forty or fifty altogether.† The need of delay and caution was impressed on him by older men; but he would listen to no dissuasion. Like a roaring tiger just wounded by an arrow, he hurried on, venting loud oaths and curses, until he reached the imperial enclosure (*jali*); and as he came face to face with the force drawn up there, most of his companions were shot down and he himself received two arrow wounds. In the struggle part of the canvas wall enclosing the Emperor's camp was knocked down.

Seated alone in his iron-clad canopy, Ghairat Khan pressed on, shooting his arrows, until he came near the elephant of Haidar Quli Khan. Stinging reproaches for base ingratitude were hurled at the latter. On his side Haidar Quli Khan retorted: "O man, untrue to the salt you have eaten! descend from that elephant and submit, and I will obtain for you His Majesty's pardon." The young Sayyid advanced and shouted: "I await your commands," adding in the most scornful tone: "Fie upon your faithfulness and upon the quality of your friendship!" Ghairat Khan then shot an arrow which fixed itself so firmly in Haidar Quli Khan's bow, that after the

* According to the *Tarikh-i-Muhammadi* his father was Sayyid Nasrullah Sadat Khan Bahadur Barha, and his mother was Husain Ali Khan's sister. The *Barhan-ul-futuh*, 168b, calls him the son of Sayyid Khan Jahan Barha. Khafi Khan, throughout this part of his story (pp. 901, 902, 905) distinguishes between Ghairat Khan and Izzat Khan; according to him Izzat Khan was killed and Ghairat Khan survived.

† Khafi Khan, 905, says there were four or five hundred.

fight it was withdrawn with difficulty. Behind Haidar Quli Khan was an Abyssinian slave named Haji Bashir, holding a loaded European matchlock. His master turned and said angrily to him: "What are you waiting for?" The slave fired, the ball entered the breast of Ghairat Khan, and he fell from the elephant dead.*

Sayyid Karim-ullah Khan, who had succeeded to Sayyid Dilawar Ali Khan's office of *Bakhshi*, headed another onset and reached the entrance of the imperial enclosure (*jali*), but his men were soon killed. Shaikh Najm-ud-din, entitled Nekandesh Khan, superintendent of the *adalat*, also fought his way with five or six horsemen into the enclosure and tried to carry off the Amir-ul-umara's body. But, after receiving two or three wounds on the shoulder-blade and side, he fell down insensible and was carried away by Haidar Quli Khan's men. Meanwhile, Rajah Muhkam Singh himself, with a troop of his men, stood looking on as a mere spectator; but Churaman *Hazari*, a man long in the service of the Sayyids, did his duty well and forced his way to the private entrance (*deorhi*) of the Emperor's tents, but could do nothing more. Khwaja Maqbul Ahmad the Sayyid's *nazir*, followed by a water-carrier and a sweeper, attacked the imperial group with drawn swords, and these three courageously made their way as far as the imperial chapel-tent (*tasbih-khana*) where they were cut down. The Khwaja died of his wounds three or four days afterwards. In another direction Mustafa Khan, the paymaster of Rajah Muhkam Singh, without consulting his master, made his way with some men to the gate of the enclosure; repulsed there, he turned off and cut through the canvas walls[†] of the privy audience chamber, entering it with shouts and curses. But after losing a few men, he was ejected by the Mughals. During this scrimmage Muhammad Shah hid behind Sadar-un-nissa, wife of Riza Quli Khan, Jahandar-Shahi. [Qasim 354, K. K. 910, Khush-hal 1009b.]

Rai Surat Singh Multani, and his son, Lala Anand Singh, did nothing but provide for the safety of their own persons and

* Khush-hal f. 1010a, says the slave handed the gun to his master. Qasim, 352; K. K. 905-908; Yahya 128a; Shakir 9b; Warid, 162a and b.

property. Lala Jaswant Rai, son of Sahib Rai Munshi, escaped by allowing his father's hoards and much of his own property to be plundered. Another man who escaped was Rai Saroman Das, Kayath, *wakil* at Court on behalf of Sayyid Abdullah Khan. He shaved, rubbed his face with ashes, and turned himself into a *faqir*. Then, hiding a few valuables in his waist-cloth, he lay concealed in his friends' tents until he was able to escape to Sayyid Abdullah Khan. Muazzam Khan, a man from the east country, although of high rank did nothing, but Umar Khan, his brother, was killed by the plunderers. Sayyid Jan Ali, brother of Mir Ali Khan, superintendent of horse-branding, fought his best and lost his life ; while his brother escaped for a time, only to be made a prisoner a few days afterwards.

The confusion lasted ten to twelve hours, and during this time countless treasure was plundered and much property was destroyed. The dead body of Husain Ali Khan was subjected to unspeakable indignities at the hands of the low scoundrels and hangers-on of the army. The event yielded striking evidence of the want of cohesion in an Indian army under the pressure of any sudden disaster. When the plundering was done, not a trace of the Sayyid's vast encampment or his mighty host could be seen. It was impossible to believe that there had ever been a heel-rope or a tent peg on that ground. Everything had been burnt or carried off, and the men had disappeared.

Muhammad Amin Khan held it wiser not to check the plundering, in which both friends and foes were busily occupied, for thereby the chance of any resistance was obviated. As an incident in this reckless plundering we are told that a common soldier carried off two bags of coin, and supposing them to be Rupees, he took them to a money-changer, and asked for gold in exchange, as being lighter to carry. When the bags were opened they were found to be full of gold coins! Before the assassination the money-changers' shops, most of Husain Ali Khan's equipage, and carts said to contain a *kror* of Rupees, had arrived in camp from the march. All these were plundered and carried off. But the Bakhshi's jewels and some money chests, which were still on the road, were saved and confiscated

to His Majesty's use. [K. K. 904-910, Yahya 129b, Warid 162b, Shiu 49a, Khush-hal 1009b.]

Rajah Ratan Chand Banya, who was much more hated by the general public than the Sayyids themselves, knew not which way to turn. The armed array of his foes barred his flight, and he was not the man to take the field and meet blow by blow. As the saying is: "A prancing ass and a shopkeeper are equally worthless." He told the beads of his rosary with one hand and with the other used his handkerchief to wipe the tears from his eyes. Abdur-rahman Khan and other Afghans of Sarhind offered to rescue him, saying: "Mount, mount." He refused with idle phrases. All that he could do was to write a hurried note of a line or two to Sayyid Abdullah Khan, and send it off by a camel-rider. Soon Rajah Daya Ram, the agent of Muhammad Amin Khan, came for him and he submitted at once. On the way some Mughals and low fellows from the bazars surrounded his palanquin, dragged him out, beat, cuffed, and kicked him, and tore his clothes to tatters. Brought in this pitiable naked condition before the new *Wazir*, he begged piteously that his life might be spared. Muhammad Amin Khan, after sending for a suit of clothes, ordered the Rajah to be put in chains and kept a prisoner. His case was an example of the saying: "As you do, so shall it be done unto you." In spite of all their efforts Ratan Chand made no disclosure of the Sayyid's treasure or buried hoards. A short time afterwards, while they were on the march, he tried to escape. The Mughals who were guarding him pursued him, cut him down, and would have liked to slay him. But he was reserved for formal execution.*

Muhkma, the son of Chura jat, was brought in a prisoner, and in his despair offered to turn Muhammadan if his life were spared, but Muhammad Shah declined his offer and treating him kindly sent him away. Sayyid Asad-ullah Khan was also captured and was long kept in confinement, until he received permission to make the pilgrimage to Mecca and started for the

* Qasim, 355; Shiu Das, 48a; Khush-hal f. 1010b; Yahya Khan, 129a; K. K. 909.

Dakhin. Ghulam Ali Khan, because he had been the emissary sent to Dihli to bring Muhammad Shah to Agra to be enthroned as Emperor, was spared and protected ; but in a few days made use of an opportunity, and escaped to Abdullah Khan. [Shiu 48a, K. K. 910.]

The death of such a highly placed and powerful noble as Husain Ali Khan gave rise, as usual in such cases, to many myths and legends. One man said he dreamt that he was in the audience-hall of the Imam Husain. Husain Ali Khan, in blood-stained raiment, presented himself at the door. He was brought in with honour, the Imam greeting him with the words : *Balagha wadaḡa, wa ghalaba adaḡa*. Strange to say these words yield, taken as two chronograms, the year of the Sayyid's martyrdom. Other chronograms were found, meaning "The month Muharram of Husain arose anew" and "In the Indian Karbala a second Husain was martyred by a second Yazid."

SEC. 14.—ABDULLAH KHAN HEARS OF HIS BROTHER'S DEATH.

As we have seen, Abdullah Khan left the imperial camp on the 12th Zul Qada (14th September 1720) on his way to Dihli. He halted for a few days at Sikandra near Agra. On the 7th Zul Hijja (9th October 1720) he was at a halting place near Sarai Chath, about forty-eight miles north-west of Agra and about sixty-four miles from Dihli, when at midnight, within eighteen hours of the event, a camel-rider brought the scrap of paper from Ratan Chand announcing the overwhelming news of Husain Ali Khan's assassination. "Revenge was his only thought. Summoning to his presence the nobles in his train, he told them his heart-rending story, beseeching and imploring them to throw in their lot with him. Some from their hearts, others only out of prudence, agreed to stand by him.

A few of the more ardent spirits proposed an immediate trial of strength, before Muhammad Shah could be reinforced, or Husain Ali Khan's troops be bought over by him. But Abdullah Khan, reflecting that Muhammad Shah was in full possession of the throne, while his own army was out of heart, decided that to take the field without any claimant to the throne was undesirable. It was better, he thought, to proceed first to

the capital, there to collect an army, select a candidate, and restore the confidence of his adherents.

That same day the march for Dihli was resumed. Disregarding the attacks of the Mewatis and the Jats, who daily plundered their baggage and slew their camp-followers, they pushed on until they came to Faridabad, twenty-one miles from Dihli. Shujaat-ullah Khan, son-in-law of Abdullah Khan, Murtaza Khan, and Sita Ram, a man in the *Wazir's* confidence, were sent forward in haste to the capital with orders to consult Najm-ud-din Ali Khan, the *Wazir's* brother, and select one of the imprisoned Princes of the house of Taimur for elevation to the throne. Disturbances had broken out at once in the *jagirs* held by the Sayyids, their agents were ejected, and the cultivators refused the instalments of rent due on the autumn harvest.*

SEC. 15.—MUHAMMAD SHAH'S MOVEMENTS.

On the day following Husain Ali Khan's death a formal audience was held by Muhammad Shah. In the interval Muhammad Amin Khan had posted pickets of Mughals to arrest deserters, and instructions were given to the armed villagers to stop any one who tried to leave the camp. In this way many men, though partisans of the Sayyids and anxious to escape, were forced to remain. Muhammad Amin Khan went among them in person to try and secure their adhesion. In spite of his Muhammadan bigotry, he visited the quarters of Rajah Muhkam Singh, one of the Sayyids' principal officers. As the Rajah saw he was in the Mughal's power, he made his submission and at his first audience was presented by Daya Ram, the agent of Muhammad Amin Khan. He was promoted to the rank of 6,000 with the right to beat kettle-drums. Mir Mushrif of Lakhnau, another of the Sayyids' chief men, after rejecting the first overtures made to him, was also propitiated and promoted. Inayat-ullah Khan Kashmiri, the *Khan-saman*, Rajah Gopal Singh Bhadauriya, and twenty-one other nobles laid their offerings at the Emperor's feet.

Muhammad Amin Khan was promoted to 8,000 *zat* and

* Kamwar 214, 238; Warid 163a; Shiu Das, 54a; K. K. 901, 911-913.

was loaded with gifts. Khan Dauran, although at the critical moment his fear of the Sayyids had prevented his declaring himself, received the same exalted rank. The grade of seven thousand had been hitherto the limit for any person not of the blood royal. Qamar-ud-din Khan, Haidar Quli Khan and Saadat Khan were made respectively 7,000, 6,000, and 5,000 in rank. Zafar Khan and Rajah Gopal Singh Bhadauriya also received promotion. To celebrate the Emperor's emancipation from the Sayyid bondage, some poet found a chronogram :

"He was a bright star (*Roshan Akhtar*) and is now a moon ;
Like Joseph he left prison to become a king."

The camp was about seventy-two miles from Agra, about one hundred and twenty-eight miles from Dihli, and the nearest point on the Jamuna, to the north-east, was distant about sixty-eight miles. Under the altered circumstances any further advance in the direction of the Dakhin was useless. There was some doubt and debate as to whether they should return to Agra or make for Dihli. At last it was decided to move northwards till they struck the Jamuna. Churaman Jat, although he owed a great deal to the Sayyid brothers, was for the moment persuaded by the offer of great rewards to join Muhammad Shah with a large force. A cunning answer of his has been preserved. Muhammad Amin Khan said to him : "Thou art a creature of the Sayyids, I have no reliance on thy service or good will." Swearing by his Hindu gods, he replied : "Nawab Sahib ! it is true that those great men have conferred on me such benefits that if I had a thousand lives and a thousand times my wealth, I would have offered up all, including my family and children, on their behalf. But now I am under the imperial flag, the true lodestone, and I swear by Bhagwan I will do such service on the day of battle that the Nawab himself will acknowledge it." He spoke the truth, for on the day of battle he plundered the imperial baggage and the goods of many others. [Qasim 366, Kamwar 236.]

As the route chosen would have passed through Churaman's villages, he persuaded the Emperor to change it. Leaving his own villages on the right, he led them across Jai Singh's territory, and took them over high hills and through thorny

jungles. There was a great scarcity of water: it had to be brought from immense distances and used most sparingly, as if it were oil and not water. Many were unable to quench their thirst and endured great hardships. On the 9th Zul Hijja (11th October 1720) the camp was moved to a place between Bhusawar and Kharida, where the festival of the Sacrifice was celebrated. In answer to a letter from Khan Dauran, written by the Emperor's special order, Sayyid Nusrat Yar Khan Barha, *faujdar* of Mewat, who was on his way to the army on a summons from Husain Ali Khan, presented himself and was well received, and promoted to the rank of 7,000. Sabit Jang (Jafar Beg), a protégé of Khan Dauran's, was another valuable adhesion. He joined a little later, just before the battle of Hasanpur. When the dust raised by his march was seen across the Jamuna, all exclaimed: "Rajah Girdhar Bahadur has come!" He and his men then crossed the river by a ford. Dost Ali Khan, Abid Khan, and Ghalib Khan, formerly superintendent of branding for the Emperor's own troops, all three officers of the late Husain Ali Khan's army, also came in, submitted, and were promoted.*

On the 11th (13th October 1720) there were many presentations with the attendant promotions and appointments; and on this day the biers of Husain Ali Khan, Ghairat Khan, and Nur-ullah Khan, after the bodies had been wrapped in cloth of gold, were despatched for burial of the bodies at Ajmer in the tomb of Abdullah Khan, the Nawab's father, which lies outside the city wall close to Abdullahganj. At the time fixed, no bearers to carry the biers could be found; and after this difficulty had been overcome, robbers, believing that the coffins contained treasure, seized them, but finding nothing threw the bodies away. After a time they were recovered by the *faujdar*s of those parts, and in the end, as was reported privately, they reached Ajmer and were buried.†

* Qasim, second recension, 429; Shiu Das, 50, 51b, 2a; Khush-hal f. 1014a; Rustam Ali, f. 245a; K. K. 910.

† Khafi Khan, 910, on the authority of Sayyid Abdullah Khan himself, who made the statement several times in open audience in Khafi Khan's hearing. See also *Jauhar-i-samsam*, B.M. Oriental MS. No. 1898, (Fuller's

The Emperor's next stages were Ramgarh (12th) and Gopalpur (13th). Here Saadat Khan was further promoted to 6,000 and named to the Government of Akbarabad. Other stages were Mandugarh (15th), Malkahri (21st); next a place between Jalauri and Malikpur (22nd), then near Khorī (23rd), Salgaon (25th), Qasba Kama (27th), and between Nandgaon and Barsana (28th). All towns, such as Narnol, Alwar, Tijara and Khohari had been avoided.*

At Barsana on the 2nd Muharram 1133 H. (2nd November 1720) Muhammad Khan Bangash, at the head of two or three thousand men, and Aziz Khan Bahadur Chaghatai, appeared from Akbarabad. Before Husain Ali Khan's death, Muhammad Khan had sought an interview with Abdullah Khah while he was still near Agra, at which he demanded fifty thousand Rupees in addition to previous advances. He then, though very reluctantly, began his march, professedly to join the imperial army already on its way to the Dakhin. Both officers had come as far as Sarai Chath on the direct road from Agra to Dihli. Their attitude was doubtful; and if they were hostile, they could bar the Emperor's way to Dihli. Abdullah Khan, who was Muhammad Khan's patron, had also called to his mind the benefits he had received, trying to win him over thus to his cause.† So grave were the apprehensions of the other side, that Haidar Quli Khan and Qamar-ud-din Khan were sent to interview the Bangash chief. Their mission was successful, and they brought the two Afghan nobles into the imperial camp. In addition to promotion in rank, Muhammad Khan received an assignment of four *krors* of *dams* on the revenues of Allahabad. *Parganas* Pali, Baira, and Bawan of *sarkar*

translation, MS. 30,784, f. 79) and Rustam Ali, fol. 244a. Mr. Eustace Kitts, formerly Assistant Commissioner at Ajmer, informs me that Abdullahganj and the tombs lie outside the town to the east, not far from where the Railway station now is.

* Kamwar 236, Qasim 367. All the above places, except Mandugarh and Salgaon, will be found on the *Indian Atlas*, sheet No. 50.

† For the letter see Sahib Rai *Khujista-kalam*, Irvine MS. There is a detailed account of the adventures of Abdullah Khan's messengers in *Siwanih-i-Khizri*, Irvine MS. pp. 68-72.

Khairabad, and *pargana* Harha and part of Sandila in *sarkar* Lakhnau, all in *subah* Oudh, were granted to Aziz Khan.

At Pahari, Sher Afkan Khan Panipati, the *faujdar* of Kora and Jahanabad, *subah* Allahabad, also marched in and joined the imperialists. When near Agra, on his way from Allahabad to his *jagirs* at Sikandra, he had met some messengers riding from Court, and asked the news. They told him that two days previously Husain Ali Khan had been killed. Khush-hal Chand, who was near his elephant, saw his face flush with joy at the emancipation of Muhammad Shah, the son of his old master, Jahan Shah. Not long after this, a letter came to him from Nawab Qudsiya, the Emperor's mother, written by her own hand, in which he was distinguished with the epithet "brother". Other arrivals were Bayazid Khan Mewati, a powerful man in that country, and Khema Jat, one of Churaman's chief officers. This Jat was placed in charge of the imperial rear-guard.*

One of Muhammad Shah's first tasks had been the issue of reassuring letters to the provincial governors, and demands for reinforcements from those known to be opposed to the Sayyid faction. Among the men written to were Nizam-ul-mulk, Rajah Girdhar Bahadur, Rajah Jai Singh Sawai, and Abdus-samad Khan, the governor of Lahor. To a certain extent these letters were in identical terms,† and as was natural, a note of triumph is perceptible in them. "Praise be to God! Husain Ali Khan has obtained the punishment of his deeds and the penalty for his acts; his suppression and removal, as my heart desired, has been effected in the easiest manner," and so on, in the same strain, then the date and place of assassination are given, with other details added, Ghairat Khan appearing as the "Devoid of Honour."‡ Husain Ali Khan's head was

* Kamwar 237; Shiu Das 57b; Khafi Khan 900, 920; Khush-hal f. 1012b. For the *parganas* named see *Ain*, ii. 176, 177, 178, 179, and *Oudh Gazetteer*, i. 247; ii. 72; iii. 50, 292.

† For one of these *farmans* see *Majma-ul-insha* (lithographed edition), p. 85, to the effect that H. A. K. was killed on the 6th Zul Hijja of the 2nd year, when Ghairat Khan and Mir Mushrif attacked the imperial camp, but were repulsed and slain.

‡ *Be-ghairat*, a play upon his name.

sent with the letter to Nizam-ul-mulk, and that noble was called upon to march at once to join His Majesty. Girdhar Bahadur, Jai Singh, and Abdus-samad Khan were, in the same way, urged to join as soon as possible. [Shiu 49a.]

In answer to these orders Rajah Jai Singh, instead of coming in person, sent his *diwan*, Jag Ram, with a force of three or four thousand men, horse and foot, and wrote that he was busy enlisting more men, and as soon as this was finished he would attend himself. Abdus-samad Khan replied that without delay he had begun to prepare for a march. But lately he had been forced to suppress a revolt by Husain Khan, head of the Afghans of Qasur, and for the pay of the troops he had enlisted on that service he still owed four *lakhs* of Rupees. The soldiers had mutinied and hindered him from marching. The *diwan* of the province, in spite of his, the governor's, offering to execute a bond, would not disburse the money from the imperial treasury. Until some order was issued or provision made for the money, he was unable to move. Girdhar Bahadur promised a speedy arrival, and Nizam-ul-mulk reported that he was about to start. [Shiu 49a, K. K. 921].

SEC. 17.—ABDULLAH KHAN REMONSTRATES.

As soon as he learnt of his brother's death, and before he resumed his march to Dihli, Abdullah Khan addressed a letter of complaint to the Emperor. It was couched in the customary language of respect. After referring to the disturbances in the Dakhin and Lahor, reports of which had already been laid before His Majesty, and the arrangements made by which Husain Ali Khan, his younger brother, undertook the former business and he himself had started to take charge of the capital, Abdullah Khan goes on to say: "Although separation from my younger brother was distasteful to me, still in obedience to the exalted order, we made no objection, and of the two brothers one set out for the capital, the other for the Dakhin, in attendance on Your Majesty. This faithful one was still on his journey and had not yet arrived at Dihli, when finding their chance and seeing my brother alone, men acting unfairly and without justification from the law, have done him, Ghairat Khan, and the

son of Nawab Auliya, to death in Your Majesty's very encampment, and all their goods and property have been plundered. O *Qibla* of the world and its inhabitants! may you be preserved! If so be that all this has been carried out by Your Majesty's order, and these men have done all this harm, and spilt all this blood, by your direction, there is nothing further to be said. What has a slave to say against the order of his master? But if it was not done by your order, and they of themselves did these vile deeds, I rely on your acting according to justice and equity by ordering the murderers to be imprisoned, so that they may not escape. This faithful one and the heirs of the deceased are coming. We rest assured that this complaint will be dealt with before Your Majesty according to the precepts of the Holy Law. This devoted one's prayer is that until he arrives they be not be released. If, by any chance, any one asks for their release, let not the request be granted." [Shiu, 54a.]

Muhammad Shah answered by asseverating his extreme grief and regret at recent events; God alone knew the extent to which he felt them. By God's help, Haidar Beg Khan, the culprit, had been killed on the spot. "By God's name I swear that I knew absolutely nothing of this affair. When the outbreak occurred, strict injunctions, such as were appropriate, were issued; but as that wretch had carried out his purpose, they were of no avail. Haidar Beg Khan is dead, the names of the others are not known, nor do you give those names. If you write precise details, action will be taken. The extreme loyalty and the clearness of the thoughts of that Pillar of the State are more evident than the sun itself, and are impressed on my heart. By the aid of God I, too, will soon reach that place; that Loyal One also purposes to come to the Presence. If it please the Lord Most High, this matter will then be decided in the most perfect and satisfactory manner according to the Holy Law and to Justice." [Shiu 55a.]

After a little time had elapsed, and the rumours of Abdullah Khan's preparations grew louder, the Emperor addressed a *farman* to him. His Majesty was still awaiting his arrival at Court, as promised in his letter, and had looked for him every

day. "Now comes the unexpected report that he has hurried off to Dihli, has brought a royal Prince from the State prison, has placed him on the throne and enlisted a great army. If the cause of this conduct be the death of his brother, (although against God's decrees man is helpless), the Holy Law provides for retaliation (*qisas*). Through God's favour the man in fault has received his punishment. If at first, owing to human weakness, angry thoughts arose, he must now submit himself to God's decrees. To place reliance on an army and cannon is not only to resist God's vicegerent, but is unfitted to the character of such a mighty noble. Let him come himself to the Presence, and whatever he wishes shall be done. He has not made any application. Let him come without delay and lay his case, in his own way, before His Majesty. His Majesty has no other thought than his subjects' welfare, and his heartfelt desire is that such a nobleman may not come to be evil-spoken of among the people. Thus it is fitting for him to give attentive ear to these words ; and having understood them and well reflected, let him act accordingly." [Shiu 56a.]

To this admonishment Abdullah Khan sent a final answer. "Certainly this true one's arrival in the presence of that Source of Beneficence will be to him a joy equal to that of the worship of God. But the things which happened to *Amir-ul-umara*, the brother of this one of lowliest qualities, are apparent to Your Majesty. If this faithful slave had been at Court, he, too, would have undergone the same ; nay, God alone knows what might have occurred. From these causes, this slave sees no safe course or refuge for himself except in turning his face away from Your Majesty's presence. Although a sovereign is God's vicegerent upon earth, still that power is deputed to him only for the welfare and protection of created beings. If there were safety where Your Majesty is, how were it possible for a lowly thing like me to disobey the exalted order. Guardian of the Realm ! Muhammad Ibrahim, too, is of Your Majesty's family and brethren. Yea verily, in him I have provided an instrument for my safety. If it please the Most High God, in a short time, attending on his stirrup, we shall be honoured with the felicity of an audience, and the true state of the matter

will be laid before you. To say more would be to transgress the rules of politeness." In these more or less ironical terms the gauntlet was thrown down by Abdullah Khan before Muhammad Shah and his supporters. [Shiu 56b.]

SEC. 18.—PRINCE MUHAMMAD IBRAHIM RAISED TO THE THRONE.

Abdullah Khan's letter to his brother, Najm-ud-din Ali Khan, instructing him to begin enlistments, reached Dihli late on the 8th Zul Hijja 1132 H. (October 10th, 1720). Before the bad news could spread, he gave out a report the very contrary of the truth, and sent the head of the police with cavalry and infantry to the house of Muhammad Amin Khan. By midnight the house had been surrounded. But Muhammad Amin Khan's people had by this time learnt the truth, and, erecting defences, had made ready for resistance, rejoicing and singing all the while, and announcing to everybody what had really happened.

The news spread like wildfire through every street and lane of the city. Soon, either a note came from Abdullah Khan forbidding interference with the women and family of Muhammad Amin Khan, or else Najm-ud-din Ali Khan changed his mind. At any rate, the troops investing the house were withdrawn. During the night the death occurred of Kesu Rai, husband of Ratan Chand's sister, and himself chief official of the Dihli *subahdar*; and although he had been then on his death-bed for several days, it was given out that he had poisoned himself. On the day of the *Id* (10th Zul Hijja, October 12th, 1720), Najm-ud-din Ali Khan attended the great mosque, his eyes full of tears, and as he was returning home, Abdullah Khan's emissaries greeted him.

Forthwith he repaired to the prison-house of the Princes and sent men to the dwelling of Jahandar Shah's sons. At first the Princes shut their gates in the faces of the messengers, but after a long altercation, admission was accorded. On learning their purpose, the Princes gave a harshly expressed refusal. Some say the messengers next addressed themselves to Neku-siyar, and were again repulsed. Lastly, proposals were made

to Prince Ibrahim, from whom they met with a more favourable reception. [K. K. 913-14.]

Before Abdullah Khan arrived at Dihli, Prince Ibrahim was brought out of prison and placed upon the throne, the *khutba* was recited with the titles Abul Fath Zahir-ud-din Muhammad Ibrahim, and coin was issued in his name. On the latter the inscription was:—

Sikḥa bar sim zad dar jahan

Ba fazl-i-Muhammad Ibrahim, Shah-i-shahan.

Silver was stamped in the world

By favour of Muhammad Ibrahim, king of kings.

This enthronement took place on the 15th Zul Hijja, 1132 H. (October 15th, 1720). The Prince, then about twenty-three years of age, was the eldest son of Rafi-ush-shan, third son of the Emperor Bahadur Shah; and was therefore the brother of the Emperors Rafi-ud-darjat and Rafi-ud-daulah. He* had been designated by the Sayyids as the latter's successor, but Sayyid Khan Jahan, *subahdar* of Dihli, with whom the final choice rested, dreading Ibrahim's reputation for violent temper, had substituted Roshan Akhtar, now become Muhammad Shah. [K. K. 914, Qasim 361, Warid 161a.]

Two days after the enthronement of the new sovereign, Abdullah Khan reached the capital, and possession was taken of the imperial treasury. The money found there, added to Abdullah Khan's own accumulations and Ratan Chand's hoards, which were now dug up, was devoted to enlisting an army. It is said that over one *krūr* of Rupees was disbursed

*The *Jam-i-jam*, a modern work, places his birth on the 26th Rabi I. 1115 H. (August 9th, 1703), thus making him the youngest of the three brothers. It also gives him the same mother, Nur-un-nissa Begam, and assigns the enthronement to the 28th Zul Hijja, 1132 H. (October 28th, 1720). As however, Danishmand Khan's *Bahadur Shah-nama*, under date of 7th Ramzan, 1119 H. (December 2nd, 1707), tells us Prince Ibrahim was then given the rank of 7000, (2000 horse), he could hardly have been born later than 1107 H. (1695-6), twelve years being the earliest age at which *mansabs* were granted to Princes. The *Tarikh-i-Muhammadi* gives his age at his death in 1159 H. (1746) as about fifty; this places his birth in 1109 H. (1697-8), and makes his age twenty-three at his accession. On the other hand, Rustam Ali *Tarikh-i-Hind*, f. 246b, says he was then forty.

in the next few days. Urgent orders were sent out far and near, and every Barha Sayyid, whether in the service or not, made it a point of honour to appear. Many Jats, Mewatis, and Rajputs had been collected on the way back to Dihli. As much as thirty thousand or forty thousand Rupees were advanced to each leader to meet the demands of new troops. Asked why he was scattering so much money, Abdullah Khan replied: "If I win, the realm and its treasures are mine; if otherwise, it is better to give the money away than let it fall into the hands of my enemies." For a man with one horse the pay was eighty Rupees, with two horses, one hundred and fifty Rupees a month. Each foot-soldier received ten Rupees for the same period. On enlistment payment was made for one or two months in advance. Every animal, whatever its size or condition, was branded and taken into the service, donkeys only being refused. Every man who presented himself, whatever his antecedents, was accepted as a recruit. [K. K. 914-17, Shiu 55b, Qasim 361.]

In the end this liberal increase of pay to the troops produced as much harm as benefit. The increase was made recklessly, without regard to the man's length of service, the old soldier receiving no more than one newly enlisted. The veterans were disgusted at being treated the same as the recruits, and men-at-arms with good horses worth two or three hundred Rupees were angry at receiving no more pay than any butcher, cook or cotton-carder who presented himself, mounted on some wretched pony that he had picked up for ten or fifteen Rupees. This carelessness was especially prevalent in Najm-ud-din Ali Khan's division, and many of the bazar loungers, as soon as they had received their month's pay in advance, were seen no more; nay, many of the regular soldiery disappeared in the same way. In spite of the immense expenditure, it was noticed that the private servants and clerks of Prince Ibrahim had no saddles for their horses.

In a few days as many as fifty thousand men had been registered. The force was poorly provided with artillery, having only a few large guns, about two hundred small field-pieces (*rahkala*), and five-hundred swivel-guns (*jazair*). In their

boastful way the Sayyids said that cannon were not needed ; they meant at the very first onset to come to close quarters. Khafi Khan, from the Bakhshi's records, to which he had access, and also from what Abdullah Khan told him, found that there were over ninety thousand horsemen recorded ; out of this number perhaps fourteen or fifteen thousand new men with ponies, or other miscellaneous levies, had disappeared. This account does not include Churaman Jat's, and Rajah Muhkam Singh's men, nor the fugitives of Husain Ali Khan's army and the *zamindari* contingents. It was the general estimate that one hundred to one hundred and thirty-five thousand men were assembled. [K. K. 918, Qasim 362.]

Ghazi-ud-din Khan Ghalib Jang, who since Farrukh-siyar's death had retired into private life, was won over by Abdullah Khan. He was flattered and styled "brother," and brought back with the rank of 7000 (7000 horse *duaspa*), the title of Amir-ul-umara, and the office of first *Bakhshi*. Great efforts were made by the other side to detach him from the Sayyid's party, as can be seen from the long letter addressed to him by Amin-ud-din Khan Sambhali, who had once more come to the front. Abdullah Khan, he wrote, could only collect the same troops that had already fled in a cowardly manner after Husain Ali Khan's death ; it was a true saying, "Beaten once will be beaten again," and the common people looked on the easy destruction of the one brother as an omen for the speedy defeat of the other. Is not the voice of the people a sign from God ?* In spite of these arguments, Ghazi-ud-din Khan was steadfast in upholding the Sayyid.†

Another adherent of some note was Hamid Khan, nicknamed "Jangali Shahzada" or Rustic Prince, uncle of Nizam-ul-mulk and cousin of Muhammad Amin Khan Chin, the new *Wazir*. Although so nearly related to the leader of the opposite

* *Halq-i-khalq, kos-i-Khaliq*, literally : 'The throat of the created, the drum of the Creator,' i.e., *Vox populi vox Dei*.

† Shiu Das, 55b ; Mhd. Qasim Lahori, 362 ; *Inshae Yar Muhammad*, p. 44.

side, Hamid Khan was on very bad terms with his cousin, and he was thus willing enough to support his cousin's enemies.*

Najm-ud-din Ali Khan was promoted to 7000 (7000 horse), and made second *Bakhshi*; Sayyid Salabat Khan, son of Sayadat Khan, and Bairam Khan, son of Ruhullah Khan Nimat Ilahi, were made third and fourth *Bakhshis*. Saif-ud-din Ali Khan, who arrived from Muradabad when his brother Abdullah Khan was at Palwal, was promoted to 5000, (5000 horse). Other promotions were those of Shahamat Khan (Sayyid Taj Mahmud), 5000 (5000 horse); Sayyid Rafaat Khan, 7000 (7000 horse); Itibar Khan, Darya Khan, Shaikh Sibghat-ullah Khan (alias Shaikhu) Lakhnawi, who joined with four sons, Sayyid Muzaffar Ali Khan, Sayyid Akbar Ali Khan, Said Muhammad Khan, Masum Khan, Rustam Ali Khan, Sayadat Khan. [Shiu 55b, Qasim 363, K. K. 914.]

Even men who had been in disgrace with the Sayyids were offered employment. Among them Itiqad Khan (Mhd. Murad Kashmiri); Mhd. Yar Khan, former governor of Dihli; Shaista Khan and Saif-ullah Khan, two connections of the late Emperor Farrukh-siyar; and the two brothers Islam Khan, once Mir Atash, and Safi Khan, lately commandant of Agra fort. Muhammad Yar Khan, Islam Khan and Safi Khan declined, but Itiqad Khan and Saif-ullah Khan accepted *mansabs* and money to pay troops. As, however, Itiqad Khan was not treated according to his pretensions, he returned to Dihli after he had marched a stage or two. [K. K. 915.]

By the 26th Zul Hijja (October 28th, 1720) Abdullah Khan's camp was formed just outside Dihli in the direction of the

* Muhammad Qasim Lahori, 363. The nickname above-noted explains what Tod, *Annals*, ii. 100, could not understand, viz., the presence of a Prince with the Mahrattas in Ahmadabad, Hamid Khan figuring as an ally of those plunderers a few years after this time. For authorities see Khush-hal f. 1012a, and *Sharaf-i-usmani*, Irvine MS., p. 319. The name was one given him by Farrukh-siyar's courtiers. One day in the imperial hunting preserves Hamid Khan dismounted and, rushing forward, shouted, "Long live the Emperor!" and made his obeisance. The explanation leaves us nearly as much in the dark as before; I presume there was some breach of etiquette involved, which laid him open to the depreciatory epithet, B.M. MS., 1832, f. 33a.

Idgah.* He moved on the 1st Muharram, 1133 H. (November 1st, 1720) from Sarai Sahil to the Qutb, and then next day to Sarai Bakhtawar Khan. Abdullah Khan's first intention had been to wait near the capital the attack of the other side, supposed then to be marching through the Rajput States. But he soon learnt that the Emperor was not advancing direct upon the capital, while the nearness of the city facilitated the secret return of the soldiers to their homes. He therefore changed his direction. Ghulam Ali Khan, who had escaped from Muhammad Shah's camp, was left behind in charge of Dihli, having with him Najabat Ali Khan, nephew and adopted son of Abdullah Khan, a boy of fourteen years of age.

On the 10th (November 10th, 1720) camp was at Faridabad ; they then moved on to Palwal, where he was joined by Saif-uddin Ali Khan, Shahamat Khan, his sons and relations, Sayyid Muhammad Khan, the eldest son of Asad-ullah Khan, Nawab Auliya, and Zulfiqar Ali Khan. The last two had been sent up by Husain Ali Khan to raise a corps of Barha Sayyids for service in the Dakhin. They brought in over twelve thousand horsemen. In their train came cartload after cartload of Sayyids who although unable to raise a horse to ride on, were eager for the fray and looked forward to the day when they would be riders on elephants. Finally Abdullah Khan fixed on Bilochpur, a village close to the Jamuna in *pargana* Palwal, as the place at which he intended to give battle. The inhabitants were turned out of the villages, and he entrenched himself. [Shiu 57, 68a ; K. K. 917.]

At this time the strain upon Abdullah Khan's mind was so great that, meaning to say one thing he would utter something else. If he asked a question no one listened, and if he wanted a thing no one brought it. The men round him had quite lost their heads. This was seen by what happened at the Qutb. Following an old custom, Prince Ibrahim was taken to that shrine to have a turban bound round his head. The same was

* The old Idgah is about three-fourths of a mile from the city wall, and to the west of it ; see Constable's *Hand Atlas*, plate 47. Yahya Khan, f. 129b, says the first march was towards the Qutb, and Khafi Khan, 917, places the move to the Idgah on the 17th Zul Hijja.

done to Abdullah Khan. A sword was then attached to the Emperor's waist, followed by a prostration at the Khwaja's shrine. It was usual when an Emperor went forth to war to loosen the string of a bow and place it near the blessed shrine. If the string returned of itself to its place, it was a sign of coming victory. Someone reminded Abdullah Khan of this observance. A bow was sought for, and the demand for one became known even outside the shrine. They waited from half to three quarters of an hour, but no attention was paid to the order, and no bow was brought. [Yahya 129b.]

Before the armies met there were many desertions from Muhammad Shah's army, and the scattered soldiers of Husain Ali Khan began to rally round his brother. Rajah Muhkam Singh Khatri, after collecting as many as he could of the secret adherents of the Sayyids, fled from the Emperor's camp at midnight, leaving his tents standing and all his property behind. With him came Bahadur Khan, Ghaus Khan, Sayyid Kamal Khan, Sayyid Muhammad Khan, and others. Churaman Jat, in response to letters sent him by Abdullah Khan, had also deserted Muhammad Shah earlier and had begun to plunder, he and his advisers holding that in case of the Sayyids' defeat, it would be much easier to secure pardon from Muhammad Shah, than it would be, in the reverse case, to save themselves from the Sayyids' vengeance. The Jat brought in with him several elephants and horses that he had taken. This booty was offered to Abdullah Khan but returned as a gift to the captor. To Churaman was confided the duty of harassing the imperial force and plundering wherever he could. His orders were to blow up, if possible, the imperial powder magazines or carry off the draught oxen of the gun carriages. But in this he was foiled by the watchful care of Haidar Quli Khan. [Shiu 58a ; K. K. 919-21 ; *Siwanih* 67, 76.]

SEC. 19.—THE EMPEROR MUHAMMAD SHAH'S ADVANCE.

We left Muhammad Shah encamped (October 30th, 1720) between Nandgaon and Barsana, about twenty miles from the Jamuna. In that poorly watered country it was imperative to acquire as speedily as possible a position commanding access

to that river. They marched ten miles north-east to Deothan on the 3rd Muharram, 1133 H. (November 3rd, 1720). Two days afterwards they moved another twelve miles to Majhwi on the Jamuna. The heavy baggage was sent back to Shergarh, a village owned by Biloch zamindars, six or seven miles to the rear, and some of the greater nobles and richer traders sent their families and dependants to the town of Mathura, over thirty miles away to the south. On the 11th Muharram camp was moved northwards six miles to near Shahpur, and again on the 12th (November 12th, 1720) five miles farther to a place near Hasanpur. Bilochpur, Abdullah Khan's position, is about six miles to the north of Hasanpur. Both places are on the right bank of the Jamuna in *pargana* Palwal.*

SEC. 20.—PREPARATIONS FOR BATTLE.

The force told off to take the field with Muhammad Shah was under the command of Muhammad Amin Khan and his son Qamar-ud-din Khan, Haidar Quli Khan, general of artillery, Khan Dauran, Sher Afkan Khan, Hizbar Khan, Hizbar Afkan Khan and Amin-ud-din Sambhali. Haidar Quli Khan went on in advance of the main body for several miles, and placed his artillery in a strongly entrenched position. The rear-guard with camp and baggage was left in charge of Rajah Gopal Singh Bhadauriya, Rajah Bahadur Rathor, of Kishngarh,† Jag Ram, *diwan* of Rajah Jai Singh Sawai, Mir Jumla, Mir Inayat-ullah Khan, Ikhlas Khan, Zafar Khan, Roshan-ud-daulah, Muhammad Khan Bangash, Aziz Khan Chaghatai and Mir Mushrif. These leaders had under them 37,000 horsemen. The total numbers are not given, but three of the other contingents amounted to 27,000 horsemen; and Khafi Khan estimates Muhammad Shah's army at less than half that of Abdullah Khan. [Shiu 58b, K. K. 921, *Bayan* 42, Khush-hal 1013b.]

* Shiu Das, *f.* 58a; the *Bayan-i-waqi*, 431, says that Rajah Muhkam Singh, and the others already referred to, joined Abdullah Khan in the night between the 12th and 13th Muharram. According to the *Ahwal-ul-khawaqin*, 177a, the armies met in the plain of Dholkot, for which see *Indian Atlas*, sheet 49, S. W.

† Khush-hal 1013b, says "of Rupnagar."

Khan Dauran, Samsam-ud-daulah, commanded on the left wing, supported by Nusrat Yar Khan, Sabit Khan, Sayadat Khan and others ; while the right rested on the river. The wings of the centre were under Azam Khan, and its advance guard under Qamar-ud-din Khan, Azim-ullah Khan, and Tali Yar Khan. The centre was held by Muhammad Amin Khan, the new *Wazir*, Sher Afkan Khan, Hadi Khan, and Tarbiyat Khan. In reserve were Asad Ali Khan, Saif-ullah Khan, Mahamid Khan, Amin-ud-din Khan, and the contingent of Rajah Jai Singh Sawai, ready to reinforce either the right or left wings as might be necessary, and to protect the imperial harem. [*Ibid.*]

On Abdullah Khan's side, after many changes of plan, positions were assigned to the several commanders for the morrow's battle. Round the *ex-Wazir* gathered all the Barha Sayyids who had flocked to the assistance of their clansman, those who had no horses marching on foot round his elephant. Abdullah Khan took command on his right, where he was opposed to Khan Dauran ; making over the left, where less danger was anticipated, to Ghazi-ud-din Khan, the new Mir Bakhshi. At the head of the artillery and the vanguard Najm-ud-din Ali Khan was placed, aided by Saif-ud-din Ali Khan, Sayyid Muhammad Khan, Shahamat Khan, Tahavvar Ali Khan, Shujaat-ullah Khan, Zulfiqar Ali Khan, Abdun-nabi Khan, and Muzaffar Khan. [K. K. 918, *Bayan* 433.]

There was great difficulty in forcing the Sayyids into any sort of subordination, no one of them being ready to serve under another, and thus the two wings could not be properly constituted, each man taking up his position where it seemed best to himself. Other leaders who took the field for Sultan Ibrahim and Abdullah Khan were Hamid Khan, Saif-ullah Khan, Bairam Khan, Nimat-ullah Khan, Amir Khan, Sayyid Salabat Khan, Abdul-ghani Khan, Ikhlas Khan Afghan, Umar Khan Rohela, Dindar Khan, Abdul-qadir Khan, Sibghat-ullah Khan, (*alias* Shaikhu) of Lakhnau, Ghulam Muhi-ud-din Khan, Diler Khan, Shuja Khan Palwali, and Abdullah Khan Tarin. In all there were seventy chieftains riding on elephants.

Abdullah Khan's own division numbered twenty-five thousand horsemen under command of his *Bakhshis*, Abul Hasan Khan, Sayyid Ali Khan, and Hiranman. With the other details we have a total of forty thousand horse and eighteen thousand foot. The rest of the army, consisting chiefly of new levies, was left behind in charge of the baggage and of Prince Ibrahim. Rajah Mukham Singh Khatri, who had escaped from the imperial camp the night before the battle, commanded in the rear, with orders to support the new troops, whose staunchness was doubted. With the Rajah were Khudadad Khan, Khan Mirza, and the seven or eight hundred horsemen who had followed him in his flight. [K. K. 923, *Siwanih* 78.]

During the night Abdullah Khan sent out Tahavvar Ali Khan and Sayyid Zulfiqar Ali Khan to reconnoitre. At a little distance from the imperialist camp they came across some Rohela horsemen. Tahavvar Ali, on being challenged, went forward and declared himself to be one of Nusrat Yar Khan Barha's men, and that he had been sent by Khan Dauran to spy out the position of Abdullah Khan. He went on talking till Zulfiqar Ali Khan and his men rode up. Three of the Rohelas were captured, two escaped. Afraid of pursuit, the Sayyid made off with the prisoners to his own camp. About midnight the prisoners were produced before Abdullah Khan, and in answer to his questions they said they belonged to the force of Aziz Khan Chaghatai, that Bayazid Khan Mewati was in charge of the rear tents and the pavilion of the Emperor. Owing to the Jats having plundered during the preceding day in the rear of the camp and carried off some elephants, Muhammand Amin Khan had ordered Afghan patrols to be sent out. That night it was the turn of Aziz Khan, who sent out these men with orders to announce at once the approach of any Jats. Aziz Khan himself lay in ambush with one thousand men. The Bangash Afghans and Saadat Khan were on the left wing. Haidar Quli Khan, with the artillery, was in advance of the main body. This was the story got from the prisoners.

Abdullah Khan sent for one of his officers, Umar Khan Rohela, to interrogate the men further. They told him of the gifts and honours conferred on Aziz Khan, and that he had

brought with him over six thousand Mewati Afghans. The Jats, they said, were for ever plundering, and the Rohelas, being held equally proficient in the art of robbery, had been ordered out as videttes. The talk went on for several hours, mostly in the Afghan tongue. The men were then rewarded and released. [Siwanih 79.]

SEC. 21.—THE BATTLE OF HASANPUR.

Early in the morning of Wednesday, the 13th Muharram, 1133 H. (November 13th, 1720), before the sun rose, Muhammad Shah mounted his elephant Padshah-pasand and took his place in the centre. In the Emperor's immediate retinue were Sayyid Ikram Ali Khan and Shaikh Ghaffar-ullah with the red and the yellow regiments, the Bhil and Karnatik matchlockmen, the mace-bearers and the *Ahadis* (gentlemen-troopers). Haidar Quli Khan was sent on ahead with the strong artillery force under his command, while Khan Dauran and Sabit Khan were ordered to follow and support him with the left wing. Muhammad Khan Bangash and Saadat Khan were sent towards the river and the rear. Round His Majesty's person were the new *Wazir* Muhammad Amin Khan and his son Qamar-ud-din Khan, Dil-diler Khan, Sher Afkan Khan, Hizbar Afkan Khan and others. Zafar Khan, Fakhr-ud-din Khan, his brother, Rajah Raj Bahadur of Kishnagarh, Nusrat Yar Khan, Jag Ram, Jai Singh's *diwan*, Aziz Khan, Mir Mushrif, and Rajah Gopal Singh Bhadauriya, were placed in charge of the main camp, which was at a distance of one *kos* from the position taken up by the Emperor. The prisoner, Ratan Chand, was now sent for. He was brought before the Emperor on an elephant; he was then made to dismount and was at once executed. The severed head was thrown before the Emperor's elephant and trodden under foot. [Shiu 59b, Kamwar 240, K. K. 924-28, Khush-hal 1013b.]

Churaman Jat, who was hovering near the army on the west, cut off many followers and penetrated into the camp. But the above-named Rajahs drove him out again. Next the Jats attacked on the south, whence they carried off some private goods and part of the imperial baggage. Zafar Khan, Muzaffar

Khan, and Muhammad Khan Bangash once more repelled them. They then made a further attempt on the east side. Here Mir Mushrif and Alwi Khan Tarin, of Lakhnau, met and defeated them. But the uproar was so great, that the camp-followers and traders in their fright jumped into the Jamuna and tried to swim across it, many losing their lives in the attempt. By three o'clock the baggage camp was moved to a safer place, and the confusion continuing, it was again moved still farther off. [Shiu 60a.]

When Najm-ud-din Ali Khan, at the head of the Sayyid vanguard,* appeared in the distance from the direction of the river, Haidar Quli Khan, the imperial *Mir Atash*, moved out his cannon into the open and encountered the advancing enemy with a storm of balls from his big guns and his field-pieces. The fire was so continuous and heavy that the artillery of the other side was silenced. After every volley Haidar Quli Khan urged on his men by lavish gifts of gold and silver. As the artillery advanced the rest of the army followed and occupied the ground. Stimulated by their commander's liberality the gunners worked zealously, and a second set of guns were loaded by the time the first were discharged. Khan Dauran's troops moved in support of the imperial artillery, Sanjar Khan and Dost Ali Khan, in command of that noble's guns, particularly distinguishing themselves. The latter was wounded in the foot. Sayyid Nusrat Yar Khan and Sabit Khan also took a leading part, while Saadat Khan and Muhammad Khan Bangash created a diversion on the left. During the day a rocket fell on Sayyid Abdullah Khan's powder magazine, exploding it and causing much loss of life. [Khush-hal 1015b, Shiu 59b.]

Throughout the day of the 13th the battle was chiefly one of artillery. The brunt of the fighting on Abdullah Khan's side was borne by his brother Najm-ud-din Ali Khan, who was commanding his vanguard. Originally the Sayyids had intended to

* Khush-hal, *f.* 1014a, b, has a different distribution of commands. Shahamat Khan he puts in the vanguard, and Saif-ud-din Ali Khan at the head of the artillery. Najm-ud-din Khan was, he says, on the right wing, and Ghazi-ud-din Khan Kosa in charge of the left.

rely on a general onset. But Rajah Muhkam Singh, who had deserted from the imperialists, dissuaded them, pointing out that to charge down on such a powerful artillery as the other side possessed would be to expose themselves to destruction. Their own small supply of guns ought, he said, to be entrenched in a good position on the edge of some ravine, and there they could await the favour of events. Although Muhkam Singh had acquired in the Dakhin the highest reputation as a soldier, his advice was not adopted. The Sayyids' artillery was placed on a high mound under the shelter of some trees near a deserted village, and they tried to subdue the other side's fire to the extent of their ability. One of their shot passed to the left of Muhammad Shah's elephant, at two or three yards' distance and close to Khush-hal Chand, the historian's horse, he being on the right side of Sher Afkan Khan. It struck the ground two arrows' flight off, ricocheted a little, and wounded a horseman. [Qasim 374, Khush-hal 1015.]

In the field the usual scattered fighting with charges and countercharges went on all day, and at one time it looked as if the imperialists would give way. But Khan Dauran, Sayyid Nusrat Yar Khan, Sabit Khan, Dost Ali Khan, Sayyid Hamid Khan and Asad Ali Khan, by redoubled exertions, prevented a catastrophe. Finding he needed reinforcements, Khan Dauran sent a eunuch to the Emperor, who detached Sher Afkan Khan from the centre to his relief. Some of the Sayyids' field-pieces were taken, and the remainder were forced to move from their sheltered position under the trees. Among those who lost their lives were Shaikh Sibghat-ullah of Lakhnau, three sons, and seventy of his men; Abdul-qadir Khan Tatthawi, nephew of Qazi Mir Bahadur-Shahi, Abdul-ghani Khan (son of Abdur-rahim Khan Alamgiri), Ghulam Muhi-ud-din Khan, and the son of Shuja Khan Palwali. Many soldiers were also slain.*

Abdullah Khan had decided to single out for attack the force under Sayyid Nusrat Yar Khan, who had command of the advanced guard near the Emperor. Against this man the

* *Bayan-i-waqi*, 437; K. K. 925, 930; Khush-hal 1017a; Shiu Das, f. 61a.

Sayyids had a special grudge, because he, one of their own clan and a relation, had sided against them. Having swept him on one side, Abdullah Khan hoped to be able to push on to Muhammad Shah's centre. First of all, he tried to make his way to his objective from his own left, but found the river such an obstacle that he changed his direction and moved across his front to the right of his own army. As soon as the movement was detected reinforcements were sent for, the Emperor's centre having been left very weak. The generals who were summoned objected to quit their posts. The artillery present with the Emperor's division was then despatched towards the river to bar the way, and part of the vanguard was also transferred to the same point. [*Bayan*, 435-441.]

Unfortunately the change in Abdullah Khan's line of advance resulted in his being drawn away from the river bank, and thus his main position was now some miles from the water side. The battle had continued till the afternoon, and so far Abdullah Khan showed no signs of discouragement; but his men, more especially the new levies, became uneasy and soon lost their heads completely. On pretence of watering their horses and camels they rode off towards the river, or as one writer puts it, "flew away like so many sparrows." At the river they found the banks in the possession of their opponents. Group after group, on the pretext of getting water, left the standard; these desertions continued until sunset, and all night long from the camp to Barahpula just outside Dihli, the road was encumbered with fugitives. At nightfall there were not more than a few thousands left of the huge host which had set out from Dihli a few days before.*

At first Abdullah Khan had ordered a small tent to be put up for the night where he stood, but countermanded it when he reflected that it would be a target for the enemy's fire. The night was a moonlight one, and the imperial artillery never ceased its fire. If any man stirred in the Sayyid position or showed himself, a gun was at once pointed in that direction and discharged. From time to time the guns were dragged forward,

* *Qasim*, 376; *Shiu Das*, 60b; *Khush-hal* 1016a; *Ahwal* 177b.

the oxen being harnessed to the muzzle, instead of as usual to the breach end of the gun. Among the guns were those named Ghazi Khan and Shah Pasand. These heavy guns were fired oftener than had ever been done before in the recollection of the oldest man. Haidar Quli Khan kept up the energy of his men by continual largesse. Abdullah Khan's troops continued to abscond in small parties. On the other side, Muhammad Shah passed the night seated on his elephant so near the vanguard as to be under fire.

When day dawned on the 14th Muharram (November 14th, 1720) Abdullah Khan found his army reduced to a few of his relations and his veteran troops. They were altogether not more than one thousand horsemen. These resumed the fight to the best of their power. Najm-ud-din Ali Khan and Saif-ud-din Ali Khan, the *ex-Wazir's* younger brothers, Sayyid Afzal Khan *Sadar-us-sadur*, and Rai Tek Chand, Bali Khatri, his chief officer, Ghazi-ud-din Khan (Ahmad Beg), Nawab Allahyar Khan Shahjahani, Sayyid Salabat Khan and Ruhullah Khan were found among those faithful few who had passed a sleepless night upon their elephants, having had neither food nor water for many hours. Access to the riverside was blocked by the Jats, who plundered impartially friend and foe. As dawn was drawing near a ball struck the seat upon Muhkam Singh's elephant. The Rajah descended, mounted his horse and galloped off, and for many a day it was not known whether he was alive or dead.*

Early in the morning, returning to his place of the previous day, Abdullah Khan, joined by Najm-ud-din Ali Khan and many Barha chiefs, again delivered an attack in the hope of reaching the Emperor's centre. The imperial left opposed a stout resistance to this onset, and at length dismounted to continue the fight on foot at close quarters. Shahamat Khan and his son Pirzada, Fath Muhammad Khan, Tahavvar Ali Khan (better known as Bahadur Ali Khan), and many others on the Sayyids' side, were slain. Darvesh Ali Khan, head of

* Qasim, 378; *Bayan-i-waqi*, 438, 441, 443; K. K. 925, 928; Shiu Das, 61a; Khafi Khan, 328, says the Sayyids had 17,000 to 18,000 men left.

Khan Dawran's artillery, was killed ; Dost Ali Khan* and Nusrat Yar Khan were severely wounded. Saadat Khan and Sher Afkan Khan were also prominent in this encounter. Abdunabi Khan and Maya Ram, two of Haidar Quli Khan's officers, and Muhammad Jafar (grandson of Husain Khan) were the only other men of name who lost their lives on the imperial side. Najm-ud-din Ali Khan was wounded by an arrow near the eye,† and a ball from a swivel gun struck him on the knee.

After a time the men of Khan Dauran, Haidar Quli Khan, Saadat Khan, and Muhammad Khan Bangash, surrounded the *ex-Wazir*, and an arrow struck him on the forehead, inflicting a skin wound. The soldiers then tried to make him a prisoner ; but, clad in chain-mail though he was, he leapt to the ground sword in hand, intent on fighting to the death. In spite of their knowing his practice of fighting on foot at the crisis of a battle, the *Wazir's* troops, when they saw his elephant without a rider, imagined that their leader must have fled, and each man began to think only of his own safety. Sayyid Ali Khan (brother of Abul Muhsin Khan, the *Bakhshi*) was wounded and taken. Then Tali Yar Khan charged at the head of his men and cut down Shaikh Nathu, commanding Abdullah Khan's artillery, and the Rajputs came up, took possession of the Shaikh's body and carried it to the imperial camp. Najm-ud-din Ali Khan and Gazi-ud-din Khan did their utmost to rally the men, but no one paid them any heed. Shujaat-ullah Khan, Zulfiqar Ali Khan and Abdullah Khan Tarin fled. Even Saif-ud-din Ali Khan thought the day was lost and left the field along with two or three hundred men, taking with him Prince Ibrahim, who quitted his elephant and mounted a horse. Ibrahim's elephant and imperial umbrella were afterwards found and taken to Muhammad Shah. The feebleness of the defence on the Sayyids' part would be fully proved if we believe, as Warid

* Dost Ali Khan died of his wounds on the 9th Ramzan, 1134 H. (June 23, 1722).

† He lost his eye from this wound, and the glass ball by which he replaced it was a subject of wonder to the common people for the rest of his life, *M. U.* ii. 508, *K. K.* 930.

tells us, that after two days' fighting only forty men were left dead on the field.*

Najm-ud-din Ali Khan, a drawn sword in his hand, rode on to enquire for and search out his brother. He found Abdullah Khan standing on the ground quite alone, and although wounded in the hand still fighting like a lion, while on every side the crowd of his assailants grew greater every minute. So far not one of them had had the courage to lay hands upon him; although one of Khan Dauran's men had wounded him on a finger of the right hand. Najm-ud-din Ali Khan dismounted from his elephant and took his position at his brother's side. Abdullah Khan called out to him: "Behold the inconstancy of Fortune, and the end of all earthly greatness," adding a verse of Sadi Shirazi, fitting to the occasion.† Haidar Quli Khan, who had noticed that the *howda* of Abdullah Khan's elephant was empty, made enquiries and was informed by one of his soldiers that the Nawab was on foot, bare-headed, and wounded in the arm. Coming up at once with a led elephant, Haidar Quli Khan addressed the Sayyid, in the humblest manner, with words of praise and flattery: "Was he not a well-wisher, and was not his life one with his? Except to set forth for the presence of the Emperor what course was there left?" Najm-ud-din Ali Khan made a movement to cut down the speaker, but Abdullah Khan held his brother back. Then with a haughty and dignified air he took Najm-ud-din Ali Khan's hand and mounted the led elephant. Throwing the Sayyid a shawl to wind round his head, Haidar Quli Khan followed on his own elephant, and conducted his prisoner to the Emperor Muhammad Shah.‡

* Qasim, 378; Warid, 164b; *Bayan-i-waqi*, 447; K. K. 931.

† Khizr Khan, who took part in the battle as one of the Sayyid's army, was near enough to know that Abdullah Khan called out, but from the uproar could not hear his words. Some years afterwards, in 1138 H. (1725-6), he met at Mathura Najm-ud-din Ali Khan, then on his way to Ahmadabad, and obtained from him the details in the text. Khafi Khan makes out that Abdullah Khan claimed *aman* (safety for life) by announcing himself as a Sayyid.

‡ *Siwanih-i-Khizri*, 92, 93; Shiu Das, 61a; Khush-hal 1018b; Khafi Khan, 933; *Bayan-i-waqi*, 446. Khush-hal attributes the capture of Najm-

His hands bound together with Haidar Quli Khan's shawl, Abdullah Khan was ushered into the presence of Muhammad Shah. Saluting him with a "Peace be upon you," the Emperor said: "Sayyid, you have yourself brought your affairs to this extremity." Overcome with shame, Abdullah Khan answered only: "It is God's will." Muhammad Amin Khan, unable to contain himself, leapt from the ground with joy and exclaimed: "Let this traitor to his salt be confided to this ancient servitor." But Khan Dauran in respectful terms intervened: "Never! Never! Make not the Sayyid over to Muhammad Amin Khan, for he will at once slay him in an ignominious manner; such a deed is inadvisable; what did Farrukh-siyar gain by the murder of Zulfiqar Khan? Let him remain with Haidar Quli Khan or be made over to the Emperor's own servants." The prisoner was accordingly made over to Haidar Quli Khan, along with Najm-ud-din Ali Khan, his brother, whose wounds were so severe that he was not expected to recover. Hamid Khan was also taken a prisoner and brought, bare-headed and bare-footed, before his cousin, Muhammad Amin Khan, and Khan Dauran. The new *Wazir* calmed his fears and assured him of being tenderly dealt with. There were many other prisoners, the chief among them being Sayyid Ali Khan, brother of Abul Muhsin Khan, and Abdun-nabi Khan. [Qasim 379, K. K. 933, *Bayan* 448.]

On the Sayyids' side the entrenchments were held and the fight maintained by Ghazi-ud-din Khan and others for nearly an hour after the capture of Abdullah Khan. When at length they were satisfied that the day was lost, they desisted. Ghazi-ud-din Khan moved off the field with such baggage as had been saved, and, with Allahyar Khan and many others, made straight for Dihli; while the Barha Sayyids endeavoured to cross the Jamuna in order to make their way to their homes. Saif-ud-din Ali Khan had brought Prince Ibrahim off the field of battle, but owing to the entire absence of carriage was obliged to leave him in the orchard of Qutb-ud-din Khan, close to the village of

ud-din Ali Khan to his patron, Sher Afkan Khan, giving details and asserting that the writer's uncle, Khem Karan, was close by.

Nekpur. Saif-ud-din Ali Khan went home to Jansath, sending Baqir Ali Khan and Khizr Khan to Dihli to bring away the Sayyid women and dependants. These messengers reached the capital before the Emperor, and carried off the ladies and children to the Sayyids' country.

Late in the evening of the 14th Muharram, 1133 H. (November 14, 1720), news reached Dihli of the defeat and capture of Abdullah Khan. His wives and women, a numerous body, nearly took leave of their senses. Many of the concubines, seizing their chance, threw old veils and sheets over their rich clothes and made off with whatever they could lay their hands upon. The man in charge, one Abdullah Khan Kashi, made no attempt to do his duty, and in the confusion a ten-year old daughter of Najm-ud-din Ali Khan took refuge in the house of a *Mirasin* or singer, attached to the Sayyids, where she was discovered and seized by the Emperor's adherents. The girl was placed in charge of the Emperor's mother, Nawab Qudsiya, who proposed to marry her to Muhammad Shah. Abdullah Khan complained to Haidar Quli Khan that such a thing had never been done before to a Barha Sayyid. That noble, by much persuasion, obtained possession of the child and sent her to Najm-ud-din Ali Khan's house.

To return to the field of battle. The Mughal soldiery, as their custom was, took to plundering, and appropriated to themselves whatever horses, camels, mules and cattle fell into their hands. Churaman Jat followed suit, and plundering both sides with strict impartiality, made off with his booty to his own country. Among his spoils were one thousand baggage oxen and camels, which had been left negligently on a high sandy mound close to the river, several camel-loads of goods intended for charitable distribution, and the records of the Grand Almoner's Department. [Qasim 381, Shiu 61a, K. K. 930.]

SEC. 22.—CAPTURE OF PRINCE IBRAHIM.

After Sayyid Saif-ud-din Ali Khan had removed Prince Ibrahim from the battle-field, finding it impossible to escort him to a place of safety, he made him over to the Sayyids of the

village Nekpur, in pargana Palwal* some miles from the field. Those villagers were unable to protect him and refused him shelter. With him were Amir Khan, whose family had been for generations in the royal service, and some others. He sat down with these few companions in a mango orchard belonging to Qutb-ud-din Ali Khan, and not far from the houses. His men suggested that if he would move elsewhere, they would not desert him. The Prince replied that he considered this battle as a final test of his fortunes ; if sovereignty had been meant for him, the fact would have declared itself by a different result. He had now nowhere to go. By this time the Prince's place of shelter had been traced, and Haidar Quli Khan, Zafar Khan, and Qamar-ud-din Khan came to arrest him.†

When these men had made their obeisance he rose up and came with them. That night, when he reached the Presence, Muhammad Shah embraced him and made him sit down beside him, asking : "How have you come?" The Prince answered : "By the way you came." His Majesty said : "Who brought you?" He replied : "The person who brought you." The allusion is, of course, to the fact that they had both been set on the throne by one and the same man, Abdullah Khan. An allowance of forty Rupees a day was fixed for Ibrahim's maintenance, and he was sent back to prison in the citadel of Shahjahanabad. There he died on the 8th Muharram 1159 H. (January 30th, 1746) at the estimated age of fifty years. As a quatrain quoted by Khush-hal Chand says, his day of power had been shortlived, "like a drop of dew upon a blade of grass."‡

* Perhaps Begpur, pargana Palwal, near the Jamuna, and about 15 miles north of Bilochpur. See *Indian Atlas*, sheet 49, S. E. ; I can find no Nekpur.

† The *Bayan-i-waqi*, p. 448, omits Haidar Quli Khan and inserts Saadat Khan. There is a story that at daybreak Ibrahim reached the *takiya* of a faqir in Nekpur, and asked for a mouthful of water. The Prince rewarded him with four gold coins. The recluse began to prepare breakfast for him, but before he could eat, his pursuers arrived and seized him, Khush-hal, fol. 1020a.

‡ Shiu Das, f. 61b; Khafi Khan, 933; Rustam Ali, 249a; *Tarikh-i-Muhammadi* (year 1159 H.).

SEC. 23.—END OF ABDULLAH KHAN.

Muhammad Shah announced the victory to his adherent, Nizam-ul-mulk, in the following terms: "After the death of Husain Ali Khan we marched towards the capital, as soon as we had heard that Abdullah Khan had raised Prince Ibrahim to the throne and was planning resistance. Nor would he listen to our remonstrances. On the 12th Muharram of our second year we pitched our tents twenty *kos* from Dihli. Next day the battle began and lasted from morn to night. On the following day the imperial troops charged the rebels, Abdullah Khan was captured, and Ibrahim, who had fled from the field, was brought back a prisoner." [*Majma-ul-insha*, 86.]

Inayat-ullah Khan and the officers of the Escheat Department (*buyutat*) were now sent with all despatch to confiscate the late *Wazir's* property together with that of all his relatives and dependants. Sayyid Ghulam Ali Khan, who had been left in charge of Dihli as the Sayyid's deputy, directly he heard of the great disaster, collected all the gold and jewels he could lay hands upon, and in the confusion got clear away, thanks to the disguise he had adopted. Sayyid Najabat Ali Khan, nephew and adopted son of the defeated *Wazir*, and then a boy of thirteen or fourteen years, was seized and sent to share his uncle's prison. [K. K. 934.]

After this seizure, there was at this time no further pursuit of the fugitive Sayyids; their home villages were not confiscated nor their houses plundered. This forbearance is attributed to the intercession of Sayyid Nusrat Yar Khan, a native of the Barha village of Kaithora,* who had taken the side of the Turanis. Muhammad Amin Khan, however, did not approve of this clemency, and gave orders to his *amil* or manager, Abdul-latif Beg, then present with five thousand horsemen in the new *Wazir's* fiefs of Budaon and Sambhal, to cross the Ganges into the Duaba and lay waste the Barha country. Nothing came of this attempt. The Sayyids collected the Gujars

* Kaithora or Kathora, one of the principal of the thirty-two villages occupied by the Chatbanuri branch of the Barha Sayyids, see Sayyid Roshan Ali's MS., *Sayyid-ut-tawarikh* (composed in 1864 A.D.).

and other tribes dwelling on their estates, and "broke the covetous teeth of the Mughals"; and as that "old dodger," Muhammad Amin Khan, died soon after, they were left for the time in peace. [Qasim 384.]

Meanwhile Sayyid Abdullah Khan remained a prisoner in the citadel of Dihli under the charge of Haidar Quli Khan, who, after the death of Muhammad Amin Khan, was high in the imperial favour. The Sayyid was treated with respect, receiving delicate food to eat and fine clothes to wear. But so long as he survived the Mughals remained uneasy, not knowing what sudden change of fortune might happen. Thus they never ceased their efforts to alarm Muhammad Shah. At one time, according to them, Rajah Ajit Singh, of Jodhpur, intended to make his own submission and loyalty conditional on the release of the Sayyid. From time to time other rumours were put into circulation. At last Abdullah Khan was removed from Haidar Quli Khan's care to a place near the imperial apartments, where he continued to be well treated. Two years elapsed, but the Mughals never ceased in their plotting, until at length they obtained the Emperor's consent to the administration of poison.* Sayyid Qutb-ul-mulk, Abdullah Khan, died of poison given in his food on the 1st Muharram 1135 H. (October 11, 1722), being then about fifty-seven (lunar) years of age. He left no children. In accordance with his dying wishes he was buried at the side of his favourite mistress, a singing woman called Kesar Mahi, in a walled garden outside the Pumba gate of Old Dihli. This garden was situated on the high road to the shrine of the saint Nizâm-ud-din Auliya; it had been presented to Qutb-ul-mulk by Rajah Bakht Mal, *diwan* of the *Khalsa*.†

SEC. 24.—THE TWO SAYYIDS: THEIR CHARACTER AND CONDUCT.

Muhammad Shah ordered that the Sayyids should be referred to after their death, the one as *Namak-haram* and the

* Khafi Khan, 941, cannot conceive it possible that Nizam-ul-mulk, although a Mughal, had any share in these plots, but *al ilm ind allah!* "God only 'knows!'"

† *Jauhar-i-samsam* of Muhsin Sadiqi, son of Hanif, B.M. Oriental MS. No. 1898. I quote from A. R. Fuller's translation, B.M. Addl. MS. No.

other as *Haram-namak*, an order which Nizam-ul-mulk objected to and refused to comply with. [K. K. 941.]

Alamgir does not seem to have been fond of Barha Sayyids. Once in the official news-letter from Ahmadabad it was reported that Sayyid Hasan Ali Khan Bahadur (afterwards Abdullah Khan), had shown promptitude in attacking and plundering one Hanwant, and had also captured the nephew of Janaji and forced him to become a Muhammadan. Zulfiqar Khan, Nusrat Jang, then on a campaign against Dhana Jadon, heard of these feats and sent to Court a proposal for raising the rank of both brothers, the elder from 800 to 1,000, and the younger from 700 to 800. Alamgir wrote across this report: "Wherefore should I not offer congratulations? But the very fact of their being Sayyids, those fountains of felicity, demands hearty exertions from them in support of the Pure Faith of their ancestor, His Majesty the Lord of Apostles. Let two robes of honour for the two brothers be issued from my private wardrobe, and let them be sent together with two swords, jewel-hilted and provided with pearl-mounted belts. Let Jamdat-ul-mulk (i.e., the *Wazir*) write much praise and many congratulations when sending these presents."

Then, on the petition received from Zulfiqar Khan, he wrote: "The proposition of that servant of my house, who knows my way of thinking, was exceedingly out of place. It is a matter of course for men of the sword (*saiḥ*) to punish leaders of strife (*ḥaiḥ*). But to agree to immediate promotion is difficult. Love for Sayyids, those men of high lineage, is an obligation imposed by the Holy Faith, nay, is a proof of having fully accepted it; while to harm that clan is to expose one's self to the displeasure of the Most Merciful. But no action should be taken which produces evil in this, and disgrace in the next world. Undue favour to the Barha Sayyids will be disastrous in both worlds. For when promoted or exalted they say: 'I am and there is none other,' and stray from the path of duty. They lift their gaze too high and begin to cause

30,784, p.79. The name Kesar Mahi seems of doubtful accuracy, but the words are so written most plainly in the Persian text. See also Rustam Ali, *Tariḥ-i-Hindī*, fol. 250a; Qasim; Kamwar, p. 255; and *Tariḥ-i-Muhammadi* (year 1135 H.).

trouble. If this attitude is overlooked, the business of this world ceases to be carried out ; if it is punished, objections will arise in the other world."*

In spite of the opposition he had encountered from the Sayyids, Nizam-ul-mulk is said to have done his best to protect Abdullah Khan's life after his fall from power. Khafi Khan, who tells us this fact, thinks it only fair to record his tribute to the good qualities of the two brothers, since he has said so much about their misdeeds. He attributes the disrespect shown to Farrukh-siyar with all the bribe-taking and harshness in revenue-farming, to the bad influence of Ratan Chand, the *Wazir's* chief official. Up to the time of his leaving for the Dakhin, Husain Ali Khan had shown extreme aversion to taking money irregularly ; afterwards, Muhkam Singh Khatri, and others did their best to pervert him. But both brothers were really friendly to the poor and non-oppressive in disposition. The townsmen, who were left to live in peace, made no complaints against them. They were liberal to the learned and the necessitous, and full of consideration for the deserving. In these respects Husain Ali Khan was even more conspicuous than his elder brother. The younger brother began a reservoir in Aurangabad, afterwards enlarged by Iwaz Khan, which formed a welcome addition to the scanty water-supply in that town. He also built in the Barha country a *sarai*, a bridge, and other works for the public benefit. [K. K. 941, 943.]

Abdullah Khan was remarkable for forbearance, patience, and extreme humanity. When Haidar Quli Khan was *faujdar* of Surat he confiscated the estate of Abdul-ghaffur Bohra, a wealthy merchant recently deceased, in spite of the existence of legal heirs. The line of action adopted by Abdullah Khan was most commendable. Haidar Quli Khan was removed from office and the estate made over to the rightful owners. Husain Ali Khan, within whose jurisdiction Surat was situated, passed a sleepless night thinking over the matter. Upon the release of the property not one *dam* or *dirham* was kept back. The younger Sayyid is also applauded for upholding the bazar people

* *Ahkam-i-Alamgiri*, Irvine MS., No. 252, fol. 23b.

against a false complaint brought by his own elephant-driver. [K. K. 943.]

The conduct of the *Wazir* in the case of the East India Company's embassy to Farrukh-siyar's Court is also very much to be commended. Misled by his Armenian colleague, John Surman had negotiated through Khan Dauran, the second *Bakhshi*, instead of through the *Wazir*. When Khan Dauran had reaped all the benefit he could and had wasted nearly two years, he repudiated the whole affair. The envoys were at last forced to apply to Abdullah Khan. According to oriental standards of conduct, this tardy application gave a splendid opening for avenging the previous neglect. Nothing of the sort happened. Abdullah Khan, when the Englishmen went to him, was affable and helpful, also, for a wonder, most prompt in action. The preparation of the desired *farmans* was carried through in a few weeks ; and still more wonderful, the *Wazir* accepted no present. We need not be surprised that Surman should style him "the Good Visier."

The Surman diaries also yield an indication that Abdullah Khan was not quite strict in the observance of Muhammadan rules. "Hearing the Visier drinks," the envoys sent him a handsome present of Shiraz wine and brandy ; and we are not told of its being returned with indignation and resented as an insult.

Another entry in the Surman diaries shows Abdullah Khan's kind heart. At the envoys' last audience Farrukh-siyar refused to allow the departure of William Hamilton, the surgeon who had attended him in his illness. In this emergency they invoked the aid of Abdullah Khan, and "the good visier readily offered to use his utmost endeavours." He wrote a very pathetic address to His Majesty, in which an imaginary wife and children in Scotland were introduced to heighten the effect. On Hamilton's promising a speedy return to India, Farrukh-siyar yielded a reluctant consent to his departure.*

The Barha Sayyids have remained almost to our own day more or less Indian in their practices. Thus it is no surprise

* C. R. Wilson's *Early Annals*, Vol. II, Part 2, "The Surman Diary," pp. 74, 131 133, 142, 143, 200, 202, 203, 205.

to learn from a contemporary historian that Abdullah Khan observed the *Basant* or spring festival, and the Holi powder-throwing usual among Hindus. In another direction he displayed superstition. Anand Ram Mukhlis noticed that every time he gave public audience, two men called *majamra-gardan*, or censer-swingers, stood at the head of his carpet swinging silver censers full of smoking rue-seed. This was done to avert the Evil Eye. We have also seen in the course of our narrative that he was more of a soldier than an administrator; and that he was a voluptuary who in time of peace was indolent and negligent of business. He left his affairs too much in the hands of his Hindu man-of-business, Ratan Chand.*

One of the *Wazir's* deeds of merit was the construction of a canal in Patparganj, a suburb of Dihli. It was begun in 1127 H. (1715) after a great fire in that quarter of the town, and it was finished in the fifth year of Farrukh-siyar (1716). As to it Sayyid Abdul-jalil Bilgrami, wrote:—

*Bahr-i-jud o faiz, Qutb-ul-mulk, Abdullah Khan,
Nahr-i-khairi kard jari an wazir-i-muhtasham;
Bahr-i-an Abdul-jalil-i-Wasiti tarikḥ kard:
"Nahr-i-Qutb-ul-mulk madd-i-bahr-i-ashan o karam."
(1127 H.)*

The same learned man and poet sings the praises of Abdullah Khan in his *masnavi*, as follows:—

*Aristu-firate, ke Asaf-nishan ast,
Yamin-ud-daulah, Abdullāh Khan ast;
Ba diwan chān nashinad nau-bahar ast,
Ba maidan chun darayad zulfiqar ast.†*

Husain Ali Khan, Amir-ul-umara, differed considerably in character from his elder brother. He was prompt in action and inclined to the use of exaggerated and insolent language. Several stories showing this habit of his are on record. For instance, the hired flatterers in his train used to recite, even in

* Kamwar Khan, entry of 3rd Rabi, II. 1132 H.; Anand Ram Mukhlis, *Mirat-ul-istilah*, fol. 248a. Herklots, *Qanoone Islam*, Glossary, p. lxxxiv, says the seed used is that of *Mahndi* (*Lawsonia inermis*), mixed with benzoin or mustard-seed.

† *M.U.* iii. 140; Khush-hal B.M. No. 3288, fol. 407a.

the Emperor's presence, Hindi verses in praise of their master. A Persian translation of two lines has been handed down ; they are to this effect :—

The whole world and all creation seeks the shelter of your umbrella,

Kings of the world earn crowns through your emprise.*

Once, on the ill-fated march to the Dakhin, being intoxicated with his own greatness, he boasted that on whosoever's head he cast the shadow of his shoe, that man would become the equal of the Emperor Alamgir. This remark gave great offence to those who heard it.†

Although he put no faith in lucky or unlucky moments and the prognostications of soothsayers, he seems to have been troubled by presages of his approaching doom. Hakim Nakki Khan Shirazi told Warid that in the last weeks of his life, Husain Ali Khan was for ever extolling and finding new meanings in the following lines :—

*Ham chu man be-kase shahide hech kafir na bud,
Subh-i-mahshar khud damid, wa khun-i-man khwabida
ast.‡*

* *Ahwal-ul-khawaqin*, fol. 176a. In the original they are :—
*Panah-i-chatr bigirand jumlah-i-alam o khalq,
Kalahdar-i-jahan ra kalah az muqdam-i-tu.*

† Yahya Khan, *Tazkirat-ul-muluk*, fol. 125a.

L'ENVOI

‡ With the disappearance of the Sayyid brothers the story attains a sort of dramatic completeness, and I decide to suspend at this point my contributions on the history of the Later Mughals. There is reason to believe that a completion of my original intention is beyond my remaining strength. I planned on too large a scale, and it is hardly likely now that I shall be able to do much more. The reign of Bahadur Shah (1707-1712) is ready to be faired out for the press ; and the first draft for the years 1721 to 1738 is written. I hope soon to undertake the narrative of 1739, including the invasion of Nadir Shah. It remains to be seen whether I shall be able to continue the story for the years which follow Nadir Shah's departure. But I have read and translated and made notes for another twenty years ending about 1759 or 1760. The preliminary work for the period 1759-1803 has not been begun. In any case I hope that my published studies on the period, although covering only part of the ground, may prove of some use ; that, at the least, they may relieve some more fortunate successor of much drudgery, of a nature commonly thought to be arid, and repellent to many minds. May my reward be, as an Oxford historian phrases it, that "some Gibbon of the future may throw me a word of thanks in a footnote." (20th October, 1907).

CHAPTER VII

MUHAMMAD SHAH'S REIGN 1720-1725

SEC. 25.—NEW APPOINTMENTS UPON MUHAMMAD SHAH'S RETURN TO DIHLI.

On the 16th Nov. 1720 Muhammad Shah moved from Biluchpur and encamped near Rahimpur. Thence on the 17th he went to Chhainsa, on the 18th to Talpat, and on the 19th to Talab Kishn Das. The 20th was spent in a visit to the Qutb and to the shrine of Nasir-ud-din Oudhi, the Emperor passing the night in his tents close to Moth ki Masjid, and on the 21st he prayed at the shrine of Nizam-ud-din Auliya. A formal entry was made into the capital on the next day, the 22nd, by way of the Ajmeri Gate. On the 24th Rajah Jai Singh's approach from Amber was announced ; and the Wazir was deputed to meet and escort him. [Kamwar 242, K. K. 934.]

On the 25th November a grand audience was held in the diwan-i-khas. Rajah Jai Singh was introduced by the Wazir, he laid his offering before the throne and received the usual gifts. Itimad-ud-daulah, as appanages to his office of Wazir, received the Government of Multan and the faujdarship of Muradabad. Day after day presentations continued. On the 26th came Abdus-samad Khan from Lahor with his son Zakariya Khan. Jafar Khan Nasiri sent his congratulations and presents from Bengal, through his representative at Court (*wakil*). Ghazi-ud-din Khan, who had retired again into private life, was sent for through Haidar Quli Khan ; and Shapur Khan, brother of Sayyid Husain Ali Khan's assassin, was elevated to the high rank of 4000 (2000 horse), with other gifts. Among other nobles who were promoted or received new titles were Lutf-ullah Khan Panipati (lately arrived at Court from exile at his home), Haidar Quli Khan, Zafar Khan, and Nusrat Yar Khan Barha. [Kamwar 244, K. K. 935.]

Few changes were made among the provincial governors. The chief were as follows : Muizz-ud-daulah Haidar Quli

Khan Nasir Jang was posted to Ahmadabad ; Kashmir was given to Zakariya Khan, son of Abdus-samad Khan ; Muhammad Khan Bangash now received the reward for his desertion of Abdullah Khan by appointment to the Government of Allahabad, and Saadat Khan faujdar of Biana, who had been party to the plot to assassinate Sayyid Husain Ali Khan, received the Government of Agra as his reward. [*Ibid.*]

ABOLITION OF THE POLL-TAX (*Jaziya*).

The *jaziya* or poll-tax had always been felt by the Hindus as an oppression ; and at this time owing to the unsettled state of public affairs grain was very dear. The Hindu traders seeing their opportunity agreed on a remonstrance against the tax, and with one accord shut up their shops. Rajah Jai Singh Sawai then took the matter in hand and laid their case before the Emperor. He pointed out that the Hindus were the ancient inhabitants of the country, that His Majesty was Emperor of Hind, that men of both religions were equally loyal. Indeed it might be said that the Hindus were more so, as they depended upon the Emperor for protection from his fellow-religionists. When Abdullah Khan's rebellion had broken out, he, Jai Singh, had called on all the Hindus to pray for Mumammad Shah's success. If their prayers should be heard, he had bound himself to ask first of all for the abolition of the poll-tax. Rajah Girdhar Bahadur, governor of Oudh, added his entreaties, reminding the Emperor how his uncle Chabela Ram had obtained the same favour from the late Farrukh-siyar after his triumph over Jahandar Shah. Yielding to these appeals, the Emperor abolished the poll-tax permanently, although it is said to have yielded four kros of Rupees from the whole of the kingdom. After an abortive attempt at its revival made by Nizâm-ul-mulk in 1723 and a merely nominal re-institution in Rajab 1137 (March—April 1725) which was never carried out, we hear nothing more of the levy in India of this oppressive tax. [Shiu Das 646 ; K. K. 936, 948 ; Warid 6, 7.]

SEC. 26.—DEATH OF MUHAMMAD AMIN KHAN.

One night about this time, a flag was tied to the railing before the chief police-office (or *chabutra* as it was called).

On the flag was written in the Persian character: "Let the Emperor beware and quite the palace." The usual reports were brought before the Emperor and the issue of a proclamation was directed in the hope of discovering the doer of this act. After the order had been announced throughout the city by beat of drum, one Naranjan, a Muhammadan mendicant of the Azad sect, was traced as the culprit. This man used to go about bare-headed, and beyond a narrow strip of cloth to cover his nakedness he wore no clothes. He admitted that he had placed the flag where it was found. When he was brought before the Emperor, the Wazir, Muhammad Amin Khan, was present. The Wazir requested that the *faqir* might be made over to him for enquiries. The man was taken to the Wazir's house and there severely flogged. When this was reported to Muhammad Shah, he sent for the man, presented him with four gold coins and set him at liberty. This occurred on the 15th January 1721.

A few days afterwards Muhammad Amin Khan fell seriously ill with a complication of disorders; and as was inevitable it was the popular belief that the *faqir's* curse had taken effect. The illness* had lasted only 4 or 5 days when it terminated fatally on the 27th January 1721, and the body was buried within the school or *Madrassa* which the Wazir had founded just outside the Ajmeri Gate. In the short space of three months during which he was chief minister, Muhammad Amin had no time in which to display his qualities as an administrator, though he had shown himself a good soldier long before in Alamgir's reign. Warid tells us that from the day of his first arrival from Bukhara he had ever been inclined towards oppression and injustice, had forgotten to fear God or be tender to the lowly; to him a Sayyid of proud descent and an unbeliever were the same. But strange to say, from the day of signal victory over the Sayyids, when the sky had cleared and no enemy remained, he entirely changed his ways.

* Revolting details in *Siyar* i. 68, all most probably untrue and due to the Shia bigotry of the writer directed against a prominent Sunni. Ghulam Ali Khan *Muqaddama-i-Shah Alam-nama*, (B. M.) 41b, has 28th Rabi II.—an evident error. He says the illness was a fatal kind of colic.

Men of both the city and the country had dreaded the day of his accession to supreme power. To their surprise, his conduct was opposed to his previous habits ; he treated everybody fairly and kindly. Even some of the Sayyids who had deserved punishment were spared. But as far as Muhammad Shah was concerned, he had obtained no benefit by the change of ministers ; and as one writer says, "He found over again the same viands on his plate." [Shiu Das 65b-66a ; Kamwar 247 ; Warid 2.4 ; K. K. 939 ; *Ahwal* 178a.]

The vacant office of chief minister was claimed by the deceased's son, Qamar-ud-din Khan, as his by right of inheritance ; but Khan Dauran, who was the Emperor's candidate, [Yahya 130b] unable to carry through his own appointment, persuaded Muhammad Shah to send for Nizam-ul-mulk from the Dakhin. Qamar-ud-din was consoled with his father's title of Itimad-ud-daulah (30th January 1721) ; and as a temporary measure the duties of the minister were made over to Inayat-ullah Khan Kashmiri, in addition to his previous office of Lord Steward (*Khan-saman*). This appointment was made on the 14th February. [Warid 48, Kamwar 248, Shiu Das 66a, K. K. 939, *Ahwal* 178b, Khush-hal 136b.]

SEC. 27.—THE NEW WAZIR, NIZAM-UL-MULK.

After the removal of the Sayyid brothers, Nizam-ul-mulk had for a time intended to return to Court. But on the whole he thought it better to delay. All power was in the hands of Itimad-ud-daulah, who was not likely to brook a rival near the throne. The new Wazir was, if the truth be told, a severer master to Muhammad Shah than the Sayyids had been. In his opinion he had been the sole cause of the Sayyids' disappearance, and presumed accordingly. It is true that the Wazir and Nizam-ul-mulk were not only near relatives but close friends. Still, to share power is grievous ; "a father becomes jealous of a son, a brother of a brother". Nizam-ul-mulk's arrival with a great army at his heels would have aroused many suspicions, leading to unending disputes. Why then, thought Nizam-ul-mulk, need he leave a country which he had already

acquired by his own right hand, in order with open eyes to plunge into such a whirlpool of troubles?

Instead of returning to Dihli, Nizam-ul-mulk proceeded southwards into the Karnatik and Maisur. It was not till his return to his capital of Aurangabad that he received the rescript calling him to Court, and, as at the same time he heard of his cousin's death, the dangers he had foreseen no longer existed. [*Ahwal* 180a, *Gulshan-i-ajab* 61a.]

At the end of the month Zul Hijja (October 1721) Nizam-ul-mulk set out from Aurangabad, leaving his relation Iwaz Khan in command, at the head of twenty thousand men. [Shiu Das 83a.] On his way through Bundelkhand he was joined by Durjan Singh of Chanderi, Rao Ram Chand Bundela of Datiya, and Chattar Singh of Narwar with their troops. He reached Agra on the 16th January 1722, when he was visited by the governor Saadat Khan. Three days afterwards he moved on to Gaoghat, and on the 28th he reached Barahpula, a few miles south of the capital. On the 20th February there was a grand audience at which the office of minister was conferred upon him with the usual gifts of robes, jewels, a ring, a jewelled pen-case and a large sum of money. The mansion on the Jamuna known as Sadullah Khan's was also conferred on him. [K. K. 939, Shiu Das 85a, Kamwar 250, M. U. iii. 897, Ashob 129b, *Ahwal* 181b.]

Nizam-ul-mulk in his new position was surrounded by difficulties. Muhammad Shah, a man of weak character, was in the hands of a clever woman known as *Koki* or the 'foster-sister', the daughter of Muhammad Jan, geomancer, Hafiz, Khidmatgar Khan, a eunuch of the palace, and others of the same standing, while the hostility of the next most powerful man in the State, Samsam-ud-daulah Khan Dauran, was barely concealed. Thus the new Wazir found himself thwarted at every step. [K. K. 940.]

His idea was to restore the public business to the condition in which it had been during the reign of Alamgir, his model in all things. One of the greatest abuses, to the abolition of which he devoted his energies, was the practice of granting

offices upon the receipt of a bribe to the Emperor, dignified with the name of peshkash or offering of the first fruits. Another abuse which he tried to remedy was the excessive assignments of the revenue-paying lands which had been made to the Princes, the Princesses and the great nobles. Lands of which the revenues had never been assigned before were now in the hands of the courtiers. By this means the receipts of the treasury were much diminished, and there was never sufficient money to meet the pay of those drawing cash salaries, which had in consequence fallen much into arrears. He also commented on the unfitness of the men appointed to high rank ; while old and deserving officers were in want of the necessities of life. Some of the latter were reduced to collecting grain from their jagirs and selling it in the imperial market-place. To add to their troubles, prices ranged very high, and more than seven sirs of grain could not be purchased for one Rupee. Every day complainants thronged round the new Wazir on his way to audiences. One man would cry out, "I am a descendant of Mahabat Khan", another, "I am one of the grandsons of Ali Mardan Khan". The populace too clamoured for the lowering of prices, casting dust upon their heads while they shouted *Faryad ! Faryad !* (Redress ! Redress !). It was with difficulty that the Wazir could force his way through the crowd. He made detailed reports on these points to the Emperor. Although nominally approved of, Nizam-ul-mulk's proposals met in reality with scant attention. Being over fifty years of age, he was considered old-fashioned by the Emperor, a young man of twenty, and his youthful boon-companions. His manners and appearance were ridiculed. * [Siyar i. 266.] If it has any truth at all, to this time belongs the story that Muhammad Shah laughed in open darbar at Nizam-ul-mulk's gait and attire and Samsam-ud-daulah used the expression, "See how the Dakhin monkey dances". For the present we turn from the intrigues at the capital to consider the disorders in the provinces of Ajmer and Ahmadabad due to the discontent of Ajit Singh Rathor. [K. K. 940 ; Shiu Das 85b ; Ahwal 181b ; J. A. S. B., lxvi, pt i. 26 and 58 ; Nadir Shah 69 and 129.]

*External
affairs*

SEC. 28.—REVOLT OF RAJAH AJIT SINGH RATHOR.

During the reign of Farrukh-siyar and afterwards, so long as their predominance was maintained, Rajah Ajit Singh remained faithful to the Sayyids' cause. Two years before he had been appointed by them governor of Ahmadabad, and now declined to acknowledge the new arrangement or send in the usual congratulations and presents. He entered the province of Ajmer, assumed possession of it, and forbade the slaughter of cows within the two provinces. Under these circumstances his speedy suppression was considered urgent. Saadat Khan, governor of Akbarabad, Samsam-ud-daulah, Qamar-ud-din Khan, Haidar Quli Khan, each in succession was offered the command of an army with the Government of the province. Each of them after accepting found excuses for withdrawing from the undertaking. Some had gone as far as sending out their tents one stage upon the road. Samsam-ud-daulah in particular was frightened by the possible cost of the expedition, only part of which would be obtained from the royal treasury. Samsam-ud-daulah's idea was that Ajit Singh might have been left in possession of Gujarat on condition of relinquishing Ajmer. Haidar Quli Khan objecting to this course, Saadat Khan was called upon to undertake the duty. Being a new man, he could not persuade a sufficient number of nobles to take service under him. Qamar-ud-din Khan would not stir unless Abdullah Khan, Nijabat Ali Khan and the other Barha Sayyids were pardoned and placed under his orders. As the Sayyids were distrusted by the Emperor's friends, the request was refused. At length on the 12th October 1721, Haidar Quli Khan was appointed to Ahmadabad and Sayyid Muzaffar Ali Khan Daipuri to Ajmer. The latter was a protégé of Samsam-ud-daulah. Haidar Quli Khan sent a deputy to his province. [K. K. 937, Ghulam Ali 43a, Shiu Das 76b.]

Muzaffar Ali Khan was willing to take charge in person of his new Government, but was a man without means. Six lakhs of Rupees were granted to him ; but as the money was not forthcoming from the treasury, he was forced to content himself for the time being with two lakhs. He took up his

station outside the city and began to enlist recklessly, offering absurdly high rates of pay. By the time he had reached Manoharpur* and had collected 20,000 men under his standard, all his money was spent. With Jai Singh the Kachhwaha Rajah there was no trouble. In July 1721 he arrived at Court and professed abounding loyalty. He had gone in person to all the mosques in Amber and directed that the public call to worship should be made and the Friday prayer recited. The prohibition of the slaughter of kine was formally set aside, and the Rajah proclaimed himself a submissive subject of the Muhammadan Empire. He produced the convention entered into by Jahan Shah (the Emperor's father), conferring on him, Jai Singh, the perpetual governorship of Ajmer and Gujarat. This document bore an impress in sandalwood dye of Jahan Shah's open hand (*panja*). The Rajah further called attention to his friendly acts towards the new Emperor in previous reigns. His guarantors in these representations were Samsam-ud-daulah and Roshan-ud-daulah, and by their influence his overtures met with acceptance. [Ghulam Ali 43b.]

Ajit Singh, on the contrary, showed no intention of evacuating Ajmer; but had sent on his eldest son, Abhai Singh, to resist the approaching governor. Thereupon orders (2nd Oct., 1721) came from Dihli for Muzaffar Ali Khan not to advance beyond Manoharpur. Here he remained for three months. The demands for pay increased and multiplied; no portion of the balance of the six lakhs promised to him made its appearance. The soldiers in their distress began to sell their arms, their clothes and all that they had. After this they had to starve or plunder: preferring the second alternative, they spread over the country far and wide, bringing in twenty thousand head of cattle. A few villages near Narnol were also plundered. [Shiu Das 77a, Ghulam Ali 44a.]

As Muzaffar Ali Khan could not pay his men, the reins of authority and discipline fell from his hands. The troopers quarrelled over the division of the plundered cattle and even went the length of fighting among themselves. Night came

* 35 m. north of Jaipur town and about 130 m. n. e. of Ajmer.

on, the impounded cattle by a desperate rush made good their escape, and returned to their villages. Convinced that the game was now up, the soldiers recited a *fatihā* for good luck, left the place, and returned to their homes. Muzaffar Ali Khan felt his powerlessness and made no attempt to attack the Rathors; after a time the general of Rajah Jai Singh arrived to his succour, and escorted him to the Kachhwaha capital of Amber, with his few remaining horse-men and infantry. He gave up all he possessed, sent back the robes of honour and the letter of appointment, and assuming the garb of a mendicant retired into private life. [*Ibid.*]

Muzaffar Ali Khan was now superseded by Sayyid Nusrat Yar Khan Barha. Ajit Singh was at Ajmer, and had been reinforced by a Jat contingent sent by Churaman Jat under the command of his son Muhkam Singh. Before the new governor could take the field, Ajit Singh sent his eldest son northwards to attack Narnol and other places in the Agra and Dihli provinces. Abhai Singh had under him twelve thousand camel-riders, armed with matchlocks and bows, two men on each camel. After a rapid march of 140 miles, Narnol was reached. The officer in charge on behalf of Bayazid Khan Mewati, faujdar of the district, fought as well as he was able, but in the end retreated and made his way to his master in Mewat. Narnol was given up to plunder; Alwar, Tijara, and Shahjahanpur were harried; and plunderers appeared even as far north as Sarai Allahwirdi Khan, within sixteen miles of Dihli. [Shiu Das 78.]

At Dihli the usual confusion prevailed. First, Samsam-ud-daulah having uttered many oaths about the sanguinary vengeance he would take, received orders to march; his tents were sent out and elaborate preparations began; but he made no further move. Even the Emperor was disgusted with him and showed displeasure, and in consequence Samsam-ud-daulah withdrew from attendance at darbar. Haidar Quli Khan was next called upon; he submitted numerous demands, and the whole of the imperial artillery was placed at his disposal; his tents were then erected outside the city; but he thought better of it and declined to start. Qamar-ud-din Khan

treated an application to him with similar disrespect. At last Nusrat Yar Khan marched, but had not gone far in the direction of Ajmer when news came that Rajah Ajit Singh had evacuated that city and had retired to his own country. [Shiu Das 78b, Ghulam Ali 44a.]

Apparently the cause of this withdrawal on the part of the Rathors was the knowledge that Nizam-ul-mulk had accepted the office of chief minister, had left the Dakhin and was now not far from Dihli. As we have stated, he was formally placed in charge of his office on the 20th Feb. 1722. A month afterwards (21st March) an emissary from the Rathor Rajah, one Khemsi Bhandari (steward), appeared at Court in the company of Nahar Khan, late faujdar of Sambhar. [Shiu Das 83a, Kamwar 251.]

Ajit Singh stated his case in a petition to the Emperor, of which the following is the substance. He begins by reciting his humble submission to the former Emperor Farrukh-siyar at the time when Sayyid Husain Ali Khan was sent against him. Before the Sayyids were deposed from power, he had been appointed governor of Ahmadabad and Ajmer. In the interests of the Empire it was well for someone to take charge ; and while he ruled, he upheld the law and practices of Islam. Then, when victory had crowned the imperial standards, he was dismissed and the province of Ahmadabad given to Haidar Quli Khan. He said nothing but relinquished it. As to Ajmer he was ready to do the same ; but Muzaffar Ali Khan never appeared. Then those who were ill-disposed towards him (Ajit Singh) made use of the attacks at Narnol and other towns as proof of his disloyalty. This was an entire mistake ; those attacks were due to a quarrel with the Mewatis. He leaves the case in the Emperor's hands, confident in his justice and being fully convinced that not by one hair-breadth had he departed from the right way. He would either appear at Court or remain in his own country, as might be desired. [Shiu Das 83a.]

In answer to this tardy submission the Emperor's *farman*, after a vague compliment to his loyalty and an equally vague excuse for having taken away the two provinces, proceeded

to state that the Government of Ajmer was for the time being again confided to him ; and, please God, the province of Ahmadabad would also in a short time be restored to him. Presents were forwarded, consisting of special robes, a jewelled turban ornament, a horse and an elephant. The rescript concluded :—"What fear can there be that any single person's petitions or representations would be accepted in respect of his (Ajit Singh's) acts? Let his mind be at rest, recognizing that this well-wisher to God's people (*i.e.*, Muhammad Shah) is occupied with his welfare." [Shiu Das 84b, Kamwar 255.]

The next stage in Ajmer affairs is the appointment on the 8th Dec. 1722 of Nahar Khan to be diwan of that province coupled with the faujdarship of Sambhar. As *diwan* or chief revenue officer, Nahar Khan was put alongside and almost on an equality with the *nazim* or military governor. His position was further strengthened by the conferment of the faujdari of Garh Patili* on his brother, Ruhullah Khan. With these men Khemsi Bhandari, Ajit Singh's agent, set out from Dihli on his return to Ajmer. [Kamwar 257.]

On the 9th February 1723, the report was received at Court that on the 6th January Nahar Khan and his brother, Ruhullah Khan, had been assassinated by Ajit Singh. Under the supposition that the Rajputs were friendly, they had encamped close to them. At dawn their tents were attacked and they were both slain. Hafiz Mahmud Khan, nephew of the faujdar, and his other relations were captured ; twenty-five persons were beheaded ; and in a few moments the whole of the camp and baggage had been plundered and carried off. The few men who had escaped took refuge in the territories of Rajah Jai Singh of Amber, where they were assisted and thence escorted into the imperial territory. [Kamwar 260-261, Tod ii. 87.]

* Mr. Irvine suggests that *Patli* 94 miles s. w. of Dihli, and *Kot*, one mile north-east of the former, probably stand for *Garh Patili* of the Persian text. Tod speaks of the siege and capture of the fort on Bithli hill (modern Taragarh) overlooking Ajmer. [J. Sarkar.]

Forthwith, Sharf-ud-daulah Iradatmand Khan* was selected to head an army against the Rajah. He was promoted to the rank of 7000 (6000 horse), and the *Bakhshis* were directed to place a force of 50,000 horse at his disposal. On the 26th February he received his audience of leave-taking, and four days afterwards he was granted two lakhs of Rupees from the imperial treasury for the pay of his troops. On the 10th March a number of nobles were detailed to accompany him; and on the 4th April express messengers were sent to Rajah Jai Singh, Muhammad Khan Bangash, Rajah Girdhar Bahadur and other great nobles who had been engaged in the Jat campaign, (to which we shall come presently), directing them to place themselves under the orders of Sharf-ud-daulah. A further expedient for the injury of Ajit Singh was the grant on the 5th June 1723 to Rajah Indar Singh Rathor of his former appanage of Nagor. At this time he was in the Dakhin with Nizam-ul-mulk, but his grandson, Man Singh, carried out the ordinary homage done on such occasions. [Kamwar 261-264, Rustam Ali 251b.]

About this time Haider Quli Khan was on his way back to Dihli from Ahmadabad in disgrace, as will be more fully mentioned in a future section. His presence at Rewari was announced on the 6th April 1723; Roshan-ud-daulah interceded for him, and his misdeeds were pardoned. Khwaja Sad-uddin, superintendent of escheats, was sent to him with a rescript appointing him to the Government of Ajmer and the faujdarship of Sambhar. In obedience to these orders Haider Quli Khan turned back and joined the imperial army at Narnol. Thence they marched on towards Ajmer. [Kamwar 263.]

On the 30th May the news was received that before that date Rajah Ajit Singh, who had been posted at the village of Bhanhra, had retired before the imperial forces without offering battle and had gone in the direction of Sambhar. This was followed five days afterwards (4th June) by the report that

* Khwaja Abdullah, entitled Sharf-ud-daulah Iradatmand Kh. Sadiq Tahavvar Jang Bahadur, died 3rd Zul Qada 1143 H. (9th May 1731) aged over 70. He was brother's son and son-in-law of Mulla Iwaz Wajih, who died in 1088 H.

Haidar Quli Khan and the other nobles and rajahs had entered Sambhar, while Rajah Ajit Singh, taking with him his family, had quitted Ajmer and moved off in the direction of Jodhpur. The garrison he had left in Garh Patili was making ready to defend that place. The new imperial governor entered Ajmer on the 8th June 1723, having left as his deputies Agha Qasim at Sambhar and Salabat Afghan at Mahrut. On the 17th June, Garh Patili was invested and one-and-a-half months afterwards (4th Aug. 1723) Haidar Quli Khan sent to Court the keys of that fortress with a report that it had been taken.*

Ajit Singh now thought it time to make terms and sent in to the imperial commander his eldest son, Abhai Singh, with several elephants and a large sum of money. He desired that his own appearance at the Dihli Court might be postponed for the period of one year. Haidar Quli Khan forwarded the Rajah's son and the presents to Court and obtained a favourable reception for his prayer. Abhai Singh was received with all honour, and gifts were conferred upon him; but he was detained at Court. Upon Nizam-ul-mulk's flight to the Dakhin, Haidar Quli Khan was restored to favour and recalled to Court on the 30th Dec., 1724, to fill his former office of *Mir Atash*, being replaced at Ajmer by Sayyid Husain Khan Barha (April 1725). [Kamwar, Rustam Ali 252a.]

SEC. 29.—MURDER OF AJIT SINGH BY HIS SON.

We shall conclude this section with the death of Rajah Ajit Singh. Tod admits that the bards and chroniclers pass over the event with a mere mention, one of them going so far as to leave a blank page at the critical point of his story. But in another part of Tod's book, we have a detailed narrative

* Kamwar 264-266, Tod ii. *Mahrut*, identified with *Marout* of the Rajputana map of 1859 about 10 m. n. of the north bank of the Sambhar lake. Warid (130) says the Rajput garrison of Garh Patili only numbered four hundred, that the place was surrendered after negotiations, and that the garrison marched out with the honours of war, flags flying and drums beating. According to the Rajput account (Tod ii. 87) Taragarh close to Ajmer was also invested in July and held out for four months under the command of Umra Singh.

of the crime.* In any case, that Ajit Singh met a violent death at the hand of his second son, Bakht Singh, is admitted by the Rajputs themselves, and even by their ardent champion Colonel Tod. [Tod i. 698, ii. 88.]

According to their story, Bakht Singh after saying good-night concealed himself in a room adjoining the one in which his parents were sleeping. When all was still he entered their room, seized his father's sword, and plunged it into him. The wife was awakened by feeling her husband's blood on her breast. Bakht Singh escaped. Ajit Singh's body was cremated on the 7th June 1724, when eighty-four wives and concubines sacrificed themselves on his funeral pyre. A dispute about the succession at once arose between the sons on the spot. On the 25th July, 1724, Abhai Singh, then between twenty-one and twenty-two years of age, obtained through the intervention of Samsam-ud-daulah the title of *Rajah Rajeshwar*, with the rank of 7,000 *zat*, (7,000 horse), and was allowed to depart for Jodhpur to take possession of his father's succession. [Tod i. 699, K. K. 974, Khush-hal 1044b.]

The fact of Ajit Singh's murder by his son, Bakht Singh, is not denied by any one ; but a divergence of opinion exists as to the incentives to the deed. Tod's informants told him that Bakht Singh acted at the instigation of his elder brother, Abhai Singh,† then at Dihli and in the power of the Emperor. The murderer's reward was to be the appanage of Nagor and its five hundred and sixty-five townships. To account for Abhai Singh's unholy desire we are told that his ambition had been stirred by the Machiavellian Sayyids, eager to wreak vengeance upon Ajit Singh for his opposition to their dethronement of Farrukh-siyar. Now let us apply some of the simplest critical tests. Can the offered reward be looked on as sufficient

* Tod, i. 699. This passage shows Tod at his weakest as an historian. His fastening of Ajit Singh's murder upon the Sayyids is a gross chronological error. Hardly less absurd is his assertion that Ajit Singh ever refused "sanction to the nefarious schemes of the Sayyids". He was their friend and partisan up to the end.

† Warid 130 assigns the same reason as Tod for the murder. Cf. *M. U.* iii. 758.

to impel Bakht Singh to an act of parricide? He may not have been a very clever man, but he was hardly such a simpleton as to incur the infamy of such an act (1) for the benefit not of himself but of a brother and (2) for the grant of an appange which, by universal Rajput practice, would have been his as a matter of course whenever his father died a natural death. But coming finally to external tests, what is there left of the story? We find that its very foundation vanishes. The assassination of Ajit Singh took place in June 1724; one Sayyid had been assassinated on the 8th October, 1720, and the other, after being defeated in battle and made a prisoner on the 14th November 1720, died in prison on the 11th October, 1722. Obviously, they could not have been in 1724 the instigators of Abhai Singh. Further, it is impossible, after even the most elementary study of the period, to ignore the fact that Ajit Singh, instead of opposing, helped the Sayyids to the utmost in getting rid of Farrukh-siyar. Tod's story is thus a mere legend, which falls to pieces directly it is examined; nor, as he admits, does his usual resource, the rhyming chronicles of the bards, afford him here any countenance. And Tod himself (ii. 113) confesses that "but for that one damning crime, Bakht Singh would have been handed down to posterity as one of the noblest Princes Rajwara ever knew." Conceding the truth of even a part only of this glowing eulogy, is it not more unlikely than ever that such a paladin could have become the miserable tool of an ambitious brother with no greater incentive than the offer of an appanage already his by family custom? Is it not rather to be believed that the father did something which the son felt was an attack on his personal honour?

Although coming from Muhammadan sources, there is another version [Kamwar] of the facts, which, destructive though it is of any respect for the character of the "great Ajit", is much more satisfactory than that put forward by the champion of the Rajputs. It is one that furnishes a sufficient motive for the dreadful deed, and thus satisfies better the conditions of the case. We are told that soon after Ajit Singh had made his peace and returned to Jodhpur, he fell in love with the wife of his middle son Bakht Singh and was guilty of an incest

tuous intercourse. Overcome with shame and touched in the tenderest point of his honour, Bakht Singh sought his opportunity of revenge. One night when Ajit Singh, drunk and stupefied, was lying fast asleep, his son stabbed him to death. As a contrast to Tod's dithyrambs, we may here give the Muhammadan view of the Rajah's character. "He was exceedingly wanting in good faith, a breaker of his oath, one who had slain unfairly many of his relations and dependants. Among his evil deeds was the abandonment of Farrukh-siyar to his fate, in spite of his relationship through his daughter; nay he took an active part in that Emperor's dethronement. In the end he attained the reward for his misdeeds:

He who sows the seed of evil and hopes for good,
Racks his brain uselessly and imagines a vain thing."

SEC. 30.—RISE OF ALI MUHAMMAD KHAN ROHELA.

The country known by the modern name of Rohilkhand was called by the Hindus Katahr, and up to the end of the first quarter of the 18th century the Muhammadans usually styled it Sambhal-Muradabad. Under them it formed a part of the province of Dihli. It is about 12,000 square miles in extent, taking it as co-extensive with the present Rohilkhand division. It has to the west and south the river Ganges, on the north the strip of land under the Himalayas called the *Tarai* (or marsh land), and on the east the province of Oudh. Its name of Rohilkhand came into use most probably from the Daudzai Pathans who settled in the south-east corner of the tract in the 17th century and founded the important town of Shahjahanpur. Daryai Khan, Diler Khan and Bahadur Khan, chiefs of this clan, were leading generals in the reign of Shah Jahan (1628-1658). *Roh*, meaning "mountainous", is the name given by the Afghans to their native country. Adding to this the Hindi ending *ela*, used to denote a person belonging to a particular group or section, we obtain *Rohela*, a man from the land of Roh; thence is derived Rohil-khand, the division or district inhabited by the Rohelas. [*M. U.* ii. 18, 42; i. 415; *Gulistan-i-Rahmat*.]

An Afghan saint, Shaikh Shihab-ud-din Badalzai, was succeeded by his third son, Mahmud Khan, known as Shaikh Muti, who took up his abode at the village of Toru Shahamatpur in Roh. On Mahmud Khan's death his five sons divided his property, and in the share of the youngest son, Shah Alam Khan, was included a slave called Daud. Some time in the reign of Bahadur Shah (1707-1712), this man Daud ran away from his master to seek his fortune in Hindustan. He found his way into Katahr (now known as Rohilkhand).

Between 1712 and 1715 the Rajputs of Katahr took possession of a part of *sarkar* Budaon (in Rohilkhand) and refused to pay revenue to the imperial treasury. One of the principal leaders of these landholders was Mudar Shah of Madhkar and Ajaon in pargana Barsir of sarkar Budaon. On his arrival in the country, Daud had with him two or three men, but he soon increased them to two hundred. With this force he entered the service of the Rajput Mudar Shah. As was usual in those days, the neighbouring zamindars were continually at warfare with each other. Once Daud was sent against the village of Bankauli, in pargana Chaumahla, with which his employer was at feud. Along with the plunder taken on this occasion Daud obtained possession of a Jat boy seven or eight years of age, whom he caused to be circumcised and then adopted under the name of Ali Muhammad Khan.*

After some years Shah Alam Khan, who had once been Daud Khan's master, hearing of his former slave's success, came to visit him in Hindustan. He was kindly received and dismissed with a present. A second time, five or six years afterwards, he again paid a visit to India and urged Daud to return with him to Afghanistan. But Daud, who had obtained possession of Banaholi† and other villages and was at the head of four or five hundred fighting men, protested vigorously against abandoning his position. Shah Alam Khan was forced to set out alone on his return journey. At Dihli he was seized by some horse merchants who were creditors of Daud Khan,

* As this expedition presumably occurred in 1715, Ali Mhd. Kh. must have been born about 1707 or 1708 A.D.

† C. Elliott omits this name. *Matkar*, 13 m. e. of Chandausi [J.S.]

and was only released on his promising to return to Katahr and procure the payment of the debt due to them. As he had promised, he again entreated Daud Khan to leave India. Wearied by these importunities, Daud resolved to have his former master assassinated. While they were both on an expedition against some refractory zamindars, four murderers entered Shah Alam Khan's tent and slew him. Daud Khan tried to obtain the murdered man's property from some merchants at Dihli in whose charge it was, but he declined to part with it, the deceased having left a son at his village of Toru Shahamatpur in the land of Roh, whither they meant to send it. This boy, alleged to have been then four or five years of age, was the well-known Hafiz Rahmat Khan. [*Gulistan-i-Rahmat.*]

About twelve months after the death of Shah Alam Khan, Daud Khan threw up the service of Mudar Shah and entered that of Debi Chand, ruler of Kumaon, by whom he was placed in charge of the forts at the foot of the hills. Soon after, it was determined by the Wazir Qamar-ud-din Khan Itimad-ud-daulah, who held the office of faujdar of Muradabad, to take action against the combined forces of the Rohelas and the hill rajah. It was reported at Dihli that about twenty thousand Afghan horse and foot had collected near Bans Bareli and Sambhal-Muradabad. They interfered with the peasantry and plundered travellers on the highroad and took possession of estates. Some of the zamindars had made terms with them. The imperial administration was practically set aside and the imperial revenue had ceased to be collected. [Shiu Das 79, Rustam Ali's Urdu *Tarikh-i-Rohela*, *Gulistan-i-Rahmat.*]

Azmat-ullah Khan Lakhnawi, the deputy governor under Qamar-ud-din Khan, was ordered to exert himself to suppress these disorders. He obtained the aid of the faujdar of Bareli and their conjoined forces advanced to the attack. The armies met not far from Rudrapur. The Rohelas, confident in their strength, advanced two kos and began the fight with musket-ball and arrow. Soon they came to close quarters, and the fight lasted nearly an hour, and both sides lost heavily. Azmat-ullah Khan, after many men had been disabled, dismounted and fought on foot with all his relations round him. The

enemy retreated and when the pursuers caught them up they turned towards the river and fled. But there were no boats: the faujdars had previously caused them to be dispersed. By this victory the province was once more brought under subjection to the imperial authority. This event occurred about December 1721. [Shiu Das 79a, *Gulistan-i-Rahmat*.]

Daud Khan is supposed to have been in collusion with the imperialists and to have deserted the Rajah in the field. After the defeat Daud Khan attempted to seize the Rajah's person as a hostage for the recovery of the arrears due to himself and his troops. The attempt was foiled by the fidelity of the hillmen. The Rajah went off to Kakar Dahra; and thence sent to the Rohela general an invitation to attend and receive his pay and arrears. Daud Khan, suspecting no treachery, obeyed this order; thereupon the Rajah ordered him to be seized, and he with all his companions was put to death. The chief surviving leaders, Malik Shadi Khan and Sadar Khan Kamalzai, and Bakhshi Sardar Khan, placed his adopted son, Ali Muhammad Khan, at the head of his force, four to five hundred in number, which was then taken into the service of the faujdar, Shaikh Azmat-ullah Khan, at Muradabad.

SEC. 31.—THE JATS.

We turn now to another quarter in which troubles had arisen. Our last mention of the Jats was in April and May 1718, near the end of Farrukh-siyar's reign. Rajah Jai Singh of Amber had been foiled in his attempt to crush Churaman, and a peace more or less favourable to the latter chief had been patched up through the good offices of the Sayyids' uncle, Sayyid Khan Jahan. This failure still rankled in the breast of Jai Singh, who had returned to the Dihli Court (1st May 1721), after the defeat and imprisonment of Sayyid Abdullah Khan. Nor, in the interval of three years which had elapsed, had further provocation been wanting on the part of Churaman. On the death of Sayyid Husain Ali Khan he had temporarily declared himself on the side of the Emperor, but, on the day of battle with Sayyid Abdullah Khan, had gone over to the ex-Wazir and plundered the imperial baggage. Furthermore

he had done his best to hinder Saadat Khan on his march to join the army proceeding against Ajit Singh of Jodhpur ; and had sent men to the aid of the Bundelas in their opposition to Diler Khan, the lieutenant of Muhammad Khan Bangash, governor of Allahabad.

Saadat Khan, as we have said, had been appointed to the province of Agra, to which he sent Nilkanth Nagar as his deputy. One of his first injunctions to this man was to proceed against the Jats and punish them for their various misdeeds. Accordingly he took up a position near Fathpur Sikri with an army of 10,000 horse besides infantry. On the 26th Sept. 1721 he went against one of the villages in the Jat territory, seized many of the inhabitants and all their cattle. As Nilkanth was on his return march, Muhkam Singh, eldest son of Churaman, came up with him at the head of five to six thousand men and offered battle. In the fight Nilkanth was hit by a bullet and fell down dead in his *howda* ; as many of his men as were able took to flight ; the rest were made prisoners and gave up their arms and horses to the Jats. All the deputy governor's elephants and property fell into Muhkam Singh's hands. The captives were released upon each man paying ransom according to his status. [Shiu Das 79b, *Siwanih*, *Siyar* text 73, Ghulam Ali 46a.]

Saadat Khan was ordered to depart at once from Court and take charge in person of his Government. On arriving at Agra he was joined by Badan Singh Jat, brother's son of Churaman. It seems that the latter had recently died and a dispute as to the succession had broken out between the cousins. Saadat Khan thought it wise to conciliate the fugitive, giving him robes of honour and an elephant and entering into an alliance with him. But Saadat Khan in spite of all his efforts made no impression on the Jats, the excuse he offered being the obstacles presented by the thickly growing trees and the strength of their forts. As he was deemed unequal to his task, his removal was determined upon and the Government was given to Rajah Jai Singh Kachhwaha.*

* Shiu Das 80a, K. K. 944, *M. U.* i. 545. Ghulam Ali (46a) says Saadat Khan was already in Oudh and wanted to return thence to Agra.

About this time, as we just said, Churaman the Jat chief had died ; this event happened in Zul Hijja 1133 (Sept.—Oct. 1721). As one story goes, there was one of his relations, a wealthy man, who died childless. The brethren sent for Muhkam, the eldest son of Churaman, and made him head of the deceased's zamindari and gave over to him all the deceased's goods. Zul Karan, the second son of Churaman, said to his brother "Give me too a share in those goods and admit me as a partner." A verbal dispute followed and Muhkam made ready to resist by force. Zul Karan determined to have the quarrel out, gathered men together, and attacked his brother. The elders of the place sent word to Churaman that his sons were fighting, which was not well ; it were better that he should adjust the dispute.

Churaman spoke to Muhkam. The son replied to his father by abusive language, and showed himself ready to fight his father as well as his brother. Churaman lost his temper and from chagrin swallowed a dose of deadly poison which he always carried upon him, and going to an orchard in that village lay down and gave up the ghost. After a long time had elapsed, men were sent to search for him and found his dead body.*

Jai Singh, the new governor of Agra, had undertaken to lead an army against the Jat head-quarters which were still at Thun. On the 19th April 1722, a number of nobles and Rajahs

But Samsam-ud-daulah interfered and the Agra Government was taken from him.

* Shiu Das 78, Ghulam Ali 46b, *Siyar* trans. i. 259.

Compare the story in *Siyar* and Khizr Khan which agree—one of them has copied from the other or both use a common source. I am obliged to throw doubt on Khizr Khan (although he was supposed to be on the spot) because he makes Churaman die *after* Jai Singh had invested Thun. Shiu Das, Mirza Muhammad and Khafi Khan, on the whole authorities of greater weight, coincide in saying that the defence against Jai Singh was conducted by the sons of Churaman and not by that leader himself.

T-i-Mhdi (1133); "Churaman Jat, an unruly zamindar of position in the Akbarabad province, died in Zul Hijja in the fighting between his sons Tham Singh and Muhkam Singh. He went to reconcile them and was killed."

were named to serve under him, the best known of whom were Rajah Girdhar Bahadur Nagar and Maharao Arjun Singh of Orchha. An army of 14,000 to 15,000 horsemen was assembled, artillery and ammunition were provided, and a grant of two lakhs of Rupees made from the imperial treasury. But on the 14th July Jai Singh was still at Court, and still later, on the 29th August, renewed injunctions to start were issued to the Rajah and his second-in-command Muzaffar Khan. The *Bakhshis* were directed to make up his army to fifty thousand horsemen. [Kamwar 251, K. K. 945.]

Finally, on the 1st Sept. 1722 Rajah Jai Singh Sawai received his formal appointment to Agra in open darbar and was invested in the usual way. More nobles were granted robes of honour and posted to serve under him, while Sayyid Muzaffar Ali Khan was appointed deputy governor of Agra. At this time Saadat Khan, the displaced governor of that province, reached the capital. He was refused an audience and told to proceed direct to Oudh, the robes of investiture for it and for the faujdari of Gorakhpur being sent to him by a messenger. His predecessor in Oudh, Rajah Girdhar Bahadur Nagar, was transferred to Malwa (9 Sept. 1722). [Kamwar 254, *Siwanih*.]

On the 25th October reports were received at Court that the sons of Churaman Jat had taken refuge in their fort of Thun, round which daily skirmishes were taking place. The Rajah commenced by cutting down the jungle, then erected his batteries. From time to time the Jats came out and taking shelter among the trees fell upon the imperial camp at night. Many men were slain on both sides. Matters went on thus for about one-and-a-half months, and one or two of the forts were beginning to feel distressed. Then Badan Singh, who once before had shown ill-will to his cousins, left their side and came over to the Rajah. He pointed out the weak places of the defenders, and two of their forts were taken. The besieged then lost heart. At midnight Muhkam set fire to the houses, exploded his powder magazines, and took to flight carrying as much cash, jewellery and portable property as he could. On the 18th November

the imperialists took possession of Thun, and the treasures amassed by Churaman were sought for; house after house was dug up, but all in vain. No treasure was discovered. Muhkam Singh took refuge with Rajah Ajit Singh of Jodhpur, and although he survived for many years was never able to regain his ancestral domains. He was alive in 1167 H., the 6th year of Ahmad Shah, for he turned up at Dihli on the 11th Safar of that year (10 Dec. 1753) and tried through Aqibat Mahmud Khan, Imad-ul-mulk's chief adviser, to get back the Raj.* In reward for his services Rajah Jai Singh received on the 12th June 1723 the titles of *Rajah-i-Rajeshwar*, *Shri Rajadhiraj*, *Maharaj* Jai Singh Sawai. Already on the 1st May 1721 he had been given the title of *Sar-amad-i-Rajahae*, and the chiefship of the Jats remained with Badan Singh. [K. K. 945; *Siyar* trans. i. 259; Kamwar 249, 265.]

SEC. 32.—MARRIAGE OF MUHAMMAD SHAH AND HIS DAILY LIFE.

One of the first matters to be seen to after the victory over the Sayyids and the completion of the consequent rejoicings was the marriage of the young Emperor to the daughter of his predecessor, Farrukh-siyar, her title being after marriage *Maliqa-uz-zamani*. On the 14th Safar 1134 H. (3 Dec. 1721) the *sachaq* or bridegroom's gifts were sent to the bride's house. Samsam-ud-daulah, who was especially active in the matter, received rich gifts and the eunuchs, such as Khwaja Khawas Khan, Mahaldar Khan Nazir, and Hafiz Jawahir Khan, were rewarded. On the 17th (6 Dec. 1721) at nightfall the Emperor proceeded in state to the chaplet room. Then the great nobles, such as the Samsam-ud-daulah (who was given a prominent part as the chief arranger of the union with this Princess) and the Wazir and Haidar Quli Khan and Roshan-ud-daulah, were employed to fix upon the amount of dower. It was settled at fifty lakhs of Rupees. Then at the auspicious moment the marriage ceremony was performed by Mulla Sadullah (entitled Musawi Khan) and Himmat Khan. Offerings of a lakh of Rupees each were made to Samsam-ud-

* *Tariqh-i-Ahmad Shah* (Br. Mus. Or. 2005), 94b.

daulah, Qamar-ud-din Khan, Abdus-samad Khan Diler Jang, Haidar Quli Khan, Khan Khanan Mir Jumla, Zafar Khan (Roshan-ud-daulah), Rajah Jai Singh, and Rajah Girdhar Bahadur. The evening ended with singing and dancing, illuminations and fireworks. Customs peculiar to the people of Hindustan, such as that called *henna-bandi* and others, were not performed publicly, in order not to clash with the prescription of the holy law. Valuable presents were conferred on the Emperor's mother Qudsiya-ul-alqab Hazrat Begam and other women of the harem. [K. K. 937, *Sahifa-i-iqbal* 465.]

In this earlier part of his reign, although Muhammad Shah was only nineteen years of age, we hear of his being already in ill-health. On the 7th Zul Hijja (28th Sept. 1721) he was under treatment for some complaint by three physicians, one of whom was the Frenchman Monsieur Martin. At this period the Emperor had several children born to him, none of whom survived. It was not until Dec. 1727 that a son destined to grow up was born. This boy became the Emperor's successor under the title of Ahmad Shah. For some years Muhammad Shah seems to have led a comparatively active life, and continued like his predecessor to make hunting expeditions at short intervals. Thus, for instance, on the 26th Feb. 1722, he went out to the preserve (*ramna*) of Shakkarpur. Again, on the 13th April of the same year he visited the preserve at Tal Katora ; and that at Badli, in the other direction from Dihli, on the 16th August. Another and somewhat larger expedition took place from the 18th Jan. to 7th Feb. 1723, in which the stages were Agharabad, Sarai Narela, *Siyubi [?=Sonipat], Sarai Kanwar [=Ganaur], Panipat (in the garden of Lutf-ullah Khan), Sarai Sambhalka, Sarai Kanwar [i.e., Ganaur] again, Sonipat, Narela and Agharabad once more, and finally Tal Katora near the Qutb. On this tour the shrines of the Panipat saints were visited. [Shiu Das 79b, Kamwar, *Siyar*, Ghulam Ali.]

A more important expedition of this sort was made after a tiger. On the 17th Sept. 1723, the Emperor went on a visit to the shrines at the Qutb, and pitched his camp at the foot of the low hills there. Four days afterwards Mutaqad-ud-

daulah Allahwirdi Khan, the head huntsman, reported that two tigers with two cubs had been marked down in a plain covered with scrub. The kind of net known as a *yawar* or *bawar* with other hunting necessities was ordered to be made ready. On the 22nd the advance tents were sent on to the village of Khaoli. Two days later they marched from the camp near the Qutb, and halted at Bijwasan village. Next day they reached Dholkot, the day after they were at Qasba Patodhi. The tiger hunt took place on the 29th. When they had arrived near the *yawar* or net the Emperor directed that the following nobles should enter it: the Wazir (Nizam-ul-mulk), the Amir-ul-umara (Samsam-ud-daulah), Ghazi-ud-din Khan (the Wazir's eldest son), Sarbuland Khan Mir Mushrif, and the three eunuchs Hafiz Khidmatgar Khan, Jawahir Khan and Itibar Khan. Some followers of these nobles, men famed for their bravery, were ordered to arm themselves and walk in front of the elephant on which the Emperor was seated. First of all, the Emperor himself shot dead the larger tiger; then four cubs were killed with sword and dagger and matchlock by the nobles and their retainers, of whom some fifteen were wounded. The next day the return march was made to Dholkot, and the day after the Emperor reached once more the palace at Dihli. [Kamwar 266, 259; *Ahwal* 183a for a plot against Nizam.]

SEC. 33.—MUHAMMAD SHAH AS AN INDIAN SOLOMON.

As a curious instance of then prevailing ideas of justice we introduce here a case which cropped up in Rajab 1137 H. (March-April 1725). Three or four years before one Ramji, a clerk in the imperial offices, had become a Muhammadan, but his wife and daughter refused to follow him. He now laid a complaint before the chief *Qazi* Mustafid Khan, to the effect that when he changed his religion his daughter was a minor and therefore *ipso facto* became a Muhammadan without having any choice in the matter. On being sent for, the girl denied everything and was sent to prison while enquiries were made. In the end she admitted that the signs of puberty had appeared three months after her father's conversion. There-

upon the chief *Qazi* and the expounders of the law recorded an opinion that the girl was a Muhammadan. The Hindus of the Urdu Bazar gathered in a crowd below the Emperor's lattice window and shouted for redress. The dispute was committed to Mir Jumla, then *Sadar-us-sadur*, or chief almoner, and he opened an enquiry at the wooden mosque within the palace. The *Sadar* held that the menses are not the only signs of puberty ; although one *mufti* named Daulat grew hot and angry and contested his finding. By the Emperor's order the girl was made over for safe custody to Jiwan Das, a Hindu cloth-seller, in case the *Qazi* might refuse to produce her.

This result was far from pleasing to the Muhammadans. Next day, a Friday, fifty or sixty thousand of them assembled at the great mosque usually known as the World's Wonder (*Jahan-numa*). With shouts and cries they hindered the recital of the *khutba* or prayer for the Emperor's welfare, next they seized two or three Hindus and forcibly circumcised them, and a great riot was on the point of commencing. Roshan-ud-daulah the third *Bakhshi* was sent to bring the chief *Qazi* and the *muftis*. To pacify them Muhammad Shah ordered the girl to be imprisoned, and two or three days after she was buried according to Muhammadan rites. "To make a long story short, she was killed, otherwise there would have been many headaches and much vexation." The poll-tax on unbelievers was re-instituted as a sop to the Muhammadans ; but in a week the chief *Qazi* was removed and other *muftis* appointed. The life of the poor young girl was as nothing compared to the ease and comfort of the Emperor and his advisers ! [Kamwar, Rustam Ali 245a differs.]

SEC. 34.—NIZAM-UL-MULK'S CAMPAIGN IN GUJARAT AND MALWA.

In the first few months after the defeat of Sayyid Abdullah Khan, before the arrival of Nizam-ul-mulk at Dihli and his appointment as chief minister, Haidar Quli Khan, head of the artillery, had been in the highest favour. Probably he entertained hopes of succeeding to the chief place when it fell vacant upon the death of Muhammad Amin Khan. At any

rate, the appointment of Nizam-ul-mulk seems to have been far from pleasing to this noble, and he set to work to counteract the measures of the new minister so far as lay in his power. A hint was conveyed by the new Wazir to Muhammad Shah, who spoke to Haidar Quli Khan. The latter was highly incensed, but thought it better to give way. He therefore obtained an order to take over charge in person of the Government of Gujarat, which had been conferred on him a year or so before this time. He quitted Dihli on the 1st April 1722, leaving Khan Zaman Mewati as his substitute in the office of *Mir Atash* or head of the artillery. [Warid 101, K. K. 940, Ghulam Ali 45a, Kamwar 251.]

When he had reached his head-quarters at Ahmadabad, where he arrived a little before 28th June 1722, Haidar Quli Khan commenced by assuming possession of those lands of which the revenue had been assigned to various nobles and officers or to Court favourites. Complaint was made to the Emperor and an order was sent to the governor forbidding his interference with these jagir lands. To this no attention was paid by him until his own assignments, which were upon lands not far from Dihli, were resumed in retaliation for those he had appropriated in opposition to orders. [K. K. 940, Kamwar 251.]

Other acts of presumption were committed by him. He granted fringed *palkis* to some of the officers in his subah, an attribute of royalty or of the very highest nobility, just as if he were an independent ruler. From the port of Surat, which was within his province, he summoned a number of Arabs, 'unbelieving pedlars', Ethiopians and Franks, and took them into his service on high rates of pay. His conduct showed in other ways an intention of declaring his independence. He heard complaints seated in audience, and when he rode out caused the streets to be cleared and guarded as was done for the Emperor. From many sources, official and private, rash words of his were reported, which showed an intention to throw off the imperial authority. [Warid 8.]

At length Nizam-ul-mulk was able to overcome Muhammad Shah's reluctance to interfere with a favourite officer; and on

the 24th Oct. 1722 the province of Gujarat was taken from Haidar Quli Khan and conferred on Nizam-ul-mulk, either in his own name or in that of his eldest son, Ghazi-ud-din Khan Firuz Jang. The audience of leave-taking was given on the 11th Nov. 1722, and Ghazi-ud-din Khan was left at Court as his father's deputy. With the Wazir went his second son Ahmad Khan and the nobles, nearly all of them his relations or connections by marriage, Azim-ullah Khan, Mutawassil Khan, Shukr-ullah Khan, Fathyab Khan, Hirz-ullah Khan, Hifz-ullah Khan and Talib Muhi-ud-din Khan. The Nawab was at Mathura on the 25th Nov. He passed through Agra, where he received some equivocal excuses by letter from Haidar Quli Khan. The camp was at Sarangpur in Malwa on the 9th January 1723, at Dhar on the 13th Feb. 1723, and on the 16th of that month he marched towards Ahmadabad. [K. K. 946, Kamwar 256—261, Ghulam Ali 45a.]

Meanwhile Haidar Quli Khan looked about him for means of resistance. His son, Kazim Khan, was sent off to Dihli to work upon the Emperor's mind; he was received in audience there on the 26th Feb. 1723, Nawab Roshan-ud-daulah being his introducer. Next Haidar Quli Khan turned to the nobles of the province, whose favour he had tried to secure by gifts of money and honours. One more eagerly than another they declined to join him in resistance, on the plea that it was not in a private quarrel, but in opposition to the sovereign that he wanted their assistance. He had been dismissed from his office, and they were no longer under his orders. [Warid 10, Kamwar 261, *Siyar* text 74.]

On learning this determination of the nobles, which was entirely contrary to what he had hoped, that very same day Haidar Quli Khan began to feign madness* and absolutely declined to eat. His physicians, it is said, resorted to an artifice. One of them rushed into his presence crying out that an order had arrived direct from Nizam-ul-mulk that if Haidar Quli Khan did not take his food he was to be bound and sent

* Rustam Ali (251 a) says that he acted thus on the advice of his *diwan* Rajah Raghunath.

to him (N-ul-m). As soon as he heard this, Haidar Quli Khan called hurriedly for food. His chief employés Raghunath Das and others, finding him in this state, constituted Rustam Ali Khan his *locum tenens*, and carried him off towards Dihli. They were so afraid of being followed, that they covered two sometimes three stages a day, passing through Udepur. But Nizam-ul-mulk did not trouble himself and gave no orders to pursue him. As we have already mentioned, the Emperor sent reassuring messages to the fugitive when he was at Rewari (6th April 1723) not far from Dihli, and gave him a new command against Rajah Ajit Singh then at Ajmer. Upon this the madness left him as suddenly as it had fallen upon him. [Rustam Ali 250b, *Mirat-i-Ahmadi*.]

Nizam-ul-mulk marched from Dhar on the 16th Feb. 1723. By this time Haidar Quli Khan appears to have quitted Ahmadabad ; for it was reported to the Emperor on the 11th March, that on the 5th March 1723 he was about 32 miles on the Dihli side of Udepur, and that Maharana Sangram Singh had sent him several trays of food and sweetmeats. On the 28th Feb. Nizam-ul-mulk had been joined at his camp near Jhalod by a force of Dakhin troops under Iwaz Khan, Abdurrahim Khan, Reayat Khan, and some of the Rajahs of that region. Iwaz Khan and the other Mughal chiefs were sent back to the Dakhin ; and the Wazir's uncle Hamid Khan, nicknamed the Jangla Shahzada, was appointed as deputy governor in charge of the Ahmadabad Gujarat province. [Kamwar 261, *Mirat*, K. K. 947.]

Nizam-ul-mulk now turned back to Malwa, where he had an old score to settle with Dost Muhammad Khan of Bhopal. Some years before (1720), this man had joined the force under Sayyid Dilawar Ali Khan sent by the Sayyid brothers to arrest Nizam-ul-mulk. He had escaped in safety from the field where so many were slain ; but the time had now come to wreak vengeance upon him. By the 23rd March 1723 the Wazir was again in Malwa ; and a force was despatched against Dost Muhammad Khan who had taken refuge in his fort of Bhopalgarh, where some fighting between the two sides occurred. Finally, it was reported to the Court on the 24th

May 1723 that the small fort of Islamgarh had been taken. Yar Muhammad Khan had been sent in by his father to plead excuses and make due submission ; Nizam-ul-mulk was satisfied by these overtures, and terms were arranged. At Sironj, on the 25th May 1723, the Wazir appointed his second cousin Azim-ullah Khan, son of Reayat Khan, to be deputy governor of Malwa, while Chandar Bans, son of Rao (Khan or Jan) Chand, was made commandant of Islamgarh. The return march to Dihli was then commenced, the artillery and heavy baggage being left behind at Sironj. On the 7th June 1723 the Wazir was at Narwar. On the 2nd July he had arrived at Khizrabad, a mile or two south of the capital, when Samsam-ud-daulah was sent out to escort him to Court. The next day he was received in audience, his younger son, Ahmad Khan, accompanying him. [Rustam Ali 251b, Kamwar 263-265, Warid 12.]

SEC. 35.—NIZAM-UL-MULK ABANDONS THE WAZARAT AND
RETURNS TO THE DAKHIN.

As soon as he had returned to Dihli (3rd July 1723), Nizam-ul-mulk resumed his efforts to restore some sort of order into public affairs. On every hand he found those efforts foiled. The Emperor's favourite Koki and her helpers, the eunuch Hafiz Khidmatgar Khan and Zafar Khan Roshan-ud-daulah, interfered in every measure and secured large payments for every appointment. Remonstrances, even when addressed direct to the Emperor himself, were unavailing ; as one writer exclaims in bitterness of heart : "What good was there in the Emperor sitting like a woman secluded within four walls? If sovereigns take to women's habits and entangle themselves in their tresses, what can a good Muhammadan do, but migrate to the Holy Places, or if for that journey funds be wanting, take a dose of poison and leave this for another world?" [Ahwal 181 and 196a.] In addition there was the continuous hostility of Samsam-ud-daulah, who headed a party of his own, principally made up of Hindustanis and the Hindu rajahs. Nizam-ul-mulk's efforts were chiefly directed to the abolition of the recent practice of farming out the revenues and to the

stopping of bribe-taking under the cover of advance-payments and of offerings upon appointment to office. He also wished to reduce the extent of assigned lands (*jagirs*) and to give those which were difficult of management to the more powerful nobles and those yielding an income easily to the smaller men. These things were most sensible and praiseworthy. A third proposal, an attempt to restore the poll-tax, cannot be equally approved ; it was due either to Muhammadan bigotry, or to a blind copying of Aurangzeb's action. The historian Khafi Khan also mentions a wild project put forward by the Wazir for the re-conquest of Iran on behalf of the Safawi dynasty, recently dethroned by the Ghilzai chief of Qandahar, Muahmmad Husain, son of Mir Wais, on the ground of showing gratitude for the hospitality once afforded to Humayun. As the news of this event had recently [10th March] been brought to Dihli, there may have been some vague talk of this sort, though such a proposal is rather inconsistent with the Wazir's well-known caution. [K. K. 947, Ghulam Ali 45a.]

Whatever the minister did or proposed was misrepresented until doubt and suspicion were aroused in the mind of Muhammad Shah. The attempt to restore a proper procedure was resented by those who profited by the confusion, for, as the proverb says, "Man is a devil to man." The Emperor himself was young and frivolous, surrounded by men who laughed and joked with him and pandered to his ignobler tastes. The advice of these private friends was more listened to than the words of the minister, and as one writer [Khush-hal Chand] says, "Every one was a chief minister or an administrator of the revenues." One of the ideas adopted by Muhammad Shah from his confidants was that Nizam-ul-mulk intended to depose him and replace Prince Ibrahim upon the throne. They said to him that vigilance was imperative if this Nizam was not to gain the upper hand, when he would act with the harshness which Muhammad Amin Khan had displayed in his day of power. The same false friends visited Nizam-ul-mulk and said to him that Muhammad Shah had not a grain of sense, was a worthless fornicator, and unworthy of the throne. Why was he not replaced by Prince Ibrahim?

Thus Emperor and minister grew suspicious of each other, just as had been the case between Farrukh-siyar and Abdullah Khan. From time to time Nizam-ul-mulk refused to attend audience ; and when he did attend, he took every precaution against violence. The deposition of the Emperor, although Nizam-ul-mulk never dreamt of it, would have been easy enough as the minister had the Dakhini officers and all the Mughals (except Qamar-ud-din Khan) at his beck and call. [K. K. 948-49 ; *Ahwal* 182*b*-183*a*.]

SEC. 36.—STORY OF KHANNA.

The extent of the disorders caused by this want of confidence may be gauged from an incident belonging to this time. There was a beef-butcher named Khanna, sometimes called Khan Muhammad, in the employ of Koka Khan, the Emperor's foster-brother. This man was secretly the head of a gang of robbers, who plundered the houses of many officials and rich traders, some men being killed and others wounded by the thieves. Bitter complaints were made to the Emperor, and he issued orders to the head of the police. The kotwal reported that Khanna's gang was at the bottom of all these outrages. But Khanna being protected by Koka Khan and himself a powerful man, a great fighter and wrestler, the kotwal was afraid to seize him.

One day when Khanna had come into the palace in the train of Koka Khan, the Emperor ordered his arrest. Khanna tried to escape. The palace guards surrounded him, threw stones and bricks at him and finally captured him alive. His Majesty sent him in custody a prisoner to the police office (*chabutra*). When the *kotwal* had well beaten him and subjected him to torture, all the stolen property and twenty thousand Rupees were recovered from his house.

Muhammad Ghaus, named by Khanna as one of his abettors, was next arrested ; he was an officer in the imperial service with a *mansab* of 500 and a good *jagir*. He admitted the accusation and gave the trace of much stolen property. In the end, a large number of well-placed men who had engaged in theft and protection of thieves were unmasked and arrested.

When Khanna saw that his life was at stake, he resolved to take advantage of the young Emperor's love for spectacle. He sent word through his jailor that he was willing to fight with a tiger ; if it killed him, well and good, if he killed it, he should be set at liberty. The Emperor approved the proposal and an enclosure was prepared under the lattice window (*jharoka*) of the palace, overlooking the Jamuna sands. Hearing of the affair Nizam-ul-mulk, who looked on it as destroying God's image, protested that much money had still to be traced and it was not advisable to kill the prisoner until the enquiry had been completed. In this way the fight with the tiger was postponed and never took place. [Shiu Das, 85b-86b.]

SEC. 37.—NIZAM-UL-MULK CEASES TO STRUGGLE.

After this digression let us return to the position of Nizam-ul-mulk as chief minister. During this time Qamar-ud-din Khan, although so nearly related to the minister, stood aloof ; partly, it is said, by reason of his excessive indulgence in drinking, which disabled him from taking any effective part in public business. The seven thousand Mughals under his command thus remained neutral. Public business was dealt with as if it were a child's toy ; "revenue business was disposed of by the heads of the army, and night watchmen decided cases instead of the Qazi." The Emperor was immersed in pleasure, the nobles drunk with envy, the servants of the State starving. The secret jealousy among the nobles round the Emperor sometimes showed itself openly. Muzaffar Khan, brother of Samsam-ud-daulah, was one of the Emperor's boon companions. Opposed to him and his brother were the bosom friends Burhan-ul-mulk Saadat Khan and Nawab Roshan-ud-daulah. Among Muzaffar Khan's officials was a Persian from Naishapur, the native place of Saadat Khan. This man's accounts fell into disorder and the money was not paid. One day in open audience Saadat Khan asked Muzaffar Khan to release the man on his security. Muzaffar Khan gave a sharp answer. Saadat Khan somewhat disconcerted persisted in his offer. The other man grew still hotter and placed his hand on the hilt of the sword of state then in his charge. Saadat Khan made as if to

strike him on the head with the fan he was holding. Roshan-ud-daulah remonstrated, and the officials dragged them apart. Issuing from the hall Muzaffar Khan ordered his matchlockmen and gunners to make ready. Roshan-ud-daulah, however, with the Emperor's permission sent for ten thousand Afghans in his employ and prevented the outbreak. Next morning Samsam-ud-daulah made complaint to Muhammad Shah and declared his intention of attacking Burhan-ul-mulk. He made many boasts of what he would do to Roshan-ud-daulah, and that before a hair of Burhan-ul-mulk's head was touched they would need to kill him and fifty thousand Afghans. As Samsam-ud-daulah persisted, Muhammad Bangash at the request of Roshan-ud-daulah joined the latter's troops and artillery. Qamar-ud-din Khan then intervened and advised Samsam-ud-daulah to desist. But the two disputants were sent away from Court for a time, Saadat Khan to Oudh and Muzaffar Khan to Ajmer. By the beginning of 1136 H. (October 1723) matters seemed to have reached a crisis, and as an open sign of his discontent the Wazir ceased to appear at Court. He sent in his resignation; but being prudent and slow in coming to decisive action, he took no further steps, though he had already, it was believed, formed the project of returning to the Dakhin. Each side thought this solution would be of favourable result to its interests. The Emperor's friends thought that, if Nizam-ul-mulk were conciliated and allowed to leave the Court, they could easily destroy him. On the other hand Nizam-ul-mulk, who had been sounded as to relinquishing the Dakhin in favour nominally of the infant Prince lately born, felt that his position there could not be long maintained unless he was present himself, although he could hardly tell the Emperor that he considered the Dakhin his own and it ought to be left with him, he having gained it by the strength of his own right arm. Messages were interchanged, a truce was entered into, and on the 31st October 1723 Nizam-ul-mulk reappeared at the imperial audience. [*Siyar*, i. 267; Ghulam Ali's *Muqad*, 45b-49a; *Ahwal* 184a-185b; Khush-hal 1042a.]

A little more than a month after this apparent reconciliation, Nizam-ul-mulk made the pretext that in the cold season

his health suffered from the climate of Dihli, and asked for leave to proceed on a hunting excursion to his *jagirs* in Sambhal and Muradabad. His audience of leave-taking was given on the 17th December 1723, and on the 22nd he crossed the Jamuna and encamped near the river bank. Here the Emperor paid him a visit, and he lingered in the vicinity in the hope of some terms being arranged through the good offices of the Rajah Gujar Mal Saksena, *diwan* of the *Khalsa*. [Kamwar 267, K. K. 949, Ghulam Ali 49a, Khush-hal 1043a, *Ahwal* 184a.]

There was still a chance that Muhammad Shah might be induced to alter his tactics, and he was approached in the interests of Nizam-ul-mulk by one of the eunuchs, Khoja Munis. Rajah Gujar Mal also urged the same views upon the Emperor, and seemed likely to succeed. These hopes were dashed to the ground by the sudden death of the Rajah on the 26th December 1723. He had prepared a written statement of the Wazir's demands and hoped to obtain on it the signature of the Emperor. The chief proposition was that the rule of farming out the taxes, introduced in Farrukh-siyar's reign by the "baniya" that is, Ratan Chand, should be entirely abolished. As he was reading out his paper to the Emperor in the audience-hall, he was suddenly seized with a fit. Qamar-ud-din Khan threw the shawl from his own shoulders over him, he was carried to his *palki* and taken home. He died as soon as he reached his house. When Nizam-ul-mulk heard of this event, after some words of praise of the deceased, he gave up all further thought of negotiations and started on his journey to Muradabad. His eldest son Ghazi-ud-din Khan was made deputy-Wazir on the 6th January 1724. [Khush-hal 1043a.]

On the 12th Feb. Nizam-ul-mulk was reported to be at Anupshahar with the intention of marching to Agra. The pretext of his being still a friend of the Court was kept up by the despatch of presents to him through his agent at Dihli on the 18th Feb., and he sent to Court many lengthy petitions to the effect that he would return straight to Dihli from Agra. Then he submitted a report that as the Mahrattas had invaded Malwa and Gujarat, provinces under his and his son's charge, he must

march southwards to expel them. He was then at Soron on the Ganges, whence passing through Jalesar and Agra by rapid marching he reached Narwar and then Ujjain in Malwa. It was not till his army had passed Dholpur, south of Agra, crossed the Chambal and gone on to Gwaliyar that the common soldiers knew their ultimate destination ; but a few had suspected it from the first as the Wazir had adopted the precaution of bringing the whole of his family with him when he left Dihli. [*Ahwal* 185*a*.] Before his arrival at Ujjain the Mahrattas had recrossed the Narmada river. He then went into Dost Muhammad Khan's country and camped at Sihor near Sironj. But these pretences were soon abandoned, and Nizam-ul-mulk made all haste for the Dakhin. He arrived at Burhanpur in Khandesh during Ramzan (May-June) and at Aurangabad, the Dakhin capital, by the month of Zul Qada (July-August, 1724.) [*Kamwar* 268 ; K. K. 949-952 ; *Burhan* 169*a* ; *M. U.* iii. 739.]

SEC. 37.—ATTEMPT TO SUPERSEDE NIZAM-UL-MULK IN THE DAKHIN.

Meanwhile, the enemies of Nizam-ul-mulk at the Dihli Court had not been idle. On the 3rd Feb. 1724, before the Wazir had fully shown his hand, a *farman* was handed to Abdul-Mabud Khan, son of Mubariz Khan, governor of Haidarabad, appointing his father to the whole Dakhin as deputy for the infant Prince Shahryar Shah, and not long after, upon the death of this infant, the appointment was confirmed to Mubariz Khan in his own name. A grant of five lakhs was made from the imperial treasury and several lakhs from the revenues of the Dakhin, to enable him to raise a sufficient army. Although he and Nizam-ul-mulk were of the same country by origin, it was believed that greed of place and power would be sufficient to overcome any reluctance due to this fact. Other orders were despatched to Iwaz Khan (deputy of Nizam-ul-mulk), Bahadur Khan, Abdun-nabi Khan, Abdul-ghaffar Khan, Amin Khan, Saadat-ullah Khan, Rajah Sahu (head of the Mahrattas), and Rao Rambha, to join Mubariz Khan and afford him every aid in their power. After nearly five months, on the 22nd July 1724, Ghazi-ud-din Khan,

deputy Wazir, was openly set aside and Qamar-ud-din Khan Itimad-ud-daulah, son of Muhammad Amin Khan Chin, was made chief minister. [Kamwar 267, Warid 13-14, Khush-hal 1044a.]

Mubariz Khan, the then governor of Haidarabad, who was thus set up as a rival to Nizam-ul-mulk, was a native of Balkh, Khwaja Muhammad by name. In 1137 H. (1724) he was a little over sixty years of age. His mother had brought him to Hindustan when he was a boy. After a time he obtained imperial employ in various offices at the Court ; and finally secured his position by marrying a daughter of Inayat-ullah Khan Kashmiri, a man high in Alamgir's favour. He was made *Bakhshi* to Alamgir's youngest son Kam Bakhsh, and afterwards faujdar of Sangamner. The first title given him was that of Amanat Khan ; and in the 47th year of Alamgir (1114-1115 H., 1703-4) the *faujdari* of Baizapur, about 48 miles from Aurangabad, was added to his former district. In Bahadur Shah's reign he was in charge of Surat : the then Wazir, Munim Khan, having the very highest opinion of his good qualities, which he held to be established by his very appearance. He was promoted on the death of Ghazi-ud-din Khan Firuz Jang, in 1122 H. (1710) to the Government of Ahmadabad Gujarat. Jahandar Shah (1712) removed him to the charge of Malwa, and for his victory over Islam Khan of Rampura in that province he was created Shahamat Khan. Early in Farrukh-siyar's reign (1713) he again received the Government of Gujarat, but had held it only two weeks when he was superseded by Daud Khan Panni. He was transferred to the province of Haidarabad in the Dakhin, and finally received the titles of Imad-ul-mulk, Mubariz Khan Bahadur, Hizbar Jang. He ruled in Haidarabad for nearly twelve years. Apparently he did not pay the Mahrattas the *chauth*, or one-fourth of the collections, as had been agreed to by Husain Ali Khan Barha when he was governor. Instead of this, Mubariz Khan fought them wherever he could ; though, in spite of his exertions, they everywhere and at all times, whenever they saw a chance, extorted more even than the *chauth* and took all they could lay hands on. Most of the roads, too, were so

unsafe owing to their depredations as not to be traversible. [M. U. iii. 729 ; K. K. 963 ; Warid 54.]

On the first occasion when Nizam-ul-mulk marched into the Dakhin (1719-20), he entered into correspondence with Mubariz Khan. The latter marched to his aid but did not join him until his arrival at Aurangabad, after the defeat of Sayyid Dilawar Ali Khan and of Sayyid Alim Ali Khan. Then in 1721 Nizam-ul-mulk thought of returning to Court, but Mubariz Khan was opposed to this move ; and when they had reached the pass of Fardapur, halfway between Aurangabad and Burhanpur, persuaded the Nawab to retrace his steps and proceed southwards to Adoni. Subsequently however. Nizam-ul-mulk's proceedings to bring under subjection the Afghan leaders of that region met with only half-hearted support from Mubariz Khan, who perceived that their interests and his were almost identical, he being in unauthorized possession of imperial lands in Sikakol and elsewhere. Nizam-ul-mulk betrayed no displeasure at the time. But when he succeeded to the office of Wazir he hindered Mubariz Khan, his sons and followers from obtaining increased *jagirs* and even told the governor's agent at Court that collections made from the crown domains were owing from the governor and would have to be paid. The Wazir also tried to get Mubariz Khan out of the Dakhin by recommending him strongly as the only man fit to take charge of Kabul, the Government of which was then vacant. Afterwards when the talk began of exchanging the Dakhin for the two provinces of Malwa and Gujarat, Nizam-ul-mulk himself proposed Mubariz Khan as his successor in the Dakhin, preferring that he should be appointed rather than a complete stranger. [M. U. iii. 729-743.]

At this time Inayat-ullah Khan wrote from Dihli to his son-in-law urging his acceptance of the appointment to the six provinces of the Dakhin and inciting him to active opposition to Nizam-ul-mulk. He was told that by so acting he would acquire the greatest favour in the eyes of Muhammad Shah. As we have already said, the formal rescript for the office had been sent to him at an early stage of the dispute with Nizam-ul-mulk. When it reached Mubariz Khan, he was busy

with the siege of Phulchari near Machhlibandar, then held by Appa Rao. The siege had lasted six to eight months. The place resisted for a little time longer, and in the end the matter was settled on terms. The governor and his force then returned to Haidarabad. There he was joined by Bahadur Khan Panni, faujdar of Karnul, Abul Fath (son of Abdun-nabi Khan faujdar of Kadapa), Abdul-Majid Khan, (grandson of Diler Khan) and his adopted son, Ali Khan; and on behalf of Saadat-ullah Khan, faujdar of the Karnatik there came Ghalib Khan (son of Amir Abu Talib Khan Badakhshi). He was also joined by Dilawar Khan faujdar of Raichor. But many men went to their homes as the rainy season had commenced. In the meantime Iwaz Khan had made a raid into Haidarabad territory, plundering the town of Banswara in the *sarkar* of Medak.* Provoked by this incursion, and urged on by the Pathans, Mubariz Khan resolved on instant revenge. The march towards Aurangabad began in the middle of the rainy season. They crossed the river Godavari in the neighbourhood of Nander and encamped not far from Udhiya, a pargana of sarkar Basim in the Balaghat of Berar, intending there to pass the season of the rains. It is estimated that he had about 15,000 horse and between 30 and 40,000 matchlockmen known in the Dakhin as *Kalapiyada* (black footmen), also a certain number of swivel guns and camel-pieces, but only two or three large cannon. His police posts occupied the country and his officials went out to collect the revenue. [M. U. iii. 736-'7. Kamwar.]

While Nizam-ul-mulk was still at Sihor (near Bhupal) in Malwa he received a letter from Muhammad Inayat Khan at Aurangabad informing him that, instigated by the courtiers at Dihli and backed by the Afghans of the south country, Mubariz Khan had accepted the appointment of subahdar of the whole Dakhin and was on his march from Haidarabad. It was believed that as soon as he had taken possession, he would move northwards into Malwa, where he would be joined

* *Banswara* is 81 miles n. w., *Medak* (town) 51 miles n., and *Nander* 145 miles n. of Haidarabad.

by reinforcements from Dihli and the combined armies would be used against Nizam-ul-mulk. This news was still under consideration when a letter from the agent at Court of Mubariz Khan conveying to him the verbal orders of his father-in-law, Inayat-ullah Khan, fell into the Nawab's hands. The contents of this letter confirmed what had been written from Aurangabad by Muhammad Inayat Khan. There could no longer be any doubt left as to the position ; and immediate action was resolved upon. [M. U. iii. 738.]

As Nizam-ul-mulk had succeeded in reaching Aurangabad unopposed, Muhammad Shah appears to have considered the game as lost, and thereupon changed his plans. After reciting that ill-health had been Nizam-ul-mulk's plea for leaving Dihli on two months' leave to Muradabad,—whence he had made off to Malwa and then to Aurangabad,—the Emperor asserts that the Dakhin provinces had been placed in charge of Mubariz Khan because Nizam-ul-mulk had complained that the country was a desolate one producing no revenue. If the extent of Nizam-ul-mulk's desire for the Dakhin had been known, a successor would not have been appointed. When Ghazi-ud-din Khan (Nizam-ul-mulk's son) found his father had gone to Aurangabad, he became alarmed at the plots of the envious and had withdrawn from the conduct of affairs as deputy Wazir. The work had been made over to Itimad-ud-daulah until Nizam-ul-mulk's return to Court. God forbid that he should suppose that he had been dismissed from his office or had fallen out of favour. The wazirship and governorship, both of them, are confirmed to him (Nizam-ul-mulk) ; he might stay in his province as long as he liked and return to Court whenever he wished. The province of Patna (Azimabad) had been given to Mubariz Khan, with whom Nizam-ul-mulk was requested not to interfere. To Mubariz Khan the Emperor wrote that the Dakhin was given to him when he reported his willingness to undertake the affair with the aid of his allies, the local Afghans. The assurances led to Nizam-ul-mulk being neglected. When the first orders were issued, Nizam-ul-mulk was at Muradabad and Azd-ud-daulah (Iwaz Khan) near Deogarh ; at Aurangabad there was no one to make any

defence. He (Mubariz Kh.) took up so much time in attempting to conquer some petty fortalices that both nobles (Nizam-ul-mulk and Iwaz Kh.) had united forces at Aurangabad. Now he (Mubariz Kh.) raised the objection of the rainy season, which is no real obstacle to brave soldiers, and on that account halted 60 *kos* from the provincial capital (Aurangabad). The projected business thus remained unperformed. Neither had Bahadur Khan and others, although written to as suggested, done anything. It was all make-believe. Thus there was no course left but to restore Nizam-ul-mulk. Further delay was inadvisable, for his adherents were weak as unfledged birds. Nizam-ul-mulk had therefore been restored, while Azimabad Patna had been granted to him (Mubariz Khan). He should depart for his new Government *via* Burhanpur or Sikakol whichever he preferred—the rescript would follow, and Nizam-ul-mulk had been directed not to hinder or interfere. But before these orders could reach or take effect the hostile governors had put their quarrel to the arbitrament of the sword and Mubariz Khan had perished. [*Majma-ul-insha*, 87-88.]

SEC. 38.—MUBARIZ KHAN PREPARES TO FIGHT NIZAM-UL-MULK.

In Ramzan 1136 H. (May-June 1724) Nizam-ul-mulk was at Burhanpur, and about the end of Ramzan (21st June) he reached Aurangabad. In order to be able to meet future criticism Nizam-ul-mulk began by addressing a letter of exhortation and warning to Mubariz Khan, reminding him of the sin he was about to commit by the shedding of Musalman blood. He pointed out the indecency of Muhammadans fighting together in the midst of infidels, dwelt on their being of one country and one race, reminded Mubariz Khan that Muhammad Shah's acts were like the fancies of a child, and that from his agents at Court he had heard several times that another Government would be allotted to him (Nizam-ul-mulk). When the order arrived he would obey by returning to Dihli, and Mubariz Khan could then take peaceable possession of Aurangabad. Without some new office he could not leave the Dakhin, as it would ruin his army and involve the triumph of his deadly enemies. A little delay would thus clear up the

whole situation. But Mubariz looked on this advice as dictated by self-interest, and at the same time felt that to give way without a struggle would be fatal to his honour as a noble and warrior of repute, more especially as he held a direct commission from his sovereign. Some think he would have given way, had not his Pathan allies talked roughly to him and accused him of preferring his Mughal tribesmen to loyalty to his sovereign. Mubariz Khan pleaded for the advantages of a peaceful agreement, but the Pathans only grew more angry than before. He gave way to them and put the blame on them in his reply to Nizam-ul-mulk's overtures. He finished his reply by leaving his fate in the hands of God, and what the Fates would bring forth would soon be seen. He continued his preparations for the campaign. [*M. U.* iii. 739 ; *K. K.* 952 ; *Burhan* 169a ; *Warid* 15, 54-55 ; *Ahwal* 187b-188a.]

Nizam-ul-mulk on his side made ready, his first camp being at Talab Jaswant. According to one account Nizam-ul-mulk's leading advisers, Iwaz Khan and Ghiyas Khan, were opposed to taking the field before the army had recovered after the march from Hindustan and until the rains were over. These views were over-ruled by the Nawab on the ground that delay would only strengthen the other side, to which there would be many defections owing to the *farman* which Mubariz Khan had received. At length, with the help of Bajji Rao and other Mahrattas, he marched out about 3rd Sept. 1724, at the head of six thousand horsemen ; in the midst of lightning, thunder, wind and rain ; they proceeded under difficulties which defy description to within twelve *kos* of Mubariz Khan's camp. When the latter had reached the pargana of Char Thana, following the advice of his generals he resolved to make for Zafarnagar, a place held in perpetual grant by his ally Bahadur Khan Panni and having a population of Afghans. He hoped by a rapid march to reach that town during one night, intending without an instant's delay to fall unexpectedly upon Aurangabad, having heard from the commandant of Daulatabad fort that Aurangabad was unprotected and the fortress would be delivered up. If, provoked to sudden action in this emergency the enemy made pursuit, their artillery in which

they were strong must be left behind, and Mubariz Khan would have them at his mercy. If, on the other hand, they resolved not to abandon the artillery, the ensuing delay would give him time to seize the women and treasure of the Nawab and the families of his soldiers left behind at the provincial capital. In pursuance of this idea Mubariz Khan left his camp on the Purna, where the two armies had been only twenty to twenty-four miles apart, and marched off in the other direction. In so doing he forgot the fact that in Hindustan to turn away from your enemy, once you have come in sight of him, is looked on as equivalent to your flight and the victory of your enemy. This way of looking at things was adopted on this occasion, as an eye-witness tells us ; and Nizam-ul-mulk's men, who until then feared defeat, now felt assured of victory. All, great and small, believed Mubariz Khan was afraid of them and had fled from before them. Offerings and congratulations were brought to their general ; and a rhymester in the camp found the date in the Hindi words, *Dar-gya Mubariz Khan*. [M. U. iii. 739, K. K. 952, *Ahwal* 189.]

At the time of passing Nizam-ul-mulk's camp, a number of Mubariz Khan's advance-guard and skirmishers made an attack upon it. Many men including the commander of the artillery were killed. But those attacked were not content to leave the matter thus. With a considerable body of Mahrattas they came out to retaliate, and adopting the tactics of Cossacks and Mahrattas put an end to the other side's attempt at a forced march, making it almost impossible for them to advance more than two steps at a time. The preliminary skirmishing seems to have begun on the 1st Oct. 1723, and by the 8th the fighting had waxed more and more severe. Nizam-ul-mulk had made a shrewd guess at the object of his enemy's strategy, and the Mahrattas having hung on to him and arrested his progress, the Nawab made a night march and by great exertions managed to cross the Purna with his artillery. [M. U. iii. 740, Kamwar, *Ahwal* 191a.]

SEC. 39.—BATTLE OF SHAKAR KHERA.

There being no other course open to him, Mubariz Khan

stored his heavy baggage and impedimenta in Shakar-Khera,* and drew up his force outside that town. For two days he and his men remained separated from their supplies, and having nothing with them but a horse and a riding whip they suffered excessively. At first the two armies were eight miles apart, and as Mubariz Khan would not leave his position Nizam-ul-mulk advanced in fighting array one or two miles a day. Both sides were on the alert to repel any sudden night attacks. The decisive battle began in the afternoon of the 23rd Muharram 1137 A. H.=11th October, 1724. [M. U. iii. 741, *Ahwal*, 191a.]

Nizam-ul-mulk arranged his force in two main divisions, the first under his own immediate command, the other under that of Iwaz Khan. His vanguard he placed under Qadir Dad Khan (son of Qadir Dad Khan Alamgiri). Talib Muhi-ud-din Khan (grandson of Sadullah Khan, Wazir) was given the command of the right wing, while that of the left wing was confided to Ismail Khan and Muzaffar Khan Khweshgi. Kunwar Chand, a son of Chhattarsal Bundela, and a body of Bundelas were placed with Barqandaz Khan, general of artillery, and Atayar Khan, superintendent of the *ahsham* and the light artillery. These took their place at the head of the vanguard. Iwaz Khan occupied a position to the left of Nizam-ul-mulk. Under him were Sayyid Jamal Khan (his son), Muqarrab Khan Dakhini and Khan Alam Dakhini, Mutahavvar Khan Khweshgi, and Aziz Beg Khan Harisi. He also had the artillery that he had organized when he became deputy governor of the Dakhin. [M. U. iii. 741, K. K. 953.]

Zahir-ud-daulah Reayat Khan, Nizam-ul-mulk's cousin, and Muhammad Ghiyas Khan were posted between the centre and the left. While Nasir-ud-daulah Abdur-rahim Khan, the Nawab's uncle, was sent to the right wing and with him Sayyid Ghazanfar Khan Burhanpuri, who was Bakhshi to Ghazi-ud-din Khan Firuz Jang (the Nawab's eldest son), also the three hundred men he commanded, some light guns and some wall-

* Now called *Fath-khera*, in the southern part of the Baldana district of Berar, some 80 miles from Aurangabad. (*Berar Gazetteer*, 168.)

pieces. To Hirz-ullah Khan (grandson of Sadullah Khan) was assigned a place between the centre and the left, and Bahadur Dil Khan (Lachin Beg) Qalmaq was sent to support him. Hafiz-ud-din Khan and Muhammad Said Khan, grandsons of Sadullah Khan, and therefore near relations of the Nawab, were stationed a furlong from the centre. The *yaltamsh* [advanced reserve] was placed under Hoshdar Khan (afterwards Iradat Khan). Muhtashim Khan (grandson of Shaikh Mir Khwafi) with several commanders of the centre (*tarah*) was placed on the right and left [of the centre]. Khwajam Quli Khan Turani with Gopal Singh Gaur, Salim Khan Afghan (deputy of the head huntsman) with his skirmishers, and Rasul Khan Afghan, all three mounted on elephants, were posted in front of the centre as a reserve [*yaltamsh*.] [K. K. 954-955.]

Nizam-ul-mulk himself was in the centre, having with him many nobles such as Khwaja Abdullah Khan, Ihtida Khan, the diwan, Rustam Beg Khan, Nek Nazar Khan (*Bakhshi* of Nasir Jang, the Nawab's second son), Himmat Yar Khan (maternal uncle of the Nawab's son) and officials such as Abdur-rahman Khan, superintendent of the personal guard. Turktaz Khan, who had often had command among the Mahrattas, was deputed to look after Baji Rao and others and the 7,000 to 8,000 Mahrattas with them.

On the other side, Mubariz Khan set his men in battle array, but he was notably deficient in heavy artillery. His vanguard was commanded by Ghalib Khan, an officer of Saadat-ullah Khan, faujdar of the Haidarabad Karnatik, and Husain Munavvar Khan (son of Khan Zaman, otherwise Shaikh Nizam Dakhini). Behind them, at the head of the supporting force (*yaltamsh*) was Muhammad Beg Khan (uncle of Mubariz Khan and an experienced officer). On the right were placed Ibrahim Khan Panni (entitled Bahadur Khan, and brother of the well-known Daud Khan Panni), Abdul Fatah Khan (son of Abdun-nabi Khan Miyana, long famed in the Bijapur Karnatik), and other Afghan commanders with 2,000 Afghan horse. The sons of Diler Khan Miyana of Bankapur, along with Ali Khan (his adopted son) who commanded their troops, and Khwaja Mahmud Khan, Khwaja Asad Khan, Khwaja Masaud Khan

and Hamid Khan, the sons of Mubariz, were posted close to the centre. Mubariz Khan himself, accompanied by Khan Zaman, son of Munim Khan (Bahadur-Shahi Wazir), Munavvar Khan, Qizzilbash Khan, Faiq Khan (his diwan), Arab Beg Khan Turani, Mir Yusuf Khan and many others, took up his position at the head of the centre. [K. K. 956.]

Nizam-ul-mulk, having given orders that there was to be no firing until the critical moment of the attack, chained his big guns together and awaited in position the onset of Mubariz Khan, the distance between the two armies being now a mile or so. Between them was a water-course, the bottom of which consisted of sticky black mud into which men and horses sank up to their chests. At length after midday Mubariz Khan gave the order to advance against Iwaz Khan, whose force was on the left of Nizam-ul-mulk's line. The attacking side was under ten thousand horsemen in number. As they rode on they increased their pace until suddenly they reached the water-course, where they were checked and the line thrown into great disorder. The crush was so great that if a horse reared it was swept on with its legs in the air, or if a man lost his seat he did not reach the ground but was carried on supported by the horses on each side of him. At length the men of the left wing found a pathway. Then, in spite of all the artillery opposed to them on their right hand with its deafening sound and its blinding smoke, they fell like "roaring tigers" on the right and advanced centre of Iwaz Khan and began a hand-to-hand struggle with sword, spear and mace. It is said that some 5,000 of his horsemen dismounted and fought on foot with sword and shield. [*Ahwal* 191b, K. K. 957, *M. U.* iii. 741, Kamwar.]

At this point some of Nizam-ul-mulk's generals arrived to reinforce Iwaz Khan, and did great execution with their swivel-guns and muskets. Soon came the news that Ghalib Khan was killed. Mubariz Khan, without a muscle moving, said, "I too am ready for this unavoidable fate." Then his son Asad Khan's elephant turned and fled. As they passed Mubariz Khan, he shouted "Asad, the runaway!" Asad Khan replied "It is not my fault, the elephant is frightened." The

father angrily retorted, "If your elephant turns, throw yourself off, and carry out your duty to your sovereign." The elephant driver, by some severe blows of his iron on the animal's head, brought it into line again. For an hour-and-a-half they were rained on by shot and bullet. At last Asad Khan and Masaud Khan were killed. Mubariz Khan, on being told, exclaimed, "Thanks be to the Almighty, from my first youth until now, I have never been defeated; wounds and death are our portion, to die unshrinking on the battlefield is our salvation; Asad and Masaud have gone from this earth; of what longer use is my valour (*mubariz*)?" So saying, he drove his elephant alongside those of Ibrahim Khan and the sons of Abdun-nabi and Abdur Rauf. He fought on for nearly another hour, and was at last brought up by the impassable ravine full of mud; he had been wounded and his strength began to fail; at times he fainted, but reviving he seized again the bow and arrow. His elephant driver was killed, he took the dead man's place himself and fought on as before. But at an hour before sunset Mubariz Khan and all his chief men had lost their lives. [*Ahwal* 192, K. K. 958, *M. U.* iii. 742.]

The principal men of his side who fell were Bahadur Khan Panni, commanding the right wing, Mukaram Khan, formerly Khan Zaman, commanding the left wing, Ghalib Khan, who was at the head of the vanguard, Abul Fath Khan Miyana, Husaini Khan (son of Ali Mardan Khan Haidarabadi), Amin Khan Dakhini, Jag Deo Rao Jadon, and Faiq Khan Kashmiri (the diwan).^c The total losses on Mubariz Khan's side are said to have amounted to 3,500 men, of whom between 30 to 40 were leaders and "riders on elephants." Two sons of Mubariz Khan, Mahmud Khan and Hamid-ullah Khan, the latter a mere boy, were among the wounded and were taken prisoners. Dilawar Khan also fell into the Mughals' hands. [*Ahwal* 193a, Kamwar, K. K. 959, Warid 16.]

The losses on Nizam-ul-mulk's side were comparatively few. Reayat Khan, a cousin to whom the Nawab's aunt was married, was shot by an arrow in the windpipe and died. Sulaiman Khan Khweshgi also lost his life and Sayyid

Ghazanfar Khan died of his wounds after two or three days. [K. K. 959.]

One of the curious incidents of the battle is that Amin Khan Dakhini and Muqarrab Khan his son fought on different sides. They had always been on bad terms, and a few days before the battle took place Amin Khan left the army of Nizam-ul-mulk and transferred his services to Mubariz Khan, taking with him a number of the commanders from Burhanpur. On the day of battle the father and the son took the field thirsting for each other's blood. Muqarrab Khan fought stoutly with everyone he encountered and showed his prowess abundantly, but never came across his father. Still as Amin Khan was killed in this battle by someone or another on Nizam-ul-mulk's side, the popular legend arose that he was cut down by the sword of his own son. [K. K. 957.]

Mubariz Khan was buried in the plain outside the town of Shakar-Khera. Shah Nawaz Khan, author of the *Masir-ul-umara*, thinks that he was to blame for carelessness and want of promptitude. If he had raised at once the siege of Phulchari and marched off to Aurangabad immediately on receipt of the imperial rescript, he would have been successful, for at that time Iwaz Khan had not more than 2,000 men. Nor, in spite of the delay, ought he to have been beaten, if he had only taken measures to collect sufficient men and material. In fact during the campaign some of the Mahratta chiefs had made overtures to him, more especially Kanhu Bhonsla, who had 5,000 men with him and would have been satisfied with a small payment. But Mubariz Khan would not hear of such a thing. All these men, as he said, had felt his claws and suffered from his blows ; and for the future as in the past he would enlist men when he wanted them. He would never lower himself by entreaties ; but if they came of their own accord without payment there would be no objection. The thorough-going partizans of Nizam-ul-mulk laid all the blame upon Mubariz Khan for having dared to oppose such a man. "What can you expect?" they said, "Is it not true as the proverb says 'You cannot gather grapes from thorns nor apples from plane-trees'?" [M. U. iii. 743, *Burhan* 169a, *Ahwal* 196b.]

The day after the battle was spent in burying the dead and attending to the wounded.* Of these latter the principal were the two sons of Mubariz Khan, Dilawar Khan, his brother-in-law and Muhammad Beg Khan his maternal uncle. The latter died of his wounds a few days afterwards, and this too was the fate of Arab Beg Khan. Among the wounded attended to were Hakim Izzat Talab Khan, Qizzilbash Kh., Mir Abul Fazl Khan, Raza Muhammad Khan (diwan of Qamrnagar or Karnul), Aqa Abul Hasan (news-writer of Machhlibandar). Nizam-ul-mulk provided most of what was necessary in the shape of food and medicine and the things necessary for mourning. But Ihtida Khan (his diwan and lord steward) also largely contributed to their relief. Diyanat Khan, ex-diwan of the Dakhin, too, furnished many of the men who had been stripped of everything, with cash and food. Large amounts of rich clothes and jewels which had been confiscated, belonging to the sons of Mubariz Khan, Dilawar Khan, Kazim Ali Khan (son of Haji Mansur) and others, were restored by the order of Nizam-ul-mulk. [K. K. 959-960.]

SEC. 40.—NIZAM-UL-MULK'S MOVEMENTS AFTER HIS VICTORY.

After a halt of three or four days to rest his men, Nizam-ul-mulk marched for Aurangabad. Soon news came to him that Khwaja Ahmad Khan, the eldest son of Mubariz Khan, who had been left behind in charge of Haidarabad, had taken

* The printed text of Khafi Khan seems to be incorrect on p. 960; either some words have been left out at the end of line 4, or the last word in line 5 is not in the negative. As the text stands, it gives the following casualties on Mubariz Kh.'s side (pp. 958-960):

Killed—Mubariz, his sons Asad and Masaud, Ghalib, Husain Munavvar, Kamal (descended from Khan Zaman Dakhini), Bahadur Kh. Panni and Ibrahim Kh. Panni (though the two are declared to be one and the same person on p. 956), Abdul Fatah, Md. Amin, Md. Beg and Arab Beg (both died of wounds).

Wounded—Mubariz's sons Mahmud and Hamid-ullah, Dilawar, Khan Zaman (s. of ex-Wazir Munim Kh.), Ahsan (not *Husaini*), Mir Yusuf, Faiq, Mir Fakhr-ullah.

Robbed but unwounded—Hakim Izzat Talab, Qizzilbash, Mir Abul Fazl, Raza Md. and Aqa Abul Hasan. [J. S.]

refuge in the fort of Muhammad-nagar close to the capital, by connivance of the garrison and its commander, Sandal Khan, a eunuch of the family. The whole of the late governor's property was transferred to this fortress, and its defences put in order and strengthened. [K. K. 960-961, *M. U.* iii. 744.]

On reaching Aurangabad the necessary arrangements were made for its protection, and all needless baggage was stored in the fortress ; then Nizam-ul-mulk set out again and made his way to the vicinity of Haidarabad, a march of 270 miles. Towards the end of Rabi II. 1137 H. (14th January 1725) his tents were pitched in the grove known as Gosha Mahal. Officials were appointed and the administration of the province taken over. Meanwhile Khwaja Ahmad Khan, who feared severe measures against himself and the connections of Mubariz Khan, was actively preparing to stand a siege. He also gave out that he expected every day a rescript from the Emperor appointing him in his father's place to the governorship of the subah and the command of the fortress. This rumour prevented the restoration of order to a considerable extent. In fact he wrote in all directions warning the garrisons of forts and the officials and landholders against giving possession to Nizam-ul-mulk's nominees until the period of one year had elapsed. He also sent troops to some places to aid them in their resistance, and released from the fort a number of notorious stirrers-up of strife who had been seized and imprisoned by Mubariz Khan, and these scattering to their homes helped to intensify the existing disorder. Nizam-ul-mulk's men lost hold of the province and the collection of revenue ceased. The roads became unsafe and were closed to travellers ; and in places the revenue officials were actually attacked. In one of these outbreaks Kazim Ali Khan (son of Haji Mansur), who was faujdar of the country round Bhongir, was attacked and slain along with a number of his men. But in the end Nizam-ul-mulk by gentle treatment and gifts of enhanced rank, new *jagirs* and the revival of titles held previously in the family, induced Khwaja Ahmad Khan to hand over the keys of the fortress.*

* Leaving Ahmad Khan untouched for a time Nizam-ul-mulk occupied the city of Haidarabad and the country round it, then went on to Machhli-

Khwaja Ahmad Khan was made Shahamat Khan and Khwaja Mahmud Khan became Mubariz Khan. The dependent members of the family were also treated with due consideration. Finally, Nizam-ul-mulk proceeded to the fort and established in it his own garrison and commandant. [K. K. 961, *Ahwal* 197, Kamwar, *M. U.* iii. 744.]

While Nizam-ul-mulk was thus busily occupied in restoring order within the province of Haidarabad, Anwar-ud-din Khan arrived from Dihli. He had just been dismissed from his appointment of faujdar of Kora and Jahanabad in the Allahabad province. Nizam-ul-mulk, glad to secure the services of such a capable officer, appointed him to be deputy governor of Haidarabad. His efforts to subdue opposition were very successful at Sikakol and elsewhere, and he brought up the revenue collections to the proper standard. [K. K. 962, *M. U.* ii. 527.]

NIZAM-UL-MULK PARDONED.

After a few months, when it was seen that Nizam-ul-mulk instead of being destroyed had become more powerful than ever, it was apparently resolved to cover the failure of their plans by restoring him nominally to the imperial favour. Accordingly on the 20th June 1725, on the petition of all the nobles present, the offences of Nizam-ul-mulk were pardoned, his *jagirs* as held before he became Wazir were restored to him, and a formal rescript was issued confirming him in the government of the Dakhin provinces. But the two provinces of Ahmadabad-Gujarat and Malwa were taken from him and given to others. To the former was appointed Sarbuland Khan, who appointed as his deputy Shujaat Khan, son of Kazim Beg Tahrani. Hamid Khan, uncle of Nizam-ul-mulk was recalled to Court, and was to be expelled if he refused to obey. Rajah Girdhar Bahadur Nagar, then absent from Court, was

bandar [Kamwar] and the Karnatik, leaving Hirz-ullah Khan in charge of Haidarabad subah. [*Ahwal* 197b.] The terms granted to Khwaja Ahmad Khan were a jagir in the Haidarabad subah, no demand for any service and a free gift of all his father's moveable property. [*M. U.* iii. 745.]

re-appointed to the charge of Malwa, *vice* Azim-ullah Khan, Nizam-ul-mulk's cousin and nominee. [Kamwar ; K. K. 962, 973.]

SEC. 41.—NIZAM-UL-MULK'S LETTER TO MUHAMMAD SHAH.

There is extant a long report from Nizam-ul-mulk addressed to the Emperor, which is probably authentic and if so represents his defence of his conduct. After referring to the disorders in Farrukh-siyar's reign, he boasts of the loyalty of the Mughal troops since Taimur's time, quoting as an instance his father's and his own service in the Dakhin in Alamgir's reign. Then he touches on his ejection of Haidar Quli Khan from Gujarat and the chastisement inflicted on Dost Muhammad Khan in Malwa. To show that he was not covetous of power, he asserts that Muhammad Amin Khan would never have consented to become Wazir if he (Nizam-ul-mulk) had wished for it ; and to meet the suspicion that he had designs upon the Dakhin, he brings forward the fact of his repeated visits to Dihli. Next, he enlarges on the purposes he kept in view while holding the office of chief minister. Being frustrated by contemptible wretches practising every deceitful art, he was forced to withdraw. Then these evil counsellors caused royal mandates to be sent to Mubariz Khan. These writings having fallen into his hands he transmits the originals and asks to be informed how he had deserved such treatment. This is followed by instances from the history of Bijapur and Haidarabad to prove that a ruler's strength resides in well-chosen advisers. From the same cause Persia had come into the possession of the Afghans. After this we have a descant on the duties of a sovereign, with very pointed application to Muhammad Shah's frivolous and debauched habits. The letter ends with a brief report of the fate of Mubariz Khan, described as a dotard although only sixty and not more than ten years older than the Nawab himself. His force is stated at 25,000 horse and an uncounted number of Karnatik foot-soldiers. In spite of exhortations to refrain, he had insisted on putting the dispute to the arbitrament of battle, whereby he himself had perished along with thirty-three of his chief men, ranking from 1,000 to

7,000 in *mansab*, and a great number of common soldiers. [*Asiatick Miscellany* (1785), i. 482-493, text and trans.]

From this period may be dated Nizam-ul-mulk's virtual independence and the foundation of the present Haidarabad State. Henceforth he bestowed offices in the Dakhin ; he made promotions in rank, conferred titles and issued assignments on the land revenue at his own will and pleasure. The only attributes of sovereignty from which he refrained were the use of the scarlet or imperial umbrella, the recitation of the Friday prayer in his own name, and the issue of coin stamped with his own superscription. Many astrologers had prophesied that if he chose he could sit on a throne. But he repudiated the suggestion saying, "May throne and umbrella bring good fortune to him who holds them! My business is to preserve my honour, and if this be mine what need have I of an imperial throne?" [Yahya 131b, *Ahwal*. 136b.]

CHAPTER VIII

MAHRATTAS IN GUJARAT UP TO 1730

SEC. 42.—THE MAHRATTAS : THE PEOPLE AND THEIR COUNTRY.

In the course of our narrative (Ch. iv. Sec. 38) we have already seen a Mahratta army appear at Dihli in the train of Sayyid Husain Ali Khan and take a somewhat inglorious part in the street riot following upon the deposition of Farrukh-siyar. From 1721 we shall find them year by year encroaching more upon Hindustan, that is India north of the Narmada, until at the end of the eighteenth century they became absolute masters in all but the name of the shrunken remnants of the once mighty Empire of the Mughals. During the early years of Muhammad Shah and onwards, these Dakhin marauders occupy a large space in this piteous drama of decay and downfall ; and thus it seems desirable to introduce at this point a brief sketch of their previous history. Fortunately, the history of the Mahrattas having once for all been written by Captain Grant Duff (1826) under such favourable circumstances as can never recur,* it is unnecessary for me to burthen myself with much research on the subject. What I have to say about it is derived mainly from Grant Duff, though I may occasionally be able to correct or give greater precision to his statements from Muhammadan sources not available to him.

The country known as *Maha-rashtra* (Great Kingdom) lies in the Dakhin, that is in India south of the Narmada and forms roughly a triangle, of which the sides are from Surat to Goa 420 miles, from the sea coast to the neighbourhood of Nagpur 420 miles, and from Nagpur to Goa 490 miles. The area

* W. Irvine wrote this in December 1898. Since then the authority of Grant Duff (especially for the period before 1775) has been greatly weakened by the publication of a vast mass of Marathi records and the discovery of Persian sources unknown to him. For the resulting corrections, see my *Shivaji and His Times and History of Aurangzib* vol. iv, and the Marathi histories of G. S. Sardesai and essays of V. K. Rajwade. [J. Sarkar.]

comprised within these boundaries is about 103,000 square miles, and the present population (in 1891) is about 12,383,411.

There are two main divisions in this country, which are very dissimilar in their natural aspects ; that to the west is known as the *Konkan*, that to the east as the *Desh* (literally "country"). The first is again sub-divided into (1) the *Tal Konkan* or low strip of land a few miles wide along the seashore, and (2) *Konkan-Ghatmahta* or 'Konkan above the passes'. The *Tal* itself is rugged and broken, while the *ghats* are a mountain chain rising from 3,000 to 4,000 feet above the sea. The high tableland or *Desh* on the eastern side of these hills is as a rule about 1,000 feet below their summit. In the *ghat* country many of the hill summits are formed of large masses of basaltic rocks, which can by a little aid from art be shaped into fortresses very difficult of approach. This natural feature explains the number of fortresses in the Mahratta possession, and, added to the extreme difficulty of moving an army in such a country, accounts for the slow progress and ultimate defeat of all the Muhammadan efforts to subdue them. The hilly portion of the Konkan is divided in its length into three parts ; that to the north called *Mawal*, the middle *Khora*, and the south *Mura*. From the first is derived the name of the Mawali herdsmen, who were so numerous in early Mahratta warfare. The *Desh* has in it four parallel ranges of hills known as the Chandor range, the Ahmadnagar hills, a range south of Puna, and the Mahadeo hills north of Satar. This Maha-rashtra is the country of the Mahrattas.*

* There are several suggested derivations for the word *Mahratta*. The most usually received is that accepted by Grant Duff. A region called *Maha-rashtra* is pre-supposed, from which word by the usual processes of linguistic decay the modern name of the people is directly obtained. But H. A. Acworth, *Ballads of the Mahrattas*, Introd. p. vi. inclines to find the derivation in a tribal name *Rathi* or *Ratha*, (chariot-fighter, from *rath* a chariot), making *Maha Ratha* equivalent to Great Warrior; it has then to be assumed that this tribal name was transferred to the country being finally Sanskritized into *Maha-rashtra*. But Mr. Baden Powell (*J.R.A.S.*, 1897, p. 249) prefers to refer the word to *Mhar* or *Mahar*, a once numerous and dominant race, from which he gets *Mahar-rashtra*—"the kingdom of the Mahars". I need only name to reject it, such a grotesque theory as that

The population of this extensive tract of country is at present, according to the Census of 1891, a little over 12 millions of souls, but probably in the 18th century it may not have amounted to half or even a third of that number. It is difficult to say exactly what portion of this total population is entitled to the specific name of Mahrattas. In one sense, all who live within the Mahratta country, or even all who speak the Mahratta language, are entitled to that designation. But in the political or military aspect, with which only we are concerned, it must be somewhat restricted. We therefore confine *Mahratta*, in our estimation of their number, to the persons who claim that name, coupled with those of the *Kunbi* caste.

In religion the Mahrattas are almost entirely Hindu, and the greater proportion belong to the respectable, but far from high-ranking, caste of Kunbis, whose chief business here and elsewhere in India is that of cultivation of the soil. From these Kunbis was formed what was called the Mahratta nation and the first founder of the Mahratta State, Shivaji, was himself a Kunbi. After 1720 power passed into the hands of the Mayors of the Palace, the Brahman *Peshwas* or chief ministers, whose office became hereditary, entirely over-shadowing the Rajahs of Shivaji's house and line.

It is not necessary for our purpose to go either deeply or far back into the internal history of the Dakhin. In briefly outlining the rise of the Mahratta State, it is sufficient to consider the condition of things there towards the end of the 16th century. The country seems to have been imperfectly subdued by the Muhammadan dynasties which from the twelfth century onwards had divided most of the Dakhin between them. In the sixteenth century Mahrattas had become numerous in the armies of Bijapur and Ahmadnagar, within whose territories their home country lay, and we are told of nine principal chiefs of the race, seven serving the ruler of Bijapur and two that of Ahmadnagar, north of that kingdom and nearer to their home

of H. D. Robertson (*District Duties during the Revolt in India*, 1859, p. 104, note) who believed that the word meant *Mar* "strike" and *Hata* "ran away", and was a nickname due to their Cossack-like mode of fighting. [For a fuller discussion, see Sardesai *Marathi Riyasat*, 2nd ed., i. 2-6. J. S.]

country. One of the two families connected with the Ahmadnagar State was called *Bhonsla*.^{*} They are said to have been the headmen (*patel*) of several villages and to have obtained their family name from the village of Bhosa or Bhonsa in which they first settled. Babaji, father of Maluji, was owner of the Hingni, Beradi, Dewalgaon and Tapatash villages in pargana Puna [M. U. ii. 342] ; but their principal residence was at Ilora near Daulatabad. Here in the year 1552 was born Maluji, eldest son of Babaji Bhonsla. He married the sister of a powerful man, the Naik or chief Nimbalkar of Phaltan, and in the year 1577 entered the Ahmadnagar service. In 1594 his eldest son was born and in honour of a Muhammadan *pir* or holy man, whose prayers were supposed to have been effective in procuring an heir, the child was named Shahji. Maluji died a little before 1620 and was succeeded by Shahji.

SEC. 43.—SHIVAJI: HIS CAREER.

In 1604 Shahji had been married, by a lucky chance boldly seized on by his father, to the daughter of Lakhiji Jadon of Sindkher and *deshmukh* of sarkar Daulatabad, the most powerful Mahratta chief in the Ahmadnagar State. After playing an active part in all the fighting and intriguing from 1628 onwards, Shahji died [at Basavapattan on the Tungabhadra] in January 1664, leaving two legitimate sons, Shivaji and Venkaji, the first named being the son of his first wife, Jiji Bai. Shivaji was born in the fort of Siuneri on the 11th April, 1627. His early days were passed in the family house at Puna, but from his sixteenth year (c. 1643) he began to absent himself and talked of becoming an independent chief. To wean him from these excursions and the lawless associates who shared them, his guardian (his father being absent on service in the Bijapur State) entrusted some of the family estates to his management. But he still cherished his youthful project of independence,

^{*} Mr. Irvine's account of early Maratha history, based upon Grant Duff, has been here corrected by references to G. S. Sardesai's *Marathi Riyasat*, vol. I. ed. of 1915. For fully detailed and up-to-date information on Shivaji and Shambhuji (with references to sources), see my *Shivaji and His Times and History of Aurangzib*, vol. iv. [J. Sarkar.]

and in 1646 at the age of nineteen acquired peacefully the hill-fort of Torna, twenty-five miles south-west of Puna at the source of the Nira river. He now offered himself to the Bijapur State as its renter and feudatory. But for several years little notice was taken of him.

Discovering a treasure hoard in Torna, he used the money in building another fort on a hill five miles to the south-east, and this place he named Rajgarh. When his guardian died, he assumed possession of the family estates, ignoring all his father's demands for remittances. Not long after this time, he strengthened his position by bribing the Muhammadan commandant to cede to him the important fort of Kondana, the name of which he altered to Singh-garh. This was followed by the acquisition by treachery of Purandhar, another place of strength. The rulers of Bijapur paid no heed to him, and thus by stealth he acquired predominance in the tract between Chakan and the Nira.

In 1648 Shivaji revolted openly from the Bijapur Government, seized a convoy of treasure on its way from Kaliyan ; ten forts were surprised and seized, several rich towns of the Konkan plundered, and finally Kaliyan was surprised and the governor's family captured.

[After making many conquests he formally crowned himself and established a regular Court administration army and navy.]

Shivaji died after a [life of incessant activity and fighting] on the 5th April 1680, in the fifty-third year of his age. As Grant Duff truly says, "he was certainly, a most extraordinary person ; and however justly many of his acts may be censured, his claim to rank high in the page of history must be admitted." At the time of his death he was possessed,* with a few excep-

* "At the time of his death Shivaji's kingdom included all the country (except the Portuguese possessions) stretching from Ramnagar (modern Dharampur State in the Surat Agency) in the north, to Karwar or the Gangavati river in the Bombay district of Kanara in the south. The eastern boundary embraced Baglana in the north, then ran southwards along an irregular shifting line through the middle of the Nasik and Puna districts, and encircled the whole of the Satara and much of the Kolhapur districts.

tions, of the whole of the Konkan from Gandavi to Ponda ; and a line of forts from Tattora to Panala distinctly marked his boundary to the eastward. He had in addition a number of detached possessions, Singnapur, Parnaira fort near Daman, many forts in Baglana, also several strong places in Khandesh and Sangamner.

SEC. 44.—AURANGZEB'S WARS WITH THE MAHRATTAS.

In June 1680, after defeating an attempt to place a younger son, Raja Ram, then eighteen years of age, upon the seat of authority, the elder son, Sambhaji, established himself in his father's place. In the next year, 1681, he gave refuge at Raigarh to Prince Akbar, the fourth son of the Emperor Alamgir. This Prince had headed a revolt of the Rajputs against his father, and finally had been driven out of their country. This combination between a rebellious son and a formidable rising State, like that of the Mahrattas, frightened Alamgir. He resolved to march into the Dakhin in person. On the 25th November 1681 he arrived at Burhanpur, and the remaining 26 years his reign were occupied by a continuous and in the result fruitless campaign. Prince Akbar was forced to leave the country and flee to Persia, Sambhaji was captured and executed (1689), his wife and children taken ;* but at the time of the Emperor's death at Ahmadnagar in 1707, the Mahrattas were more powerful than ever, and it was with difficulty that the imperial camp itself was protected from their inroads.

The son of Shambhaji, Shivaji, known through life as Sahuji, a nickname given him by Alamgir, was eight years of age when captured. He was brought up in the Muhammadan

This tract formed his *swaraj* or 'old dominions'.....A recent but permanent acquisition was the Kanarese-speaking country extending from Belgaum to the bank of the Tungabhadra opposite the Bellary district.....His latest annexation was the northern central and eastern parts of the present kingdom of Mysore and portions of the Madras districts of Bellary, Chittur and Arcot. This province was really held by an army of occupation." [J. Sarkar's *Shivaji and His Times*, ch. 15.]

* For details see my *History of Aurangzib*, vol. iv. ch. 44 and 48. [J. S.]

camp, and in 1707 when Alamgir's death occurred was still a prisoner of State. The Mahrattas had in the interval continued their resistance under the leading of Raja Ram, the half-brother of Shambhaji ; and on his death, which took place in March 1700, by one of his widows, Tara Bai, on behalf of her minor son, another Shivaji (born 1691).

During the years from 1700 to 1707 Alamgir continued his efforts against the Mahrattas, being chiefly occupied in reducing some of their innumerable strongholds. But meanwhile the "execrable enemy" multiplied their activity. In 1702 they levied contributions from Surat and Burhanpur. In 1705 they crossed the Narmada for the first time and penetrated far into Malwa. They overran Khandesh and Berar and broke with a large force into Gujarat. Mughal armies were sent after them to the north, while the Emperor himself marched southwards from Juner to Bijapur. An attempt was made to come to terms with them by offering first the release of Sahu, son of Shambhaji ; secondly ten per cent. on the Dakhin collections under the name of *sardeshmukhi*. Nothing resulted from these negotiations. In February 1705 the Emperor began to besiege the fort of Wakinkhera, the stronghold of Pem Naik, the investment of which lasted nearly three months, nor was the place taken until Zulfiqar Khan and Daud Khan had been recalled to headquarters. The fort fell on the 7th May, 1705 : and the imperialists passed the rainy season near Dewapur on the Krishna river, three *kos* from the place. On the 30th Jan. 1706 the Emperor reached Ahmadnagar, and there died on the 2nd March 1707. At the time of his death the Mahrattas were plundering quite close to the imperial camp. [*Mirat*, 498-507 ; *M. A.* 498, 504, 512, 521.]

SEC. 45.—MAHRATTA AFFAIRS AFTER 1707.

As already recounted, there was now a contest for the throne between Mhd. Muazzam, the eldest, and Azam Shah, the second son of the deceased Emperor. The latter took possession of the imperial camp and with it of Rajah Sahu, who had recently been made over to the care of Zulfiqar Khan, son of the Wazir. On the march from Ahmadnagar to Agra,

Sahu was released at the request of Zulfiqar Khan and allowed to return to the Dakhin. He left the camp when it was at Duraha and taking with him some fifty retainers made for the home of Mohan Singh zamindar, in the hills bounding sarkar Bijagarh and pargana Sultanpur-Nandurbar. Having been there provided with some supplies, he was passed on beyond Sultanpur, when he was assisted further by Ambu Pande, a Mahratta, who had a fort called Kokar-manda in pargana Sultanpur and lived by plundering the country from the port of Surat as far as Burhanpur. By these reinforcements he was enabled to reach his home country, where already many of the forts taken by Alamgir had again fallen into the hands of the Mahrattas. Such leaders as were lukewarm adherents of Tara Bai, the widow of Raja Ram, now came over gladly to Rajah Sahu. He marched to Ahmadnagar and visited the spot where Alamgir had died, and distributed gifts ; then he went towards Aurangabad and Daulatabad with the intention of making a pious visit to the tomb of that Emperor at Khuldabad. His followers began to plunder and the governor, Mansur Khan, prepared to resist. But Sahu restrained his men, and having carried out his purpose, returned to his own country.*

In March 1708, after some feeble opposition by Tara Bai and her partisans, Sahu obtained possession of Satara and seated himself on the throne. It was at this time that a Brahman revenue collector first came to notice, one Balaji Bhat, son of Wishwanath, a man who afterwards became *Peshwa* or chief minister. In 1709 the contest with Tara Bai was continued ; but at the end of that year an agreement was come to with the Mughals, which obviated the necessity of deciding the rival

* The above is based on K. K. 582-'3 and *Dil.* 171b. Kokar-manda is on the north bank of the Tapti, 62 m.n.w. of Dhulia in Khandesh, and on the frontier of the Rajpipla State. The route given in Chitnis 8-9 is incredible. G. S. Sardesai misreads Khafi Khan and says, "Sahu.....came to Sujan Singh Rawal, a zamindar of the hilly country of Bijagarh, Sultanpur and Nandurbar, who lived in a fort at Lambkani, 7 or 8 *kos* from Dhulia." (*Marathi Riyasat*, i. 744). Other early helpers of Sahu are named in this work on the basis of Marathi records. *Ambu Pande* is corrected by Rajwade as *Amrit Rao Kadam Bande*. [J. S.]

claims. Daud Khan, the *locum tenens* of Zulfiqar Khan, governor of the Dakhin, agreed to allow the *chauth*, or one-fourth of the Dakhin revenues, to all leaders who acknowledged his protégé, Rajah Sahu ; the money to be collected by and paid through the Mughal officials. In January 1712 Shivaji, son of Raja Ram and Tara Bai, died of smallpox ; he was replaced as claimant to the throne by his half brother Sambhaji, son of Raja Ram by another wife, Rajis Bai.

In 1713 after the execution of Zulfiqar Khan, his representative, Daud Khan, was removed from office ; and the agreement with him being at an end, the Mahrattas resumed their old activity ; Chandar Sen Jadon *senapati*, or commander-in-chief, was sent out to levy the Mahratta blackmail in the Dakhin province under the heads of *chauth* (one-fourth of the collections), *sardeshmukhi* (10 per cent. for the office of headman) and *ghas dana** (or expenses). With him went Balaji Wishwanath, charged with attending to the interests of Rajah Sahu. A quarrel soon broke out between the two men, and Balaji was [defeated in the battle and] forced to flee for his life along with his two sons, Baji Rao and Chimnaji. He found a refuge in Pandav-garh.†

Nizam-ul-mulk now became governor of the Dakhin (1713). At first he espoused the cause of Sambhaji, but after some fighting a compromise was arrived at. The contest among the Mahrattas themselves, however, continued and thereby Balaji managed to improve his position until [on the 16th Nov. 1713] he was appointed to the office of *Peshwa*. In 1719 a new viceroy came to the Dakhin in the person of Sayyid Husain Ali Khan Barha, Amir-ul-umara and chief Bakhshi of the Empire,—Daud Khan, who opposed his taking of possession, having been defeated and killed ; the Sayyid's arms were turned against the Mahrattas. His efforts were attended with

* *Ghas dana*, literally grass and grain, i.e., forage money, instituted in 1692. It was imposed by the Maratha officers for their own benefit, the *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi* being accounted for to the State.

† For a detailed and correct account of Balaji's early career, see G.S. Sardesai's *Marathi Riyasat*, ii. 17-40. Pandavgarh is near Wai. Sardesai gives Dec. 1710 as the date of this battle. [J. S.]

so little success that in the end he was glad to agree to terms. The *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi* were promised and certain so-called hereditary lands (*swa-raj*) were granted, and Husain Ali Khan then returned to Dihli. Although Farrukhsiyar refused to ratify this agreement, there can be little doubt that on the spot it was acted upon and in 1719, after the dethronement of Farrukhsiyar, the formal deeds were issued. Sahu promised in return to pay a *peshkash* of ten lakhs for the inherited domain and a fine on his appointment as *sardeshmukh*, to suppress depredation, either punishing the thieves or restoring the amount stolen, and to maintain 15,000 horse for the Emperor's service.*

Soon there followed Nizam-ul-mulk's flight from Malwa, his successive defeats of Sayyid Dilawar Ali Khan and Alim Ali Khan, his appointment as Wazir, his final return to the Dakhin when he became in fact, if not in name, the independent ruler of the territories claimed by the Mughals. From this rapid summary it will be seen that up to 1670 the Mahrattas confined themselves to the western side of the Dakhin or roughly speaking to their own country of Maharashtra. The first exaction of one-fourth of the collections on a province immediately under the Mughals took place in 1670 during an excursion into Khandesh, the year in which Shivaji in person sacked Surat [for the second time]. As early as 1658 the Mahrattas seem to have employed a proportion of Muhammadans, but the superior commands were retained in the hands of Hindus. This seems to have been the case up to the end of their history as a conquering power. Their first incursion beyond or to the north of the Narmada (if we except a slight attack in 1720) did not occur until 1705, when Malwa and Gujarat were both overrun. These raids into Hindustan increased in frequency and extent as the years went on, until they became an annual infliction. We now purpose to give in somewhat more detail the course of events in the provinces of Gujarat, Bundelkhand and Malwa during the first half of Muhammad Shah's reign and their connection with the incursions

* For full and correct details, Sardesai ii. 82-115. [J. S.]

of the Mahrattas. The persistent aggressions in the Mughal territories north of the Narmada, which now began, were continued until the rise of the British power, and were the outcome of a settled intention of over-running the Muhammadan dominions. The author of this far-reaching scheme was Baji Rao, who in the year 1720 succeeded his father, Balaji Wishwanath, in the office of Peshwa.

SEC. 46.—THE MAHRATTAS IN GUJARAT.

After Shivaji's death in 1680, the first appearance of the Mahrattas in the subah of Gujarat seems to have been in the year 1702 when they levied a contribution from Surat ; this was followed in 1705 by an irruption of 15,000 horsemen who defeated the faujdars at Baba Piara ford on the Narmada and carried slaughter wherever they went. Order was restored to some extent by Prince Azam Shah, who was at once appointed governor. From Alamgir's death (1707) up to the accession of Muhammad Shah (1719), the Mahrattas do not seem to have made any invasion on a large scale ; but in the interval they had by small yearly expeditions succeeded in obtaining the *chauth* or fourth share from a great part of the province. The Mahrattas assert that their right to this tribute was confirmed at Dihli in 1719, when the deeds for the *chauth* on the six provinces of the Dakhin were executed. But this assertion is totally unproved and probably quite unfounded. From 1720, when Baji Rao succeeded his father Balaji in the office of Peshwa or chief minister of the Mahratta State, began a series of vigorous and sustained encroachments on the Mughal Empire north of the Narmada. This was in pursuance of a matured and far-reaching plan. As Baji Rao said to Rajah Sahu, "Let us strike at the trunk of the withering tree ; the branches will fall of themselves. Thus should the Mahratta flag fly from the Krishna to the Indus." Thereupon the Rajah exclaimed enthusiastically : "You shall plant it upon the Himalayas !"

At this period arose the practice of assigning to particular officials or commanders the attack on particular provinces. To the Peshwa were assigned Khandesh and part of the Balaghat, and later on, the operations in Malwa and the country to the

north of it as far as the Jamuna. Khandi Rao Dhabariya, the *senapati* or commander-in-chief, realized the dues in Baglana, or the country between the Tapti and the Narmada, and also in Gujarat.

At the battle of the 9th August, 1720, near Balapur, between Sayyid Alim Ali Khan and Nizam-ul-mulk, the troops of Khandi Rao Dhabariya had fought well on behalf of the Sayyid. One officer, Damaji Gaikwar, had especially distinguished himself ; and on the *senapati*'s recommendation Rajah Sahu made this man second in command with the title of Shamsheer Bahadur. In 1721 Damaji died and was succeeded by his nephew Pilaji Gaikwar,—who thus became the principal Mahratta leader in the attacks upon Gujarat. Another man of note was Udaji Puar, son of Wiswas Rao, who had lately risen to notice and made many distant expeditions into Malwa as far as Dhar and into Gujarat, in the latter plundering as far as Luniwara.* There was also Kanthaji Kadam Bande, an active partisan who took a prominent part in the raids into Gujarat.

During the reigns of Bahadur Shah (1707-1712) and Farrukhsiyar (1712-1719), order had been more or less preserved by successive governors ; among the most notable of whom were Ghazi-ud-din Khan Firuz Jang and Maharajah Ajit Singh Rathor. It was in this period that Haidar Quli Khan Isfaraini's first connection with the province arose. He was in charge of the important city and port of Surat from Dec. 1715 to June 1718. In 1720 on the overthrow of the Sayyids, to whose party he belonged, Ajit Singh was replaced as we have seen by this Haidar Quli Khan. He gave way in turn to Nizam-ul-mulk's representative Hamid Khan in February 1723. [M. U. iii. 765.] But as Haidar Quli Khan contested his successor's rights, the province was left by him in the charge of his nominee, one Shujaat Khan. By a fresh turn of the wheel, Nizam-ul-mulk lost his appointment to this province, which was conferred on Sarbuland Khan Mubariz-ul-mulk. The new governor's first act was to re-appoint Haidar Quli Khan's nominee, Shujaat Khan, as his deputy. As this man and his brothers now become

* About 68 m. n. e. of Ahmadabad.

chief actors in our narrative, it will be well to give some account of them before we proceed further.

SHUJAAT KHAN AND HIS ORIGIN.

One Shujaat Khan (Shaikh Muhammad Shah Faruqi),* was long connected with Gujarat, and in 1112 H. (1700-1) died while governor of that province. One of his principal officers was Kazim Beg. This man had six sons. Of these one was killed fighting the Kolis, a jungle tribe, during the government of Ibrahim Khan (1705-1708); and during Haidar Quli Khan's rule at Surat, two others lost their lives, one in an attack on some rebels at Jamu, the other in the course of his duty as faujdar of Surat. The three sons who were left became favourite officers of Haidar Quli Khan, he furthered their interests in every way, and obtained titles for them. Muhammad Masum, who had married the daughter of Shujaat Khan (Shaikh Muhammad Shah) was created Shujaat Khan; the two others were made Rustam Ali Khan and Ibrahim Quli Khan.

SEC. 47.—HAMID KHAN'S GOVERNMENT.

We now return to our narrative. When Nizam-ul-mulk heard that Haidar Quli Khan had abandoned Ahmadabad, he discontinued his advance on that place and sent a letter to Safdar Khan Babi a prominent local leader, directing him to

* *M. U.* ii. 708; *K. K.* 965. Irvine's account of Gujarat affairs in Muhammad Shah's reign is almost entirely based upon the *Mirat-i-Ahmadi* of Ali Muhammad Khan, the diwan of the province and an eye-witness of many of them. The information from this source is here and there supplemented by a few details or variants from Khafi Khan and Kamwar Khan, and, more rarely, Khush-hal Chand. Irvine had made his first draft from the works of Khafi Khan and Kamwar, but he afterwards cancelled it in favour of the fuller and more correct narrative given in the *Mirat*. The text of the last-named history lithographed at Bombay is incomplete and stops with the year 1715 in the governorship of Daud Khan Panni; it is therefore useless for our period. English readers will find an excellent summary of the *Mirat* account (by Col. Watson) in *Bombay Gazetteer*, vol. i. pt. i, pp. 295-345. For purely Mahratta affairs, Irvine has relied on Grant Duff, with one or two references to Forrest's *Selections*. [J. Sarkar.]

take charge of the province until the arrival of a new deputy. Safdar Khan thereupon entered on possession of the governor's palace known as the *Bhadar*. Meanwhile, on the 12th Feb. 1723, Nizam-ul-mulk had appointed his uncle, Hamid Khan, to be his deputy with Fidwi Khan as provincial diwan. Certain parganas were removed from the *Khalsa* register and converted into *jagir* lands, five of the most productive of these being absorbed into Nizam-ul-mulk's own *jagir*, and Godhra granted in *jagir* to his brother-in-law, Mutawassil Khan.

Hamid Khan was met on his way by Salabat Muhammad Khan and Jawan-mard Khan, the sons of Safdar Khan Babi, and at Dohad he picked up Mihr Ali Khan, the late diwan, who had been detained there by illness. Shujaat Khan joined him at Godhra and Rustam Ali Khan at Thasra.* When he had arrived near the city, he pitched his camp near the Kakariya lake, in the grove of Mihr Ali Khan. On the 5th April 1723 he made his formal entry into the city. [*Mirat.*]

Things now went on in the usual way in the *subah*. Sayyid Nasir Khan, chief of the imperial mace-bearers, arrived from Dihli with robes of honour for the deputy governor. About this time there was a fight between Kripa Shankar Nagar, a military officer, and the underlings of the city faujdar. Hamid Khan ordered his artillery to besiege the man's house in the Rajwara quarter, and the disturbance lasted until nightfall. Rustam Ali Khan, who thought the culprit a valuable officer, then interfered, carried him off to his own house, and next day presented him to Hamid Khan. Pardon was granted to Kripa Shankar, and he was admitted into the deputy's service.

After a time Hamid Khan marched out into the districts to collect *peshkash*. Rustam Ali Khan undertook to pay a

* *Thasra*, about 36 m. e. of Ahmadabad.

K. K. 965-968 makes Shujaat Khan resist Hamid Khan on his first arrival in Gujarat. But as Hamid Khan started from Jhalod in Feb. 1723 and Shujaat Khan was not killed until Nov. 1724, it seems impossible to bridge over this interval. Therefore I treat Khafi Khan's account as referring to the later period when Shujaat Khan was re-appointed deputy of Sarbuland Khan. This is in the true order of events as found in the *Mirat-i-Ahmadi*.

lump sum on account of the collections from the country on the banks of the river Watrak, which flows into the Sabarmati on the left bank about twelve miles south of Ahmadabad, after a course of over 80 miles. The youngest brother, Ibrahim Quli Khan, was sent out to obtain the money and pitched his camp on the banks of the Watrak. When Hamid Khan was at the fort in Nariad, about 24 miles south-east of the capital, certain enemies of the brothers persuaded the deputy governor that he had now a good opportunity of attacking and getting rid of one of them. Ibrahim Quli Khan was informed of the plot and made ready to defend himself. Pretended friends in Hamid Khan's camp wrote that he ought to withdraw. He refused. Rustam Ali Khan turned out from Ahmadabad during the night to his brother's protection, and reached him at daybreak. Hamid Khan had already started from Nariad, but on his way learnt that Rustam Ali Khan had already joined Ibrahim Quli Khan. Giving up his purpose, Hamid Khan sent friendly messages to the brothers and returned to the city. The brothers went together towards parganas Pitlad and Baroda, of which they were in charge. There they attacked and burnt the village of Dhawan, belonging to the Kolis, built a small fort there, and placed a garrison in it. [*Mirat.*]

SEC. 48.—SHUJAAT KHAN REPLACES HAMID KHAN IN GUJARAT.

In Dec. 1723 Nizam-ul-mulk left Court, as we have seen, without the Emperor's consent, and Mubariz Khan was incited to resist his advance into the Dakhin, the result being a triumph for Nizam-ul-mulk. The Emperor thought it expedient to make concessions and in exchange for the confirmation of his vice-royalty in the Dakhin, Nizam-ul-mulk resigned the office of Wazir and with it the governorship of Malwa and Gujarat. The new governor of the latter province, Sarbuland Khan Mubariz-ul-mulk, nominated Shujaat Khan as his deputy until his own arrival, and Hamid Khan was directed to return to Court. Rustam Ali Khan, younger brother of Shujaat Khan, was at the same time appointed to the charge of Surat in place of Mumin Khan Najm Sani, who in turn replaced Fidwi Khan in

the office of diwan of the *subah*. [K. K. 966]. The official order, accompanied by a letter from Sarbuland Khan, reached Ahmadabad in July-August 1724. Hamid Khan was made acquainted with the orders, and the new deputy proceeded to appoint his own officers. Shujaat Khan called upon Hamid Khan to evacuate the Bhadar or governor's palace. As it was the middle of the rainy season, he asked for a little time. Shujaat Khan would make no concession and began to erect batteries in preparation for an ejection by force. The fighting went on for three nights and days, and many houses near the fort were injured. Those men of Ahmadabad who envied Shujaat Khan went so far as to send their followers to aid Hamid Khan and gave him encouragement in his resistance. But Ali Muhammad Khan* thought it wise to attempt a compromise. He therefore saw Safdar Khan Babi and said to that man's sons, "Another governor has been appointed, it will be wise for you to quench these flames if you want to stand well with the new man." He forced them to mount their horses and visit Hamid Khan. Ali Muhammad Khan next interviewed Shujaat Khan. In this way hostilities ceased and Hamid Khan quitted the city. His intention was to join his cousin Azim-ullah Khan, governor of Malwa, but finding that he had already quitted his Government and returned to Dihli, Hamid Khan until the rainy season had passed halted at Dohad 110 miles east of Ahmadabad. Thence he reported the facts to Nizam-ul-mulk and requested an answer. He also wrote to Dihli representing that he was in great straits for money; thereupon an order for two lakhs of Rupees was sent to him, payable from the treasury at Sironj. [*Mirat*, Kamwar.]

It seems that Shujaat Khan, knowing that the late Wazir was out of favour at Court, had offered to attack him in the Dakhin; and that the Emperor had granted three lakhs for this purpose from the treasury of Surat with which he engaged to raise twenty thousand men. As a counter-blast to this project, Nizam-ul-mulk entered into engagements with Kanthaji

* Faujdar of Haveli Ahmadabad and father of the author of the *Mirat-i-Ahmadi*. The author himself returned to Ahmadabad in 1724.

Kadam Bande, one of Rajah Sahu's generals, offering him the *chauth* or one-fourth of the revenues of Gujarat in return for the reinstatement of Hamid Khan. He was also embittered by the summary way in which his uncle had been ejected by Shujaat Khan. At the end of the rains Kanthaji Kadam came across the Narmada with 15,000 to 20,000 horsemen and joined Hamid Khan. The two allies came first to Kaparwanj, about 32 miles east of Ahmadabad, whence Hamid Khan opened communications with his friends at Ahmadabad, who encouraged him to advance as the chances were all in his favour. At this time Shujaat Khan was away from Ahmadabad, engaged in suppressing some unruly zamindars. He had with him only 4,000 to 5,000 horsemen : and thought he could overcome his enemy without waiting for reinforcements. [*Mirat*, Kamwar.]

Hearing that Hamid Khan was making for the city of Ahmadabad, Shujaat Khan returned in that direction by forced marches and reached the village of Dhabora, nine *kos* from the city. He neglected to send out scouts, and being thus quite unaware of the enemy's approach he ordered a halt in order to collect tribute from the village. On Thursday the 14th Dec. 1724 he resumed his march towards the city, many of the soldiers and people of the bazars dispersing as he went.*

SEC. 49.—SHUJAAT KHAN SLAIN.

When they reached the village of Motiya Medara, four *kos* from the city, being in total ignorance of the enemy's presence, the camp-followers and the troops, mostly horsemen, began to leave in small groups and race each other to the city. All order and discipline were lost. Mahratta horsemen, known as *Hol-suwar*, appeared in sight and attacked the rearguard. Shujaat Khan's men lost their heads entirely, and the march became a mere *saue qui peut* with the city as its goal. Pressing onwards the Mahrattas fell upon the centre and commenced plundering it. Shujaat Khan did all he could to restore order, but owing to the crowd of fugitives and the strings of carts his

* Khush-hal Chand (Berlin MS. f. 1045) suggests drunkenness as the cause of Shujaat Khan's defeat.

efforts were without avail. The men were only too eager to escape out of their chief's sight and save themselves from the Mahrattas.

Shujaat Khan abandoning these fruitless endeavours took up a position on one side, a little apart from the crowd. Hamid Khan seized the chance and came on, clad in armour *cap-a-pie*, seated in an iron-sided canopy. The standard elephants of the two leaders fought together and that of Shujaat Khan prevailed. Then Hamid Khan drove forward the elephant he was riding. Shujaat Khan was seated on a simple pad with no iron-protected sides and with him was a little child, his son. Nevertheless he hesitated not, but brought his elephant alongside that of his enemy. Then both men let fly their arrows.

Husain Quli, son of Shujaat Khan, who commanded the vanguard of three thousand horse, saw from his seat on his elephant Hamid Khan come up against his father. He tried to rally the few men about him and lead them in a charge ; not one followed him. Alone he rode to his father's succour ; but arrived too late. Shujaat Khan's arrows glanced harmlessly off the sides of the iron canopy, while several of Hamid Khan's had struck Shujaat Khan with full effect. His few companions, who had not been killed or wounded, took to flight and were made prisoners by the Mahrattas. Then Hamid Khan's men surrounded the elephant and gave the *coup de grace* with their lances and spears. The deceased's family, including two sons, Husain Quli Khan and Mustafa Quli Khan, were taken prisoners ; and the whole of the goods and equipage in his camp became the spoil of the conqueror. At nightfall Hamid Khan accompanied by the Mahrattas entered his camp, which was pitched at the Shahi-Bagh. During the night the head of Shujaat Khan was sent into the city to Safdar Khan Babi, and he sent it on to Ibrahim Quli Khan.

The next day, the 17th Dec. 1724, Hamid Khan entered the city and took possession of the Bhadar palace. Munim Khan the diwan and Fidwi Khan his predecessor, who had taken up his abode in the city, accompanied by the chief Muhammadans and Hindus, presented themselves in fear and trembling. In all the parganas west of the Mahi the *chauth*

and *sardeshmukhi* were given to Kanthaji ; and the Mahratta's soldiers thronged the streets and lanes, went where they pleased, and sold the plunder of Shujaat Khan's camp. Much property was also removed from the shrine of Shaikh Ahmad Khattu [at Sarkhej].—grain, glass candle-shades, canvas awnings, and brass railings, the latter torn down from their place round the tomb. Kanthaji sent out his agents to realize the *chauth*, and went himself to levy ransom (*khandani*) from Viramgaon, an unfortified unwallled town. By the advice of Ude Karan the *desai*, the inhabitants submitted and agreed to the levy of 250,000 Rupees if their goods were spared. When the money was collected the *desai* prudently added something, and with this money a fort was built. Meanwhile Hamid Khan threw off the mask, turned out the imperial officers and *grandees*, took possession of the whole country, and by degrees sent for all the books and papers of the diwan's office, and from this time forth the revenues of this province were lost to the Emperor and retained by the governors (*nazims*).

SEC. 50.—DEATH OF IBRAHIM QULI KHAN.

Ibrahim Quli Khan, owing to rumours of Hamid Khan's approach, had enlisted more troops and had made preparations to defend the city. Two days before the battle he had gone to live in his house in the Karez Bazar.* Safdar Khan Babi had long borne a grudge against Shujaat Khan and his brothers, founded on injuries done to him by Haidar Quli Khan, their patron, when ruler of Surat. He now pretended to be Ibrahim Quli Khan's friend and offered to intercede with Hamid Khan. The young man, suspicious of this new-born friendship, declined the offer and sought instead the mediation of another officer,† who was a native of Ahmadabad. Through this man, who became his surety for the good faith and loyal conduct on

* More correctly, *Karanj*. It was a building with a fountain in the centre of the outer court of the Bhadar and opposite the middle of the three gateways. [*Bombay Gazetteer*, iv. 273.]

† Mumin Khan, the diwan of the province, according to Kamwar.

both sides, he presented himself at the new governor's audience, where he was well received and was given a turban ornament.

A few days after the battle, over-persuaded by Safdar Khan and other evil-minded persons, Hamid Khan resolved to break his pledged word, send for and imprison Ibrahim Quli Khan, and in the end slay him. The secret was badly kept, for as the saying is "A secret is never concealed when many share in it", and passing from mouth to mouth the news soon reached the ear of the officer who had stood security. This man sought out Ibrahim Quli Khan at midnight, told him what was purposed, and advised him to flee [to Kambhayat and Surat, during the darkness] while there was yet time. His friend offered to join him. Ibrahim Quli Khan was too proud to seek refuge in flight. He accepted the decrees of Fate and was prepared to die. Soon the agents of the governor made their appearance and demanded his attendance and the delivery of the valuables belonging to his late brother, which were asserted to be in his possession. Aqa Hadi, the family's trusted man of business, had already been sent to prison. On the 20th Dec. 1724, at about 9 A.M., after having taken a bath of purification and bidden a long farewell to those of his household, Ibrahim Quli Khan set out, followed by thirty to forty men who were still found faithful in adversity, and accompanied by his surety at the head of seven or eight men.

Arriving at the Bhadar or palace of the governor, Ibrahim Quli Khan entered fearlessly with his party at his heels. The body of mace-bearers and doorkeepers on guard at the gate of the garden-house objected to their entering. Ibrahim Quli Khan must lay down his arms before he could enter and could take with him no more than two or three of his men. In spite of these remonstrances, the party forced its way in, thus only incensing the doorkeepers still more; they vociferated louder and louder, became abusive and made a show of force. Ibrahim Quli Khan's patience was soon exhausted and he struck at once at them with the short sword he was carrying. His friends then drew and all ran as fast as they could towards the audience-hall. Hamid Khan had not yet come out and the visitors waiting to see him dispersed. Ibrahim Quli Khan made for

the door of the private apartments close to the hot bath (*hamam*). There he met face to face Nauindh Rai, manager of Nizam-ul-mulk's lands, Bhara Mal faujdar of Duraha, Girdhar Lal diwan, and one Patiya, head agent of the zamindar of Jhalwa.* In the struggle Patiya was killed and the two others wounded. Ibrahim Quli Khan passed on into the private apartments. The men on duty fled, some escaping by a drain leading to the Sabarmati. Hamid Khan had escaped to the roof and could not be found. His enemy sought him in the women's rooms, but the more he sought the less he found. By Hamid Khan's orders soldiers came from all sides. Soon Ibrahim Quli Khan met his death from the bullets fired, and the stones and clods thrown at him. His head was severed from the body, and both head and trunk were taken out and exposed separately upon the gates. A body of Purbiya soldiers ran about trying to appropriate whatever weapon and clothes they could lay hands upon. The gates of the Bhadar were closed, no one was allowed to go out or enter, and search was made for the accomplices of Ibrahim Quli Khan. Among those waiting in the courtyard for audience were Ali Muhammad Khan, agent for Sarbuland Khan, Ashraf Ali Khan son of the late Mihr Ali Khan diwan and his introducer Aqil Khan faujdar of Idar. These men feared that they might be accused. As Ali Muhammad Khan knew the eunuch in charge of it, they hid in the wardrobe room (*toshak-khana*).

To preserve his reputation at Court, Hamid Khan wrote to his agent at Dihli that Shujaat Khan when on the march to Ahmadabad had been attacked near that city and killed by Kanthaji; that he (Hamid Khan) not being far off hastened to the spot, took measures to protect the city, and had preserved it from injury. As his letter was the first to arrive, the Emperor recorded his thanks and granted him robes of honour and a string of pearls. Two days afterwards letters arrived from Sarbuland Khan's agent and the truth became known.

* Was it *Jabwa*, midway between Ahmadabad and Indore or, more probably, *Jhalod* in Panch Mahals? [J. S.] This narrative is based on *Mirat* and *Khush-hal*.

SEC. 51.—ADVANCE AND DEATH OF RUSTAM ALI KHAN.

As soon as the real course of events was reported at Dihli, orders were issued to Rustam Ali Khan, the middle brother, then deputy governor of Surat and faujdar of Baroda and Pitlad, to draw from the treasury of that port whatever money there was in hand, and therewith equip a force to eject Hamid Khan. When these orders reached him, Rustam Ali Khan was at the pass of Khanapur some miles from Surat, engaged in a contest with Pilaji Mahratta. He returned at once to the city, and in a few days' time had got ready a force of 15,000 horsemen, 20,000 matchlockmen and bowmen, and sufficient artillery. The more prudent of his advisers pointed out to Rustam Ali Khan that in the three months when the rains began the Mahrattas would as usual withdraw. The interval could be best used at Surat in perfecting his preparations; and when they advanced they would in all probability win without a contest. But Rustam Ali Khan could brook no delay. Pilaji Mahratta, with whom Rustam Ali Khan had recently had some skirmishes, had followed him to Surat, and with 10,000 horsemen under his command barred the way. Mustafa Khan was sent to interview the Mahratta leader. Terms of alliance were offered to him, and for a payment of two lakhs of Rupees he consented, at least outwardly, to give his services.* Taking with him Kamgar Ali Khan, his brother-in-law, then faujdar of Baroda, Rustam Ali Khan set out in haste towards Ahmadabad, Pilaji his new ally marching one stage behind him.

On learning this news, Hamid Khan left Safdar Khan Babi in the Bhadar as his deputy and placed his family in the care of Allahdad and Muhammad Ashraf brother of Muhammad Khan Ghorni, one of Rustam Ali Khan's commanders. He

* The above account is based on Kamwar and Khafi Khan (968). *Mirat* (1806-1814) adds the following details:—"At the camp between Karju and Bajud near Baroda, Rustam Ali Khan and Pilaji met and here they halted for several days, while matters were under discussion. A lakh of Rupees was paid in cash, and gifts of an elephant cloth and jewels were added. Pilaji with Mustafa Khan then crossed the Mahendri and encamped."

then quitted Ahmadabad, pitched his camp at Tal Kakariya,* and there awaited reinforcements for which he had sent in all directions. Leaving Tal Kakariya at the head of thirty to forty thousand horsemen, Hamid Khan marched towards Baroda. After a halt of two or three days in the open plain outside Ahmadabad, he continued his route, and at a distance of about 70 miles from Ahmadabad reached the bank of the Mahi river, and there encamped. Followed by Pilaji at one day's interval, Rustam Ali Khan crossed the river Mahi and reached the village of Aras in pargana Pitlad. Pilaji's camp was on one side, not very far off. This was on the 7th Feb. 1725. On the same day Hamid Khan with his ally Kanthaji Mahratta and certain nobles, Salabat Muhammad Khan Babi, Sayyid Fayyaz Khan and others, arrived from Ahmadabad and pitched his camp about five miles from that of Rustam Ali Khan. He was joined here by Mir Nathu and Salabat Khan Rohela, who had come from Malwa in search of employment.

During the night after his arrival, Hamid Khan sent to Pilaji the letters of Nizam-ul-mulk calling upon him to give assistance to the writer's uncle. It suited Pilaji to meet favourably these overtures. He knew that for the carrying out of his purpose of seizing the country the removal of Rustam Ali Khan was necessary, but he felt that he could not do this by his own strength alone. The same night he visited Hamid Khan's camp, terms were agreed on, robes of honour and an elephant were conferred upon him, and he returned to his own camp. This betrayal was forthwith brought to Rustam Ali Khan's knowledge. He professed to be quite indifferent; for was not victory the gift of heaven, it depended not upon this, that or the other man;—"Be it he whom the Friend desires or to whom His inclination turns."

On the following day, as the sun rose Rustam Ali Khan sounded his drums and took the field with some four thousand horse and four thousand foot. His vanguard was led by Sardar Muhammad Khan Ghorni and Kamgar Ali Khan his brother-in-

* A reservoir covering 72 acres and more than a mile round, situated about three-fourths of a mile from the Raypur gate, and surrounded by many tiers of cut stone steps. [*Bombay Gaz.* iv. 17.]

law. On the right was Ahmad Quli Khan (son of Shujaat Khan) and on the left Kazim Beg Khan (son of Kazim Beg Khan). Muhammad Panah commanded the rearguard ; the leader himself held the centre. From the fact that Hamid Khan had posted his artillery in front the night before, Rustam Ali Khan looked forward to an artillery action. He therefore sent his baggage and transport away to the village where there was a small fort, in which these were accommodated so far as possible, a body of Arab infantry being left for their protection. The drums beat and the trumpets blew ; the cannon on both sides began to roar.

Rustam Ali Khan rode straight at the cannon and after a short struggle took possession of them, Girdhar Lal, Hamid Khan's diwan, and many others being killed where they stood. Seeing this reverse, Mir Nathu and Salabat Khan Rohela (who were in Hamid Khan's vanguard) now advanced and the battle became general. Sardar Muhammad Khan brought his elephant alongside that ridden by Mir Nathu. After exchanging several passes with their swords, Sardar Muhammad Khan succeeded in slaying his opponent. Rustam Ali Khan engaged Hamid Khan. The latter thinking that, as the proverb says, "Well-timed fight is the same as victory", descended from his elephant, mounted a horse and escaped.

The Mahratta leaders, who had a wholesome fear of Rustam Ali Khan, held aloof and merely looked on, while he forced his way to Hamid Khan's camp and there released the sons of the late Shujaat Khan, Husain[†] Quli and Mustafa Quli, and his chief agent, Aqa[†] Hadi. They were found in fetters. Rustam Ali Khan collected as much as he could of the property belonging to Hamid Khan and remained in the camp a couple of hours. Finding there was no further opposition, he carried off the lead and powder with a few of the guns, and spiked the rest. He then returned to his own camp, taking with him such soldiers and camp-followers as had asked for and received quarter.*

* Rustam Ali, who looked on himself as the victor and believed he had slain his enemy (Hamid Khan), wrote an account of the battle to the Emperor at Dihli. The letter reached the capital in 10 or 12 days, and in

As soon as Rustam Ali Khan, having driven Hamid Khan off the field, had gone away towards his own camp, Kanthaji began to plunder the rest of Hamid Khan's baggage, the horses and goods of the survivors were appropriated, and in a few minutes a clean sweep was made of everything. On the other side, while this fight had been going on, Pilaji had laid hands similarly on the camp of Rustam Ali Khan, and had taken everything belonging to him except what was in the fort held by the Arab guard. The gun-carriages were set fire to, the guns spiked; horses, lead, powder, everything was removed as far as possible and the rest burnt. On Rustam Ali Khan's return he found not a trace of his tents. Some of the men whose goods had gone told him their story; and all he could do was to pitch a small tent on the edge of the village tank. The wounded were attended to and the dead buried; among the latter was Kazim Beg Khan, who had fallen in the first onset.

Upon escaping from the battle-field Hamid Khan sought refuge with Kanthaji, whom he cursed heartily, first, for standing by idly looking on; then, for plundering the camp. The Mahratta made profuse excuses and returned a few tents, such as were absolutely necessary, and the Nawab's riding elephant. Hamid Khan remained in the Mahratta camp; and for two days not a Mahratta showed himself to the other side, in fact on the day of battle many had crossed the Mahi river. Then a force of Mahrattas arrived from the Dakhin under the command of Puar and Sombanshi. This party was an advance guard of the thousands of Mahrattas who hearing of Shujaat Khan's death flocked to Gujarat as to a promised land. In the end some seventy to eighty thousand of these men were collected.

On the day next but one after the first fight, the Mahrattas brought up several cannon and resumed the offensive. Rustam

reward for this victory and the [supposed] death of Hamid Khan, Rustam Ali's rank was raised to 6,000 *zat* (same number of *sawar*) and the Government of Gujarat was granted to him in his own name. It was currently reported at Dihli that the bodies of the slain were to be seen along a distance of twenty-three *kos*, and some four or five thousand Mahrattas lost their lives. Salabat Rohela and a large number of the Afghans who had come with him from Malwa were also slain. [Kamwar.]

Ali Khan's side replied. But the swarms of Mahrattas blocked the way for all supplies of grain or grass. Night and day the cannonade continued ; the Muhammadans were devoid of shelter, and each day a number of them fell victims.

While this fighting was going on elsewhere, in Ahmadabad the loose characters and city thieves and those who had lost everything in Shujaat Khan's camp, began to plunder. They appropriated horses and carriages ; they interfered with the dependents and servants of Hamid Khan. They collected in crowds and attacked the Bhadar palace, emptied the Government store-houses of their carpets and clothes. Safdar Khan Babi escaped with difficulty from these rioters, and leaving the palace returned to his own dwelling, while Hamid Khan's men hid wherever they could find a refuge. Word had been sent by Rustam Ali Khan to Mumin Khan diwan with a request to preserve order in the city, while Mir Ibrahim a dependant of the late Shujaat Khan was sent to occupy the Bhadar palace. The diwan enlisted men and deputed his son, Muhammad Baqir, to patrol the city at night and visit the outposts.

Meanwhile, in Rustam Ali Khan's camp idle stories were brought in daily of the death of Hamid Khan.* Rustam Ali Khan had intended in the day of his first success to march forthwith to Ahmadabad. The destruction of his camp equipage hindered this ; and for eight days and nights he lay helpless on the bank of the pond in Aras village. From morn to eve he was cannonaded. Finally, on the 14th Feb. 1725 he ventured to make a start in the direction of Ahmadabad, with four or five thousand men unprovided with artillery or sufficient equipment. The Mahrattas in enormous numbers hovered round him, and he had to fight for every step, advancing

* Two or three days after the battle, Rustam Ali Khan at last ascertained that Hamid Khan, severely wounded, had found refuge among the Mahrattas. His surrender, dead or alive, was demanded. As they were in need of time for the arrival of reinforcements from the Dakhin, the Mahrattas gained some days by deceitful promises. Then one of Rustam Ali Khan's clerks, who had fallen a prisoner into their hands, wrote to him secretly that a large reinforcement of Mahrattas was on its way from Aurangabad *via* Surat and that the promises made were nothing but pretences for delay. [Kamwar.]

daily not more than three or four miles. They succeeded in getting no further than the village Napad in Chaurasi Kambhayat. In the two succeeding days, under similar difficulties, they reached fort Kalamsar and then Napa in pargana Pitlad. They were never left in peace for one moment day or night: and wherever there was an opportunity the camp-followers and such of Hamid Khan's men as had asked quarter, disappeared. Daily the numbers diminished through death and desertion. Aqa Hadi, who had been rescued only a few days before, lost his life one day in the rearguard on his elephant when the animal, taking fright from the noise of the rockets, refused to obey its driver and made off into the enemy's line.

In this emergency one Banarsi, headman of Basu in pargana Pitlad, a village about 25 miles from the city of Ahmadabad, came forward with an offer of aid. Food and a small reinforcement of men would be found in his village. If Rustam Ali Khan could reach it, he might remain a few days to recruit his strength and await the arrival of any reinforcements despatched from Ahmadabad. Accordingly they directed their march towards that village. But Hamid Khan and the Mahrattas made use of threats to Banarsi; and Rustam Ali Khan's enemies in Ahmadabad also used their influence upon him. Banarsi grew alarmed, and at night-time evacuated the village, taking everything with him and leaving it quite empty.

Rustam Ali Khan with his 800 men fought his way to Basu village and reached it at nightfall on the 18th. During this day's march Kamgar Ali Khan and others lost their lives. A halt was made at the tank near the village; but on exploring further not a trace of inhabitants nor a scrap of food could be found. No one dared to come to their assistance, and the enemy fired on them all through the night,* such as were killed being buried on the bank where they were camped. Next day they found that to march was impossible; a halt was called. As the village was a large one and only recently abandoned, a close search produced a small amount of grain and forage,

* Kamwar: From the 20th February Rustam Ali's force was so closely pressed that the men had hardly time to get a drink of water, much less to cook and eat their food.

which enabled the men to feed themselves and their horses. The day after (the 20th), at break of day they resumed the contest. By immense efforts they forced their way a mile or so onward, to the edge of a small artificial lake called Sai Talawar, where they halted. Incapable of further struggle, this fragment of an army lost heart and hope, nay, abandoned their horses, threw away their arms, disguised themselves as far as they could, and as night came on fled.

The sun rose on Thursday the 21st February and found Rustam Ali Khan still undaunted. He said his morning prayer composedly and called for his coffee. Sardar Muhammad Khan Ghorni rode up and called to him: "It is time to mount and begin the fight." Reaching a cup of coffee to him, Rustam Ali Khan said, "Let us spread our rug here, and await our fate." His officer still urged him to mount, and an elephant was brought. But Rustam Ali Khan said "Now is the time for horseback and a *mélee*." Shouting "*Allah! Allah!*" he turned his steed towards the foe. Under the pressure of the Mahratta numbers his men dispersed, many were killed, many were wounded, a few were made prisoner, a few escaped unscathed. Sardar Muhammad Khan was left on the field severely wounded. At first the Mahrattas got out of Rustam Ali Khan's way, but in the end gathered round him and inflicted on him many a wound by arrow and spear. At length in a hand-to-hand fight he was cut down and killed. Husain Quli Khan and Ahmad Quli Khan, the sons of Shujaat Khan, were a second time made captive. The Dakhinis severed Rustam Ali Khan's head from the body and sent it to Hamid Khan. Pilaji removed one of the hands and sent it as a memorial of his valour to his abode at Songarh.* The head was sent in to Ahmadabad; the body was buried at Basu village. News of Rustam Ali Khan's defeat and death reached the city on the Friday, and his head lay before the Police office for one

* 50 m. e. of Surat. *Mirat* (175a): "Soner, a village in pargana Nokara of sarkar Surat, 32 *kos* from that port. Pilaji made an alliance with the zamindar to whom it belonged, and on a high hill near it erected a small fort and at the foot of the hill built a small walled town." *Bomb. Gaz.* vii. 585, 169.

day and night. It was then buried beside the body of his brother Ibrahim Quli Khan.

All the friends and backers of Hamid Khan now emerged from their hiding places, and seeking to revenge their ancient wrong committed fresh excesses. Mir Ibrahim under the protection of Sayyid Nur-ullah, whose troops he had hired, removed from the Bhadar to his own house and then escaped. Hamid Khan and the Mahrattas arrived, and after one night at the Shahi-Bagh entered the Bhadar. The gates of the fortress of Ahmadabad were destroyed. Pilaji and Kanthaji, mounted on Rustam Ali Khan's elephant and followed by their troops, came into the city and paid a formal visit to Hamid Khan. Mumin Khan diwan and Fidwi Khan ex-diwan each presented a female elephant with such clothes and other outfit as they had ready, Hamid Khan having repeatedly complained to them of the distress caused to him by the recent plundering of his camp.

SEC. 52.—EXACTIONS OF HAMID KHAN AND THE MAHRATTAS.

As agreed on, the *chauth* for the lands on the Ahmadabad side of the Mahi river was given to Kanthaji and that for those on the side of Baroda Surat and so forth to Pilaji. The Mahrattas spread wherever they liked far and wide in the parganas, and collected sums by way of ransom, payments which they called *khandani*. On his side Hamid Khan assumed airs of independence. A sum of eighty thousand Rupees and the clothes prepared for the Emperor (a department in charge of Shaikh-ul-Islam Khan) were forcibly seized. The store-rooms of imperial goods were opened and emptied of their contents; and as the official accounts formerly annexed had been destroyed, the remaining volumes were removed from the diwan's custody. All the lands of the subah, assigned or unassigned, were appropriated, wealthy men were seized and the fine locally called *babura** imposed. Ahmad Quli and

* It was assessed in various ways, on the amount of trade, or on each caste, or by heads, or on homes. It had never been heard of before, but now became an annual thing. [*Mirat*, 180a.]

Husain Quli (sons of Shujaat Khan) were poisoned ; only Mustafa Quli (a small child) was allowed to live. Murlidhar, a Gujarati of the writer caste, was appointed by Hamid Khan to be his diwan.

Meanwhile the Mahrattas spread over the country in all directions, burning and plundering wherever they went. At Sarkhej, where is the tomb of Shaikh Ahmad Khattu, the better class of the inhabitants immolated their wives and children in the mode known as *juhar*, while many hundreds of high-born women threw themselves into wells or ponds to avoid outrage. Thus, too, in the hamlet across the Sabarmati where Afghans lived, many women were slain by their relations. Two sons of the late Shujaat Khan, one three years of age and the other an infant at the breast, were put to death by the victors ; and of that family the only survivor was Suhrab Khan, a boy of twelve, who had been left in charge of the city and fortress of Surat.

Kanthaji, as an officer of Rajah Sahu, affected to look down upon Pilaji, a mere agent for the Mahratta *senapati* or commander-in-chief. At Kambhayat (Cambay) this feeling led to a dispute, ending in a conflict. They fought within sight of the walls, and Pilaji, being defeated, retired to Mahtur a village near Kaira. Kantha then levied a contribution from Cambay, where the English factors, in spite of their letters of protection from Rajah Sahu were forced to pay five thousand Rupees. After this open quarrel, Hamid Khan forced them to sign an agreement by which Pilaji took the *chauth* to the east, and Kanthaji that to the west of the river Mahi. Soon after the battle at Cambay, Pilaji retired into quarters at Songarh, and Kanthaji went to his *jagir* in Khandesh. [*Mirat.*]

SEC. 53.—SARBULAND KHAN'S PREPARATIONS FOR OCCUPYING GUJARAT.

When sometime early in March 1725 the bad news first of Shujaat Khan's and then of Rustam Ali Khan's defeat and death became known at Dihli, the new governor Sarbuland Khan was urged to complete his preparations more rapidly and take possession of his Government at the very earliest date.

For the seven or eight months since his appointment he had been loitering sometimes in the neighbourhood of Dihli, sometimes near Rewari or Kot Putili. The supposition was that His Majesty in person would take the field ; but this project, if ever entertained, never took practical shape. He was now given a subsidy of one kror of Rupees, of which fifty lakhs were paid at once and the balance was promised in monthly instalments of three lakhs each. Maharajah Abhai Singh Rathor of Jodhpur, Chattar Singh of Narwar, Gandharb Singh, and the Maharana were directed to assist. Muhkam Singh Khatri, formerly the principal officer under Sayyid Husain Ali Khan, who for the last four years, ever since the defeat of Sayyid Abdullah Khan had been out of employment deprived of title, rank, or pay, was re-invested with the rank of 6000 (5000 horse), the title of Rajah, and a *jagir* of two krons of *dam*. He also received a cash advance of two lakhs of Rupees. A number of Barha Sayyids were also restored to the service and ordered to Gujarat. Najm-ud-din Ali Khan, younger brother of Abdullah Khan, who had been in prison for five years, was restored to his old rank, appointed governor of Ajmer, and ordered to join Sarbuland Khan. Other Barha Sayyids appointed were Saif-ud-din Ali Khan, a younger brother, Shujaat-ullah Khan, Muhammad Khan, Shah Ali Khan, Sayyid Nijabat Ali Khan (a nephew of the Barha Wazir), altogether between twenty and thirty leaders of the Barha with their troops came to the capital and were despatched to Gujarat. In the end of Rajab (30th=13th April, 1725) Sarbuland Khan left Dihli on his way to Agra, but he only went two or three short marches and halted at Tilpat, 13 miles from the capital, and there he remained until the end of Shaban (29th=12th May 1725). In Ramzan (May-June) he was only at Faridabad, but the Emperor's mace-bearers who had left him encamped on the bank of the Jamuna, reported that he was now proceeding stage by stage to Agra.

EVENTS IN AHMADABAD.

In April 1725 Hamid Khan heard that Sarbuland Khan would soon start from Dihli. But the rainy season was about to commence and the Mahrattas, as usual, retreated to their

own country. Hamid Khan extracted a promise from them to return to him the instant the rainy season had ended. Meanwhile Ali Muhammad Khan, agent for the new governor, quitted the city under the protection of Abdur-rahim Babi, whom Hamid Khan had just appointed *faujdar* of Kari. Then he proceeded on the invitation of Salabat Muhammad Khan Babi to Viramgaon. Here letters were received from Sarbuland Khan calling for frequent reports of Hamid Khan's doings and all the city news. Ali Muhammad Khan subsequently moved to Radhanpur under the protection of Jawan-mard Khan Babi. Hamid Khan's officials began to lose their hold on the country. At Pattan Qazi Ilm-ud-din gave out that he had been appointed *faujdar* of that place and ousted Hamid Khan's nominee. The same thing occurred at other places. In September Hamid Khan sent out his tents with the avowed object of collecting tribute (*peshkash*) from the zamindars in the direction of Jhalawar, and under urgent orders Salabat Muhammad Khan and Jawan-mard Khan left their stations and joined him.

SEC. 54.—SARBULAND KHAN ENTERS AHMADABAD ; HAMID KHAN
RETIRETS TO THE DAKHIN.

By this time Sarbuland Khan had reached Ajmer, and thence *via* Marwar had marched on towards Ahmadabad. Ali Muhammad Khan waited on in the hope that the two Babi chiefs would succeed in joining him ; but they were now with Hamid Khan and could not escape. On the day that Sarbuland Khan arrived at Vadgaon, he was overtaken by Sayyid Aqil Khan bringing three lakhs of subsidy from Dihli. The bearer of this welcome help was appointed *faujdar* of sarkar Godhra and Thasra in place of Nizam-ul-mulk's nominee Mutawassil Khan.

In response to repeated orders Ali Muhammad Khan left Radhanpur for Pattan and thence for Sidhpur. There he found Shaikh Allahyar Bilgrami, the new governor's Bakhshi, at the head of an advanced force with several guns which had been detached from the main army at Jhalor. A consultation took place and a list of local adherents was drawn up. Qazi Ilm-ud-din was summoned from Pattan and taken into service.

Sarbuland Khan was found at Dantiwara and there he issued a writing appointing Sardar Muhammad Khan Ghorni to be his depty in Ahmadabad. This letter was sent to his nominee with instructions to make use of the first opportunity to take possession of the city.

When Hamid Khan heard that Sarbuland Khan was drawing nearer and nearer he turned back towards Ahmadabad ; on the way he was forsaken by Salabat Muhammad Khan and Jawanmard Khan (Babis), who hastened off to join his successor. Hamid Khan still looked anxiously for the Mahrattas, but they came not. Several times he wrote most pressingly to them ; but still they made no sign. As there was a new governor actually on the boundary of the province, he feared that those of the city would not revenge themselves for his previous oppression. He therefore named one Rup Singh as his deputy and recommended him to the good offices of Sardar Muhammad Khan ; he then quitted the city and marched in the direction of Mahmudabad.

Urged to haste by his master, Shaikh Allahyar hurried on from Sidhpur, and when Sardar Muhammad Khan received his letter of appointment this advanced force was only some sixty miles from the capital. The new governor's nominee at once interviewed Rup Singh and pointed out the danger to which he was exposed. A new governor with his army was close at hand ; and it would be well for him to save his own head by making his escape. Thankful for this chance the man departed, and Sardar Muhammad Khan took peaceable possession. Just when this had happened, news of the Mahrattas came to Hamid Khan ; he and Kanthaji quickly joined forces and turned their faces towards the city. On their way they met the fugitive Rup Singh, from whom they learnt that an advanced force was quite near. Hastening onwards the allies pitched their camp in the Shahi-Bagh and sent messages again and again to Sardar Muhammad Khan demanding his neutrality, but without obtaining any satisfaction.

The two events, Sardar Muhammad Khan's successful occupation of the city and the return of Hamid Khan with his Mahratta ally, were reported to Shaikh Allahyar together when

he was at Kalol, some thirty miles from Ahmadabad. Evidently no time was to be lost. Making over the command to Mirza Ghulam Ali Beg, Khwaja Muhammad Aman Nurani, and Raizada Har Karan, Allahyar started at night with one thousand picked horsemen, reached the Sabarmati opposite the city, and crossing over entered by the Raigarh gate. The spirits of the garrison rose and the inhabitants were overjoyed at the prospect of escaping from Hamid Khan's exactions. The rest of the advance force under Ghulam Ali Beg followed from Kalol, and when they arrived at Adalaj, about ten miles from the city, they entrenched themselves. They reported their movements to Sarbuland Khan. Owing to an accident to the wheel of the gun-carriage belonging to the great cannon called Fath Laskar the latter had been compelled to halt for two days at Dantiwara. On his reaching Sidhpur, he was joined by Salabat Muhammad Khan Babi and Jawan-mard Khan Babi. The next halt was at the town of Mehsana. After one day at that place they came to the village of Bist Rain, about 45 miles from the city.

Here they learnt that Hamid Khan and the Mahrattas had attacked the party entrenched at Adalaj under Ghulam Ali Beg. The fight continued from dawn till the afternoon, then some of the newly enlisted local troops (*qasbati*) began to retreat, and the force lost cohesion, Ghulam Ali Beg and the two other commanders drew up their men and led a charge against the foe. They succeeded in pushing their attack as far as the centre where Hamid Khan's elephant stood, but they were soon overcome by numbers and Muhammad Aman and Har Karan were slain. Ghulam Ali Beg, in spite of severe wounds managed to break through with a few men and reached the city. Some fugitives from his force found shelter in the surrounding villages, others fled to Bist Rain where stood the advance tents of Sarbuland Khan.

To decide upon the course to be taken after this contre-temps, a council was called; the faujdaris of Viramgaon and Pattan were given to Salabat Muhammad Khan Babi and Jawan-mard Khan Babi; and summonses were issued to many Rajput and Koli chiefs. The direct route being insufficiently supplied with water they resolved to advance by way of Bijapur,

keeping close to the banks of the Sabarmati. Ali Muhammad Khan and the two Babi chiefs were sent ahead to lead the way. Next day they came to the Sabarmati and thence pressed on by successive marches.

From Adalaj Hamid Khan returned to the Shahi-Bagh. He now made up his mind to withdraw. The gates of the city remained closed against him, Sardar Muhammad Khan's force was rapidly increasing, and the new governor was reported to be at the head of twenty thousand men. On Hamid Khan's side there were only the four or five thousand men of his own army on whom he could rely. The Mahrattas were accustomed to fight as irregular skirmishers and were not likely to stand against regular troops in a pitched battle. Moreover, his soldiers were already in mutiny for their arrears of pay, and the civil officials were deserting him daily. Murlidhar his diwan, being a native of Gujarat, feared retaliation under a new régime [and went over to Surbuland's side]. For all these reasons combined, Hamid Khan gave up the struggle and went off with Kanthaji to Mahmudabad and then crossed the Mahi river on his way to the Dakhin.

On the 11th Dec. 1725 Sarbuland Khan pitched his camp on the north of the city by the Sabarmati and close to the garden of Muhammad Amin Khan. Mumin Khan the diwan, Abul Mufakhir Khan the *Sadar*, Abdullah Khan the *Qazi*, Amanatdar official reporter, Kabir Ali Khan, news-writer, Shaikh Allahyar, Sardar Muhammad Khan, Sayyid Fayyaz Khan, Shiran Khan, Khush-hal Chand the *nagar-seth*, or head of the traders, and all the chief men, Musalman and Hindu, came out to meet him. During a halt of some days many new appointments were made. As an entry into the city was held to be inadvisable, Sarbuland Khan marched round it, past the shrine of Shah Bhikan, to a point south of the walls and on the bank of the river. Fida-ud-din Khan* received a large sum for the entertainment of men and was placed in charge of the country near the capital. Kalb Ali was sent into the city as police officer.

* Afterwards created Najm-ud-daulah Mumin Kh. Dilawar Jang and subahdar. Died 1158 H.

SEC. 55.—THE RETURN OF THE MAHRATTAS.*

Kanthaji, after he had seen Hamid Khan safely across the Mahi river, was joined by Pilaji. The absence of pursuit emboldened them to return to the neighbourhood of the city, where they plundered the hamlets and slew travellers entering or leaving. Fida-ud-din Khan, the man in charge of the suburbs, was sent out against them and there were several skirmishes near Bara Nainpur and Rajpur. A strong force was collected as quickly as possible to take the field under the command of Khanazad Khan, the governor's eldest son. With him were sent Jawan-mard Khan Babi, Sardar Muhammad Khan Ghorni, and Sayyid Fayyaz Khan at the head of their Gujarati troops, three to four thousand in number ; with them went Muhammad Iraj, Nur-ud-din Muhammad Khan, and Ali Mardan Khan, appointed respectively to Duraha, Kambhayat and Pitlad. On the 22nd Rabi II. 1138 H. (27 Dec. 1725) Sarbuland Khan made his formal entry into the city of Ahmadabad and sought to seize the officials who had been employed by Hamid Khan, in the hope of recovering from them some of the revenue collections.

During his advance to Duraha, Khanazad Khan was assailed on all sides by the Mahrattas. That place having been reached, Muhammad Iraj was established and the army resumed its march. Again the Mahrattas collected, and there was a pitched battle near Sojitra in pargana Pitlad, in which the enemy were worsted. Ali Mardan Khan was left at Pitlad, and Nur-ud-din Muhammad Khan installed at Kambhayat. By continued pressure the Mahrattas were forced temporarily across the Mahi ; and after posting new officials in various places, Khanazad Khan, in obedience to his father's orders, returned and encamped at the village of Rakhyal, about five miles to the east of Ahmadabad. Najm-ud-din Ali Khan, Nijabat Ali Khan and other Barha Sayyids sent from Court now arrived, the governor's second son Shah Nawaz Khan escorting them to their encampment in the Shahi-Bagh. After a few days the

* This account is almost entirely based upon the *Mirat-i-Ahmadi* occasionally supplemented by Warid.

Sayyids with the three thousand men under their command were ordered to join Khanazad Khan.

When Khanazad Khan returned to Ahmadabad, the Mahrattas made for Kaparvanj* and in concert with the Koli tribes prepared a camp which they protected with thick branches of trees and a hedge of thorns. Leaving within this place all their baggage and carriage, they advanced into the open to meet the Muhammadans. The fight did not go well for the Mahrattas and they were driven back into their lines, where the Muhammadan artillery played upon them. Losing heart the Mahratta soldiery fled and left the field and camp in the hands of their opponents. Having possessed themselves of the camp, the Muhammadans started in pursuit which they kept up continuously until the Mahrattas had retired across the Mahi and sought shelter in the hill country of Ali Mohan.† Shaikh Husain-ud-din was placed in charge of Baroda ; and other men were sent to Bharoch, Jambusar and Maqbulabad.

While Khanazad Khan's army was out in Ali Mohan acting against Kanthaji and Pilaji, another body of Mahrattas under Antaji and Bhaskar appeared in the north from the direction of Idar. They surrounded Vadnagar, a town inhabited by rich Nagar bankers and other prosperous merchants. Urgent applications was made at the capital for a detachment of troops. The town had a fortress, but it had neither supplies nor garrison. As there were no troops left at head-quarters none could be sent and the townspeople to save the place from being plundered paid a ransom (*khandani*) of four lakhs of Rupees.

Kanthaji and Pilaji, seeing that they had little or no chance of success against the Muhammadans in formal battles, now resolved to separate forces and scatter their men on plundering expeditions. Kanthaji passed by way of Godhra to Idar and thence to Vadnagar, while Pilaji made for Baroda, crossed the Mahi, visited the neighbourhood of Kambhayat and thence hastened to Surat. Kanthaji invested Vadnagar. As the

* 30 m. east of Ahmadabad, on the eastern bank of the Mohar river. (*Ind. At.* 22 N. E.) [J. S.]

† Now Chota Udepur in the extreme east of the province, the town of Udepur being 50 m. due east of Baroda. (*Bom. Gaz.* vi.) [J. S.]

inhabitants had not yet recovered from the first calamity, they lost heart entirely and during the night took to flight. Next morning the Mahrattas entered the town, seized everything that had not been carried off, and unearthed much buried treasure. They ended by setting fire to the town, many handsomely decorated houses being destroyed: and the inhabitants dispersed came seeking refuge as far off as Mathura and Benares. When the usual season arrived (May-June 1726) Kanthaji and Pilaji left the province and returned to their homes. Khana-zad Khan was promoted to the rank of 6000 (5000 horse), with the title of Ghalib Jang. Najm-ud-din Ali Khan was also promoted.

SEC. 56.—SARBULAND KHAN'S ADMINISTRATION OF GUJARAT.

Shortly after the recall of the troops, Sarbuland Khan quarrelled with Najm-ud-din Ali Khan. Men said that without the Sayyid's aid the governor would have fared badly. These remarks came to Sarbuland Khan's ears, and on their next meeting he behaved rudely to the Sayyid and they were near coming to blows. Najm-ud-din Ali Khan took no further notice but awaited orders from Court. But one day Sarbuland Khan ranged his cannon in front of the Sayyid's camp and sent him word that there was only one thing for him to do—to march back to his own province. Najm-ud-din Ali Khan took the hint and returned to Ajmer, whence he was soon transferred to Gwalियar and there died. [Warid 111, Khush-hal 1055b.]

Sarbuland Khan seems to have had a faculty of quarrelling with those under him. In this first year in Gujarat, Khanazad Khan left his father and returned to Dihli. Sardar Muhammad Khan Ghorni was also dismissed. He had asked to be put in possession of the city revenues as security for the pay of the local militia (*sibandi*). A sharp dispute took place and the Sardar fell into disgrace; and with him his friend Ali Muhammad Khan who was replaced in the office of *diwan* by Said Beg, and he in turn by Muhammad Sulaiman. Khush-hal Chand, a rich merchant known as the *nagar-seth* (chief merchant) was removed in favour of Ganga Din, a silk seller; and a heavy fine

was exacted from him under the threat of public degradation.* But the soldiers were already importunate for their pay and Sarbuland Khan thinking it wiser not to proceed to extremities, threw out a hint that Ali Muhammad Khan's intervention would be acceptable. By his good offices the Seth paid sixty thousand Rupees ; but proceeded at once to Dihli in the company of one Muhammad Latif, a dismissed officer.

In 1139 H. (1726) Sarbuland Khan took the field in pargana Kari and Bijapur,† collecting tribute (*peshkash*) and reducing the country to order. When the season arrived for the return of the Mahrattas (October 1726), Kanthaji appeared again on the Mahi. The Mahratta sought to come to terms and Sarbuland Khan, although some think his means of resistance would have given him the upper hand, was equally indisposed to continue the indefinite contest. One Surat Singh came from Kanthaji, and an agreement was arrived at. A grant was made of the *chauth* or one-fourth of the collections from all the lands on the west or Ahmadabad side of the Mahi river, with the exception of the Haveli or home pargana and the heads of revenue (*mahals*) collected from the city. The excepted items were those held by the governor in the lump (*bil muqta*) in lieu of an assignment for his pay and expenses. Deeds were drawn up, and letters to all the faujdars and *amils* were made over to the envoy. These letters directed the officials to give entry to the Mahratta collectors (*muḳasaders*).

Sarbuland Khan now devoted himself without fear of interruption to the affairs of his province. Having settled the portion lying near the Sabarmati river he turned towards Jhalawar and the region of Sorath. The village of Wadhwan in pargana Viramgaon, held by Arjun Singh, showed an intention to resist. Negotiations were opened but failed : and the village was fired upon. On the second day the water in their well (*baoli*) gave out, and on the third day the zamindar asked for terms. He came out and took shelter with Rajah Chattar Singh of Narwar who was on duty in the governor's army. A fine of three lakhs of Rupees was imposed in addition to the fixed

* *Tashhir*, parading through a town with ignominy.

† Bijapur, 36 m. n. of Ahmadabad.

revenue and a present (*peshkash*); and the zamindar's sureties were detained until he paid.

Other zamindars took warning of the fate of Wadhwan. The agent of the Jam of Islamnagar otherwise known as Nawannagar agreed through Salabat Muhammad Khan Babi to pay three lakhs of Rupees. Altogether the collections made this year in that part of the country were large. Sarbuland Khan then returned to Ahmadabad and moved thence to the Koli villages near the Watrak. Having forced these men to execute bonds for their good behaviour he again returned to the city. There the faujdar of Duraha, Muhammad Iraj, attended with the village and pargana headmen, to render accounts and arrange for the revenue of the next year. As the faujdar in question was loudly complained of Ali Muhammad Khan was appointed in his place. Numerous other changes of officials were made ; while Muhammad Amin Beg and Shaikh Allahyar Bakhshi were sent with troops to assess and collect tribute (*peshkash*) from the Kolis in the country near the Mahi river.

When it was reported at the imperial Court that the *chauth* had been agreed to and terms negotiated with Kanthaji, the monthly payments of three lakhs of Rupees, of which three had been made, were discontinued. As Sarbuland Khan kept up a large army and employed many highly paid officials, the revenue from the parganas and the money brought in as offerings (*peshkash*) did not suffice to meet his expenses. He endeavoured to fill up the deficiency by imposing fines and resorting to violence of many kinds, and listening to calumniators and other short-sighted self-sighted counsellors.

SEC. 57.—MAHRATTAS IN GUJARAT, OCTOBER 1726—JUNE 1727.

Pilaji, acting on behalf of Trimbak Rao Dhabariya, the *senapati* to whom the *chauth* on the lands east of the Mahi river had been assigned, exerted himself to collect the money. But Baji Rao the Peshwa to harm his sworn rival sent his own officer Udaji Puar to interfere in the collections. Both sides met at Baroda and the quarrel ended in a fight. Abdun-nabi Beg, deputy *faujdar* of Dabhoi, having been much harassed by Pilaji about the payment of *chauth*, took the side of Udaji and

gave him shelter in Dabhoi. In the subsequent fighting Abdunabi Khan was killed, and the town and fort thus fell into Udaji's sole possession.

Kanthaji now came back from his quarters in Khandesh and joined Pilaji in laying siege to Dabhoi. While the Mahrattas were thus occupied, Sadar-ud-din Muhammad Khan, the new faujdar of Baroda, made a dash for that place. He crossed the Mahi at Fazilpur and hoped by a night march to reach his destination. Pilaji detached a party which intercepted him, his baggage and transport were plundered, and he was forced to fight his way to Baroda. The attack on both it and Dabhoi was pushed more actively than ever, and Udaji was forced to apply to Sarbuland Khan for help. Anand Rao, his brother, came with his son to Talab Kakariya, agreements were entered into and presents interchanged. Muhammad Amin Beg and Shaikh Allahyar were recalled. They had settled the country on the banks of the Mahi and were just then moving towards Jhalawar and Sorath and were at the moment near Dhanduka.* On their march towards Dabhoi they were hindered at every step by Mahratta horse under the command of Krishna, adopted son of Kanthaji Kadam, and the ingress of supplies was stopped. Near the Watrak there was a pitched battle in which Krishna suffered defeat and retreated to Baroda.

Pilaji and Kanthaji raised the siege of Dabhoi and making a forced march attacked the Muhammadans, who were then at Nariad on their way to Baroda. Amin Beg and Allahyar with their rear to the town resisted for a week. Kanthaji then offered terms to Sarbuland Khan through Fida-ud-din Khan, faujdar of Pitlad. The governor gave a favourable answer, Mumin Khan the provincial *diwan* was sent from Pitlad and an agreement was made to pay the *chauth*. The governor's troops were recalled. Udaji foiled in his attempt to obtain aid from the Muhammadan governor, strengthened the defences of Dabhoi and continued the warfare, being helped as far as his means allowed by Sadar-ud-din Muhammad Khan, faujdar of Baroda. Their united efforts though long continued were of no

* In the north-eastern corner of the Kathiawar peninsula, 30 m. s. s. e. of Wadhwan. (*Indian Atlas*, sheet 22 S. W.) [J. S.]

avail ; finally the two men evacuated Dabhoi and entered the province of Malwa where Udaji had a foothold at Dhar. Dabhoi and Baroda were occupied by Pilaji. Having sent out their men to collect the *chauth*, Kanthaji and Pilaji departed to their quarters for the rainy season. Krishna the adopted son of Kanthaji took the fort of Champanir and made it his headquarters and abode. From this strong inaccessible fortress, standing on the top of a high hill, he led plundering expeditions into Marwar as far as Jhalor.

In the latter part of 1139 H. (April-May 1727) when the harvest was ripe, Sarbuland Khan once more took the field and went into Sorath,* and for the second time the zamindar of Nawanagar paid a tribute of one lakh of Rupees through Salabat Muhammad Khan Babi. In time the governor reached Purbandar and Chhaya on the shores of the ocean. The latter place could not be reached by the Muhammadans until they had cut down the trees and burnt the brushwood. On their approach the zamindar put to sea in a boat and escaped, leaving behind him a few cannon, seven cuirasses and such supplies as he had not time to remove. The governor waited in the hope of the fugitive's return. As he did not submit, men were set to work to raze the fort to the ground. But under other advice Sarbuland Khan changed his plan, began to repair the fort and announced the appointment of a faujdar. The fear of permanent exclusion soon brought the absconder to his senses and he was reinstated on making a payment of 125,000 *Mahmudi* Rupees. On the return march Sarbuland Khan married the daughter of Partab Singh of Halod and the *peshkash* on his estate was remitted. Jam Tamachi (son of Rai Singh) had succeeded to the rule of Nawanagar on 11th Bhadra Sudi 1767 S. (1710). His nurse fearing his uncle Hardhol sent him to his aunt Bai Ratnaji at Bhuj. The aunt spent money in his interest and also wrote to her brother Rajah Partab S. of Halod to give his daughter in marriage to Sarbuland Khan and the daughter of one of his cousins to Salabat Mhd. Khan Babi. These two men expelled Hardhol and restored Tamachi.†

* i.e., Kathiawar. Not to be mistaken for the port of Surat. [J. S.]

† Ranchorji Amarji's *Tarikh-i-Sorath*, p. 258.

Sarbuland Khan's position at Court now began to be seriously undermined. From the first, when he was opposed by Hamid Khan, the governor had occupied and turned to his own uses all the parganas assigned in jagir to nobles and courtiers at Dihli. Complaints were made to the Emperor, and the governor's *wakil* (agent) at Court repeatedly received orders for transmission to his master directing the restoration of these jagirs. No attention was paid. At last Sarbuland Khan's old jagirs in the Panjab, held irrespective of his office (*bela shart*) were annexed; and the more influential of the displaced jagirdars obtained rateable shares in them in proportion to the lands they had lost. But the rest were ruined, and either starved where they were or dispersed in search of a livelihood.

SEC. 58.—GUJARAT AFFAIRS, OCTOBER 1727-JUNE 1728.

Chimnaji
Khan
In 1140 H., after the rainy season (July-Sept. 1727) Chimnaji invaded the province in the interests of his brother Baji Rao the Peshwa. Apparently some arrangement as to the *chauth* was contemplated and letters had been interchanged. From his camp at Duraha, twelve *kos* from Ahmadabad, Chimnaji sent Udaji Puar and some Pandits to Sarbuland Khan. The latter named Nath Mal, his secretary, to represent him. But the conditions imposed by the governor prevented an agreement and the negotiations fell through. Chimnaji began to plunder Duraha, an unwallled town, and the villages round it. Many of the local soldiery (*qasbati*) were killed and wounded, and in the end a *khandani* or ransom having been agreed to the plundering was stayed. As soon as he had received the money Chimnaji retired to Malwa by way of Godhra and Dohad, taking possession of those parganas and of the fort of Champanir.

This season (Oct. 1727—June 1728) Sarbuland Khan devoted to restoring order in Duraha and collecting tribute along the banks of the river Watrak. Lal, zamindar of Mandu, paid twenty thousand Rupees and other Koli chiefs other sums according to their means. The governor was at the village of Barnube when he learnt that Kanthaji had arrived at Mahmudabad, twelve *kos* from the capital, his suspicions aroused by the

recent visit of Chimnaji. Sarbuland Khan pitched his tent at Kona Maudij, where he was visited by the representatives of Kanthaji and matters connected with the *chauth* were discussed. Kanthaji moved towards Surat and Sarbuland Khan then retraced his steps and continued operations against the Kolis in the neighbourhood of the Watrak. These men took refuge with their families in the dense jungle near the village of Mahkul in pargana Piplod. The Muhammadan army then moved towards Murasa and Ahmदनगर, and enforcing the payment of revenue as it went it marched along the banks of the Sabarmati on its return to Ahmadabad.

SEC. 59.—GUJARAT AFFAIRS, OCTOBER 1728—JUNE 1729.

In 1141 (the open season thereof being from about the 1st Oct. 1728 to the 30th June 1729) Sarbuland Khan proceeded to the country along the banks of the Mahi river. At Tal Chaudula he halted to enable stragglers to join and the artillery to arrive. While still there he heard of the death of Jawanmard Khan Babi, faujdar of Pitlad. This officer had attacked the village of Balur and in the fight was hit by a ball on the left thigh and died, several days after his return to Pitlad. He was buried near the Idgah at the capital by the side of his ancestors' graves, and his eldest son Kamal-ud-din Khan received his rank and assignments in parganas Sami and Munjewar with his father's title. The younger son M. Anwar was made Safdar Khan and appointed faujdar of Radhanpur in his father's place.

Sarbuland Khan moved his tents to the village of Kanaj in pargana Haveli. Thence he marched to the town of Nariad, where he was joined by the officials and headmen of pargana Pitlad. Rai Kishwar Das, the chief officer of the late faujdar, who had held the district on a lump rent, agreed to take over the obligation. After a time, having failed to meet his engagements, the rent was made over to Salabat Muhammad Khan Babi; but as the arrears were still unrealized he was put into prison in the Bhadar and there committed suicide. The governor then moved on to the banks of the Mahi and attacked village Bhadarwara, the residence of Sardar Singh. The first day's

fight was indecisive and Sarbuland Khan spent the night on the spot. In the morning when hostilities were renewed terms of submission were offered and through Salabat Muhammad Khan the demand was settled for twenty thousand Rupees. As it was now the end of the dry season and fodder was very scarce, the army returned to Ahmadabad, taking on the way tribute from Utmina and other places.

In this year (1728-29) the collection of the revenue in the district round the city was a source of trouble. Himmatt Dil Khan quarrelled with the headmen and tenantry, they fled, he resigned, the assessments and collections fell into confusion. Ali Muhammad Khan who had known the people for many years, having been Prince Jahan Shah's agent in the reign of Bahadur Shah (1707-1712), was placed in charge, one son* was made faujdar of the district and another was appointed to several offices in the city, [such as] the collections on cloth, the customs dues, the horse market, and the mint. Soon the governor's necessities caused him to ask for ten thousand Rupees more than had been assessed. Ali Muhammad Khan pointed out that in the current year the district could not bear further harassment ; if left alone it would pay a large increase in the coming year. But the need of money was extreme. Sarbuland Khan next suggested that the money might be raised in the departments of receipt subordinate to the faujdar or magistrate's office. As money in that department could not be levied without oppressive action, Ali Muhammad Khan refused and resigned his offices. Zainal Khan, a dependant on Mumin Khan, succeeded. The extra funds were produced by imposing fines and leasing the ferries to harsh unscrupulous renters. Once or even twice in the year the trading community was taxed either on their income or the number of persons or on the number of houses. One Hasan, an iron merchant, who had risen to wealth by questionable means, was killed one night on his way home. His heirs accused his caste-fellows of the crime. The governor, glad of the pretext, seized their chief men, and by beatings and torture extorted three lakhs of

* The author of the *Mirat-i-Ahmadi*.

Rupees, one of the chief men dying under the cruelties inflicted.

Kanthaji on his way from Sorath to his home country passed by Ahmadabad at a distance of about twelve miles. When he was in the vicinity of Sanand, his horsemen, known in Gujarat as *Hol-suwar*, spread out in all directions in search of plunder. In the plain near the village of Ghiyaspur, about six miles from Baroda, they came across a party of Sarbuland Khan's elephants which had been sent to collect forage. Of these three were driven off. To punish this affront, Allahyar Bakhshi was despatched at once ; but he had not gone beyond Mahmudabad when the governor learnt that the Mahrattas, afraid of pursuit, had abandoned the elephants after having driven them for a couple of miles. Allahyar was recalled and returned the next day.

SEC. 60.—GUJARAT AFFAIRS, OCTOBER 1729—JUNE 1730.

When the rainy season had passed and the harvest was ripe, the time had come to take the field once more (Oct. 1729). Sarbuland Khan marched towards Kolwa and recovered tribute from Bhao Singh of Sahpur. Collecting money as he went, the governor arrived at the village of Madhupur near Junagarh. The place, which was a large one, was attacked and plundered. Here an invasion of Kachh was planned, but as a preliminary, envoys were sent to demand a tribute of ten lakhs of Mahmudi Rupees. The ruler of Kachh declined to treat. Thereupon his rivals and enemies promised to point out the most flourishing parts of his territory whence most money could be realized, and asserted that little or no effort would be required. But to approach Kachh it is necessary to cross the salt waterless desert known as the Rann, about fifty miles in breadth. Sarbuland Khan was warned by the men of the country that there would be great difficulty, but tempted by the hope of gathering tribute and plunder, he decided to make the attempt. Each man was ordered to carry as much food and water as he could ; and to make the march easier they started at night. In spite of this precaution, before the other side of the desert was reached many men had died of thirst.

When they had entered the territory of Bhuj, they began to burn and plunder the villages. They surrounded Bhuj, dug a trench, and erected batteries. Both sides began an artillery fire. Then the zamindar asked for terms, but those offered being too high he refused them and burnt all the villages for some distance round until there was not a trace left of grass or grain. He also sent out every day parties of well-mounted cavalry and all ingress of supplies was stopped. Meanwhile he continued to send misleading offers of submission. In this manner one-and-a-half months were passed. In the camp all supplies had been exhausted ; men and four-footed beasts daily grew weaker, most of the artillery bullocks and the baggage camels died. Then came word from the wakils at Court that Sarbuland Khan had been removed from the Government and replaced by Maharajah Abhai Singh Rathor of Jodhpur. The siege of Bhuj was raised, and the return march was directed towards Radhanpur, where the Rann desert is not quite so wide. At Radhanpur visits of condolence were paid to the family of the late Jawan-mard Khan Babi, and thence Ahmabad was reached.

SEC. 61.—RISING OF BAHORAS UNDER SHAIKH ABDULLAH.

As soon as the army had returned to its head-quarters, the soldiers broke out into mutiny and demanded their arrears which had now accumulated. To meet their demands it was resolved to make a levy from the city as had been done several times before. It was taken as usual in the proportion of three-fourths from the Hindus and one-fourth from the Bahora traders, who are Muhammadans of the Sunni sect. Collectors were appointed. News that Sarbuland Khan had been superseded emboldened the Bahoras to resist. Ostensibly they pleaded poverty, their idea being that Sarbuland Khan would be too much afraid of a riot to use force. Shaikh Abdullah, an old Bahora who had lived as a recluse for thirty years, headed the agitators. The malcontents assembled in the great mosque. The Shaikh began to tear his beard and proclaim that the heavenly hosts would fight for them. At his instigation word was sent to Sarbuland Khan that if he did not leave the city

at once he would be put under arrest. The Shaikh's words acted on the crowd like naphtha thrown upon fire, and all accepted him as an envoy from on high.

Sarbuland Khan summoned Abdul-ghani Khan the diwan of the subah and the other leading officials. Repeated messages of the mildest kind were forwarded to the Shaikh. He was told that the governor had graciously resolved to remit the share of the levy due from the Bahoras and they should now depart in peace to their houses. Instead of propitiating the Shaikh, these soft words only served to harden his heart; he believed that his hard words had produced an effect and that "the arrow of his desire had hit its aim". After using stronger language than before he answered that not only must Sarbuland Khan leave the city but the order to levy money from the Hindus must also be rescinded. He incited the Hindus to join and made ready for street fighting.

His friendly overtures having been rejected, Sarbuland Khan ordered out his troops under Shaikh Allahyar with orders to close all the streets leading to the mosque. The governor then moved out of the Bhadar palace and passed through the three gates of the Maidan Bazar. The common people who had accepted the Shaikh's silly talk and boasts as words of wisdom, on seeing the approach of troops, mounted the shop roofs on each side of the road and began to throw bricks and tiles. Allahyar caused a few of them to be seized and bound; the rest, forgetting all about the Shaikh's miraculous power, took to their heels, without waiting for the arrival of the hosts of heaven.

Allahyar seized the gates of the mosque and his men on entering found the Shaikh and a few men seated on the *mihrab*.* The Shaikh was quickly seized and some of his friends killed, the rest asked for mercy. The only result of the Shaikh's interference was that the Bahoras were made to pay double the original demand. This affair occurred on the 14th Muharram 1143 (29th July, 1730).

* An elevated place in a mosque where the leader of the prayer stands.

SEC. 62.—SARBULAND PREPARES TO RESIST MAHARAJAH
ABHAI SINGH, HIS SUCCESSOR.

Towards the end of Safar (Sept. 12, 1730) Salabat Muhammad Khan Babi who was faujdar of Viramgaon obtained permission to march to that place. Ude Karan, the headman or *desai* who held charge on his behalf, had been killed. He was set on at night by one Ali brother of Daulat Muhammad Tank, a native of the town, and stabbed to death. The cause of quarrel was not known. Salabat Muhammad Khan made his first march to the village of Paleri on the other or western side of the Sabarmati river and there waited until his men should collect. Two days afterwards he had an attack of cholera and was at the point of death.

It so chanced that on the very same day Sarbuland Khan announced that he also would march to Viramgaon. But his real object was to confer with Salabat Muhammad Khan about resistance to the new governor Maharajah Abhai Singh, reported to be then at Jhalor. Suddenly without apparent cause Sarbuland Khan started, leaving by the wicket gate of the garden in the Bhadar which opens upon the road. With him were the few intimates who happened to be present. Finding Salabat Muhammad Khan in a state of collapse, the governor awaited the arrival of his own tents and men, and his camp was pitched close to the great dome. In the evening Salabat Muhammad Khan's body was carried to the city in the hope that although unconscious he might revive. But he was beyond treatment and died that night.

Sarbuland Khan remained at his first halting place for several days which were employed in the collection of men, material of war and supplies. When he heard that Maharajah Abhai Singh had reached Palanpur 82 miles from Ahmadabad [in the north] he moved to the village of Kali* north of the city, on the west side of the Sabarmati, and there prepared to

* There is a *Kari*, 25 m. n. e. and a *Kalol* 16 m. n. of Ahmadabad. Neither of them can be the place meant, as the *Bombay Gazetteer*, (Vol. I. pt. 1, 311) says that Sarbuland's camp was between Ahmadabad and Adalaj, 9 miles north of it. There is a *Karhi* 8 m. n. e. of the city, but on the eastern bank of the river. (*Indian Atlas*, 22 N. E.) [J. Sarkar.]

block the road from the north. His total force consisted of four thousand horsemen and as many Baksari and Arab matchlockmen. Out of this total, five hundred horse and one thousand foot were sent back to protect the city, under the command of Muhammad Amin Beg and Shaikh Allahyar, who took with them the governor's younger son, Shah Nawaz Khan. Round the camp were placed seven hundred pieces of cannon, large and small, chained together, and about one thousand wall-pieces. There were in store two thousand *maunds* of lead and powder. Thus equipped Sarbuland Khan awaited the approach of the Maharajah.

Some of the men whom Sarbuland Khan admitted to his confidence, asked what his object was in thus preparing to resist. Had he not frequently sent in his resignation? Why, then, refuse to give over possession to the successor sent to relieve him? Sarbuland Khan answered: "My offers to resign were quite genuine. But immense sums have accumulated for arrears of pay, which I am unable to meet. The newly appointed man is an infidel and so are all his soldiers. If I am slain in this contest, I shall not only be quit of the debt for arrears, but shall at the same time acquire the glory of a martyr to the faith."

SEC. 63.—MAHARAJAH ABHAI SINGH RATHOR SENT FROM
DIHLI TO GUJARAT.

At the Dihli Court Sarbuland Khan's favour had by this time waned and disappeared. Muhammad Shah's hope that through Sarbuland Khan vengeance would be wreaked upon Nizam-ul-mulk had vanished. Meanwhile complaints of the governor's conduct began to accumulate, the taking of illegal fines, the resumption of jagirs, and other aggressive acts. More fatal still, Khan Dauran, in whose hands then rested supreme power, for some unknown reason had become estranged. In consequence Khan Dauran caused the stoppage of the monthly subvention promised when the appointment to Gujarat was accepted. The loss of this allowance threw all of Sarbuland Khan's plans into confusion; he was essentially careless and profuse in his expenditure and the pay of the large number

of troops required, owing to the disturbed condition of the province, more than exhausted such revenues as he could collect, more often than not at the point of the sword. As soon as the monthly cash allowance was withdrawn, he began to threaten that he would resign if it were not restored, hoping that the difficulty of finding any one to replace him would secure compliance. But Khan Dauran, who nourished exaggerated notions of his own wisdom and statesmanship, was of opinion that the great Hindu Rajahs were the only men who could effectually confront the Mahratta onrush. Abhai Singh Rathor, ruler of Jodhpur, appeared to be the very man for Khan Dauran's purposes, and an additional point in the game would be scored by this appointment, for Abhai Singh would be detached from the rival party of the chief minister Itimad-ud-daulah and the Turanis.

Abhai Singh along with the usual honours and gifts received eighteen lakhs of Rupees from the treasury in aid of his expenses together with fifty cannon of various sizes and their complete equipment. The Maharajah then proceeded from Dihli to Jodhpur, where he collected twenty thousand well trained Rathor horsemen from Marwar and Nagor. He was joined by his brother, Rajah Bakht Singh, and their combined forces started for Ahmadabad. When they reached the neighbourhood of Palanpur they were met by the faujdar, Karim Dad Khan.

Hearing that Sarbuland Khan meant to oppose his entry, Abhai Singh sent secretly to Sardar Muhammad Khan Ghorni a banker's bill for twenty thousand Rupees with a warrant of appointment as deputy governor. He was instructed to occupy the town if he could. Sardar Muhammad Khan enlisted a number of Gujaratis and awaited his opportunity. Meanwhile Shah Nawaz Khan, M. Amin Beg and Shaikh Allahyar bricked up the gateways, placed men to watch on all the bastions, and made ready supplies for a siege. Night and day their vigilance never relaxed, and Sardar Muhammad Khan found no opening for action.

When the Maharajah was close to Sidhpur, 64 miles north of Ahmadabad, Jawan-mard Khan and Safdar Khan (Babis), nephews of the late Salabat Muhammad Khan, appeared from

their jagir of Radhanpur. They forgot the benefits received from Sarbuland Khan, and impelled by self-interest submitted to the new ruler. Many professional soldiers, and those known as *qasbati*, flocked to the Maharajah's standard in the hope of employment. So also without informing his uncle Abdul-ghani Khan, the diwan, Muhammad Baqir son of the late Mumin Khan departed secretly with three or four men to the Rajah's camp and there joined his brother, Mumin Khan (II.)

SEC. 64.—ABHAI SINGH'S BATTLES WITH SARBULAND KHAN
FOR THE POSSESSION OF AHMADABAD.

Early in Rabi II. 1143, (middle of Oct. 1730) the Maharajah arrived at the village of Mojir on the banks of the Sabarmati within a couple of miles of Sarbuland Khan's camp. There he dug some field works and encamped for the night. Sarbuland Khan moved out his cannon across the river to the grove of Muhammad Amin situated in a line with the Rajah's camp and commanding it. There the gunners commenced a cannonade and several shots fell into the camp. As night came on the two armies sent out their videttes ; on both sides, the generals spent the night with their counsellors in preparation for the morrow's battle. At dawn Sarbuland Khan drew out his men and awaited an onset. But the Maharajah declined to fight in that position. On the advice of the Gujaratis he retraced his steps and moved four or five miles up-stream, reaching near nightfall the point west of the city, where first of all Sarbuland Khan had his camp near the great dome. There the Maharajah pitched his camp.

The Rathors occupied the houses of the hamlets on the river bank where the land is high. They used the walls as batteries for their guns and blocked up the entrances to the village and the ferry approaches. This position is opposite the citadel of Ahmadabad, and the flowing stream is there about the distance of the flight of a wall-piece bullet from the city bank of the river. The entrenched village was placed in charge of the Marwari foot soldiery together with Jawan-mard Khan and Safdar Khan (Babis). On their taking up this position a few shots were fired at them from the Bhadar fort, but other-

wise they were not molested. Another body was sent by the Rajah across the river south of the city near the tomb of Shah Bhikan and the villages of Bahrapur and Bara Nainpur, the latter the residence of a faujdar. The object here was to erect batteries in preparation for an investment of the capital.

As it was near sunset when Sarbuland Khan first obtained precise information of this disposition of his opponent's forces, he waited where he was for the return of daylight ; but as a precautionary measure placed some men with wall-pieces and swivel guns in the fort of Kali near his camp, and others similarly armed upon the roof of Malik Maqsud Gujarati's mosque near the Shahi-Bagh. At dawn he moved up and pitched his tents in the plain opposite the tomb of Dargai Khan Gujarati, which is to the front of the Shahi-Bagh. His excess artillery with some of the balls and powder, some baggage and part of his force, horse and foot, were sent into the city. The day was passed in the position thus occupied ; while a cannonade went on all day from the fort and the walls. On the other side the Maharajah's men were busy building up brick walls inside the gates of the hamlets that they held ; they dug deep ditches outside ; and when all was ready returned the fire from the city. As the ground on their side was a little high some of their balls did good execution in the city, more especially in the fortress ; while those fired from the city fell harmless on the earthworks that had been raised.

On the 20th October, an hour or two after sunrise Sarbuland Khan mounted for battle and took up his position in the sands of the Sabarmati with his rear to the fortress. His object was to clear out his opponents from their entrenchments. After two or three volleys from his artillery he advanced to the attack and his men pressed across the stream. The ground being impracticable for cavalry the men dismounted and clambered over the earthworks. Displacing the obstructions they reached the top of the village walls and thence directed a matchlock fire on the defenders. In the end after great exertion the gates of Khanpur were broken. The place stood on the edge of the stream, and below it were many hollowed out channels made by the river when in flood, full of ups and downs, where

the hard ground, trampled into holes by cattle, was difficult to cross. Sarbuland Khan's men in spite of every difficulty struggled on, some entered by the gate, others crept in by unnoticed ways. The Gujaratis who had enlisted under the Maharajah held their ground; a hand to hand struggle began, in which both fists and daggers played their part. After many leaders of note had fallen, the survivors retreated and rejoined the Maharajah.

Sarbuland Khan who had arrived with his reserves now committed the fatal mistake of ordering his artillery back to the fortress. It would have been quite easy to bring it across the river. The ford at Badij was not far distant and had not been occupied by the other side. Thence, leaving the houses of the hamlets on the left hand, they could have debouched into an open plain admirably adapted for a pitched battle. The governor knew of this route himself, and was also reminded of it by his friends. But his only answer was that he feared to draw the enemy's fire upon the houses in the fort occupied by his women. Furthermore, the troops ought to have passed in a body through the lanes and bazars. Instead of this, the men on foot, the Baksari matchlockmen and the artificers, scattered to plunder the houses,* the inhabitants of which had not fled. Each man laid hold of what he could and made off.

Sarbuland Khan, with his rear to the hamlets, moved out into the plain and set his ranks in order. Then the Maharajah with his whole army, mostly cavalry, advanced to give battle. After an opening cannonade the Marwari horsemen rode hotly at their foe, firing as they came on. The greater part of Sarbuland Khan's matchlockmen and men carrying swivel guns had dispersed after the hamlets had been assaulted and taken. Thus the Muhammadans could only reply with arrows to the balls from the matchlocks and swivel pieces. After many on both sides had been killed and wounded, there was a general

* Up to this time (1730) the villages on that (the west) side of the river had been very populous. They suffered from the Mahrattas in the days of Hamid Khan (1726); but after this second plundering they were abandoned altogether and in 1174 H. (1760-1), when the *Mirat-i-Ahmadi* was written, there was not a trace or sign of them to be seen. (*Mirat* 199a.)

charge. Instead of entering into battle, in the Indian fashion, mounted on elephants, the Maharajah and his brother had this day dressed themselves like all the other Rajputs and were riding their horses. Seeing a group of elephants, Sarbuland Khan galloped recklessly towards them, and fell on them like lightning. At the first onset he broke through the ranks of these defenders. There were no riders! Appropriating the two or three bows he found upon them the Nawab let the elephants go again, resumed his sword-play and sought again for his prey.

SEC. 65.—SARBULAND'S ARMY DISPERSED.

The Marwaris held together and opposed a bold front to their assailants. Neither did the Muhammadans cede any of their ground ; after a time however these latter began to obtain the upper hand and at length the Marwaris gave way and began to leave the field. Sarbuland Khan made repeated charges and drove them before him. But from this point the fortunes of the day underwent a change. Several officers of note had been slain on the Muhammadan side. Jamal Ali Khan lost his brother Abid Ali Khan, who was killed at his side on the elephant they were both riding. Having sent the body into the city Jamal Ali Khan mounted his Arab horse and returned to the field, where he recovered the bodies of Sayyid Qaim and Tarin Khan Afghan. He and his men then escorted the bodies into the city. Others seized the opportunity and left the field ; the general feeling being that Sarbuland Khan could not finally prevail and would surely be slain. Beginning as a mere supposition, this opinion passed from mouth to mouth until when it reached the city in the course of the afternoon it had assumed the shape of a report of Sarbuland Khan's death.

On hearing this report, Muhammad Amin Beg and Shaikh Allahyar, who had been left in charge of the city, assembled their men and without a moment's delay left it by the Khanpur gate. In the sands of the Sabarmati they encountered men who had scattered after the attack on the hamlets and also the men accompanying the corpses of the slain. These fugitives to avoid any imputation on themselves told the two generals that

it was useless to proceed, in all probability the affair was settled beyond remedy, and the most pressing need now was the defence of the city and of their leader's family. Amin Beg and Allahyar paying no heed to these remonstrances went on their way.

Meanwhile, the Marwaris who had in the first instance been put to flight became aware of the fact that Sarbuland Khan's division had now been reduced to little more than four hundred men. Although he held the field without concerning himself about the fewness of his men, the Marwaris drew from it fresh courage, turned their bridle reins, and resolved to try their luck once more. The fighting was vigorously renewed, but Sarbuland Khan stood undaunted and many a Marwari was laid low by an arrow from his bow. Soon an elephant appeared in the distance and on it a man bearing a flag. The flag was recognized as that of Sarbuland Khan ; it must surely be Allahyar with reinforcements ! As Amin Beg Khan and Allahyar rode up, the drums beat once more and the contest was renewed more vigorously than before. In one of the Marwari onsets Shaikh Allahyar was shot ; but Sarbuland Khan undismayed faced the foe and once more put them to flight. He pursued them nearly to the village of Sarkhej, a distance of about five miles. The fighting lasted all day, and it was only at nightfall that the two sides desisted. Until the going down of the sun Sarbuland Khan held the field, his drums beating a victorious march. Tents were sent for and erected where the general stood.

During the day word had been brought to the Rajput camp that the Maharajah had fled from the field. Consternation seized upon the whole camp. There was a hurried loading of carts and pack bullocks, tents were struck, flags were removed, and the cry was "Marwar is far off". The local soldiers, the Gujaratis and Qasbatis, departed to the villages round about, a few went as far as Duraha without a halt, many hid in the houses in the city suburbs. It was not till the time of evening prayer, when the Maharajah returned from the battle-field that the hearts of the timid were reassured. Fugitives who had not gone very far returned and rejoined the Rajput general.

When Sarbuland Khan issued his orders to pass the night upon the battle-field, Muhammad Amin Beg said to him: "Have you not obtained your desire? You were always resigning the governorship. At this time the wounded should be attended to and the survivors consoled. You ought to return to the city." In compliance with this remonstrance a march was ordered. About an hour-and-a-half after nightfall, they reached the city wall just below the fortress. Here they encamped, on the bank of the Sabarmati. Inside the city, however, the chief Gujaratis, more especially Sardar Muhammad Khan, who held the new governor's patent as deputy, would not believe that Sarbuland Khan had escaped unharmed. Sardar Muhammad Khan had cashed the bill of exchange sent to him, and with the money had enlisted men. He was in his house watching for his opportunity when the report came that Sarbuland Khan was dead, he resolved to act by seizing the city gates and throwing them open. But to make certain he sent a man to his neighbour Ali Muhammad Khan for news. He was told the truth and advised to desist. But still unsatisfied and restless, he sent again near midnight to make enquiry. To satisfy him, his man was sent into the fortress, and mounting the wall was allowed to look down on Sarbuland Khan's camp, and they could hear him in his tent recounting the events of the day to one of his friends. When this man had reported to him, Sardar Muhammad Khan gave up his intentions.

SEC. 66.—NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN SARBULAND KHAN AND
ABHAI SINGH.

Next day when the Maharajah learnt that his opponent was unhurt he took the field once more. Sarbuland Khan was on the alert. But his spies soon reported that the Maharajah did not intend to fight on that day. The respite was used by both sides in carrying off the wounded and burying the dead. In the course of the day Abhai Singh resolved to offer terms to his predecessor. As envoys he selected two Muhammadans acquainted with Sarbuland Khan, Mukhlis Khan, jagirdar of Mahmudabad, and Mumin Khan, the news-recorder of his army and faujdar of Kambhayat. A note was sent, and upon

receipt of a favourable answer Mukhlis Khan paid Sarbuland Khan a visit towards the end of the day. After the usual ceremonial he introduced his business and left again at night.

Next day, Mukhlis Khan having been excused on account of his age and corpulence, the negotiation was resumed by Mumin Khan and Amar Sing Udawat. The terms made were that Sarbuland Khan should receive one lakh of Rupees in cash for expenses, that camels and carts be furnished for transport, and that visits should be interchanged. The first visit was to be paid by the Maharajah, it being arranged that each party should erect a tent for the purpose at a distance from his camp. Accordingly the Nawab put up a tent near the grove of Ghazi-ud-din Husain and the Maharajah spread a cloth in front of his camp opposite the tomb of Shah Bhikan. As so frequently happens in these cases, the Maharajah made all kinds of pretext to avoid paying the first visit and the whole of the next day was spent in the expectation of his arrival. In the afternoon of the following day Sarbuland Khan mounted his horse and followed by a small retinue made his way to the Maharajah's tent. He found the Marwaris drawn up in ranks, in armour *cap-a-pie* either as a precaution against treachery or merely out of a desire to see the Muhammadans. On Sarbuland Khan entering the tent enclosure the Maharajah advanced as far as the surrounding screen, the two nobles embraced, and then sat down like brothers side by side. As there was little time available they exchanged turbans in sign of brotherhood and then bade each other farewell. Sarbuland Khan returned to his camp, which was now at the grove of Muhammad Amin Khan and there his property and women had been transferred. Bakht Singh who had received an arrow wound did not attend at the interview ; and it is said that Abhai Singh wore under his coat a shirt of chain-mail.

SEC. 67.—ABHAI SINGH ENTERS AHMADABAD ; SARBULAND
LEAVES GUJARAT.

On the 26 Oct. 1730 one Jagdeo was appointed to arrange for the departure of Sarbuland Khan and on the next day, the 27th, the Maharajah's deputy, Ratan Singh Bhandari, entered the

Bhadar fort, and a new *kotwal* was appointed. Sarbuland Khan was detained for some days while carriage was collected and the payment in cash as agreed on, for which Amar Singh Udawat had become responsible, was made. One hundred and seventy-three cannon, large and small, were made over on the imperial account to Abdul-ghani, *diwan* of the province, and his receipt was taken. There were still twenty thousand Rupees unpaid out of the lakh of Rupees promised. Amar Singh undertook to send this balance* and a march was resolved upon. On reaching Murasa, the Nawab's son-in-law Sayyid Newazish Khan, who had been ill, expired. For this reason one day's halt was made ; but from this place the daily marches were resumed. Finally passing through Udepur, Sarbuland Khan made his way to Agra.

The Maharajah now moved his camp to a place near the Shahi-Bagh and there awaited the lucky moment for making his entry into the city. There he was visited by Abdul-ghani Khan *diwan* of the province and Abul Mufakhir Khan the news-writer. On the 7th Nov. 1730, which was an auspicious day, the Maharajah and his brother, without their troops, came into the city, remained for a short time in the Bhadar fort, and then returned to camp. Some days afterwards he took up his permanent quarters in the city and entered upon the revenue and general business of the province.†

Sarbuland Khan continued his return march from Udepur on to Agra, where he was detained a long time by his inability to satisfy his mutinous troops. In the end he was so hard pushed for money that he was forced to pledge his goods and obtain loans from the money-lenders. Badan Singh Jat sent two of his Muhammadan officers, Khizr Khan and Nur Ali Khan, to offer a present of one lakh of Rupees if he would take up his abode in the Jat territory until the Emperor restored him to favour. After a week's delay the two men were admitted to an audience, the Nawab at that time being laid up with

* The money was never paid.

† Up to this point the history of Gujarat affairs is based almost entirely upon the *Mirat-i-Ahmadi*.

pains in his feet. On hearing the message Sarbuland Khan laughed and said that grateful as he was for such a hospitable offer he had not yet reached such a stage of destitution that he should apply to his equals. He was very comfortable where he was and felt no hardships. However when he needed such help he would send intimation. He sent a horse and jewelled sword as a present to Badan Singh with a letter styling him *Thakur*. Badan Singh sent the letter back along with 5,000 Rupees and prayed that he might be addressed as Rajah, a title promised to Churaman by Sayyid Husain Ali Khan when he started from Agra for the Dakhin. The Sayyid's assassination had prevented fulfilment. Moreover, Rajah Jai Singh had promised the title when the fort of Thun was surrendered; while Ajit Singh and Abhai Singh had corresponded with him in that form, Sarbuland Khan replied that he had no right to give titles, a prerogative of the Emperor alone, but if he ever recovered favour he would urge Badan Singh's claim. The letter and the money were then returned. [*M.U.* iii. 801, Khizr 122, *Hadiqat* 381.]

SEC. 68.—LAST YEARS OF SARBULAND KHAN.

With his removal from Gujarat Sarbuland Khan's public career ended, except for a short time when he was governor of Allahabad and his brief appearance in 1738 as one of Nadir Shah's collectors of the fine imposed upon the capital. Compared with many of his contemporaries he was an active and energetic officer. But in none of his Governments, Agra, Patna, Kabul or Gujarat, did he succeed in fully establishing his authority. In Patna he defeated the Bhojpur zamindar Sidsht Narayan son of Dhir, and in Kabul he met with one or two successes. In Ahmadabad Gujarat he seems to have made continuous efforts to restore some sort of order. But he was wanting in prudence and foresight, and above all he was too lavish and careless about expenditure. During his five years in Gujarat he showed himself an active soldier and the extent of his success in that province can be best gauged from the increasing weakness of his successors. Compared with theirs his hold upon his province was thorough and effective. When

at last after a long stay at Agra Sarbuland Khan was able to return to Dihli he was forced to entrench himself in his house to keep off his creditors, and whenever he was called to Court the Emperor sent an imperial letter with several imperial attendants to protect him from an attack. Mubariz-ul-mulk Sarbuland Khan Bahadur, Dilawar Jang (original name Muhammad Rafi) died on the 13th Zul Qada 1154 H. (19th January 1742) at the age of sixty-nine (lunar) years. [T-i-M.]

Having carried on the story of the Mahratta advance in Ahmadabad-Gujarat up to the year 1730 we now turn to another part of the country, Bundelkhand, in the province of Allahabad, where we shall find the same disorganization on the imperial side and the same promptitude on the part of the Mahrattas in taking advantage of the slightest weakness of their opponents.

29. General

28. 28. 28.

CHAPTER IX

BUNDELKHAND AND MALWA, 1720-1736.

SEC. 69.—BUNDELKHAND : THE LAND AND THE PEOPLE.

Bundelkhand, to which we now turn, had never been completely subdued by the Mughals, and consequently the Mahratta attacks upon it inflicted less vital wounds on the Empire than did their encroachments in Gujarat. According to the Mughal provincial divisions Bundelkhand or the country of the Bundelas fell almost entirely within the subah of Allahabad, Kalpi sarkar in the Agra subah being the only exception. It lies to the south of the Jamuna river—its western boundary being now-a-days the territory of Gwaliyar, from which it is separated by the Sind* river; its eastern limit is formed by Baghelkhand otherwise the Riwa State. On the south the boundary is rather more indefinite, but according to the Mughal territorial divisions Bundelkhand extended to the confines of Malwa. According to Thornton (153) the tract is 200 miles in length from south-east to north-west, and 155 miles in breadth from the opposing angles. Taking the census of 1891, the area may be estimated at 20,641 square miles and the total population at 3,907,585, it being still, according to Indian standards, somewhat sparsely inhabited.

The name Bundelkhand, which is derived from that of the ruling Rajput clan, is comparatively modern. Up to the end of the 12th century the Chandela clansmen, with their capital at Mahoba,† were the dominant race, at any rate in the western half of the region. The Bundelas can never have been very numerous. Even in these days of enumeration of the people,

* The *Sind*, a tributary of the Jamuna, rises in Malwa near Sironj. For 130 miles out of its course of 200, it is the boundary between Bundelkhand and Sindhia's dominions.

† 25° 18 N. 79° 55 E., 30 m. s. w. of the Banda railway station. (I. A. 69 S. E.)

it is not easy to fix their number, as the record of the Census of 1891 is misleading. In one district (Banda) where they must be strong, they are not separately recorded ; and in the Native States of Bundelkhand they are included in the generic name of Rajputs. All things considered it will be safe to estimate the Bundelas as numbering about 100,000 in a Rajput population of 416,000 and a total population of nearly four million of people (1891). There would thus be now about 20,000 grown men of the clan where a hundred and fifty years ago the number must have been very much smaller. There are in addition a few Bundelas in the Central Provinces, especially in the two districts of Sagar and Damoh. The origin of the Bundela clan is extremely obscure, though they are admitted to be Rajputs of some sort. They owe their importance in history to their position as chiefs or rulers, a position which they won for themselves by their undeniable valour.

The Bundelas themselves claim as their place of origin the country round Benares, and make themselves out to be a branch of the Gaharwar clan. Some faint reason for this claim to have come from Benares may be the fact that out of the total number of the Gaharwars in the United Provinces of Allahabad and Agra (53,477) we find fully half (26,832) reside in the two districts adjoining Benares, namely Mirzapur (20,249) and Ghazipur (6,583). The one colony is in pargana Kantit, west of Mirzapur, and the other in pargana Mahaich, south of the Ganges, midway between Benares and Ghazipur. In the nineteenth generation from a more or less mythical Kashi Rajah of the Gaharwar clan, one Rudra Partap rose to importance in the western part of what is now called Bundelkhand. He was ninth in descent from one Suhan Pal who had managed about the year 1292 A.D. to establish there a small independent State. Rudra Partap first emerged from obscurity in 1501 A.D., and in the last year of his life, on the 3rd Baisakh Sudi 1588 S. (21st April, 1531) he founded the town of Orchha and removed thither from Kurar.* Soon afterwards he was killed in

* There is a *Kurahra*, 12 m. e. of Mau and 44 m. s. e. e. of Orchha. (I. A. 69 S W.) *Dilkasha* mentions a *fort Karara* as belonging to Bir

endeavouring to save a cow from the clutches of a tiger. From his nine sons sprang, directly or indirectly, all the rulers of the States of Bundelkhand.* Six large States, Orchha, Datia, Panna, Bijawar, Charkhari, Ajaigarh, and nineteen large jagirs are still held by their descendants. [*M. U.* ii. 317, Pogson 3-11.]

The derivation of the name Bundela is disputed. The Bundelas themselves connect it with their tutelary deity, Bindhbasini Devi, the goddess whose temple is at Bindhachal, a spur of the Vindhya range jutting out towards the Ganges a few miles to the west of Mirzapur. The Muhammadans solve the problem by saying that the root of the word *Bund* is a mere corruption of the Persian *banda*, a slave, and that the clan sprang from the issue of a slave-girl. Another attempt at an etymology refers the word to *Bund*, the Hindi for a "drop of liquid" and a story is told connecting the name with the drops of blood in the sacrifices offered to the goddess, Bindhbasini Devi.*

Orchha on the Betwa, the capital of the first independent State founded by the Bundelas (in 1531 A.D.), being in the west of the tract, it would seem more probable that the tribe entered Bundelkhand from that direction rather than from the north-east. In the latter case they must have traversed Riwa Banda and all the intervening country. Of such a tribal migration, which could hardly have been a peaceful one, tradition has left no trace. The first firm ground we tread upon is arrived at when the town of Orchha was founded by Rudra Partap in 1531. When at the instigation of Prince Salim (afterwards the Emperor Jahangir), Bir Singh Deo (Rudra Partap's grandson) procured the assassination of Akbar's minister Abul-fazl, a new era of extended prosperity began for the Bundela race.†

Singh Deo. Orchha is on the left bank of the Betwa, 8 m. s. of Jhansi. Datia is 16 m. n. e. of Jhansi. [J. Sarkar.]

* *Hadiqat-ul-aqalim*, 167; *Chhatra-prakash* in Pogson p. 8.

† The early history of the Bundelas given here has for its primary sources Lal Kavi's *Chhatra-prakash* (Hindi text ed. by W. Price, Calcutta 1829, used) and *M. U.* ii. 317, with some information from the *Dilkasha* of Bhimsen. Pogson's translation of *Chhatra-prakash* in his *History of the Boondelas* (Calcutta, 1828) is incorrect at places not only in respect of the proper names, but also the sense of the verses. Mr. Irvine has greatly relied on and freely used a book by Manzur Ahmad. Among the deriv-

The eastern half of Bundelkhand was much later in coming under the domination of the Bundelas. It went generally by the name of the *Dangiya Raj*, and its rulers were known as the Dangiya Rajahs. This name is usually referred to the Hindi word for wrangling or confusion, but it really comes from a local word meaning a wild and hilly tract of country.

In 1531 when Rudra Partap died, his second wife, Rani Muhrban, removed with her children from Orchha to Katera, a hilly country covered with thorny scrub lying twenty miles to the east of Orchha. Her eldest son Udyajit, third son of Rudra Partap, founded a new home in a village called by him Mahewa,* for which he appropriated the surviving buildings and houses of a ruined town called Patari. This place had been once the abode of a Rana Rudra of the Jat tribe, who had been defeated and killed by Ala-ud-din Khalji (1295-1315). Udyajit and his descendants lived their lives in obscurity at Mahewa, and we hear nothing more of the family until the fourth generation, when it emerges into notoriety in the person of Champat Rai, father of Chhattarsal.

Champat Rai was born at the village of Mor Pariya† near Mahewa in the State of Orchha. The place is not far from Katera and Mau Ranipur. When he grew up he found himself in very straitened circumstances, having only a small appanage on which to subsist. He therefore adopted the life of a free-booter, but was warned by the Rajahs of Orchha and Datiya, whose territories lay to the west of Mahewa, not to come in their direction. Accordingly he advanced into the Dangiya country to the east where he made some conquests. He seems

ative sources are *Hadiqat-ul-aqalim* and Pandit Kishan Narayan's *Tarikh-i-Bundelkhand wa Jalaun* (1853). For the lives of the Bundela Rajahs in Mughal times, *M. U.* ii. 131, 214, 258, 317, 510 &c. [J. S.]

* Katera is 20 m. e. of Orchha, and Mahewa is 3 m. s. of the former. Half a mile north of Mahewa rises the Patari hill. (*J. A.* 69 S. W.) This Mahewa must not be confounded with the more famous Mahoba, which lies 59 miles east of it. Mau is 10 m. due east of Katera. [J. S.]

† Probably Mohur-paharee of *Indian Atlas*, sheet 69 S. W., about 4 m. south of Mahewa. Manzur Ahmad says that there is another Mahewa, 10 m. n. w. of Chhattarpur, founded by Chhattarsal in memory of his family home. (*Ind. At.* 70 N. E.)

to have been feudatory or dependent of the Orchha Rajahs : at any rate we find him in 1627 fighting on the side of Jhujhar Singh, eldest son of Bir Singh Deo.

SEC. 70.—JHUIJHAR SINGH'S LIFE AND END.

Jahangir died on Oct. 28, 1627 and Bir Singh pre-deceased him by a few months. The Rajah's eldest son, Jhujhar Singh, who was at the Mughal Court, despairing apparently of a continuance of the great favours showered on his father in the previous reign, fled from Agra to his home. Three armies under Mahabat Khan Khan Khanan, Khan Jahan Lodi, and Abdullah Khan Firuz Jang, were sent against the rebel ; and approaching from three directions invested him in Orchha. Abdullah Khan scored a first success by surprising Iraj* on the 10th Jan. 1629. But before more could be done Jhujhar Singh had persuaded Mahabat Khan to plead his cause with Shah Jahan. His pardon was accorded early in March 1629.

Jhujhar Singh was placed on duty in the Dakhin under Mahabat Khan, but in 1044 H. (26th June 1634—15th June 1635) he obtained leave of absence from that general and returned to his home, leaving his eldest son Bikramajit (Jag Raj) in his place. The Rajah now commenced a campaign of conquest to the south, attacking Bhim Narayan, the Gond Rajah of Deogarh, whose fort of Chauragarh† was taken after his treacherous assassination. The Emperor now intervened and demanded the surrender either of Chauragarh or of some pargana in exchange for it. Jhujhar, hearing of the Emperor's displeasure, secretly recalled his son Bikramajit, then in Balaghat of the Dakhin. Khan Zaman, the governor of Balaghat, pursued and overtook the fugitive in pargana Ashta. Although wounded Bikramajit made good his escape, and by jungle paths managed to reach his father at Dhamoni, a strong fort on the Malwa border that had been constructed by Bir Singh Deo.‡

* *Irich*, on the Betwa, 42 m. n. e. of Orchha. (*I. A.* 69 N. W.)

† *Deogarh* about 24 m. s. of Chhindwara in C. P. *Chauragarh* is 25 m. s. of the Narmada and 24 m. s. w. of Narsinghpur.

‡ The two wars with Jhujhar, Abdul Hamid's *Padishahnama*, i. pt. 1, 240-248, and i. pt. 2, 95-139.

The imperial forces were set in motion under Abdullah Khan Firuz Jang, Sayyid Khan Jahan, and Khan Dauran, and to prevent quarrels the Prince Aurangzeb, under the tutelage of Shaista Khan, was placed in supreme command. On the 29th Aug. 1635 the Prince began his march. The Raj of Orchha was conferred on Debi Singh of Chanderi, son of Bharat Sah, and descended from Rudra Partap in the sixth generation. Jhujhar Singh fled from Orchha to Dhamoni [80 miles southwards]. Orchha was occupied on the 14th Oct. 1635. When the imperialists drew near to Dhamoni they found that Jhujhar had again retreated and was gone towards Chauragarh. Dhamoni was soon taken. Jhujhar by this time had reached the town of Shahpur four miles from Chauragarh and had asked help from the Rajah of Deogarh. The pursuit from Dhamoni was placed under the conduct of Khan Dauran and Abdullah Khan Firuz Jang. Jhujhar found no help in Deogarh, the zamindar having just died. Destroying the cannon, burning other things and blowing up the buildings of Chauragarh, Jhujhar fled through Deogarh country towards the Dakhin. The pursuers passed through Garh Katanga and Lanji until they reached the boundaries of Chanda. The fugitives were then halted four *kos* ahead of them. Marching all night the pursuers reached the spot only to find their prey had flown. But next day at noon the fugitives were overtaken and after a fight abandoning their standards, kettle-drums and elephants, they fled into the forest and hid themselves. The pursuit was not relaxed. Udebhan and another younger son of Jhujhar Singh managed to escape and reach Golkōnda. Jhujhar and Bikramajit when overtaken fled deeper into the forest after an attempt to sacrifice their women. The principal wife, Dirghban (a son of Jhujhar), and Durjan Sal (son of Bikramajit) were made prisoners.

Some Gonds found the two Bundela chiefs in the forest and put them to death. Khan Dauran went to the spot and cut off their heads and took their signet rings. The heads were laid before Shah Jahan at Sihor. On the 10th January 1636 they were exposed on the gates of the sarai at that place. Fifteen days afterwards Khan Dauran arrived with tribute from the

Rajah of Chanda, some of the Bundela plunder, and the family of the rebels. Rani Parbati had died of her wounds, but the other women were made Muhammadans and transferred to the imperial harem. Dirghban, the son, and Durjan Sal, the grandson of Jhujhar Singh, were made Muhammadans under the names of Islam Quli and Ali Quli. A couple of months afterwards, Udebhan and another son, a child, with their follower Siyam Dauwa, who had been delivered up by the king of Golkonda, arrived at Court. The two men of full age were offered their lives if they accepted Islam ; on their refusal, they "were sent to hell." The child was placed in the charge of the nazir or head of the harem.

SEC. 71.—CAREER OF CHAMPAT RAI BUNDELA.

Throughout the events connected with the reduction of Jhujhar Singh of Orchha, Champat Rai seems to have acted against the Muhammadans, but did not follow Jhujhar Singh in his flight. Two or three years after that Rajah's death Champat made common cause with Pirthi Raj, one of his sons, and raised a disturbance in the neighbourhood of Orchha. Abdullah Khan Firuz Jang then in charge of that country with his headquarters at Islamabad,* attacked the Bundelas at their stronghold about six miles from Orchha between that place and Jhansi, 18th April, 1640. After a forced march his troops, under the command of one of his chief officers Baqi Khan, fell upon the Bundelas just as day was breaking and routed them putting many to the sword. Pirthi Raj was made a prisoner, but Champat Rai escaped. Pirthi Raj was sent to prison in the fortress of Gwaliyar ; and as Abdullah Khan was supposed to be wanting in zeal, he was superseded by Bahadur Khan Rohela, to whom the assigned revenues of Islamabad were transferred. Bahadur Khan had made great promises, but he was not allowed much time to show what he could do, for Shah Jahan's advisers told him that it was "inadvisable to turn Bundelkhand into a Rohelkhand", and in consequence of their objection Bahadur Khan was soon recalled. [*Pad.* ii. 193, *M.U.* i. 420.]

* Manzur Ahmad says (p. 47) that the ruins near Kathera are still known as Salimabad. This is probably the place referred to.

The only success obtained by Bahadur Khan was reported by him in a letter received at Court on the 13th January 1641. He had succeeded in cutting down some jungle and killing some Bundelas, but Champat and his brother Sujan had again escaped. In Oct. 1641 Abdullah Khan Firuz Jang had been sent to form part of the army under Prince Murad Bakhsh proceeding against a hill-rajah named Jagat Singh. On the 18th Nov. 1641 he returned from the army to make some report, but as he was suspected of some intrigue he received no audience. Bahadur Khan secretly recalled from Bundelkhand was appointed in Abdullah Khan's place and the latter was sent back to Bundelkhand. [*Pad.* ii. 221.]

On the 4th June, 1642 as the results of Abdullah Khan Firuz Jang's campaign were unsatisfactory, Rajah Pahar Singh Bundela, brother of the late Jhujhar Singh of Orchha, entered into a compact to root out Champat and his brothers, and on receiving Abdullah Khan's appointment, his rank was raised to 3000 *zat* (3000 troopers with two or three horses). As Champat had risen to notice in the service of Bir Singh Deo and Jhujhar Singh, his son, he preferred to make terms with Pahar Singh rather than to continue the contest with one of a family to which he was under some obligations. [*Ibid.* 303.]

According to tradition, affairs between Pahar Singh and Champat Rai did not proceed altogether smoothly. Pahar Singh attempted once to get rid of his troublesome vassal by poison ; but a friend and relation Rajah Bhim changed cups and offered himself up in sacrifice for Champat Rai. The latter, following his mother's advice, made overtures to the Mughal Court, whereupon he was summoned and enlisted in the imperial service. According to tradition, he was employed in the year 1656 in the reduction of a fort called Bhargarh,* for which he

* This is incorrect. The fort besieged was Qandahar in Afghanistan, as the *Chhatra-prakash*, p. 30, distinctly mentions *Khandhar* and Dara Shukoh's participation in its siege, but with the usual exaggeration of a Court eulogist says that Champat forced it to surrender! The third Mughal siege of Qandahar, conducted by Dara Shukoh, from April to September 1653, was a miserable failure. *Padishahnama* (ii. 304) records that Champat with his brothers entered the service of Dara some years after 1642. [*J. Sarkar.*]

received in jagir the pargana of Kunch worth three lakhs of Rupees a year. Pahar Singh was annoyed at this move and presenting a gift of nine lakhs of Rupees to Prince Dara Shukoh obtained the pargana for himself. Disgusted at this treatment Champat Rai left Court and returned to Mahewa. [Manzur Ahmad 52, Pogson 25.]

When Prince Aurangzeb started from the Dakhin to contest the throne with his brother Dara Shukoh, Champat Rai presented himself and his services were accepted. After the defeat of Jaswant Singh Rathor (the partisan of Dara Shukoh) at Dharmat on the 25th April, 1658, the Bundela leader was given a horse and a robe of honour. At the battle of Samugarh (9th June 1658) Champat was in Aurangzeb's right wing under Prince Muhammad Azam; and after the victory he was presented with an elephant. He then joined in the pursuit of Dara Shukoh. When Alamgir Aurangzeb's camp was at Sarai Jauhar Mal in the Panjab, Champat Rai and his son Angad were sent on to Lahor to serve under Khalil-ullah Khan. Alamgir then returned to Dihli, which he reached on the 21st Nov. 1658. In January 1659 a force was sent against Prince Shuja who had advanced beyond Allahabad. In the fight at Khajwa in the Ganges-Jamuna Duaba Jaswant Singh Rathor, who had by this time made his submission to Alamgir, turned traitor once more and failing in an attack on the Emperor's rear, fled to his own country of Jodhpur. Dara Shukoh now entered Gujarat and advanced northwards to Ajmer. Taking advantage of the confusion thus created, Champat fled from Lahor, reached Bundelkhand, and soon closed all routes through Malwa. All that could be done at the time was to despatch Subhkaran (Rajah of Datiya) and Indarman (Rajah of Orchha) against this disturber of the peace. [*Alamgir-nama*, 78, 92, 163, 217, 301, 631.]

Champat Rai having plundered Bhandar [24 miles n. e. of Jhansi], took up his quarters in the fort of Iraj. Subhkaran advanced against him and gave battle in the open field. In the end Subhkaran withdrew his forces and turned his attention to the fort of Shahgarh, but the place was defended so valiantly that he was unable to reduce it. [Pogson 35-36.]

SEC. 72.—FLIGHT AND DEATH OF CHAMPAT RAI, 1661.

After an interval Subhkaran returned with reinforcements. Champat then fled to Dharaini ; where some inconclusive fighting followed. Champat's next refuge was at Anghori. By this time Alamgir had returned to Dihli (May 1659), and his brother Dara Shukoh had been made prisoner. He now deputed Rajah Debi Singh Bundela of Chanderi to take charge of the operations in Bundelkhand. This was in the fourth year (30th April 1661—19th April 1662). Champat now proposed peace through his brother Sujan Rai. The parties met at Bedpur but the conditions imposed by Subhkaran could not be accepted by Champat Rai. Subhkaran, however, declared the subjugation of Champat beyond his power. Then Ratan Sah one of Champat's sons made offers of submission through Namdar Khan, but without result. [Pogson 38.]

Sujan Rai, who had gone to the imperial Court with Subhkaran [in the hope of making favourable terms], now returned to Bundelkhand and invoked the aid of Rani Hira Dei of Orchha, but his advances being repulsed by her he went on to the fort of Bedpur. Here he was attacked by the Rani and when his ammunition was exhausted the place was taken by assault. The wives of Sujan Rai immolated themselves, and Sujan Rai rather than be taken prisoner plunged a dagger into his own breast and expired. [Pogson 38-39.]

On learning the news of Sujan Rai's defeat, Champat left Orchha* and passed three days at Jatwara. The Rani's army was in pursuit. Then Champat bethought himself of Rajah Indarman Dhandhera of Sahra, in sarkar Sarangpur of subah Malwa. At the time when Champat was in favour with Alamgir, this man Indarman was a prisoner at the Mughal Court. He had resisted the conquest of his State by Shiva Ram Gaur, to whom it had been granted by Shah Jahan. Champat interceded for him, procured his release and his restoration to his State.† Champat resolved to seek shelter at Indarman's capital,

* Irvine wrote *Berchha*, but the Hindi text of *Chhatra-prakash* reads *Orchha*. [J. S.]

† Pogson (p. 40) says that Indarman had been imprisoned for slaying

and made straight for Sahra, closely pursued by the imperialists, sixteen thousand in number. At this time Champat had with him no larger escort than fifty horsemen. He was ill and daily his illness increased on him. One day having travelled over 30 miles, he halted to give his people and his horses a rest. They had begun to feed the horses when suddenly they heard the sound of kettle-drums ; they already saw some of the enemy. Champat got ready his quiver, placed it in his waistband, mounted his horse and escaped. He soon came to a difficult pass in the hills where after an attempted defence he scrambled down the other side. A follower named Indarman in trying to get through the pass fell with his horse and was cut to pieces. While this fight was going on Champat Rai fled and took shelter in a village. The news was brought to Sahib Rai Dhandhera, who was in charge of Sahra during the absence of the Rajah Indarman. It was resolved to afford sanctuary to Champat, and Shiva Ram Dauwa and Gopal Bari were sent to meet him at the head of two hundred horsemen.

Suddenly hearing the tramp of horses, Champat made ready his bow, but it was old and broke as he stretched it. His son Chhattarsal resolved to fight to the death in his father's defence, while his wife drew a dagger and was ready to die gladly for her husband's honour. As the Dhandhera's horsemen drew near she shouted "Who are you advancing so boldly? I will not give up nor quit Champat until I have finished a sacrifice for him. Then you may work your will". The leader called out "Why all this anger, we are come devoid of plot or guile to escort Champat to Sahra, where no enemy will trace him." At this mild answer their fears were dispelled and they consented to be conducted to the camp assigned them.

an imperial officer named Shah Malik. The Emperor with whom Champat interceded was Shah Jahan, and could hardly have been Alamgir. Shiva Ram was granted the Dhandhera lands early in Shah Jahan's reign. (*M. U.* ii. 265). Aurangzib released Indarman from the fort of Junnar when starting from the Dakhin to contest his father's throne (*Ibid.* 266), and Champat could have had no hand in the matter. But early in Aurangzib's reign Indarman fell into disfavour on account of the conduct of his kinsmen. (Talish). [J. Sarkar.]

For a time they remained at Sahra, thence went to Sitabari where is a temple of Raghunath. Then the pursuing army arrived in the neighbourhood. Rajah Indarman was still absent and his representative Sahib Rai took shelter in the fort where he was helpless. The Dhandheras lost heart and he wrote to Sahib Ram Dauwa and Gopal Bari in charge of Champat's escort with orders to gain their guest's confidence and then murder him. By this treachery they hoped to make their own peace with the Emperor.

All unconscious of this plot Champat decided to start for a place called Morangaon, after Kali Kunwar, the fugitive's wife, had prayed and made offerings at the temple of Raghubir. Their son Chhattarsal was sent away to his brother-in-law Gyan Sah's village. Reaching this place Chhattarsal found his sister at home, but she refused to see him. The youth had fasted for three days and had nothing with which to buy food. It was not until Gyan Sah's return home in the evening that he heard the news and sent out some food, which was cooked and the night passed.

Champat now thought of a way of beguiling his pursuers. While he was being carried to Morangaon, another litter would be sent to the orchard near Sahra. In it someone would take his place covered from head to foot in his sheet, guarded by the two hundred horsemen. Kali Kunwar spoke to a servant from her father's house. When the request was heard by him it was refused. The Thakurani fell at his feet, but he persisted in his refusal. On the failure of this device, Champat marched for the orchard at Sahra attended by the two hundred Dhandhera horsemen. After they had gone seven *kos*, the men interchanged signs, and suddenly fell upon and slew the Bundela chief—his illness preventing him from making any effective resistance. The Thakurani leapt from her horse and ran to her husband's side. She laid hold of a horseman's rein, but he turned and plunged his dagger into her. Thus husband and wife died together and together they set out for the other world.*

* The entire account of the pursuit of Champat from his leaving the fort of Iraj to his death is based on the *Chhatra-prakash*. [J. S.]

At the Mughal Court Rajah Sujan Singh of Orchha claimed the credit of Champat Rai's removal. He reported that he had followed the rebel to his refuge in Sahra and there demanded his surrender. But the Dhandhera men, unknown to Sujan Singh, sent Champat Rai's head to Court, where it arrived on the 7th November 1661. [*Alamgir-nama*, 633.]

SEC. 73.—RAJAH CHHATTARSAL, HIS CAREER DOWN TO 1720.

Thus at the age of twelve years Chhattarsal,* who was the fourth son of Champat Rai, was left an orphan and a fugitive. He sought shelter first with his eldest surviving brother Angad Rai at Deogarh and his mother's jewels having been obtained from the town of Dilwari, where they had been deposited, his marriage was carried out. He now offered his services to Rajah Jai Singh of Amber then on his march to the Dakhin and about to proceed against Shivaji the Mahratta. His brother Angad Rai soon joined the same commander, under whom they did good service. When Bahadur Khan besieged Deogarh, Chhattarsal formed part of the detachment sent by Jai Singh as a reinforcement. In a battle fought to force the passes through the hills, Chhattarsal was left for dead on the field of battle and was not discovered till night had come on.

Chhattarsal disgusted at Bahadur Khan's neglect of his services, decided to join Shivaji, the Mahratta, and with this intention after a long and trying march through hills and forest, he crossed the Bhima river. At an interview Shivaji counselled him to return to his own country of Bundelkhand and there raise his standard against the Muhammadans.† Adopting this suggestion Chhattarsal first of all sought to obtain assistance from Subhkaran Bundela Rajah of Datiya, then serving in the Mughal employ in the Dakhin. Subhkaran refused to quit the

* The history of Chhattarsal to the death of Alamgir is based upon the *Chhatra-prakash*, with dates and a few details from *M. U.* ii. 510 and *M. A.* 169, 384, 424, 483. The letters of Jai Singh in the *Haft Anjuman* give us information about Chhattarsal's service under him. [J. Sarkar.]

† Bhimsen gives another account. See my *Shivaji and His Times*, ch. 7 end. [J. S.]

Mughal, but offered to intercede with the Emperor and obtain for Chhattarsal a suitable rank. Chhattarsal refused.

Now commenced a struggle which lasted for over fifty years. Chhattarsal crossed the Narmada into Bundelkhand in 1671, when he was in his twenty-second year. His following then consisted of five horsemen and twenty-five foot-soldiers ; while at his death in December 1713 he was lord of the eastern half of Bundelkhand. In the course of this career of conquest, he defeated many Moslem commanders, Hashim Khan, Sayyid Bahadur, Randaula Khan, Tahavvar Khan, Sayyid Latif, Anwar Khan, Mirza Sadar-ud-din, Hamid Khan, Abdus-samad Khan and Murad Khan (agent of Diler Khan). These obscure struggles are hardly mentioned by the Muhammadan historians. The only campaign they tell us of is that of 1089 H., 1678-9, when Jaswant Singh Bundela was sent 'against the sons of Champat'.

Twenty years seem to have passed in this never ceasing struggle. Alamgir's departure from Northern India in 1681 and his prolonged campaigns against the Muhammadan Governments and the rising Mahratta power, diverted his attention from the other parts of his Empire. The local generals ceased to exert themselves, in the way that they did in the time of Shah Jahan ; and this want of energy was without doubt exceedingly favourable to the rise of a local chief like Chhattarsal. Somewhere about the 40th year of the reign (5 April 1696—23 March 1697) Chhattarsal was induced to enter the imperial service and repaired to the Dakhin. In the 46th year (19 Feb. 1700—8 Feb. 1701) he was appointed to the command of fort Satara. Four years afterwards he abandoned the service and returned home. In the next year the 49th (1705) Nawab Firuz Jang obtained his reinstatement with the rank of 4,000. He returned home when Alamgir died (2nd March 1707).

In the early part of Bahadur Shah's reign, Chhattarsal neglected the summonings to Court which were sent to him. But on the 30th May 1708, when the new Emperor was on his way to the Dakhin to fight his younger brother, Kam Bakhsh, Harde Narayan and other sons of Chhattarsal presented themselves and received *mansabs*. In the fourth year of that reign,

on 22nd April 1710, when the Emperor was at Karatiya in the Kota country on his return march to Hindustan, Chhattarsal himself attended and proceeded northwards with the army, then on the way to suppress Banda, the follower of the deceased Sikh leader Guru Govind Singh. On the 10th Dec. 1710 Chhattarsal took part in the assault on the Sikh fastness of Lohgarh in the outer Himalayas. Under Farrukh-siyar (1713-1719), he seems to have remained in favour. On the 21st Jan. 1714 he became 6,000 *zat* (4,000 horse), and on the 3rd May 1718 three of his sons and several grandsons attended Court and received presents. [Kamwar, *Dil.* 171b, *Bahadur, M. U.* ii. 510.]

SEC. 74.—MUHAMMAD KHAN BANGASH'S CAMPAIGNS IN
BUNDELKHAND.

Soon after the downfall of the Sayyid brothers Muhammad Khan Bangash, as his reward for deserting from Sayyid Abdullah Khan, obtained the Government of Allahabad (25th Dec. 1720). Within the limits of this province lay the greater part of Bundelkhand* including the whole of the territory over which Chhattarsal had usurped authority. Thus Muhammad Khan, pursuant to the Mughal claim to sovereignty over the whole of India, had a direct official connection with Bundelkhand. Not only so. The parganas of which the land revenue was assigned to him in 1713, in the first year of Farrukh-siyar, were all in Bundelkhand. To this troublesome charge (the Mughals having little or no hold on the country thus granted), Diler Khan, the grantee's favourite *chela*, was appointed. In 1720 the Bundelas rose, sacked Kalpi, and killed the local officer (*amil*). Diler Khan at the head of some troops was sent against them and quickly ejected them from Kalpi and Jalalpur.† The Bundelas, however, soon recovered themselves and advanced

* From this point onwards to the final retirement of Md. Khan the history of Bundelkhand is based upon Irvine's chapters on the Bangash Nawabs of Farrukhabad in *J. A. S. B.* 1878, with some additional details from Shiu Das and other writers, who will be cited at the proper places. [J. Sarkar.]

† *Jalalpur*, 18 m. s. of Kalpi, but south of the Betwa. [J. S.]

to the number of thirty thousand men with Chhattarsal at their head. After a fierce battle fought on the 25th May 1721, Diler Khan and five hundred of his men were slain. He was buried at Mauda. [20 m.n.w. of Banda]. Chhattarsal had already made himself obnoxious to the imperialists by sending aid to Girdhar Bahadur at Allahabad and to the rebel Kichar zamindar of Asothar in the Duaba. This crowning act of open hostility resulting in the defeat and death of Diler Khan, made Chhattarsal's suppression imperative. [Shiu Das 67a, Ghulam Ali 41b.]

No immediate vengeance for this disastrous defeat could however be inflicted upon the Bundelas. The whole strength of the Mughals was at the time absorbed in the attempt to repel the aggressions of Rajah Ajit Singh of Jodhpur and the rescue of Ajmer from his clutches. At length, towards the end of 1723, Ajit Singh sued for peace and sent his eldest son Abhai Singh to Court. Muhammad Khan who had taken a part in the campaign returned to Dihli with this Prince. Chhattarsal having in the interval continued his aggressions upon imperial territory, Muhammad Khan was now ordered to proceed in person to Allahabad the head-quarters of his province, and there prepare an expedition to be led by him into Bundelkhand.

This first campaign was quite inconclusive. After a two months' stay in Allahabad, Muhammad Khan collected a force of fifteen thousand horsemen and formed a camp at Bhognipur in the Duaba. In the end he crossed the Jamuna into Bundelkhand, and by dint of six months of fighting he penetrated as far as Sahenda, 12 miles south of Banda. Nizam-ul-mulk's defeat of Mubariz Khan (11th Oct. 1724) alarmed the Court and decided it upon concentrating its forces. Muhammad Khan was recalled. He made the best terms he could and returned to Dihli. Then he was ordered to Gwalior to repel an anticipated advance of the Mahrattas. In his absence the Bundelas renewed their inroads, and soon the little impression that had been made was entirely obliterated; Baghelkhand was over-run by them, even to the borders of the subah of Patna.

About the end of 1726 Muhammad Khan was directed to restore order in the Bundelkhand portion of his province. A

money allowance of 2 lakhs of Rupees a month was granted to him ; this was afterwards commuted into a grant of *chakla* Kora. On the 3rd Feb. 1727 his vanguard crossed the Jamuna somewhere not far from Allahabad. By the first operations the eastern part of Bundelkhand was cleared, with the exception of Tarahwan. Leaving his eldest son, Qaim Khan, to prosecute the siege of that place, Muhammad Khan moved on to within four *kos* of Sahenda. Parganas Bhend, Mauda, Pailani, Agwasi and Simanni* came into his possession : and on the 22nd Dec. 1727 Tarahwan fell to an assault delivered by Qaim Khan.

Pushing his way westwards Muhammad Khan at last encountered the enemy at Ijoli in pargana Mahoba. Here on the 22nd May 1727 he stormed their entrenched position at a heavy loss on both sides in killed and wounded. Chhattarsal, his sons and grandsons took flight and sought a refuge in the forest of Salhat† to the south of Jaitpur, a country full of natural obstacles in which pursuit was difficult. On the 18th June 1727, twenty-seven days after the first battle, the imperial army marched towards the enemy's new position. The attack was delivered a little before dawn on the next day (19th June, 1727) but before the Muhammadans could come to close quarters the Bundelas broke and fled to Mahoba. The forts of Barigarh, ten miles, and Lauri-Jhumar, sixteen miles south-east of Mahoba, were occupied. The Muhammadan camp was pitched two miles beyond Mahoba, and here they passed the five months of the rainy season during which in that soil it is impossible to place one foot before another. [Shakir's *Gulshan-i-Sadiq*.]

In Nov. 1727 the advance was resumed. The enemy's

* *Tarahwan*, 42 m. e. of Banda and one-fourth of a mile from Karwi. *Bhend*, probably Benda, a village 22 m. from Banda and 14 m. from Pailani. (*N. W. P. Gaz.* i. 390). Or, *Bhenr* (*Bheyr*)? *Mauda*, 20 m. n. w. of Banda. *Pailani*, 20 m. of Banda. *Agwasi*=Augasi, 28 m. n. e. Banda, and on the s. bank of the Jamuna. *Simanni*, 18 m. n. e. of Banda. *Ijoli*=Ichauli, 11 m. n. w. of Banda. *Jaitpur*, 20 m. w. of Mahoba. [J. S.]

† The *Salat* hill is 9 m. due east (and not south) of Jaitpur, and midway between the latter and Mahoba. [J. S.]

entrenchments in the hills were attacked for a whole day with little effect, but at sunset the Bundelas gave way. At this point a delay of four months seems to have occurred during which Muhammad Khan wrote repeatedly to Court for more money and more men. Active hostilities were resumed in April 1728, and on the 29th April 1728 a fresh entrenchment between the hills at Kulpahar [14 m.w. of Mahoba] was stormed by the Muhammadans, seven lines of defence being carried one after the other. Next day the general started for Mundhari four miles east of Jaitpur, and its fort was seized. The Muhammadans now took up their position in front of Kulpahar with Jaitpur on their right, Mundhari a little on one side in the same direction, and the hills of Salhat on their left, the latter occupied by the enemy. Finally the Bundelas resorted to the hills of Ajhnar, six miles south of Jaitpur. The siege of Jaitpur itself then commenced. The rainy season came on and progress was slow, for owing to the excessive moisture the mines fell in as soon as dug. At length about the month of December 1728 the fortress fell into the besiegers' hands. By this time the campaign had lasted fully twenty-four months (January 1727 to December 1728).

SEC. 75.—MUHAMMAD KHAN'S DESPATCH OF BATTLES.

It was in the operations preparatory to opening the siege of Jaitpur that the fighting occurred which is thus described by Muhammad Khan himself in his report to the Emperor [Shakir's *Gulshan*] :—"The enemy having come out of the hills of Bundelkhand awaited the arrival of their brethren, the Mahrattas and the Jats. The first victory was obtained during the first march, when we were forty miles from Jaitgarh.* On the 14th Shaban of the current year (1140?), Chhattarsal with a body of Bundelas had advanced to the village of Suni, where they plundered the property and cattle of the country people. Although many of my men were away procuring supplies, and

* The name of the fort of Jaitpur. *Suni*—There is a *Sundee*, 50 m. north of Jaitpur, and 12 m. s. w. of Kalpi, but north of the Betwa (69 N. E.) [I. S.]

only a small force was available, yet instigated by the recollection of what had happened to Diler Khan shortly before, I mounted without delay and after advancing six *kos* (about 12 miles), came face to face with the enemy. They drew up in battle array and began the attack with arrows and matchlock fire, holding their ground firmly. After much effort on both sides and many casualties, including the loss of my horse, the enemy began to give way. We pursued for six *kos* and cut off many heads. Many horses and standards and arms fell into our hands. Long ago, in a previous report, I sent a detailed account.

"After this fight we reached by repeated marches the foot of the stone fort belonging to the enemy. Here Mangal Khan and Bhure Khan joined me. The united force passed the 29th of the said month (Shaban) [=9th April 1728] below the fort. On the night of Friday a council was held. It was decided, in order to secure water, that we should move to the banks of a small stream, six *kos* to the south of the fort. Some were for procrastinating. One watch of Saturday had gone when we reached our destination, we had not yet fixed upon the site of our camp and our men were scattered about, as occurs on a march. I was standing with a few *chelas* ready mounted, watching for the enemy.

"Suddenly the vanguard of the Bundelas, headed by the eldest son of Chhattarsal, bore down on us. At once I sent to the camping ground for Mangal Khan and some of his men; these were formed into a left wing. Bhure Khan and his men were sent to the front; while Sardar Khan, Shams-ud-din Khan, and Rustam Khan were posted on the right wing. Meanwhile the enemy gathered in great strength; and dividing into many groups completely surrounded me and my men. In addition to the central body there were three *daur* (lit., circles). One of their *daur* is by measurement one hundred and seven *jarib*. Their total force was estimated at 45,000 men. It is also said by persons from the enemy's camp and landholders of the neighbourhood that Chhattarsal in person, with all his brethren and leaders, thirty-seven in all, was present. The Jat, too, was there with his artillery and troops.

"Although the enemy thought they had prepared a meal for themselves, they had to retire without eating it. When the sun reached its height the battle began to rage. Arrows sped and bullets flew. From bows and cannon and muskets there fell, as it were, a hailstorm from the sky. The enemy then came against our Van ; but we held our ground. I sent for my artillery and ordered my *Mir Atash* to make the horsemen attached thereto dismount ; and directed them to fire at the camels of Chhattarsal. Thus the enemy was brought under matchlock and rocket fire. Seeing they could gain no advantage in that direction, they turned their whole army and all its parts towards our right. They reached close our encampment and began to plunder our tents and disturb our attendants. There was an enormous disparity in our numbers, and I saw that it was no use to try and save our baggage. Whether victory or death were our fate, the destruction of our goods and chattels was of no importance. We addressed our vows to the Protector of All and continued our efforts.

"Then three strong divisions united together and bore down on our right wing. Many of our men failed to withstand this onset ; they began to give way. But Mangal Khan and Bhure Khan, although wounded, stood fast, and our faces were reddened with the glow of success. Those brave men yielded not their ground but gave their lives as a sacrifice. In a short time victory would have been with the enemy. Then as befits a true leader, I remembered my reputation as a soldier and my devotion to His Majesty's service. It was plain that there was nothing left except to advance in person and fight like a soldier.

"At two hours before sunset I collected the artillery in position on the left wing, in advance of the vanguard ; and followed by a few of my best cavalry, I drove my elephant straight into the thick of the enemy, where my men seemed to be struggling hopelessly against them. At this moment two of the enemy's horsemen, one after the other, rode their horses, with the greatest boldness, at my elephant, so that their horses' forefeet were on the elephant. By God's aid one after the other was dispatched by our arrows. The whole of my friends

and *chelas* at this juncture performed prodigies of valour in the vanguard, and many received repeated wounds. With the greatest effort the force in front of us had been repulsed, when a fresh one appeared in great strength on our right. We succeeded in also repelling this attack. A third time the enemy showed on the left, but soon fell back. The fourth time they came on massed together as a single body. By God's help and His Majesty's good fortune, after much fighting and slaughter, such as cannot be detailed in this brief report, the whole of the enemy finally withdrew.

"We pressed them in their retreat, and parties were detached in pursuit. These after notable deeds rejoined my main army. Two arrows had struck the elephant of Chhattarsal; it was wounded and fled from the field. We pursued him and his host four or five miles. Cannon, gun-carriages and falconets were seized as prize, many of the enemy were killed, many drums and horses fell into the hands of our men. Excluding those slain in battle and in the camp, we collected about seven thousand heads.

"After the victory I remained three days on the spot. At present I am turning my attention towards Jaitgarh. As my former report was lost on the road, this second account has been sent. No blessing of good fortune could be greater than this victory over a vast gathering of Bundelas, vouchsafed to this lowly person, of no account, a mere nobody and a humble dependent."

While Muhammad Khan was pressing on westwards his eldest son Qaim Khan was left to reduce Tarahwan on the east of the province. It fell to his investment on the 22nd December 1727. Leaving an officer in charge, Qaim Khan then rejoined his father. But immediately he had done so, they heard that the Bundelas had risen again and had attacked the Tarahwan garrison. Qaim Khan was detached against them with ten thousand horse and foot; but before he could reach Tarahwan the enemy had taken the first and outworks. On the 4th Oct. 1728 he retook the outer fort. A month afterwards 11th Nov. 1728 a mine was exploded under one of the fastnesses and the rest of the place succumbed to an assault. Qaim Khan

then took the field and cleared the country to the east as far as Bargarh.* He was still absent on this duty when in March 1729 Muhammad Khan's career of victory was suddenly arrested.

SEC. 76.—MUHAMMAD KHAN BANGASH MEETS WITH DIFFICULTIES
AND REVERSES.

While maintaining the investment of Jaitpur, Muhammad Khan had not ceased to annoy the Bundelas in their retreat within the hills to the south. Jaitpur fell in December 1728 and in the same month Harde Sah and other sons of Chhattarsal came in and surrendered. Soon afterwards Chhattarsal also submitted.† For three or four months they remained quietly in the Muhammadan camp awaiting an answer from Court to Muhammad Khan's offer to bring the prisoners with him to Dihli. Under pressure of circumstances the Rajah had meanwhile agreed to submit to the imperial authority, to deliver up all the places he occupied ; and to permit the placing of imperial armed posts throughout his country. From Dihli no answer came, and three months passed by. At Court the story was started that Muhammad Khan and Chhattarsal had entered into a league and covenant to upset the dynasty and place the Afghan on the throne. The silliness of this rumour was proved by the acts of the Bundelas themselves. They wrote to Burhan-ul-mulk, a rival of Muhammad Khan, and received an encouraging reply. Other courtiers too wrote urging continued resistance and a recommencement of hostilities. Having then learnt what powerful enemies Muhammad Khan had, the Bundelas plucked up courage to renew the struggle. In February 1729, the time of the great Hindu festival of the Holi was approaching, and on this pretext the aged Chhattarsal was allowed to remove to a place 6 or 7 miles south of the Muhammadan camp to carry out the ceremonial of the feast.

Muhammad Khan lulled into a false security had allowed the larger part of his army to proceed on furlough, and many

* Probably *Barigar*, 10 m. s. e. e. of Mahoba.

† Warid says that Chhattarsal paid 40 lakhs to Md. Khan to save his dominions.

of the soldiers were scattered in small parties at the armed posts that he had established. His total force did not exceed four thousand men. Ugly rumours now reached him about a Mahratta invasion. They had quite recently defeated and slain (8 Dec. 1728) Girdhar Bahadur, the imperial governor of Malwa. But Muhammad Khan had full confidence in the agreement entered into by the Bundelas, and treated the suggestion of danger from the Mahrattas with supreme contempt. He made no preparations.

SEC. 77.—BAJI RAO ASSISTS CHHATTARSAL IN BUNDELKHAND.

The Mahrattas were within two and twenty miles of his camp before Muhammad Khan could be persuaded to believe in their approach. With great difficulty he now made up his army to nine thousand men and entrenched himself. The invaders were under the chief command of Baji Rao, the *Peshwa*. With him were Pila Jadon, and other celebrated leaders ; and as he advanced his force was joined by the turbulent zamindars till it had swollen to seventy thousand men.* They first appeared within two miles of the Muhammadan encampment on the 22nd March 1729, but their skirmishers who tried to drive off the grazing cattle were soon dispersed. Next day they advanced by the right and left to the rear of the camp and cut off the camels and ponies as they were being driven out to bring in grass. On the 25th Muhammad Khan made a sortie without permanent benefit. Gradually the Mahrattas closed round the camp, 'the commonest grain cost' twenty Rupees a *seer*, and other kinds were unprocurable. For two months the Muhammadans subsisted on the flesh of camels, horses and cows.

In the middle of May, Qaim Khan who had heard at Tarahwan of his father's straits, reached Supa, 12 miles north-east of Jaitpur, bringing supplies and reinforcements. A portion of the Mahratta army moved off to intercept him.† Suddenly

* The junction of the Mahrattas with Chhattarsal described in Sardesai ii. 384 *et seq.* [J. S.]

† The repulse of Qaim Khan is thus described in a Marathi letter from Pilaji Jadon: "On the 9th Shawwal [7 May 1729] Qaim Khan with

seizing the opportunity the beleaguered soldiers poured out of the camp on their way to Jaitpur, Muhammad Khan was left with no more than one thousand men. The Bundelas came down from their hiding places in the hills and Muhammad Khan moved out, leaving not a single soul in camp. For three hours an unequal contest was maintained, and honour being satisfied Muhammad Khan consented to withdraw to Jaitpur.

On reaching Jaitpur Muhammad Khan put it so far as he was able in a state of defence. But there were no stores of food and no time to procure any. When the Mahrattas returned, having defeated Qaim Khan, they invested the town and fort, into which Muhammad Khan had withdrawn. The besiegers could make no impression on the place and resolved to starve it into surrendering. For close on four months the garrison held out under the most heart-rending conditions. The only food was the flesh of the gun-bullocks and of the troopers' horses; flour could not be procured at a hundred Rupees the seer. Many men died of starvation; many deserted; all who gave up their arms were allowed to pass out. [Warid 11b, Khush-hal 1049-1052.]

In this time of dire distress Muhammad Khan called upon the Emperor and the great nobles to extricate him. Not a hand was raised to help or encourage him. The Emperor did indeed order the first Bakhshi, Khan Dauran Samsam-ud-daulah, to proceed to Jaitpur. As usual with this noble, there was much promise and little performance. His advance tents were sent outside the walls of Dihli with great pomp and ceremony; but not one single other step did he take to forward the matter. Full of intrigue, and deceit and excuses, he every evening put off his start to the morning, and every morning put it off until the evening. Then in order to stir up strife he wrote to the Bundelas that the 'thoughtless monarch' was trying to send an army to the aid of Muhammad Khan. He went so far, it is

30,000 men came against us. We fought him (at Supa). By God's grace he was defeated. We captured 3,000 horses and 13 elephants, two of these elephants have been taken by Antaji Mankeshwar and Dabalji Somvanshi the *sar-i-lashkar*, the rest are with me." (Rajwade, iii. No. 14.) [J. Sarkar.]

said, as to suggest to Chhattarsal that his deadly enemy Muhammad Khan being in his power, he would throw away all chance of fortune if he did not slay him. The head of Muhammad Khan would be an acceptable gift to lay at the feet of the Emperor and would secure the sender high dignity and reward. Khan Dauran also tried to persuade the Emperor that there was danger to the throne from a too successful Afghan general. [Warid 11b.]

After his repulse at Supa, Qaim Khan was obliged to abandon all hope of conveying immediate relief to his father and the besieged garrison. He resolved to obtain, if he could, contingents from some of the other nobles. His first visit was to Burhan-ul-mulk, governor of Oudh, at Faizabad. Instead of affording him help, a plot was made for his seizure. The Afghans in the Oudh service were so angry at this intended trickery that they followed Qaim Khan to the number of twelve hundred in his march to the Pathan colony of Shahjahanpur. Here more men joined him. His next visit was to Ali Muhammad Khan Rohela at Bangarh,* and with this ruler's help more recruits were collected. Reaching his home at Mau Shamsabad [in the n. w. of the Farrukhabad district], he raised money from the money-lenders and pledged all his father's goods. In this way he succeeded in gathering together a force of about thirty thousand men.

SEC. 78.—FINAL WITHDRAWAL OF MUHAMMAD KHAN FROM
BUNDELKHAND, 1729.

In the interval Jaitpur had continued to be strictly invested and the sufferings of the garrison were intense. Then an epidemic broke out in the Mahratta camp and thousands of their men died. Moreover the time for their annual return to their homes during the rainy season had arrived. Alarmed at the losses by disease and anxious to get home, the Mahrattas raised the siege and marched for the Dakhin. Chhattarsal undaunted continued the siege with the twenty thousand men still with him. A further period elapsed and besiegers as well as besieged were tired out. Qaim Khan, too, had crossed the

* About 10 m. n. of Budaon.

Jamuna and was hastening to his father's deliverance. Chhattarsal and his family decided that it was more prudent to come to terms, and Muhammad Khan was allowed to evacuate Jaitpur (August 1729) on signing a written agreement not to attack them again, but to content himself with the tribute they had formerly paid. On meeting his father Qaim Khan proposed that they should renew the struggle, but Muhammad Khan refused to break his pledged word. They recrossed the Jamuna at Kalpi on the 3rd Oct. 1729, and from that time Muhammad Khan never re-entered Bundelkhand. In 1144 (July 1731—June 1732) he was superseded in the Government of Allahabad by Sarbuland Khan. [Warid 11-13.]

As a reward for their alliance the Mahrattas received from Chhattarsal one-third of his territories, the parganas so ceded were situated in the south and west of the region and were supposed to yield a revenue of 30,76,953 Rupees or about £300,000 a year.* They seem to have soon had some difficulties with their Bundela neighbours in the parent State of Orchha for in Zul Qada 1144 H. (April-May 1732) Pirbhuji a brother of Malhar Holkar was killed in a fight with Rajah Udwat Singh of that place.

Rajah Chhattarsal died at Panna on the 14th Dec. 1731, at the age of eighty-two years. He left a number of sons: but the two eldest Harde Sah and Jagat Raj divided the State between them, the former becoming Rajah of Panna and dying soon after in 1151 H. (April 1738—April 1739); and the latter Rajah of Jaitpur (died 1758).

The younger sons, in the usual Rajput manner, obtained small appanages for their support. The supposed revenue of the Panna State was 38,46,123 and of Jaitpur 30,76,953 Rupees. [Pogson 105-115.]

SEC. 79.—EARLY MAHRATTA INCURSIONS INTO MALWA.

In the Mahratta scheme of aggression upon Hindustan, or India north of the Narmada, the rich province of Malwa† was

* Partition of Bundelkhand, Sardesai ii. 386. [J. S.]

† The history of the Mahrattas in Malwa given here by Irvine is based entirely upon Grant Duff and *The Bangash Nawabs of Farrukhabad* (pub-

selected by the Peshwa Baji Rao as his special prey. From the year of his appointment (1720), he sent annually a detachment from Khandesh into Malwa, but did not cross the Narmada in person until the end of 1724. At first his stay in the province was never very prolonged, affairs at home and the intrigues of Nizam-ul-mulk demanding his constant attention in the south.

We have seen [ch. iv. sec. 33] that late in the reign of Farrukh-siyar Muhammad Amin Khan was sent to Malwa expressly to defend it from Mahratta incursion. On his return to Court without orders he was superseded (15th March 1719) by Nizam-ul-mulk; and he again, owing to the constantly shifting policy of the Court, was followed on the 9th Sept. 1722 by Rajah Girdhar Bahadur Nagar, who was removed from Oudh in order to make a vacancy for Saadat Khan, Burhan-ul-mulk. A year afterwards, Nizam-ul-mulk's star being once more in the ascendant, he removed Girdhar Bahadur in favour of his cousin Azim-ullah Khan (25th May 1723). When Nizam-ul-mulk quitted Oudh and fled to the Dakhin, the province of Malwa was made over once more to Girdhar Bahadur (12th June 1725). [Kamwar 199.]

Girdhar Bahadur throughout his period of rule in the province, carried on a gallant struggle against the rising waves of Mahratta encroachment. For the selfish reason that they diverted the Mahrattas from the Dakhin, these constant attacks on Malwa were secretly encouraged by Nizam-ul-mulk. The country was overrun by Baji Rao's officers, Udaji Puar, Malhar Holkar, and Ranuji Sindhia. The fortune of war constantly varied; but whoever might win in the field, destruction to the prosperity of the country was equally the inevitable result.

lished in *J. A. S. B.* 1878). The few other works used by him will be cited by name. The editor has supplied all the additional information from Marathi sources.

The first recorded Mahratta incursion into Malwa was in 1690 (Malcolm's *Central India* i. 61n). In 1698 Udaji Puar looted Mandu but did not make any permanent occupation. That work was due to the enterprise of Balaji Vishwanath. A Marathi letter of 1715 mentions that Dabalji Somvanshi was the first to attempt the conquest of Malwa, though the work was rendered easier by the energy of Baji Rao's assistants Sindhia Holkar and Puar. (Sardesai, ii. 355). [J. Sarkar.]

At length, on 8th Dec. 1728, in the neighbourhood of Ujjain, Girdhar Bahadur was defeated and slain by the Mahratta army led by Chimnaji, brother of Baji Rao, and Udaji Puar.* At the same time fell his relatives Rao Gulab Ram and Rajah Anand Ram. The resistance was carried on for a time by Girdhar Bahadur's nephew, Daya Bahadur. But finally he too was defeated in a battle near Tarla, [4 m. s.w. of Dhar] between Dhar and Amjhara, where he and nearly two thousand of his troops lost their lives. [Siyar, i. 79 ; T-i-M.]

SEC. 80.—HOW THE MAHRATTAS GAINED A PERMANENT FOOTING
IN MALWA.

[Written by the Editor.]

For the history of Malwa between the death of Girdhar Bahadur and the arrival of Muhammad Khan Bangash as the new governor of the province, we have copious information in the Persian letters of Girdhar's sons (*Ajaib-ul-afaq*) and the Marathi and Hindi letters received by Nandalal Mandaloi chaudhuri of Indor, (printed in Sardesai ii. 363-375). Our difficulty is only about some of the dates. Irvine's Persian authorities say that Muhammad Khan reached Ujjain on the 30th January 1731, from which it follows that the battle of Tarla and the death of Daya Bahadur had taken place some months earlier (say, October 1730). But the Marathi letters give the date of the battle as the 21st Rabi II. *Shahur San* 1132, (which corresponds to the 22nd October 1731 new style), and some others represent Daya Bahadur as alive on the 20th October. Muhammad Khan, as all authorities agree,† did not arrive in Malwa before the death of Daya Bahadur. Therefore the Khan's campaigns in Malwa and, in consequence, the Nizam's movements connected with Muhammad Khan's, must be dated one year later than what Irvine states.†

* "Rajah Sahib Girdhar Bahadur was the Malavi-raj of Malwa. In support of the Emperor he fought my brother Chimnaji Apa at Sarangpur." (Letter from Baji Rao.) The Mahratta attack on him here was a surprise and ended in his death. [J. Sarkar.]

† On the other hand, there may be a mistake in the conversion of the *Shahur San* dates above. The Marathi dates, also, cannot be implicitly

It is clear from the letters of Daya Bahadur that Girdhar Bahadur had aimed at turning Malwa into a hereditary kingdom for his family, in imitation of Nizam-ul-mulk and other ambitious provincial governors of the fast dissolving Empire of Dihli and that Daya Bahadur dreamt the same dream. But the task was hopeless on account of their having no ally even among the Hindus. They could hold Malwa only by promising to the Emperor to keep the Mahrattas out. In this work they could not get any Rajput support. The Rajputs, especially Sawai Jai Singh, were allies of the Mahrattas and actually called them into Malwa in order to weaken the detested Mughal power in Northern India. This is the keynote of Malwa history in the early eighteenth century. The local zamindars (mostly Rajputs) naturally tried to take advantage of the disorder by withholding revenue. Daya Bahadur alienated them by attempting a strict collection of the dues of the State, and (as I infer) by giving himself royal airs. These short-sighted local magnates and their tenants sided with the Mahrattas as the best means of evading their legal obligations to the Mughal Empire. There were soon to have King Stork from the south in the place of their old King Log of Dihli.

Nandalal Mandaloi, a *chaudhuri* of Indor under the Mughal administration, on being greatly harassed by the imperial officers, turned towards the Mahrattas, at the advice of Jai Singh. He had very great local influence and "held the hearts of all the chiefs (*sardars*) of Malwa in the clutches of

accepted as correct, because in two of these letters Nandalal's death is put in S.S. 1132, while a third is addressed to him in 1133. In each of these cases the year is given in *words* and we cannot explain the mistake by ascribing it to a natural clerical error in transcribing numeral *figures*. The course of events implies that Daya Bahadur governed Malwa for a longer period than what Irvine's dates would give him (16 months, July 1729—Oct. 1730). My dates, therefore, are :—

8 Dec. 1728. Death of Girdhar Bahadur ; his son Bhawani Ram governs Malwa.

? July 1729. Daya Bahadur succeeds as governor.

22 Oct. 1731. Death of Daya Bahadur at Tarla.

19 Jan. 1732 (*i.e.*, 22nd Rajab, but of 1144). Muhammad Khan reaches Ujjain as governor.

his hand" (as two letters put it). He was the intermediary of all the Mahratta intrigues and movements against the Mughal Government in Malwa. By treacherously leaving the fords of the Narmada (of which he was officially in charge) unguarded, he facilitated Baji Rao's invasion of Malwa. [Mandaloi papers, printed in Sardesai ii. 364-370.]

SEC. 81.—GOVERNMENT OF MALWA BY BHAWANI RAM.

[*By the Editor.*]

On the death of Girdhar Bahadur (8th December 1728), the Emperor wrote in his own hand to his son Bhawani Ram condoling with him and requesting him to defend the province against "the infidels." Bhawani Ram was created a Rajah with the title of Chimna Bahadur, two lakhs of Rupees were granted to him, and Sayyid Najm-ud-din Ali Khan, the Maharana (through Sawai Jai Singh), Durjan Sal and Md. Umar Khan were ordered to march to his aid.

Chimnaji Apa and Udaji Puar, after their great victory at Sarangpur, went about plundering the country round Ujjain. Bhawani Ram hurriedly recruited more men and threw up earth-works round the town. On the 20th December the Mahratta army laid siege to Ujjain and daily fights took place. Bhawani Ram's difficulties were aggravated by his lack of money. He owed a large sum to the troops of Girdhar Bahadur who had raised nearly 8,000 men in addition to the regular contingent of his office and also artillery. The men in arrears were ready to break out into mutiny, and the news of this crisis tempted the Mahrattas to prolong their stay in his neighbourhood. On the 23rd January 1729, when the siege of Ujjain had lasted 35 days, Bhawani Ram made a sally. There was a fight at close quarters with losses on both sides, after which the Mahrattas retreated.

Months passed away, but no money nor the promised reinforcement from the Court reached Bhawani Ram. He owed 5 lakhs of Rupees to his troops. The Mahrattas, after trying to take Sarangpur, went on towards Sironj where Najm-ud-din Ali was resting, having entrenched himself and placed obstacles round the town.

New difficulties now arose. Najm-ud-din Ali Khan wrote to announce that he had been appointed to the governorship of the province and that the revenue collected was to be held in trust until his arrival. He also wrote for the miscellaneous revenue (cesses) to be collected and sent to him. The Court wrote to the Khan to desist from such acts and to return to his own faujdari of Dhamuni. When Najm-ud-din Ali reached Kaliyada, 3 miles from Ujjain, he began to raise all sorts of trouble. (April 1729). The Court's orders were shown to him, but he went on as before. Finding persuasion useless, Bhawani Ram had no course open but to resist force by force. He brought his tents out of Ujjain and encamped opposite Najm-ud-din. From morn to night the men on both sides stood armed and ready. Durjan Sal and Umar Khan, failing to persuade Najm-ud-din to refrain, finally left him. The strong attitude of Bhawani Ram, however, had the desired effect, and the baffled Sayyid at last marched away.

Meantime, the rumour of Bhawani Ram's supersession had thrown his affairs into confusion. The zamindars refused to pay the revenue. His soldiers mutinied and demanded their arrears; in concert with the neighbouring zamindars and men from the city of Ujjain, they surrounded Bhawani Ram at Kaliyada, but he fought and put them to flight.

Next year (1729—1730) his troubles were renewed. Kanthaji (about June 1729) had invested Khargun [south of the Narmada, 25 m.s. of Mandleshwar] for four days and levied a blackmail of Rs. 50,000, and had then crossed the Narmada [at Barwana] into Malwa and was raiding the country round Dhar,—while Malhar and Udaji had assembled their troops and were waiting at Chikalda for the arrival of Baji Rao and other leaders from Burhanpur. This year the Mahrattas took up their quarters for the rainy season within the province of Malwa. But Jai Singh had not yet moved out of his capital Amber, and his general Zorawar Singh (then at Rampura) had sent to Ujjain only 700 horsemen as aid. Bhawani Ram had by this time exhausted his money and his credit and had no means to pay new recruits.

The Emperor assured him that Rao Ram Chand (of Kota?)

and Rajah Udwat Singh of Orchha had been ordered to go to his aid, while Jai Singh was on the march with 30,000 men. Meantime, a second Mahratta force of 5,000 (under Udaji) had burst into Malwa and was plundering Dhar Dharampur and Malori in the Mandu district. Finally a letter came from the Emperor informing Bhawani Ram that the governorship of Malwa had been made over to Jai Singh, under whom he was to serve. [*Ajaib-ul-afaq*, B.M. Or. 1776, ff. 11b, 74b—78b, 80b—86a, and Nos. 195, 197, 180, 189.]

SEC. 81.—GOVERNMENT OF MALWA BY DAYA BAHADUR.

[*By the Editor.*]

This seems to have happened in June or July 1729. But Jai Singh evidently did not assume the viceroyalty, as we find Daya Bahadur, a son of Girdhar Bahadur's father's brother Chabela Ram, in charge of the government of the province for some years before his death at the same post in October 1731. The new governor, Daya Bahadur, who probably replaced his young nephew Bhawani Ram* in July or August 1729, set about his duty with great vigour. His energetic administration and strict collection of revenue were resented by the insubordinate local chiefs. But his greatest enemy was the chaudhuri Nandalal Mandaloi. We have several letters in which he tries to flatter and tempt Nandalal into giving him his support. This chaudhuri was courted by the Mahrattas in equally flattering terms. Jai Singh's influence kept him on the side of the Mahrattas and he did not even reply to Daya Bahadur's pathetic letter of appeal. In March 1730, the governor, learning that Nandalal was raising a force of 50,000 men, invited him to a conference at Ujjain or, as an alternative, offered to visit him at Indor, in order to hear his grievances and settle terms of alliance with him. But still the chaudhuri did not respond to the invitation, nor to another letter written in April 1731.

*As Daya Bahadur wrote to Nandalal on 25th January 1730: "In *Malavi Sal* 1132 (?) Rajah Girdhar Bahadur was slain by the Mahratta sardars at Sarangpur. Then, to take revenge on them, I had gone to Dihli, petitioned the Emperor, and come back with the charge of the province." (Hindi letter, printed in Sardesai, ii. 364.)

In June 1731 Baji Rao was at Burhanpur and wrote promising aid to Nandalal. Mahratta contingents were posted at Nalcha and Mandu, while the local "zamindars and tenants, having grown discontented on account of Daya Bahadur's oppression," had appealed to the Peshwa. From Nimar 5,000 men, peasants and revenue collectors, had come to strengthen Nandalal's forces.

The gathering storm burst on the head of the unhappy governor in October of that year. He had run three mines under the Mandu pass (*ghat*) and kept there 25,000 men ready to oppose the invaders coming from the south. The Mahrattas, learning of his preparations from the treacherous Nandalal, avoided the trap, and entered the province by another route, the Bhairo ghat. The mines, however, were fired, probably by accident, and many on the Mughal side, including Nandalal's kinsmen ('brothers, sons, and sardars') were blown up and perished.*

This took place on the 19th October. Three days later Daya Bahadur himself was attacked at Tarla, 4 miles west of Dhar, defeated and slain. As Baji Rao writes, "A great victory was gained. Rao Sahib [Nandalal Mandaloi], Thakur Narhar-das and Mayaram the *wakil* rendered hearty assistance."

Jai Singh congratulated Nandalal warmly on this result: "You have defended our religion in Malwa and crushed the Musalmans, establishing *Dharma*. You have fulfilled my desire."

The Emperor was highly displeased when these facts were reported to him. He wrote to Jai Singh blaming Nandalal for "having called in the Mahrattas—Malhar Holkar and Ranuji Sindhia—by sending *wakils* to them, and established them in

* As Daya Bahadur wrote angrily to Nandalal, "What is your policy? To save the Mahrattas, give your brothers, sons and sardars up to slaughter and put the kingdom in the enemy's possession? What is this that you are doing? Have you lost your senses?...Take counsel with your chiefs and do not give your own country of Malwa up to another...But if you invite the enemy and give such advice to Jai Singh, you will gain nothing. Know that in the future these Mahrattas will not remember this day." (Sardesai, ii. 367). *Bharo-pura* is 3 m.n.e. of Mandu, on the northward road from the Narmada.

Malwa with his full support, after giving up to death thousands of men—his own brothers, sons and chiefs.” He also accused Jai Singh of having instigated this treasonable surrender of the province, and then proceeded, “Never mind. Revenge will be taken for it. The Mahrattas came to Malwa on three other occasions but fled beaten. So this time, too, they will meet with similar chastisement and be expelled. Take care! The date has been fixed for the starting of the expedition from here.”

Evidently to carry out this policy, Muhammad Khan Bangash was sent to Malwa.

SEC. 82.—MUHAMMAD KHAN BANGASH'S CAMPAIGNS IN
MALWA, FIRST YEAR.

When Muhammad Khan Bangash reached Dihli in the end of 1729, on his return from Bundelkhand, the vacancy in Malwa caused by the death of Girdhar Bahadur was still unfilled. Muhammad Khan did his best to retain his place at Allahabad, a province of which the greater part was productive and easily held. Unsuccessful in these efforts he applied for the onerous charge of Malwa, for which under the existing conditions there was little or no competition. [J. A. S. B. 305.]

His appointment to Malwa, for which the rescript was dated the 17th Rabi I. of the 12th year (1143 H.=29th Sept. 1730), was obtained through Zafar Khan Roshan-ud-daulah Panipati aided by the reigning favourite Rahim-un-nissa known as Koki Jiu (Madam Foster-sister), to both of whom heavy bribes were paid. There was much discussion, as usual in Muhammad Khan's affairs, about revenue assignments and money grants. Very little money could be obtained. On the 5th November 1730 Muhammad Khan had reached Agra, where some guns were obtained from the arsenal. His force numbered some 8,200 horse and 2,500 foot. At length Agra was left on the 16th Nov. 1730 and the camp pitched at Jajau, eighteen miles south of the city. Proceeding by way of Dholpur, the Chambal was crossed and Gwaliyar reached a few days afterwards. Here a halt was made. [*Id*; *Aziz-ul-qulub* 40b.]

As letters urging haste came from Khan Dauran, three commanders were sent on by forced marches to Sironj,

Mandleshwar and Sarangpur. In December 1730 Muhammad Khan himself had reached Sadhaura, 172 miles north of Ujjain, and here he received a letter from Nizam-ul-mulk proposing a conference on the banks of the Narmada. On the 25th January 1731 the army was at Sarangpur, fifty-two miles north-east of Ujjain. Holkar, who was at Shahjahanpur, sixteen miles off [to the south-west], hearing of its approach sent his heavy baggage back across the Narmada. As the Muhammadans were entering camp at Sarangpur, the Mahrattas fell on them, but soon fled "like crows on seeing a bow." On the 27th January the Muhammadans relieved Shahjahanpur. Ujjain the capital of the province was occupied on the 30th. [J. A. S. B. 308.]

On the 18th February Muhammad Khan again took the field, and went towards Dhar fifty miles to the south-west of Ujjain, while another force under Ahmad Khan the Nawab's second son was sent to deal with Holkar in the direction of Sarangpur and Shahjahanpur. Muhammad Khan himself reached Dhar on the 24th February 1731. The Mahrattas appeared five days afterwards and some skirmishing took place. Next day Holkar arrived. Yar Muhammad Khan of Bhupal, turning traitor to those of his own creed, had persuaded the Mahrattas to attack Ujjain. Muqim Khan the officer in charge beat off the Mahrattas who then went in pursuit of Muhammad Khan. The fighting round Dhar went on for nearly ten days to the end of Shaban (8th March 1731). As the result of this first year's campaign the Mahrattas were expelled from Ujjain, Mandleshwar, Dhar and Dipalpur, while their new forts on the Narmada had been levelled. [*Id.* 310.]

Having heard that Nizam-ul-mulk was on his way from Burhanpur, Muhammad Khan on the 8th March, 1731 set out for the Narmada. Successive letters had informed him that Nizam-ul-mulk had on the 30th Dec. 1730 crossed the pass of Fardapur and gone into Baglana and on the 28th Jan. 1731 had arrived at Galna. In these letters Nizam-ul-mulk exposes his plan. Pilaji Gaekwar and Udaji Puar had quarrels of their own with Baji Rao Peshwa and were willing to enter into a compact with the Muhammadans. To obtain Muhammad

Khan's accession to this alliance was apparently the object of Nizam-ul-mulk's journey. As he put it to the Nawab "Union is strength." From Dhamangaon he wrote on 8th February that he hoped soon to be at the Narmada. However, he did make a start from Burhanpur on the 24th Feb. The meeting between the two nobles at length took place near the Akbarpur ferry on the Narmada early in April. [*Id.* 311.]

According to prevalent rumour Muhammad Khan Bangash when accepting the Government of Malwa had secretly bound himself to lead a campaign against Nizam-ul-mulk as soon as the Mahrattas had been sufficiently dealt with. At any rate this belief was held throughout Nizam-ul-mulk's own army: and they became quite certain of the fact when their commander suddenly marched to the Narmada. To their astonishment, instead of the fighting to which they had looked forward, peaceful negotiations began. For twelve days the two nobles interviewed each other. We do not know any details of what took place between them, but there can be little doubt that they had agreed to act in concert. Muhammad Khan finally left Akbarpur on the 8th April. [*Id.* 313, *Ahwal* 199-200.]

No very long time had elapsed before the whole of Nizam-ul-mulk's scheme fell to pieces. Hearing of the coalition against him, headed on the Mahratta side by his rival Trimbak Rao Dhabariya the senapati, Baji Rao hastened northwards to Gujarat. On the 11th April 1731, between Dhaboi and Baroda* he came up with the confederates and attacked

* The battle took place at Bhilapur, 11 m. s.^{e.} of Baroda. We have two accounts of it from Marathi sources. "Trimbak Rao Dabhare had been opposed to Baji Rao from the first. When the *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi* of Gujarat were given to Baji Rao, Dabhare began to recruit men, created a split among the Maratha leaders and began to act against Baji Rao. Expecting that he would get the help of the Nizam, he assembled 35,000 men, and determined to march into the Dakhin, saying openly to his men: 'Baji Rao has seized the kingdom of our master, I am going to free him'." [*Peshwa Shākavali*]. Baji Rao writes, "Trimbak Rao Dabhare, Udaji Anand Rao Puar, Kanthaji Raghujī Kadam Bande, Pilaji Gaekwad, and Chimnaji Dada [=Damodar], with 30,000 men came to fight me. The battle took place on the 4th Shawwal.....five *kos* from Dabhoi. Trimbak and Zavaji Dabhare, Maloji Puar, Pilaji Gaekwad's son [Sambhuji], in all 14 chiefs

immediately. Trimbak Rao was killed with one son of Pilaji and some other leaders. Udaji Puar and Chimnaji Damodar were taken prisoner. Pilaji and other leading men were wounded but escaped. With the news of this disastrous affair came word that Baji Rao had immediately turned back, had recrossed the Narmada, and was marching for Surat and the south. Nizam-ul-mulk trembled for the safety of his capital Aurangabad. Forthwith he began forced marches westwards and seems to have fought one action with Baji Rao somewhere in the neighbourhood of Daman. But by the end of August the two sides had arranged their differences and Baji Rao returned to Satara. By a secret compact Nizam-ul-mulk was left undisturbed in the Dakhin on condition that Baji Rao might pursue undisturbed his designs against the northern part of the Mughal Empire. [J. A. S. B. 313, *Khujista-kalam* for the letter.]

For the rest of the open season before the coming in of the rains of 1731, Muhammad Khan was employed in reducing forts and repelling desultory incursions by the Mahrattas. Two forts Kalkli and Chikalda, belonging to Udaji Puar on the right bank of the Narmada, were occupied on the 10th April. Some Bhil forts were then taken. From these operations he was called away to meet Malhar Holkar who was plundering

were killed, Udaji Puar and Chimnaji were captured, Anand Rao Puar [Jaswant Rao], Pilaji Gaekwad and Kumār Bahadur [Kumar Baba Puar] fled wounded. Bande fled. Their army was plundered. On our side Narayan Dhandhere was slain." The family chronicle of the Dabhare tells us: "Baji Rao seduced Dabhare's officers and induced the men to desert to him under various pretexts.....With only 5,000 men Trimbak Rao stood up for battle, Baji Rao hemmed him round. From dawn to the third quarter of the day Trimbak fought valiantly, slew many men on the Peshwa's side and drove the latter one *kos* back. Thinking that he had won the battle, he began to play his band. Then Trimbak's step-mother's brother, Bhao Singh Toke, secretly corrupted by the Peshwa, ordered his *bargirs* to fire. Trimbak was shot through the temple and fell dead on his elephant in the evening. His brother Jaswant Dabhare arrived at 9 P.M., cremated his body, and then pursued Baji Rao to Satara,.....where the Peshwa hid himself in the women's rooms in the palace" (Sardesai, ii. 250-256). [J. S.]

near Mandleshwar. Before the Nawab could come up with him Malhar had made off into Jaipur territory. Other Mahrattas crossed the Narmada and after plundering the country near Mandu retreated to their homes. Antu was plundering round Shahjahanpur. On the 19th May 1731 the governor reached his capital Ujjain, and after a week's rest started against Antu. On the 13th June as the Nawab approached Kauth,* Antu withdrew. [*J. A. S. B.* 314-315.]

The next day an express came from the officer commanding at Sarangpur that he would be overwhelmed by Holkar unless immediately reinforced. At midnight Muhammad Khan started and reached Sarangpur, nineteen miles to the north, a little after sunrise. Before they had come off the line of march they were set upon by Holkar Antu and others. All day the fighting went on. Near sunset the Mahrattas took to flight, and the Muhammadans were out until midnight pursuing the fugitives and plundering their camp. Muhammad Khan now tried to collect some revenue and went to Sironj, 136 miles north-east of Ujjain. He preferred apparently to make his head-quarters at Sironj, as being nearer his line of retreat on Hindustan. Here he seems to have passed the rainy season of 1731. No money could be collected and Muhammad Khan spent his time in urgent appeals to the Court for assistance. [*J. A. S. B.* 317.]

SEC. 83.—MUHAMMAD KHAN IN MALWA: SECOND YEAR'S
CAMPAIGNS.

About the commencement of his second year in Malwa (October 1731) Muhammad Khan opened a campaign to the north of Sironj. Several forts were reduced and finally Shahabad,† the residence of Rajah Chhattar Singh Narwari, was invested. Terms had nearly been agreed on with him when news came of a fresh invasion by Baji Rao. The Rajah absconded; and the governor had no alternative but to return to Sironj and face the new danger. [*Id.* 320.]

* Kauth, 19 m. s. of Sarangpur. (*Ind. At.* 53 N. W.)

† Shahabad, 55 m. s. w. of Narwar and 84 m. n. w. of Sironj.

As affairs had been arranged in Gujarat, there was no danger to the Mahrattas from that direction, they turned with their full force upon Malwa. It was reckoned that they had now one hundred thousand horse in the province. Fath Singh and others were posted with thirty thousand horse at Khimlasa, 42 miles east of Sironj; Chimnaji (Baji Rao's brother) Malhar and others with an equal number were in Umatwara,* between the Kali Sind and Parbati rivers; twelve thousand were still south of the Narmada; another twelve thousand were coming up by way of Sagar. Directly the Mahrattas were announced the zamindars flocked to them to pay the *khandani* or black-mail that they habitually levied. Having thus secured themselves these Rajahs went home and stirred not hand or foot to aid the Muhammadans. Muhammad Khan's attempt to open negotiations direct with Rajah Sahu at Puna was unfruitful. He was referred to Baji Rao, Pandit Pardhan, "who was his sole and only adviser in all matters". [*Id.* 321.]

On reaching Sironj Muhammad Khan's first impulse was to deliver an immediate attack on the enemy at Khimlasa. But before starting he learnt that Malhar with fifty thousand men was already within fifteen or sixteen miles of Sironj. Other twenty thousand men were scattered about to the south and west. It was obvious that if Muhammad Khan moved to Khimlasa it would take him at least fifteen days to defeat and pursue the enemy. While he was absent Sironj Bhilsa and other towns would be plundered. In fact the game was up and he was checkmated. He sent for the Mahratta leaders, gave them presents and entered into agreements with them. The Mahrattas then evacuated the province for the time being. [*Id.* 322.]

The rainy season of 1732 was passed at Sironj, this leisure season being employed in repeated applications to Dihli for help. Muhammad Khan's resources were exhausted, his jagirs were in the hands of the Bundelas. If his reports were thought

* *Umatwara*.—The only place with a name approaching this word in the position indicated is *Antah*, 28 m. due east of Kota (*Ind. Atlas*, 51 S. W.) [J. S.]

long-winded and exaggerated, let them send someone else who can abbreviate their lengthiness. He would willingly serve under the new man. If things went on much longer as they were, the Mahrattas would overrun Hindustan ; why not resist their encroachments now. Had not Shaikh Sadi written "You may stop with a needle the source of a stream which when full you cannot ford upon an elephant?" [Id. 323.]

No help came. The local chiefs were told that a new governor was about to be appointed. Nizam-ul-mulk, although appealed to, made no sign. The only answer from Court was an upbraiding letter from Samsam-ud-daulah. Soon a rescript in the Emperor's own handwriting reached Muhammad Khan informing him that Rajah Jai Singh Sawai had been appointed his successor. He was directed to report himself at Agra, to which place the Emperor said he intended to proceed. Muhammad Khan after making over the town to his successor's officers left the province and reached Agra on the 16th December 1732. [Id.]

Apart from difficulties about money and the general non-success of his arms, three causes appear to have led to Muhammad Khan's disgrace ; first, the complaints of the jagir-holders in Malwa, persons who were influential in the palace ; secondly, the attack on Chhattar Singh of Narwar, who was the protégé of the eunuch Hafiz Khidmatgar Khan and others ; thirdly, the friendship which had sprung up between the governor and Nizam-ul-mulk. Perhaps the last of these was the greatest offence, for at that time Nizam-ul-mulk's acts were most jealously watched by the clique in power at Dihli. The subsequent rapid advance of the Mahrattas shows that they were already too strong for resistance by one provincial governor, and it is clear that with inferior means Muhammad Khan did as much if not more than all the forces of the Empire led by the Wazir and the Amir-ul-umara were able to accomplish. [Id. 324, Rustam Ali 261a].

Jai Singh's rule in Malwa was both short and inglorious. In 1148 H. (1735-6) after two years' struggle the Mahrattas expelled him from the province, and at once advanced to Gwalियar and beyond it. No effectual resistance was made, and Samsam-

ud-daulah, the directing spirit at Dihli, and his bosom-friend Jai Singh thought it the highest wisdom to propitiate the invader.* On the 16th July 1736 a meeting took place at Dholpur. Accompanied by Ranuji Sindhia, Malhar Holkar, Jaswant Rao Puar and others, Baji Rao visited Rajah Jai Singh. An agreement under seal was executed by which the Mahrattas bound themselves not to pillage the imperial territories in the future. In exchange Baji Rao received the appointment of *deputy* governor of Malwa from Rajah Jai Singh. Appearances were thus saved ; but no good result followed. As we shall soon see the Mahrattas in no way refrained from their depredations. Compromise they ever treated as a sign of weakness, and concession as an incentive to fresh demands. [J. A. S. B. 327.]

* Malwa was thus divided : "Sindhia Holkar and Jaswant Rao Puar settled that they should divide the territory which had fallen to their king, maintain forces and work in concert. 31 per cent. of the income was to go to the Government [of Rajah Sahu], 30 p. c. to each of Sindhia and Holkar, and 9 p. c. to Puar. This was approved by Baji Rao. The rates were subsequently modified and finally the respective proportions were as follows,—45 p. c. to the king, 22½ p. c. to Sindhia and Holkar each, and 10 p. c. to Puar." (Sardesai, ii. 375-376). [J. S.]

CHAPTER X

MUHAMMAD SHAH: COURT AFFAIRS 1721-1733 AND MAHRATTAS IN NORTHERN INDIA 1732-1738.

SEC. 84.—THE DELHI SHOE-SELLERS' RIOT.

The shoe-sellers' riot in the eleventh year of the reign occupies a considerable space in all the histories of the time ; and, besides its value as a picture of the turbulence of the capital, it is important as conducing to the downfall of the group of palace favourites whose influence was all powerful on the Emperor's mind throughout the first twelve or thirteen years of his reign.

By the common usage of the lower order of Muhammadans, the first half of the month Shaban is devoted to festivities, among the chief of which are the illumination of lamps and the discharge of fireworks in the streets. In the evening of the 8th of the month (8th March 1729) one Subhkaran, a jeweller belonging to the imperial establishments, was on his way home from the house of the eunuch, Hafiz Khidmatgar Khan, curator of the Jewel House. The man had been for many years protected by the all-powerful Roshan-ud-daulah Panipati, by whose aid he had obtained an imperial rank (*mansab*), and had received an important office on the Lord Chamberlain's establishment.*

His way home, for he lived behind the Jauhari-bazar, took Subhkaran past the shoe-sellers' shops in the square or *chawk* of Sadullah Khan, situated to the south of the palace. These men were all Panjabis, and their shops, which were very large and numerous, lined both sides of the road. All were bigoted Muhammadans, strict in their prayers ; their elders were men of dignity, well dressed and long bearded, many knowing their

* Ashob 56a-64b (basis of this narrative); *Bayan-i-waqai* 497-507; Warid 26-32 and 37.

Quran by heart and able to expound it. As the munshi's palki approached, both Hindus and Muhammadans were busy letting off squibs in the street, in the way usual at that season. One of these squibs fell into the palki and burnt a hole in the munshi's darbar clothes: the servants running at his side remonstrated and after words the two parties came to blows. The retinue were armed while the shoe-makers had only their rasps; but the latter being the more numerous seized one of the sepoys and took from him his sword and shield. Subhkaran in an angry mood made his way home and at once ordered the man who had been disarmed to return and punish his assailants.

After nightfall the man, accompanied by a crowd of his friends, went back to the shoe-sellers' quarter and caught a stripling who was beaten till he almost died. Hearing the cries, one of the elders known as Haji Hafiz, rose from his cot and ran barefooted to the boy's assistance. In rescuing the boy the Haji himself received a sword cut and fell down dead. The assailants leaving the body where it fell made off home. At dawn the shoe-sellers, and after them the whole city, gathered round the body and swore that until the murderer and his employer were killed, the body should lie there unburied. All the lower class Muhammadans joined themselves to the shoe-sellers. The body was placed on a cot, and in the greatest excitement shouting *Din Din* they carried it off and laid it before the door of Subhkaran.

During the night Subhkaran had sought refuge in the mansion of Sher Afkan Khan Panipati, then Lord Chamberlain (*Khan-saman*) and therefore his official superior. Subhkaran as already said was a protégé of Zafar Khan Roshan-ud-daulah, also from Panipat. Roshan-ud-daulah was connected by marriage with Sher Afkan Khan, and the two men for this reason and their being natives of the same town were the closest of friends. Sher Afkan Khan was the younger brother of another very influential noble, Lutf-ullah Khan Sadiq. For these two reasons (1) that the fugitive was his official subordinate and (2) was the protégé of his bosom friend, Sher Afkan Khan refused to give the man up to the mob; in fact, stoutly denied that the man was in his house. Leaving the body at the

munshi's door, the crowd went away to make complaint before the palace.

At the time of their arrival there, Muhammad Shah was on his way back with his mother Qudsiya Begam from a visit to the garden known as Jafar Khan's. He was greeted with cries of "The Faith", "The Faith", and "Justice!" "Justice!" and the men were allowed to tell their story. An order was given to Qamar-ud-din Khan the Wazir, who also held the office of superintendent of the audience chamber, to send a palace attendant to arrest the accused wherever he might be found. Sher Afkan Khan, the man's protector, refused absolutely to comply with the order. And thus the Thursday passed.

From early dawn on the Friday (11th Shaban 1141 H.= 11th March 1729) the shoe-sellers traversed the city calling upon every Muhammadan to join in their protest in defence of the Faith and its followers. The point of assembly fixed upon was the Great Mosque; and by the time of the midday prayer its spacious court was thronged. They so crowded on the praying space and the pulpit that the service was interrupted, while the noise and confusion increased every moment. The most demonstrative groups were those led by the Arabs, Abyssinians, and Constantinople Turks in the service of Rumi Khan and the dependents of Sayyid Arab Ali Khan the Baghdadi, most of whom had been employed in the imperial artillery from the time of Haidar Quli Khan, formerly *Mir Atash* or Master of the Ordnance. These men although unarmed acted as leaders. They pressed in a circle round the pulpit, the kneeling worshippers had no room to rise to their feet when required by the ritual, the officiant was prevented by rough usage from pronouncing the bidding to prayer, blows and curses were showered on the *Qazi* and the expounder of the law, accused of supporting the unbeliever. Swords were not drawn, no blood was shed; but the *Qazi* and his son were buffeted and kicked till they were nearly dead, and the expounder and the reciter were dragged off the pulpit, thrown on the ground, and thoroughly thumped till they nearly fainted.

Reports of the outbreak reached the palace and by order of the Emperor the Wazir and Roshan-ud-daulah went with

their troops to allay the disturbance, restore order and cause the prayer to be completed. The Wazir was the first to reach the spot and he entered the mosque with his followers by the northern gateway. He lavished promises of help to the Muhammadan cause and by his smooth talk abated for the time the vigour of the assault on the Qazi and his subordinates. But the accession of such a great noble, as it seemed to them, only made the mob more resolute in the pursuit of their vengeance. Unfortunately Roshan-ud-daulah now appeared with his following at the eastern gate, the entrance used by the Emperor. His retinue was made up of ignorant Afghans, puffed up with notions of their valour, men from Khurja, Sikandra, and other parganas round Dihli; and leaders from Shahjahanpur, Mau-Shamsabad and Farrukhabad (the "Indian Afghanistan"), with a few men from the towns about Thanesar in Sarhind. From another direction, the southern side, came up Sher Afkan Khan, who had been trying to make the heirs of the murdered man accept the price of blood. Now, hearing that the Wazir and Roshan-ud-daulah had come, he too had turned out from his house with the whole of his armed train of Hindustanis at his heels.

With the idea of preventing more men crowding into the mosque, Roshan-ud-daulah ordered his Afghans to close the gates. The sight of Roshan-ud-daulah and Sher Afkan Khan once more roused the mob to fury. With cries of "The Faith, the Faith" and "Strike the infidels on the face", they brought forth their only weapons, the iron-heeled shoes that they had hid under their arm-pits and the stones and brickbats they had collected in the long skirts of their coats. These they hurled at the two nobles with loud curses and foul abuse. On Sher Afkan Khan fell the first brunt of this attack; and his "dignity was subjected to the indignity" of being struck by these shoes and other missiles. Some fell on his turban; others passed him and struck the plumes of Roshan-ud-daulah's gold-brocade head-dress. The rioters then attacked the Afghans who were standing in rows behind their masters. All this time the Wazir held aloof near the pulpit, a mere onlooker.

At last, alarmed at the danger to the two nobles, and

angered at seeing the bruised and bleeding faces of their own captains, the Afghans lost all patience and set upon the attacking party, sword in hand and shield on arm. The bazar men would have soon got the worst of it. But the artillery who had taken up their cause now fell on, armed with fusils and European pistols. Joined with them was a body of unruly Mughals from the quarter of Mughalpura. One of the Habshis fired from near the pulpit at the two nobles. Thereupon the Afghans wild with excitement rushed forward ; and the ranks of both sides were inextricably intermingled. The Afghans were far more numerous than the artillery men while the shoe-sellers were unarmed. Up to this point the Mughals round the Wazir had hardly been able to restrain themselves ; but now, as the day was going against their fellow countrymen, they disregarded all the Wazir's orders. Seizing their weapons they took part in the fray.

The other Mughal troops were drawn up mounted in the streets outside the masjid waiting to escort the Wazir on his return. Excited at what was taking place these men rode up the flight of steps leading to the gates, dispersed the Afghans guarding them, burst them open, and with one shout dismounting ran at full speed into the masjid. Following them came the Wazir's elephant and the camels bearing his wall-pieces and rockets. Many of the rioters lost their lives. After holding out as long as they were able and seeing many of their leaders and comrades fall, the Afghans began to yield ground. Sher Afkan Khan received a cut on his right wrist and his sword fell from his grip. Some of his followers were killed and others wounded ; the rest sought safety in flight and made for the south doorway. All this time other Afghans had stood round Roshan-ud-daulah like a living shield. When Sher Afkan Khan retreated they forced Roshan-ud-daulah to follow. His bulk and corpulence rendered him incapable of nimble movement, they lifted him on their shoulders fighting as they went. Exhausted and breathless they reached the gate.

Issuing from the mosque they fled to the mansion of Dil-diler Khan, the elder brother of Sher Afkan Khan, distant only a few paces. When the Afghans inside learnt that the two nobles

had reached a place of safety they, too, left the mosque and sought the same refuge. The rioters, disregarding Qamar-uddin Khan the Wazir's orders, wished to follow and continue the fight, and surrounding Dil-diler Khan's house burn and destroy it, seize their prey and wreak vengeance. In the end they were persuaded to desist. A number of nobles in the train of Roshan-ud-daulah who had no taste for fighting hid themselves in the corners and arches and turrets of the mosque. Driven from these refuges by the bullets that were flying about, they clambered over the arches adjoining the bazar and let themselves down into the street below as best they could. One great man Azam Khan in thus escaping met with a ridiculous adventure. Below the place where he climbed over was a thatched shop full of earthenware pots. In spite of the strength of the thatch his legs went through and he was caught in the beams and bamboo supports. The shop-keeper, angry at the damage done and the danger to his wares, seized a bamboo and belaboured Azam Khan's feet so that they became all swollen and broken, and for many days he was unable to stand.

As the result of the day's doings the Wazir, without having moved hand or foot, became a popular hero as the defender of Islam against the unbeliever. Muhammad Shah was also delighted that the trouble of a decision had been taken off his shoulders. Removing the turban from his head, the Emperor gave it to an eunuch to carry to the Wazir as a present—with orders for his immediate attendance. Leaving men to clear the mosque of the rioters and posting strong guards at the doors, after he had said the Asar prayer in the screens at the Holy Footprints and had given thanks to God and presents to the guardians of the shrine, the Wazir returned with the eunuch to the audience-hall and reported to the Emperor. Samsam-ud-daulah First Bakhshi had remained on duty at the palace all day. Both nobles after presentation of gifts now took their leave, and the Emperor retired into the palace. The murdered shoe-seller was buried that night on the site of the munshi's house which was demolished by the crowd; in the end a mosque was erected over the grave. For many a year

this affair formed the subject of poems, both in Persian and in Hindi.

SEC. 85.—COURT PARTIES AND COURT FAVOURITES (1721-1733)

Throughout his reign Muhammad Shah was influenced by private favourites, most of them women and eunuchs, whom his weakness encouraged to interfere in public affairs. As one writer [Ashob, 11a] says, the nobles of this time delighted in nothing but childish stories such as that of Hamza the Arab, who fought in seventy-two battles although he had become a martyr in the first of them—or the rubbish of the *Shahnama* and the *Mahabharat*: and to them these lines applied

Birds of a feather flock together,
Children are fond of childish things ;
A crow goes gladly to roost with other crows,
How could he prefer the nightingale's song?

As we have already seen, these intriguers coalescing with Nizam-ul-mulk's public rivals had been able to render his tenure of the post of chief minister so intolerable that he had abandoned the field to them and retired to the Dakhin. During the first half of the reign the most conspicuous and the most influential of these favourites was the woman Rahim-un-nissa, known familiarly as *Koki Jiu* (Madam Foster-sister), with her acolytes Hafiz Khidmatgar Khan, a palace eunuch, Roshan-ud-daulah Zafar Khan of Panipat, known usually by the nickname of *Turra-i-baz* (Falcon's Crest), and the holy man Shah Abdul-ghaffur. During the same period the baneful influence of Khan Dauran Samsam-ud-daulah the Amir-ul-umara was equally paramount. The Wazir was an indolent man of intemperate habits ; while Muhammad Shah's only share in the government was, as one writer says, "to sit on the throne and wear the crown." [K. K. 940, Warid 44.]

KOKI JIU.

This clever and capable woman, Rahim-un-nissa by name, was the daughter of Jan Muhammad, geomancer (*rammal*), originally a thatcher in Old Dihli. He became a Muhammadan in his childhood, obtained some education in the schools of his

quarter, and having acquired a knowledge of geomancy gained his living through telling fortunes by that method of divination. His six children, four sons and two daughters, were sent to school and all obtained some proficiency in letters. But the eldest girl Rahim-un-nissa was the most intelligent and excelled her brothers in handwriting and composition. She visited the mansions of the nobility as her father's messenger and thus acquired most polished manners. By degrees the fame of her father increased until he was consulted by the ladies in the harems of the royal Princes dwelling in the palace-prison of Salimgarh. Like all eastern women they had the liveliest faith in omens and the casting of dice, whether proved by the event to be true or false. One of the chief palace-friends of Rahim-un-nissa was Nawab Qudsiya, the mother of Roshan Akhtar (afterwards Muhammad Shah). During the illness of one of her children Jan Muhammad's prophecy of a recovery was fulfilled; from this time the Begam became a devout believer in him and his powers. Among other things Jan Muhammad, after consulting his dots and lines, had announced that Roshan Akhtar would soon ascend the throne. After this the Princess could not bear Rahim-un-nissa to be out of her sight. The door-keepers, however, interfered with the woman's free access and a thousand wiles and entreaties were necessary before she was admitted. To overcome these obstacles it was given out that Rahim-un-nissa had been suckled by the same nurse as Roshan Akhtar, and that while still unweaned the Prince had become very fond of her. From this time forth, she became known as Koka or Koki Jiu, that is, Madam Foster-sister. She was employed to write letters and to act as intermediary between the Begam and her friends outside, a service she performed skilfully without detection. [K. K. 940, *Siyar* 75, Ashob 45b, Warid 44, Khush-hal 1042.]

During the first two years of Muhammad Shah the Sayyid Wazir and his brother were all powerful and the Emperor a mere cypher. But after their disappearance and the sudden death of Muhammad Amin Khan, Muhammad Shah obtained a certain amount of liberty in State affairs, and in the exercise of this power Koki Jiu's voice was predominant. It is doubtful

whether she became the Emperor's concubine ; more probably she was not. Her power came from a belief in her or her father's power to read futurity and prescribe the course leading to success and fortune. The Emperor himself, a youth of eighteen when he came to the throne, was occupied in frivolous pursuits, and to the neglecting of all public business, spent his time in idle talk and jesting with Amir Khan Umdat-ul-mulk and others of the same character. One day Muhammad Shah is reported to have said that if she were a man he would make her Wazir. A disrespectful courtier suggested that Roshan-ud-daulah's beard should be cut off and stuck on her face.* It is said that during the period of her power Koki Jiu held possession of the imperial seals and was permitted to impress them on documents on the Emperor's behalf. In the opposition to Nizam-ul-mulk during his ministry, Koki played a leading part, provoking the Wazir to compose a satirical quatrain, of which the last line was "To-day a filthy woman is in the place of Alamgir." [Bayan, 530.] A specific instance of the court paid to her is found in a statement made by Muhammad Khan Bangash that on his appointment to the Government of Malwa he paid or promised her one lakh of Rupees (£10,000). There can be little doubt that a considerable portion of these *douceurs* surreptitiously found its way into the pocket of the Emperor. He was not wise enough to see that for a little immediate profit he was ruining the State. [J. A. S. B. p. 306 ; Ashob 45b.]

HAFIZ KHIDMATGAR KHAN.

One of the triumvirate who acted as Koki Jiu's agents was the eunuch Hafiz Khidmatgar Khan. Under the name of Khwaja Ambar he had been from childhood in the service of Alamgir by whom he was educated. His training by Alamgir had produced in him an appearance of ability which he did not actually possess. He was like 'gilded copper', and in reality he retained the qualities of slaves and eunuchs, who prefer men of base birth and low habits to the well-born. One writer, Warid, declares that Khidmatgar Khan, refused to take bribes, and being thus a hindrance instead of a help, Koki after

* Dalpat Singh's *Malahat-i-naql*, B.M. Or. 1828, 32a.

one year's trial dispensed with his services. Be that as it may, he was generally believed to be one of her confidants and agents until his death, which took place on 21st June, 1732. His chief man of business, Khush-hal Chand Kayasth, was cruelly treated in order to make him disgorge the money obtained from the eunuch's office of privy-purse-bearer, and the accumulation from his lands in pargana Mirat. Dogs were set upon the man and his flesh torn by them before he would reveal the place where the money was hoarded. [K. 940 ; Warid 44, 47 ; Ashob 45a—46 b ; Khush-hal 1060.]

ROSHAN-UD-DAULAH.

We have already mentioned the rise of Khwaja Muzaffar in the first year of Farrukh-siyar. During the changes of Government following the deposition and death of Farrukh-siyar, he succeeded in making friends among the men of the new régime. Early in the reign of Muhammad Shah he formed a close alliance with the favourite Koki and soon acquired great wealth from the presents made to him to secure his support. He had no obvious qualities to account for his great position, but he possessed no doubt the suppleness required in a courtier.* Outside the Court he did not shine ; his service as faujdar of the troublesome country of Mewat did him no credit. But he was gracious in manner and hospitable, and the repute was great of his charity, more especially to religious mendicants. He was a devoted follower of the holy man Shah Bhik, who is buried at Thaska near Thanesar. Roshan-ud-daulah's yearly illumination of the road from Dihli to the shrine of Qutb-ud-din was long a subject of popular talk. He was also a great builder. In Dihli he built a mosque near the palace and a college with mosque in the main street or Chandni Chauk, both having their domes and minarets adorned with copper-gilt plates. In Panipat he erected in the same style another school and a tomb for himself. In Karnal and Panipat he added gilt domes to the shrines of Shah Sharf Buali Qalandar, also arches

* Or, as Warid (58) says, applying a proverb to him, "He showed you wheat (as sample) but delivered you barley,"—i.e., he was a man of great promise and small performance.

and a pulpit. In Thaska also he adorned the shrine of the same saint and added a house for pilgrims, a hall of assembly and a relief kitchen, which he endowed with several villages. At Dihli he also repaired and cleaned annually the shrine known as Qadam-i-sharif (The Holy Foot-prints) and on the twelfth day of Rabi I., the day on which the prophet was born, he distributed there food gratis and other largesse.* [M. U. ii. 333 ; Ashob 47b-56a ; Ghulam Ali 17a.]

SEC. 86.—SHAH ABDUL-GHAFFUR : HIS CAREER AND INFLUENCE.

The third member of Koki's group of councillors was Shah Abdul-ghaffur a native of Tattha, who passed as a Sayyid but is believed to have been really a cotton-weaver. In the reign of Alamgir he found his way to Kabul and secured the friendship of a eunuch in the employ of Prince Muazzam (afterwards Bahadur Shah), then governor of that province. In the end he was expelled from the province as a forger. He resided for a short time at Lahor, then joined Bahadur Shah's camp when he was on the way to Agra to contest the throne with his brother Azam Shah. During the advance from Agra to the Dakhin, Abdul-ghaffur followed to Haidarabad, himself on foot and his wife on a pack-bullock belonging to the eunuch who had formerly befriended him. In the same manner he found his way back to Hindustan. After the disturbance at Lahor following on the death of Bahadur Shah (1712) Abdul-ghaffur went off to Dihli.

In the popular belief Abdul-ghaffur was the intimate of *jinn*s and devils, from whom he had learnt magic spells and incantations. In his early days he had served a Hindu recluse who lived a life of solitude on the summit of a hill in the wild country beyond the Indus. From this man Abdul-ghaffur received his initiation, and went to and fro as his emissary to the Rajahs of the hill country and his other disciples. Some

* He loved to clothe himself in gorgeous raiment and to use gold in every possible way. This is shown by the gilt covering he gave to the domes of his buildings. It was a tradition that after his retinue had passed through the streets, poor people swept up the dust in order to recover the atoms of gold-dust that had fallen from his attire. [Ghulam Ali, 52a.]

time afterwards the Jogi died and Abdul-ghaffur succeeded. His ambition was not satisfied however with such a confined domain, and he made his way, as already stated, to the camp of Shah Alam (afterwards Bahadur Shah), then governor of the Kabul province. Here he altered his appearance to that of a Muhammadan mendicant.

When he followed the camp of Jahandar Shah to Dihli Abdul-ghaffur took up his quarters in an old mosque outside the city, having with him one or two Sindi followers. These men hawked about in the city the amulets he wrote and on the proceeds they and their master lived. Gradually his fame spread and people flocked to consult him. [Ashob 68a—69b.] He claimed to know every science and every art and professed to read the future. One part in ten of his pretences was true: the rest false. The ignorant guards at palace gates and the illiterate eunuchs became his disciples, and he was asked by women of the imperial harem for amulets against sickness. Nawab Qudsiya mother of Mhd. Shah became his patron and he was asked to interpret her dreams, and this increased his reputation. Some of the persons to whom he had given amulets recovered. He and Koki his firm friend had sworn an oath to stand by each other. She made him out to the Begam a saint (*wali*) with supernatural powers (*tasawuf*). He pledged his word for the competence in geomancy of Koki and her father. At length through his friend the eunuch and the recommendation of Qudsiya Begam he made the acquaintance of Muhammad Amin Khan Itimad-ud-daulah. Over this noble he soon obtained great influence, his glibness of tongue secured belief in his universal knowledge and he was soon admitted to his patron's most secret councils. Owing to this intimacy the common people believed the Shah to be the spiritual director of Mhd. Amin Khan. In the intrigues leading to the assassination of Husain Ali Khan, we have seen him play a prominent part, passing between the conspirators and Muhammad Shah's private tents in the disguise of a milk-woman and carrying Mhd. Amin's letters. On Muhammad Amin Khan's death shortly after his accession to power, Abdul-ghaffur attached himself to Koki's party and for twelve years

was nearly as powerful as she was herself. Qamar-ud-din Khan supported him out of respect to his father's memory, and Nizam-ul-mulk, during the short period that he was at Dihli, paid deference to Abdul-ghaffur's apparent claims as a holy man. [Warid 39-42 ; Ashob 64-72 ; Khush-hal 1041-1042.] Subsequently Abdul-ghaffur having made an alliance with Koki Jiu became all powerful and accumulated immense wealth. His income from his offices is said to have amounted to five thousand Rupees a day, in addition to as much more from bribes. Of these latter something under one-fourth was made over to the Emperor ; the balance was divided in equal shares between Koki and Abdul-ghaffur. His habits were miserly in the extreme. [Warid 58-71.]

Abdul-ghaffur was not loved himself by either the courtiers or the crowd ; but the hatred to him was as nothing to that provoked by his son and daughter. Early in the reign Abdurrahim, his son, a good-looking youth, was raised to the rank of 6,000 *zat*. But his conduct was exceedingly dissolute ; he never hesitated at taking life, with or without pretext. One of his freaks was to dress up as a loose woman with his hands and feet *henna*-dyed and wearing many gold ornaments ; in addition a sword and shield hung across his shoulder by a gold-embroidered belt. In this guise he would parade the streets preceded by mace-bearers and matchlockmen with matches lighted. They entered every assembly and took part in every disturbance. At other times, clad in complete steel, with nothing to be seen but his two eyes, he would ride out with his retinue similarly attired. Woe to anyone who looked their way : without fail he was cut down. But if the other side was too strong for him, he fled. Dancers were called to dance at his gate while he sat there wine-cup in hand. In a little, he would attach rattles to his ankles, cover his head with a shawl and join in the dance. Armed men were posted at each end of the street to prevent anyone passing up or down. If anyone persisted, his life was taken. Litters carrying the wives of poor men were stopped ; the women were brought before him, and those he approved were appropriated. For the gratification of other and more unnatural passions he expended large sums of

money. The daughter was even more shameless. [Ashob 66b.]

When towards the end of 1144 (June 1732) the eunuch Hafiz Khidmatgar Khan died, his servants were very harshly treated in an attempt to obtain possession of his wealth accumulated as clerk of the privy purse. About the same period disgrace began to overtake the other members of the combination, for whose downfall Samsam-ud-daulah had been plotting from the first. Koki lost her hold over the Emperor. One of her brothers, Ali Ahmad Khan, gave offence by his conduct as superintendent of the office of Confirmator (*arz mukarrar*); and worst of all the Queen Malika Dauran quarrelled with her. Koki's money was demanded. She replied that it was all the Emperor's and sending the key of her rooms in the harem to the Begam left the palace. Samsam-ud-daulah brought against Roshan-ud-daulah a charge of having embezzled the money granted to him for payments to keep the roads from Peshawar to Kabul open. And Abdul-ghaffur at length disgusted even the Emperor by the absurd length to which he carried his claims of authority, spiritual and secular. [Khush-hal 1061-1062.]

Roshan-ud-daulah's disgrace came about in this way. Early in the reign he had become the intermediary for the payment of a monthly sum to keep open the passes into Kabul. This money was disbursed by the hand of Nasir Khan, the provincial governor, who had obtained his appointment through Roshan-ud-daulah; the payment is stated to have been five lakhs of Rupees a month, but that is most probably an exaggeration. Roshan-ud-daulah also managed the affairs at Court connected with the port of Surat and with many parganas of the Gujarat province. Samsam-ud-daulah charged Roshan-ud-daulah with embezzling the Kabul money, and since, according to him, the State obtained no benefit, this payment to the pass Afghans was abolished. Remonstrances and appeals were sent again and again by Roshan-ud-daulah but passed unregarded. From this time Roshan-ud-daulah fell out of favour with Muhammad Shah, and soon demands were made upon him to account for all the Government money that he had received. The auditors stated the balance still at three *krors* of Rupees.

Under this pressure the Nawab paid in two *kror*s of Rupees and escaped further molestation. But his influence, already shaken by his ignominious share in the shoe-sellers' riot of 11th March 1729, never revived. His position was also weakened by the conduct of his third brother Munavvar Khan, one of the Emperor's boon companions, who fell in love with and carried off Nur Bai, a dancing woman who was Muhammad Shah's mistress. At first Munavvar Khan's death was decreed ; in the end his life was spared but he lost his rank and jagir. After some years Ishaq Khan the new favourite procured his restoration and he was given the office of Bakhshi to the Ahadis. Roshan-ud-daulah died at Dihli on the 12th Zul Hijja 1148 H. (23rd April 1736).*

As Muhammad Shah paid no attention to public business, Abdul-gaffur for full twelve years held the supreme direction of affairs ; if he opposed, nothing could be done, even the Emperor's wishes were then ignored. At length in his thirteenth year Muhammad Shah rebelled. [Warid 60.]

SEC. 87.—FALL OF ABDUL-GHAFFUR.

A small thing first of all provoked the Emperor's anger. One day he paid a visit to the shrine of Qutb-ud-din Bakhtiyar. Near by was a large handsome chapel lately erected by Abdul-gaffur. Muhammad Shah expressed a desire to inspect it, but the doors had been firmly closed up and the keys taken away. The door had to be opened with a borrowed key : and for the time nothing was said. Next came a complaint made by outcry below the palace balcony by Shaikh Muhammad Fazil and Moti Lal, two men employed by the Shah in his office as Master of the Mint. Muhammad Fazil had left the mint to take a contract lease of Sonepat, one of the Shah's parganas, coupled with a loan of one lakh of Rupees for working it. Time passed and the lessee fell into heavy arrears. Stronger and stronger pressure was put upon the debtor and abusive language was addressed to him. In revenge Muhammad Fazil, bringing his successor at the mint Moti Lal over to his side, now made

* Khush-hal 1061b; Ashob 53-55a; Ghulam Ali 47-54.

formal complaint that Abdul-ghaffur had embezzled public money.

Behind the scenes these obscure men were urged on by Samsam (First *Bakhshi*) and Saadat Khan (governor of Oudh). They pressed the complaint home and the Emperor said that the money must be recovered. Abdul-ghaffur was contumacious and refused to listen to the Wazir who was on his side and counselled submission. The Shah abused the Wazir in good set terms and proceeded to send for Muhammad Fazil and Moti Lal, the two men who had dared to complain. Roz Afzun Khan, a palace eunuch, brought this act to the Emperor's notice, and Abdul-ghaffur was prevented from doing anything. Matters were pushed further, and as much as 60 lakhs of Rupees was found to be the amount of his defalcations.

Abdul-ghaffur turned a deaf ear to Qamar-ud-din Khan the Wazir, who wished him well, and listened in preference to Samsam-ud-daulah and Saadat Khan, who were only plotting his ruin. To increase his extravagance of conduct they pretended that the Emperor was inclined to forgive and forget and was about to appoint the Shah to be governor of the Tattha (Sind) province. With this idea in his head he became more violent than before. One day he started for the imperial audience although the Wazir had warned him that he was not master of himself and had better remain at home.

Now, in deference to his character of holy man, he was never called upon to make obeisance but uttered instead the usual greeting between equals of "Peace be upon you", to which the Emperor would reply in the appointed form of words. On this day Abdul-ghaffur marched in and said nothing. Muhammad Shah without any comment, himself said "Peace be upon you." Omitting to return the salutation the Shah began to use strong language. The Emperor rose in silence and retired towards his apartments. When he had gone a pace or two, he called the Wazir to his side and said "I suffer all this through you." The Wazir answered "How could this slave dare such a thing?" "Then having placed your hand on my feet, renounce all interest in this matter." The Wazir acted accordingly.

Returning to his house Abdul-ghaffur continued to curse and swear. But of what avail was his empty talk! An account was now drawn up requiring from him 3 krons of Rupees. A *chela* was sent to obtain the money or to bring the Shah in a prisoner. Abdul-ghaffur's only answer was abuse and the question "Does the palace still stand?" He was arrested and put in prison in the palace. In spite of what was got rid of, cash to the amount of one kror of Rupees was seized besides property and buildings. His principal servants were imprisoned until they gave up their hoards—his chief man Dakhni Rai paid one lakh, his head clerk Kunwar Sen, and Sampat Rai (Dakhni Rai's brother and the brother-in-law of the historian Khush-hal Chand), the Shah's deputy in the Horse Market, and other employés paid varying sums according to their standing. [Khush-hal 1059b-1061b.]

SEC. 88.—ANOTHER ACCOUNT OF THE DOWNFALL OF
SHAH ABDUL-GHAFFUR.

The historian Warid gives a very detailed account of Abdul-ghaffur's decline from favour and his last days: Muhammad Shah, after having been under Abdul-ghaffur's tutelage for years, at length rebelled and in the thirteenth year (1731-32) called upon the auditors to report the total income received by Abdul-ghaffur from his offices and, after deducting the sum he had paid into the treasury, to report the amount still due. The balance of actual revenue due was found to be twenty-five lakhs. The Wazir was told to realize the money. Qamar-uddin, on account of his father's friendship with Abdul-ghaffur, was on the whole well inclined towards him. After a stormy interview, the minister advised Abdul-ghaffur to pay one half, and he, the Wazir would provide the other. Abdul-ghaffur rejected the proposal with indignation. When the officials arrived to confiscate his property Abdul-ghaffur declared that he would have them beaten with shoes. Thereupon the Wazir reported to the Emperor that he had done what he could to befriend the man, and whatever measures were thought necessary might be resorted to.

Muhammad Shah was already displeased with the conduct

of Abdul-ghaffur's son, who though a beardless and smooth-faced youth was already an oppressor of the helpless. Abdul-ghaffur himself was also a harsh man. A month before his fall, he called for a servant who happened to be at his prayers. Another man was sent to drag him to his master, whether he were kneeling or standing up. Abdul-ghaffur said to the culprit "By God! Your only lord, without whom you would starve, is Abdul-ghaffur—and he is seated here. What God were you worshipping away there? If you do it again, I will punish you." Another story is that once when asked to disburse the money to put a half finished building in repair before the rainy season—he dragged the man to the side-room where his treasure was locked up and said: "Here have I had locked up for many years the god in whose power all things are; both cloud and rain are under my control, and without my will not a drop of rain can fall."

When the Wazir had thrown over Abdul-ghaffur, the Emperor, easy-going as usual, sent some slaves for the unpaid money. If the man had met the demand by prompt payment he would probably have been pardoned; but he sent instead a sharp answer. Guards were placed over him to prevent his either eating or drinking. In a few days he paid up twenty lakhs and some thousands of Rupees, and obtained a respite of twelve days within which to produce the balance. After sixteen days men were sent to Abdul-ghaffur, who instead of producing the money used language about the Emperor that could not be applied with decency to the lowest in the land. One of the slaves repeated the language; and at last Muhammad Shah's anger burst forth. Abdul-ghaffur was ordered to be arrested, the whole of his hoards to be cleared out, locked up, and placed under seal. This time he made no resistance but announced that shortly the palace and all in it, Muhammad Shah included, would disappear. As he had made Muhammad Shah so would he destroy him. When, in reply to his questions, he was told that the palace still stood and the Emperor lived, he would say half aloud that Muhammad Shah was dead though the fact was concealed by the courtiers. The various stages in his downfall occupies two or three months, but it was

on the 4 Zul Hijja 1144 H. (28th May 1732) that he was finally arrested and locked up in the fort. After having been in prison at Dihli for one year Abdul-ghaffur, his wife, son, and daughter were sent to the fortress of Ruhtas in the province of Bihar. He died there on the 22nd Shawwal 1148 H. (5th March 1736). His character is thus summed up by Warid: "He never spent money on a good work, never conferred a favour, never did a kindness." [Warid 60-69, Khush-hal 1061b.]

By the year 1734 the favourites who had held Muhammad Shah in thrall from the beginning of his reign were discredited and dispersed. Samsam-ud-daulah thus obtained for a time a free hand. But it was not long before the weak monarch was once more under the control of new favourites, of whom the most prominent were Muhammad Ishaq and Amir Khan Umdat-ul-mulk, having as time went on Abul Mansur Khan Safdar Jang (governor of Oudh) for their ally. For the present we turn to other subjects.

SEC. 89.—INCREASING ENCROACHMENTS OF THE MAHRATTAS
(1732—1735).

We have already carried the story of the Mahratta invasion of India north of the Narmada to the point where Gujarat had been partly occupied, Bundelkhand partitioned, and Malwa temporarily overrun. This brought us to the year 1145 (1732) and Rajah Jai Singh Sawai's appointment to be governor of Malwa. The northern advance by way of Gujarat was now stayed, partly because that province was difficult of subjugation, partly because the Rajput principalities of Udepur and Jodhpur more or less barred the road. The Mahratta efforts to reach the heart of the Empire at Dihli and Agra were now concentrated upon Malwa and the smaller Rajput States to the north of it. It was here that the Peshwa Baji Rao found a fitting field for his genius as partisan leader and diplomatist. It was his lieutenants, Malhar Rao Holkar and Ranuji Sindhia who founded the States of Indor and Gwalियar, the ruler of the latter wielding from 1790 to 1803 supreme power in Upper India. Let us now devote our attention to the events in Malwa

and the country adjoining it from 1732 to 1738, and in so doing the narrative will be more clear if we divide it into parts corresponding to the period of Mahratta activity in each year beginning with the 1st October, about the period of the *Dasahra* festival, and ending with the 30th June of each year, when the rainy season had usually set in and the armies on both sides were accustomed to retire into quarters.*

CAMPAIGN OF 1145-46 H., 15TH YEAR OF MHD. SHAH
(1 October, 1732—30 June 1733).

Times had changed since, as Warid notes (p. 80), two thousand Mahrattas could be put to flight by one hundred Hindustani horsemen, and the Mahratta women and children could not with safety pass two nights in succession in the same place. For several years the plunderers had not ventured outside of Malwa ; but now becoming bolder they swarmed over the country up to a few miles from Agra, and the Hindu States, obtaining no help from the Mughals, compromised with the invaders by paying their demands.

One after another the great nobles were ordered to proceed against the enemy ; but all with one consent began to make excuse. [Warid 117.] At length Muhammad Shah, though wedded to ease and idleness, resolved to march in person. The tents were sent out and in Shaban 1145 H. (February 1733) he made one or two short marches and then crossed the Jamuna. After proceeding for a short distance along the river bank he crossed back again. In this cowardly and childish manner several months were consumed. The imperial camp never got beyond Faridabad, sixteen miles south of Dihli, there was confusion and disorder throughout the camp, and the open season was fast coming to an end.

Qamar-ud-din Khan, the chief minister, knowing the Emperor's character guessed that he was in reality disinclined to take the field. To the Emperor's great relief, the Wazir offered to undertake the campaign and his offer was at once

* Warid on the Mahrattas, 76, 80-85, 91-96, 99-100, 116-127 (carrying the history down to March 1734).

accepted. He started from Dihli on the 21st Shawwal (5th April 1733). With him went his cousin Zahir-ud-daulah and his son-in-law Firuz Jang (son of Nizam-ul-mulk). On reaching Agra they were joined by Muhammad Khan Bangash. It was reported that the Mahrattas were between Sironj and Narwar engaged in plundering the Umait landholders. An advanced division was sent on beyond Narwar to Loda Dangar, south of Kularas. There it was learnt that the Mahrattas had recrossed the Narmada in spite of a feeble attempt by Rajah Jai Singh to hinder their retreat. After this the Rajah had sent off his baggage towards his own country of Amber and had already moved himself one march in that direction. Either thinking the campaigning season was over or obeying an order from Dihli, the Wazir recalled his troops, and they rejoined him at Shiupuri. Some say that he received urgent and reiterated requests from the Emperor to return at once to Court, —one of the letters quoting the line "With you wine is lawful ; without you, water prohibited." On his return march the Wazir turned down the Duaba to Ghazipur [in the Fathpur district] to punish Bhagwant son of Udaru Kichar, who in March 1732 had killed Jan Nisar Khan, faujdar of Kora Jahana-bad. After the first day's bombardment, Bhagwant fled to Asothar. Here Muhammad Khan was left to settle the matter, while the Wazir hurried back to Dihli to thwart a combination against him between Samsam-ud-daulah, Burhan-ul-mulk and Mubariz-ul-mulk. He reached the capital about the end of June 1733. Warid attributes the futile nature of his proceedings to the constant use of alcohol and his addiction to the company of women. [Khush-hal 1063b, Rustam Ali 265, Warid 85, Ghulam Ali 54b.]

CAMPAIGN OF 1146-47 H.—16TH YEAR OF MHD. SHAH

(1 October 1733—30 June 1734).

This year the Mahrattas returned with more boldness than ever. They spread themselves from Gwaliyar to Ajmer, a distance of 220 miles. They were specially active in the Bhadawar country a few miles east of Agra. The Rajah who was at Court obtained leave to return for the defence of his

country. But it was too late. Before he arrived the villages and towns had been plundered. He took refuge in his fort and resisted for a time. But he soon saw that to look for imperial help was useless. He might as well try "to measure the sun with an ell-wand or imprison the wind in his closed hand". He paid three lakhs of Rupees to the Mahrattas and thus persuaded them to retire. [Wārid 118, *Siyar* 289.]

At this juncture the shortcomings of Rajah Jai Singh of Amber came into special prominence. For twelve years he had been governor of Agra and for four or five governor of Malwa. From the gates of Dihli to the banks of the Narmada he was in supreme authority. But in spite of all the disorder around him, the Rajah, supported by the Court influence of Samsam-ud-daulah, sat calmly at home and did nothing, though he possessed an army of 30,000 horsemen and a still larger number of matchlockmen. Several times in previous years the Rajah had received from Muhammad Shah large sums, as much as thirty lakhs or twenty lakhs it is said, for payment to the Mahrattas. Half would be paid to them and half retained by the Rajah; the Mahrattas then went home and Jai Singh returned to his own State. After two or three years of this procedure, the Mahrattas began to expect their "breakfast", as Wārid styles it, and every time grew greedier and more avaricious. But for fears for Samsam-ud-daulah's displeasure, Muhammad Shah was afraid to take away the Government of Agra or Malwa from Jai Singh. Samsam-ud-daulah himself, although well able to do so, undertook no campaign against the invaders. [Wārid 119—120.]

For years it had been the custom at Court, when the Dakhin intelligencers reported the invasion of Gujarat and Malwa to send out Muhammad Shah on long visits to the various gardens round the capital, or to distract his mind by hunting and shooting expeditions in the many royal preserves. Meanwhile the Wazir sought relaxation by a visit to his country-house on the canal about twelve miles from Dihli, where he would remain a month or longer. His time was taken up with fishing or hunting deer. All business was suspended, and the country remained practically without a Government. The

pious Muhammadan could do no more than raise his helpless hands to Heaven.*

This year (1733-34) it was the turn of Samsam-ud-daulah to be ordered out against the Mahrattas. He spent three or four months in sending out and bringing back again his advance tents, or in fruitless efforts to persuade someone else to take his place. At length, when the season was nearly over and the Mahrattas would be about to retire as usual, Samsam-ud-daulah sent for his brother Muzaffar Khan, long governor of Ajmer, from his head-quarters at Narnol in Mewat. The first orders were issued on the 28th June 1733, but it was not until the 20th February 1734 that his tents were set up in the gardens near the city. Another month was spent in further preparations and at last on the 30th March 1734 the first march of six miles was made. By this time the spies had reported that the Mahrattas had begun to retreat; and it was quite clear that before Muzaffar Khan could reach Agra they would have recrossed the Narmada. In December there had been a contest between Malhar Holkar and Yar Muhammad Khan of Bhupal, in which several lives were lost.

Muzaffar Khan succeeded in reaching Sironj, but the enemy had disappeared, and thus without once coming into action, it would seem, the army retraced its route on the 21st June 1734. Muzaffar Khan was admitted to audience on his return to Court. [Ghulam Ali 54a, Rustam Ali 265b, *Siyar* 289.]

CAMPAIGN OF 1147-48 H., 17TH YEAR, OF MHD. SHAH
(1 October 1734—30 June 1735).

In this year, the Mahrattas having spread over a very wide extent of country, it was resolved to send out two armies, one under the command of the Wazir, Qamar-ud-din Khan, and the other under that of the Mir Bakhshi, Samsam-ud-

* Warid (123) quotes the proverb,

'The earth dried up, the clouds without dew,
Alas! for the poor handful of grass.'

Khak-i-khushk wa abr-i-be-nam,
Wai bar musht-i-gyah.

daulah, the former taking the defence of the eastern and the latter of the western half of the invaded territory.

Qamar-ud-din Khan received his audience of leave-taking on the 20th November 1734. The Wazir marched by way of Agra against Pilaji Jadon and Baji Rao, having with him his own troops and artillery and the whole of the Turani Mughal leaders. The Rajahs through whose States he passed were called upon to serve. From the 3rd to 12th February 1735 he was in contact with and fighting the Mahrattas. Apparently this was in the neighbourhood of Narwar, and his antagonist Pilaji Jadon. The army advanced as far as Sipri and Kularas on the boundary of Malwa. Pilaji Jadon continued to oppose the advance at the head of 30,000 to 40,000 Mahrattas. There were three or four encounters in which the Wazir had the advantage. As soon as the rainy season was at hand, the Mahrattas, obeying Baji Rao's order of recall, returned to the Dakhin. The Wazir reached Dihli on the 21st May 1735, having been preceded, eleven days earlier, by Samsam-ud-daulah. [Ashob 104-106, Khush-hal 1066-67, Rustam Ali 267, Ghulam Ali 54*b*.]

On his side Samsam-ud-daulah marched out with all his own troops and the Wala-shahi or bodyguard, a corps distinguished by red turbans, accompanied by many nobles and Rajahs. He was joined *en route* by Rajah Jai Singh of Amber and his army. The objective was Ajmer, where Malhar at the head of a much smaller force was plundering as usual. Sambhar was one of the places which had suffered from his marauders. There is no record of any fighting; and Jai Singh was for a long time at Tal Kakariya. Samsam-ud-daulah was persuaded by Jai Singh that the wisest measure was to accede to the Mahratta demands. It appears that the exacting of the one-fourth of the revenues was agreed to, before the Mahrattas would retire beyond the Narmada. An annual sum of 22 lakhs of Rupees from Malwa was promised. One Mahadeo Pandit was accepted as the Peshwa's agent and the imperial army went no further than the Kota and Bundi States. All the new recruits, who had gone to great expense to buy horses, were at once dismissed. Samsam-ud-daulah

reached Dihli on the 21st or 22nd May 1735. [Ashob, *Bayan* 532, Rustam Ali 266-67, Khush-hal 1067a.]

SEC. 90.—CAMPAIGN OF 1148-49 H., 18TH YEAR OF MHD. SHAH.
(1 October 1735—30 June 1736).

When the Mahrattas again took the field after the rains of 1735, they displayed more actively than ever. They visited and plundered Udepur in Mewar, Mairta and Nagor in Marwar, the imperial territory of Ajmer, and the town of Rupnagar to the north of it. As in the previous year, two army corps were despatched from Dihli, that sent to the south-east commanded by the Wazir, that to the south-west by Samsam-ud-daulah. Saadat Khan Burhan-ul-mulk, governor of Oudh, was directed to co-operate in the neighbourhood of Agra. [Rustam Ali 267b ; J. A. S. B. (1878) 326-27.]

The Mahrattas were in Bundelkhand, through which their friends Harde Sah and Jagat Raj, sons of Chhattarsal, allowed them free passage : a few hundred of their horsemen had come even as far as the Jamuna to look out for fords. It was expected that they would cross into the Duaba, plundering Kora, Kalpi and Etawa as they went. Chimnaji, brother of Baji Rao, had come near to Gwalियar by way of Sironj and Bundelkhand ; Baji Rao himself being detained this year in the Konkan where he was carrying out an expedition against the pirate stronghold of Janjira. Pilaji Jadon had been sent north into Malwa to support Chimnaji Malhar Rao Holkar and Sindhia.

Crossing at the ferries opposite Auruya and Sarai Ajit Mal, [in the Etawa district] the Mahrattas plundered Khanpur, Derapur, Mangalpur, Sikandra, and Shinganpur [in the Cawnpur district], while their collectors levied *khandani* or ransom-money from the villagers and imperial officials. The invaders were also numerous in the Gwalियar country, Bijipur fifty-two miles south of Gwalियar had been surrounded and the inhabitants of Antri had fled to Gwalियar city, twelve miles away. It was feared that Agra might be invested.

Muhammad Khan Bangash, who had been told off for the defence of Agra and Gwalियar, began to cross the Jamuna on the 10th Jan. 1736. Reports were received that one force.

of Mahrattas had come beyond Nurabad fourteen miles north-west of Gwalियar in the direction of Agra and that another was close to Antri in Bhadawar. Accordingly on the 24th Jan. 1736 a division of two thousand horse and two thousand foot advanced to Dholpur to protect the ferries on the Chambal. The local clansmen, Daudotias, Sengars and others, were sent to guard all the routes and crossing places. The enemy from Nurabad came daily to the Chambal banks but found themselves unable to cross. At length the Mahrattas renounced their attempts and retired into Bhadawar. They could make no impression on Gwalियar itself, which was held by two thousand Pathans from Mau sent by Muhammad Khan Bangash, added to one thousand men of the local forces. [J. A. S. B. 328.]

While Muhammad Khan had thus come to the rescue at Agra, Qamar-ud-din Khan had pushed on across the Chambal to try conclusions with Pilaji. At Narwar he left his wives and family and such portion of his impedimenta as was in excess of his needs. When he reached Orchha he encamped on the banks of Arjal lake, 12 miles east of it, which is deep long and wide, surrounded by hills, and twelve to fourteen miles in circumference. On the further side in the plain and on the hill-sides was the camp of Pilaji. To both armies the command of this piece of water was a necessity. Throughout the month of Ramzan (January 1736) there were daily skirmishes but no decisive fight. [Ashob 105-106.]

One day both sides came out in force. In this battle the Mahrattas got the worst of it and fled. Thereupon Sher Baz Khan, a near relative of the Wazir's and proud of his fame for valour, rode out from the army attended by his two sons, mere raw boys, and made for a body of the enemy. As he galloped he cried to his two 'tigers' whelps, "I am teaching you how you must hunt your prey." In the onset the elder boy was killed and the other Mir Muhammad Azam made a prisoner. The latter a boy of ten or twelve was disarmed and carried off seated behind a Mahratta trooper. The boy drew the man's dagger from his waist and before he could turn had stabbed him three times. The man fell and the boy rode off

to the Muhammadan camp. Meanwhile Sher Baz Khan had fought his way back to his elder son and lifting the body on to his horse rode off lamenting aloud for his second son. When Muhammad Azam returned the father's weeping was turned into joy. [Ashob 106.]

On the *Id* (13th Feb. 1736) Pilaji, having been reinforced by troops from Baji Rao's army on the Narmada, came out early to give battle. The fight was continued throughout the day, but during the night the Mahrattas quitted their camp, and proceeding by forced marches soon crossed the Narmada. Pursuit was made to Sipri and Kularas, to Sironj and Ujjain, and when satisfied that the Mahrattas had vacated Malwa for the time, the Muhammadans under the Wazir marched back to Dihli. [Ashob 107.]

On his side Samsam-ud-daulah started to reinforce Rajah Jai Singh in his efforts to eject Malhar Rao Holkar from Rajputana. At Toda Tank he was joined by the Maharajah by whose advice he prepared field entrenchments and took up his position within them. Malhar, who had no more than 7,000 to 8,000 men, awaited the arrival of Partap Singh Hada of Bundi. Urged by ill-will to Jai Singh and hoping to save his own dominions, this man had put his well-equipped army at the disposal of the Mahrattas. As soon as Partap Singh had joined him, Malhar advanced and took up a position 10 or 12 miles from the Muhammadan entrenchments. Every day from a little before sunrise until the time of evening prayer, the Mahrattas skirmished round the camp, and not a soul could set a foot outside the ditch of the entrenchments. The Muhammadans fired their cannon continually, but dared not come out into the open.

In a short time all supplies of grass and grain were cut off. The men's horses were no longer able to stand. At length the men of the Ahadi regiment, some 1,000 to 1,500 in number mostly of Baluch and Mughal race, marched out headed by their petty officers without leave or order from the general. They were about eight miles from camp and busy collecting anything they could lay hand upon in the villages, when suddenly they were surrounded by Malhar Rao and Partap Singh

with their men. For some hours the Mahrattas fared badly as the imperial veterans were armed with bows and matchlocks. The Mahrattas were thus unable to close and ply their spears and straight swords. At length when the arrows and ammunition were exhausted the Mahrattas came on. Partap Singh Hada and his Rajputs being better mounted than Malhar's men outstripped their allies and poured their blunderbuss fire into the Muhammadan ranks. Many fell and the rest dispersed. The historian Ashob had two kinsmen among the wounded—one Shihab-ud-din Beg after lying three days under a heap of dead bodies was recovered and lived for forty years, but lame and without the use of his hands which had been eaten away by ants. It was three days before Jai Singh could collect the dead bodies, which was done with the permission of Malhar Rao. After their defeat the Muhammadan commander and the Rajah again gave strict injunctions that no man should leave the entrenchments without their orders. [Ashob 108-109.]

In due course Malhar Rao returned as usual to the Dakhin, thus releasing the two commanders from their difficult position. Samsam-ud-daulah returned to Dihli, where he was received as if he were a conquering hero ; and Jai Singh went home to his own State. Soon afterwards by Samsam-ud-daulah's advice the Emperor accepted the proposal brought forward by Jai Singh that he should relinquish the Government of Malwa in favour of the Peshwa Baji Rao. In pursuance of this scheme on the 6th Zul Qada 1148 H. (18th March 1736) Yadgar Kashmiri with Kirpa Ram and Najabat Ali Khan was sent off to Jai Singh to open the negotiations. On the 8th Rabi I. 1149 H. (16th July, 1736) Jai Singh and Baji Rao met at Dholpur where an agreement was entered into whereby Baji Rao became the deputy governor of Malwa under the Rajah. Accompanying Baji Rao were his son, and his chief commanders Ranuji Sindhia, Malhar Holkar, Jaswant Rao Puar, and others. [Ashob 110b ; Ghulam Ali 54b ; Rustam Ali 267-68 ; *Siyar* 294, 309 ; *J. A. S. B.* 328.]

Mahratta sources throw more light than do the Muhammadan on the nature of these transactions. To start with, the Emperor had been willing to concede the following terms :

First, an assignment to Baji Rao of thirteen lakhs of Rupees from the revenue of the country south of the Chambal, for one season, payable in three instalments. Secondly, an authority to be given him to levy an annual tribute of 10,60,000 Rupees from the Rajput States, beginning at Bundi and Kota [and extending] as far as Bhadawar. The second item would, it was hoped, create ill-feeling between the Rajputs and the Mahrattas. Documents in accordance with these proposals were secretly prepared and made over to Yadgar Khan, with orders not to produce them unless necessary. Unfortunately for the Muhammadans, the agent of Baji Rao discovered what had been done and informed his master. Baji Rao convinced now that the Emperor was at his mercy, raised his demands. He must have the whole province of Malwa in assignment, the Pathans at the same time being dispossessed from Bhupal. He must be put in charge of the forts of Mandu, Dhar, and Raisin. Next, he demanded the whole tract south of the Chambal in jagir, with the appointment of faujdars. Then he required a payment of fifty lakhs in cash or in an order on Bengal. In a little time he added to his list Allahabad, Benares, Gaya and Mathura in jagir. Finally he required the hereditary rights of a sardesh-pandya in the six provinces of the Dakhin. [Grant Duff 254.]

Rajah Jai Singh as we have said had agreed to nominate Baji Rao as his deputy in the Government of Malwa. This was, in effect though not in form, a cession of the province. As to the other concessions the only one agreed to was the last, the hereditary appointment of sardesh-pandya. The rate of payment was the same as that of desh-pandya, namely half that of *deshmukh*, or five per cent. of the revenue. The object of this payment being conceded by Samsam-ud-daulah was the injury thereby done to Nizam-ul-mulk and his provinces.

SEC. 91.—CAMPAIGN OF 1149-50 H., 19TH YEAR OF MHD. SHAH.
(1st October 1736—30th June 1737).

The concessions recently wrung from the Muhammadan Government had no deterrent effect upon Baji Rao's plans of conquest. When the open season came round again his horse-

men were once more upon the move. By Zul Qada 1149 H. (March 1737) they were swarming in Bhadawar, the country lying to the east and south-east of Agra. To repel this renewed invasion armies from Dihli again took the field, and Saadat Khan governor of Oudh was directed to co-operate. On the 8th March 1737 the tents of Samsam-ud-daulah the Mir Bakhshi were erected outside the city and on the next day (the 9th March) he began his march eastwards, his first stage being Talpat, 15 miles south of the city. The Wazir on the 21st March likewise made a start by moving into camp at the Char Bagh. Samsam-ud-daulah preceded the Wazir and reached Mathura early in the month of Zul Hijja 1149 (1st to 29th April 1737). On the 5th Zul Hijja (5th April 1737) he was at Hasanpur, eighteen reputed kos from Mathura, intending to march the next day to Shergarh and the day after to Brindaban, with a view to joining Samsam-ud-daulah and Saadat Khan who were then at Agra. It was reported that Jai Singh of Jaipur (Amber) had moved out from his capital. Although, much to the Wazir's disturbance of mind, a heavy force of Mahrattas was said to have gone towards Rewari; for two days he did not give up his intention to continue his march eastwards as he was very anxious to come into touch with the enemy before he returned. An additional piece of bad news was received, that Budh Singh of Bundi had risen. [Khush-hal 1070b, Rustam Ali 270b.]

Baji Rao, leaving his heavy baggage at Jaitpur with Jagat Raj Bundela, second son of the late Rajah Chhattarsal, advanced to the banks of the Jamuna, forty miles from Agra. On his way he attacked Rajah Anuradh Singh of Bhadawar. The Rajah came out from his town of Ater with a well-equipped force of 7,000 horse besides foot-soldiers and 45 elephants. One of the Rajah's brothers who had long been at strife with him, went over to the Mahrattas. On this man's advice they left half of their force standing in front of the Rajah, while the other half came suddenly from Gohad and Barhad, entered the town of Ater, and began to plunder. To save his capital the Rajah retreated fighting and took shelter in the fortress at Ater. In the end he sued for terms and paid

twenty lakhs of Rupees and gave ten elephants. After this opening success the Peshwa's principal officers, Malhar Rao Holkar Pilaji Jadon and Wituji Bulé, went across the Jamuna and carried fire and sword through the Duaba. [*Siyar* 309, Ghulam Ali.]

SAADAT KHAN FROM OUDH DEFEATS PART OF BAJI RAO'S ARMY
IN THE DUABA.

In Zul Hijja (April 1737) the Mahrattas had crossed the Jamuna near the town of Rapri and commenced an investment of Shukohabad. Lal Jiu Khatri, the officer in charge, paid 1,50,000 Rupees and gave one elephant and thereby saved the town. Advancing up the Duaba burning and plundering as they went, the Mahrattas raided Firuzabad and Itimadpur, the latter town only 11 miles east of Agra. Leaving that place they came to Jalesar. Suddenly as day dawned the troops of Saadat Khan appeared in sight. He had come from Etawa a distance of 85 miles, by forced marches. The advanced guard under his nephew Abul Mansur Khan Safdar Jang consisted of 12,000 horse.

Thinking the attacking force inferior to themselves in numbers, the Mahrattas, as their fashion was, tried to envelop it completely. Abul Mansur Khan retreated slowly, fighting all the time, towards Saadat Khan's main body numbering 50,000 cavalry. As the retiring vanguard drew near, Saadat Khan and his men gave their horses the rein and charged the enemy. The Mahrattas broke and fled. Each man sought a road for himself and a hot pursuit was maintained for many miles. At the edge of a piece of water in Itimadpur the pursuers overtook three chiefs and nearly one thousand men. These became their prisoners. Such horsemen as escaped the sword re-crossed the Jamuna. When crossing they had marked the ford and the depth of water at it by planting bamboo stakes in the bed of the river. But in the hurry of escape many mistook the ford and were drowned. The majority got across in safety. This affair took place upon the 22nd Zul Qada 1149 H. (23rd March 1737). Malhar Rao rejoined Baji Rao at Kotila near Gwaliyar. [*Ashob* 112a.]

Saadat Khan continued his march westwards to join Samsam-ud-daulah. At Mathura, which Samsam-ud-daulah reached shortly after the 1st April 1737, they met. With the Mir Bakhshi were 25,000 horsemen and many cannon and numerous elephants. Muhammad Khan Bangash was also there with a contingent of about twelve thousand men. One day Samsam-ud-daulah had invited Saadat Khan to a banquet in his tent. In the midst of the feast they learnt that Baji Rao passing Fathpur Sikri and leaving on his right the town of Dig, in the country of Badna Jat, had managed to get as far as Dihli. In the utmost alarm the imperialists broke up camp and began a hasty return to the capital 'placing the finger of vexation upon the teeth of shame.' [Rustam Ali 272.]

SEC. 92.—BAJI RAO ATTACKS DIHLI.

We must now explain how this sudden and unexpected movement took place. As Saadat Khan arrived at Agra Baji Rao had moved away from the Chambal, where his left flank was confined by the river and his camp intersected by deep ravines, to opener country upon the north-east. There through his agent in Samsam-ud-daulah's camp he heard of the boastful account that Saadat Khan himself gave of his successful action. "I was resolved," Baji Rao writes, "to let the Emperor know the truth, to prove that I was still in Hindustan, and to show him the Mahrattas at the gate of his capital."*

* As Baji Rao wrote to his brother Chimnaji Appa, from the environs of Sawai Jai-nagar on 15th Zul Hijja: "Entrusting my heavy baggage (*bungah*) to Rajah Jagât Raj of Bundelkhand and sending it to Bundelkhand, I became lightly equipped.....Saadat Khan had written to the Emperor and the amirs many such false stories as that he had defeated the Mahratta army which had crossed the Jamuna,—of whom 2,000 horsemen had been slain and 2,000 drowned in the river, including Malhar Holkar and Vitoba Bule,—and that he was driving the Mahrattas back beyond the ChambalThis report had been sent to me by Dhondo Govind.....I decided to go and burn the city of Dihli and make the Emperor see that the Mahrattas exist.....So I started on 26th Zul Qada, leaving the king's highway and making long marches.....Covering forty miles a day, in two marches I arrived at Dihli, near Kushbandi, on 7th Zul Hijja, leaving Barapula and Kalika's temple on my right hand." (*Brahmendra-Swami Charitra*, letter 27.) [J. Sarkar.]

Six days before Samsam-ud-daulah and Saadat Khan had united their forces, Baji Rao was on his way to Dihli, crowding a ten days' journey into two days and nights by continuous travelling. He passed the camps of the Wazir and of Samsam-ud-daulah on each side of him at a distance of a day's march. In the afternoon of the 9th Zul Hijja 1149 (9th April 1737), the vigil of the Feast of Sacrifice, he suddenly appeared at the small hill on which stands the temple of the Hindu goddess Kalka, an ancient place of worship about six miles south of the city near the Khizrabad grove and between the shrines of Nizam-ud-din Auliya and Nasir-ud-din 'the Lamp of Dihli'. Several times a year there are gatherings of worshippers which continue all day and sometimes all night. Traders bring their wares and there is a sort of fair. The day of Baji Rao's arrival being the Ram Navami, commemorating the birth of Ram Chandra, was a fair day. Baji Rao at once, after seizing some elephants and camels coming out of the city, sent his men to slay and to plunder at the temple. After this had been effectually carried out, he and his horsemen rested for the night at Malcha near to the grove at Tal Katora which belonged to the Emperor and was known as Muhammadabad. It is two *kos* from the city wall and four from the palace. The first idea of burning the suburbs was abandoned in order that the Emperor and Samsam-ud-daulah, from whom he expected concessions, should not be driven to extremities. Baji Rao wrote letters to the Emperor and to Rajah Bakht Mal. In reply the Emperor asked him to send in his agent [Dhondo Pant], but Baji Rao declined unless a guard for him came out. But his answer was politely worded and he said that "as he apprehended mischief to the city from the contiguity of his troops, he was about to retire to the *Jhil* tank" (possibly Tal Katora is meant). [Ashob 113*a*, Rustam Ali 273*a*, Baji Rao's letter cited before.]

The plundered fugitives first brought the disastrous news into the city, and thence it was carried into the palace. Clamorous groups of the wounded and plundered assembled at the gates; but when called upon to tell their story, they were in such a state of terror and contradicted each other so

much that the facts could not be arrived at. The Emperor and his courtiers laughed at them. What could Baji Rao have to do at Kalka Devi? It was some small raid of Mewati thieves and nothing more. Why had the traders been so careless and over-confident as to take their goods into a waste place? But doubts still lingered in the minds of the courtiers; and in the afternoon a man disguised as a mendicant was sent to Kalka Malcha and Tal Katora to find out how things stood. The messenger returned before midnight. Appearing before the Emperor he took out of his beggar's wallet a handful of grain, mostly dry unground gram, a few scraps of raw half baked bread devoid of salt and some pods of red pepper.* These were the alms he had received in the Mahratta camp. He told them that in the morning by breakfast time there would be an attack on the city. [Ashob 113b.]

Plans were at once discussed, but they felt that they had little chance of resisting successfully in the open field. At one time they would enter into arguments how these "devils" could have reached Dihli without encountering the two formidable imperial armies already in the field. If those had been defeated, the only thing left for the Emperor and Court was either to demand terms or escape down the Jamuna in boats. Thus, amid much vague and silly talk, unconsidered advice was tendered and useless proposals were brought forward by each man according to his disposition and ability. Sad-uddin Khan, the head of the imperial artillery, although far from a hero, had passed a lifetime in the company of experienced men, had served under Nizam-ul-mulk in the Dakhin, and knew the mode of fighting peculiar to the Mahrattas. Compared to the other courtiers he might be called a renowned warrior. His voice prevailed. It was held to be derogatory for the Emperor to command in person against low fellows, mere ploughmen, like the Mahrattas, while to take refuge altogether behind the fort walls would be even more disgraceful. As

* The red pepper was first crushed by the Mahrattas between stones picked up from those lying about—and then eaten as a relish with the bread.

there were from 10,000 to 12,000 horse and nearly 20,000 foot in the garrison, it was resolved to send these out under the command of the Emperor's favourite Amir Khan, entitled Umdat-ul-mulk Mumtaz-us-sultanat. [Ashob 114b.]

In spite of his many weaknesses Amir Khan was after all a man of noble descent, by nature brave and valiant. There were also other leaders. One was Aghar Khan, son of Aghar Khan the Mughal, who had commanded troops in the Dakhin, and had gained some victories over the Mahrattas. He still had a force of men of his own race, and a considerable number of armed Turkish, Qalmaq and Qarghiz slaves. Another Mughal who offered his services was Mubariz Khan, the superintendent of the mace-bearers. He was the son of the Mubariz Khan governor of Haidarabad who in the year 1137 H. had been defeated and slain by Nizam-ul-mulk. The imperial artillery was placed by Sad-ud-din Khan at the disposal of Amir Khan; while two Rajput officers of the Ambari regiment of the bodyguard, Rajah Shiu Singh and Rajah Ajmeri Singh, joined him with five hundred and two hundred and fifty men respectively. [Ashob 115a, Rustam Ali 273b.]

The Emperor was left in the fort guarded by 3000 of the artillery, 1000 of the Shah Ala regiment, the matchlockmen and artificers, and half of each regiment of the bodyguard, the other half being sent to join Amir Khan. The command of the fort was in the hands of Sad-ud-din Khan. As a precaution in case of disaster, all the boats from the ferries for a distance of fifteen to twenty miles up and down the river were collected and placed under the palace window. If necessary the women of the harem could be embarked on them and thus escape from dishonour. Eunuchs were sent round to all the principal lords to excite them to vigilance while all night long heralds went round from house to house warning the men of the palace guard.

An hour after nightfall Amir Khan drew up his men outside the wicket gate known as the Phatak of Misri Khan. Here he was joined by Aghar Khan and Mubariz Khan. After a council of war they began to entrench themselves from the city to the grove at Tal Katora, their guns being placed at

intervals along this line. There they waited for the Mahrattas to develop their attack. By the time that these preparations were completed the day had dawned ; not a sign of the enemy was to be seen. The defenders' position was strong and looking to the Mahratta distaste for storming entrenchments, it was probable that the Muhammadans would have held their own, had not some of the more fiery and hot-headed of the young nobles insisted on assuming the offensive. [Ashob 115b—116a.]

Chief of these was Mir Hasan Khan Koka, recently created Khan Jahan Bahadur Kokaltash Zafar Jang, whose sole longing was to justify his claim to be in fact as in name 'the Victorious in war'. As the proverb says, "His iron was always in the fire." This young man was good looking and very ambitious to be thought a soldier. Although the son of a man from Iran, he modelled himself in all things on the Pathans of Mau Shamsabad and Shahjahanpur ; his costume from head to foot, his saddlery and equipment, his life and manners, every movement and gesture aped those of the Pathans. Lately he had been appointed by the Emperor to command the imperial escort, a force smaller in numbers than the other bodyguard regiments but more relied on, its men being tried and chosen fighters with good horses and excellent arms. In this sudden peril the regiment was ordered to remain in the palace, a duty which did not accord with Mir Hasan Khan's ambitions. Calling the Emperor a coward for hiding within the fort, Mir Hasan Khan marched his regiment off without orders and joined Amir Khan. [Ashob 116b—117a.]

Hasan Khan's influence prevailed with the younger nobles who were eager for the fray ; and cursing Amir Khan and his friends as arrant cowards, these men led their troops forward into the open.* Directly they appeared in sight, Baji Rao, who was on the alert, mounted and set his troops in array. Ahead he sent five hundred well mounted and well armed Rawat horse (under Satwaji Jadon) to draw the enemy and

* "Near Rikabganj, outside the city, with 7 or 8 thousand troops." (Baji Rao's letter). [J. S.]

discover their strength and position. These skirmishers came on below Tal Katora and Malcha into the plain. When they had arrived an arrow's flight from the line of swivel-pieces they were joined by Baji Rao. He ordered them to charge, to ply their spears and lay about them with their long straight swords. Against them were Mir Hasan Khan and other youths such as the sons of Kokaltash Khan, young Koka Khan, and other swashbucklers, experienced in street brawls but ignorant of real war. The brothers and sons of Shiu Singh and Ajmeri Singh Rajputs were also there. Looking on Baji Rao and his scanty force as an easy prey, they advanced at the head of about two thousand horse, paying no heed to the remonstrances of the older men, whom they accused of want of spirit. [Ashob 117a.]

Baji Rao recognized at once by the way they rode and their reins, that they were unsteady inexperienced troops. To lure them on he made his men retreat once or twice, and as these gave way the Muhammadans grew bolder and pursued more hotly. They were soon two miles from their supports under Amir Khan, and beyond Tal Katora on the farther side of it from the city. Satwaji Jadon sent back notice that the Muhammadans were coming on. In a moment Malhar Holkar, followed by Ranuji Sindhia, had turned and was upon them. With spear and sword busily at work they rode down the Muhammadans, wounding severely and unhorsing fully a thousand of them. Many of them bore the marks of their wounds to their dying day. Close on a thousand riderless horses were captured with their saddles and gorgeous equipments in scarlet and gold. Baji Rao reported 600 Muhammadans killed and wounded, 2000 horses and one elephant taken. On the Mahratta side very few men were lost and only one officer was wounded.* [Ashob 117b, Rustam Ali 273b.]

Meanwhile Mir Hasan Khan fled in the extremest perturba-

* Baji Rao writes, "Rajah Shiu Singh and ten or twelve other *darbari* nobles were slain, Mir Hasan Khan was wounded, 250 to 300 of the Emperor's bodyguards fell, 400 men were wounded.....Khans fled into the city, 2,000 horses were captured, 5 or 6 thousand fled; Indraj Kadam, an officer of Ranuji Sindhia, had two of his fingers shot off." [J. S.]

tion towards Amir Khan's army. Before he could reach a place of safety he was overtaken and with one prod of a lance point unseated; his horse was seized, his fine clothes and weapons taken, and he was left bleeding on the ground. If any wounded follower came up and appealed to him by his titles, he threw dust on his head and made humble obeisance saying "For God's sake, be quiet! If you use titles to me the enemy will recognize me and I shall have to pay an enormous ransom." Koka Khan was killed outright. Rajah Shiu Singh when he saw the disgrace that his sons and relatives had brought on themselves rode out from the earthworks to their aid. The beaten horsemen could not be rallied and Shiu Singh was left alone. The Mahrattas surrounded him and though he defended himself, as a brave man should do, he was in the end cut down and killed. On the other hand Ajmeri Singh, one of the greatest boasters, was the first to flee; also many of his followers being badly mounted were overtaken, wounded by sword and lance, and unhorsed, yielding up their arms to their captors. Deprived of all they possessed, they slunk naked and on foot through Amir Khan's ranks and crept back into the city with loud cries and lamentations to the intense alarm of the inhabitants.

This alarm was renewed when the dead and severely wounded were brought in by their relations. Quitting their posts in Amir Khan's division these men had made their way to Paharganj (south-west of the city) and the neighbourhood, where they collected cots from the shop-keepers. The corpses were laid in these cots and carried through the city lanes to their dwellings. The citizens prepared for flight and the contagion of terror spread to the fort and the palace. In a very short time the Mahrattas who were gathered watching events near the small hill of Malcha would have found their way unopposed into the city. [Ashob 118b—119a.]

RETREAT OF BAJI RAO FROM DIHLI.

The danger of the city being sacked disappeared as suddenly as it had arisen. Instead of advancing on the town

Baji Rao went off towards Mahramnagar*, and Sarai Allahwirdi Khan. At once Amir Khan sent off an express with the joyful tidings to the palace. There they were more depressed and fearful even than those in the open field. The Emperor had sat in the privy council hall from a little after midnight holding open Court and discussing the measures to be adopted. Every messenger who reached the city had to fight his way from the city gate to the fort gate, and thence to the presence chamber through a huge crowd of eager askers for news. Mounted men were now despatched towards Sarai Allahwirdi Khan to verify the intelligence; and reaching Mahramnagar they found that place entirely evacuated by the enemy. [Ashob 119b.]

The reason of this sudden flight was this: During the progress of the action with Mir Hasan Khan, Baji Rao heard that the Wazir and his Mughals on their return march to Dihli were at no great distance. The Wazir's vanguard was commanded by Zahir-ud-daulah Azim-ullah Khan, the Wazir's cousin, and the rearguard by Ghazi-ud-din Khan Bahadur Firuz Jang, eldest son of Nizam-ul-mulk. With these two reassuring pieces of news, the flight of Baji Rao and the arrival of the Wazir, Amir Khan returned to the palace and was received in audience. [Ashob 121a.]

SEC. 93.—BATTLE BETWEEN BAJI RAO AND THE WAZIR.

On learning that the Wazir and his army were drawing near, Baji Rao abandoned his attempt to take Dihli. About midday he left the field, by the time of evening prayer he was beyond Sarai Allahwirdi Khan, and had reached a place called Badshahpur,† 20 miles from Dihli. Here the Wazir confronted him. Both sides had reached the ground after long marching

* Ashob 121a says that Mahramnagar is 7 *kos* from Dihli. It has a *bagh* and a *sarai*, very handsome and well-kept; founded by Mahram Khan, eunuch of the Wazir Itimad-ud-daulah Chin Bahadur Nusrat Jang. There is a market-place named after the eunuch. Sarai Allahwirdi Khan (*Ind. Atlas* 49 S. E.), 16 m. s. w. of Dihli and one mile n. of the Gurgaon Railway Station.

† Ashob says that *Badshahpur* is 15 *kos* from Dihli. There is a

and neither had time to form order of battle, or get their artillery into place. The Wazir, conscious of the fact that daylight would soon be gone, that twilight was upon them, that in a moment or two it would be night, forbade an engagement. In addition his men were quite exhausted, having come eighty or ninety miles over hills and through jungle by forced marches. In fact, only half of the army had yet arrived, the other half being still involved in the stony region of Mahabatabad ; and with the exception of the artillery attached to the general's escort, a few light swivel guns, and a few war rockets loaded on swift camels, there was no artillery ; the big guns were still on the march. Altogether the army was in no condition for giving battle. [Ashob 122a.]

But Zahir-ud-daulah had sworn on oath to attack the Mahrattas wherever he found them. Possessed by this idea and enraged at the affront done to the Emperor by the attack on Dihli, he drove his elephant on, taking with him his flying artillery and some other troops, and moving a little ahead of the Wazir, managed bit by bit to get away from him altogether. He sent back a message that being quite close and in touch with the enemy he intended to attack, and asked the Wazir to follow in support with his whole force. Then after breathing a prayer he drove his elephant forward with the shout "God is great". On the other side the Mahrattas marched out to meet him.* Champions on both sides issued from the ranks with weapons ready and fell upon each other. The general ordered his big kettledrums to play and brought his artillery and matchlockmen into action. Baji Rao replied with the roll of his drums and the blare of his trumpets. He then came on and with his vanguard attacked repeatedly the advancing

Badshahpur in the Gurgaon district, 20 miles s. w. of Dihli and 6 miles south of Gurgaon station. The Wazir had been at Kama 12 m. n. of Dig and 27 m. west of Mathura [Rustam Ali 273a], whence he had hurried back to Dihli on hearing of Baji Rao's arrival. There is a *Mahabatabad Kotera*, 17 m. s. of Dihli and 10 m. e. of Badshahpur. (*Ind. Atlas* 49 S. E.) [W. Irvine.] *Sarai Allahwirdi Khan* is one mile north of Gurgaon railway station and 7 m. n. of Badshahpur.

* Ashob had two elder brothers in Janish Khan's division of the Wazir's

Muhammadans. The Wazir soon arrived in support of Zahir-ud-daulah. [Ashob 122a.]

The combined attack proved too strong for Baji Rao and his men. When night had fallen he began a retreat towards Rajputana. He had lost thirty men, and according to his own account he moved eight miles to the westward of the field of battle. Before the day dawned on the morning of the *Id* (10th April 1737) he was beyond Kot Patili, 93 miles from the capital. That day he marched on steadily all day long until he reached Narnol.* There he passed the night, but early in the morning resumed his flight, and in all haste went on to Ajmer. As the Wazir had come a tiring journey of over a hundred miles, his men and their horses were so tired out that no pursuit was possible. The wounded were attended to and the dead buried, while the rest of the army stood to their arms until dawn. As it was the festival day of the Sacrifice, the due rites were performed in a tent that had been erected for the purpose outside the camp; and the appointed largess was distributed. [Ashob 124b.]

force. They and Mir Ghiyas-ud-din had ridden ahead as scouts and came across Baji Rao and his Muhammadan mistress Mastani seated on one saddle cover, drinking and singing while they rested. The presence of these scouts was the first intimation the Mahrattas received of the arrival of the Mughals. Mastani, a *kanchani* or dancing-girl, followed Baji Rao on all his expeditions and never left his side. She rode on a tall horse, stirrup to stirrup with him, and was as good as any Mahratta in horsemanship, spear throwing and sword play.

* Baji Rao's letter (cited above) passes lightly over his repulse from the environs of Dihli. He writes: "After the flight of Mir Hasan Khan..... I halted at Jhil-talao. It was four hours (*ghatika*) to nightfall when I received the news of Qamar-ud-din Khan coming *via* Badshahpur. I immediately got ready and advanced. Our armies met in conflict. On reaching Bara, an elephant was captured by Jaswant Rao Puar. The horses and camels came to the camp. By this the sun set. If I rested at night, the Mughals would surround me.....The Jhil-talao was 16 *kos* off, on my Right was Qamar-ud-din Khan, behind me the City. On Thursday Khan-i-Dauran, Saadat Khan and Muhammad Khan Bangash would effect their junction with Qamar-ud-din. Therefore, leaving the Mughals [behind], I encamped 4 *kos* off. On our side Firangji Patankar was shot dead, 10 or 5 others wounded; the Mughals lost 10 or 5 killed, 10 or 20 wounded.

On the day after the battle after the time of midday prayer Samsam-ud-daulah reached the camp of the Wazir. When at Gao Ghat on the Jamuna, some fourteen miles north-west of Agra, he had heard of Baji Rao's sudden dash upon Dihli. He had come from Gao Ghat to Dihli in three days of continuous marching. Every twelve or fifteen hours a short halt was called for resting and feeding man and beast. On the 11th Zul Hijja (11th April) during the afternoon Saadat Khan too arrived. After defeating Pilaji Jadon he had gone to Agra but hearing of Baji Rao's movement on Dihli had marched in that direction with all possible celerity. [Ashob 124b.]

The three chiefs exchanged formal visits and held counsel together. As Baji Rao was already beyond Narnol and close to Ajmer whence he would soon pass into Malwa, pursuit was held to be useless. Even after long and painful marching through hot winds and heat like hell fire, they could not hope to come up with the enemy. They resolved instead to proceed to Court to congratulate the Emperor on the holy festival, and compliment him on the escape from a great calamity. On reaching the city they were received in audience. Saadat Khan was ordered back to his province and Muhammad Khan Bangash who had arrived with Samsam-ud-daulah was sent off to guard Agra, while the other two nobles repaired to their mansions in the city. So far as they were concerned campaigning was at an end for that year. Having returned to Gwalior Baji Rao proposed to re-cross the Jamuna and re-enter the Duaba, but fear of Nizam-ul-mulk's interference in Malwa restrained him, and in the end he marched for the Dakhin and from Satara proceeded at once into the Konkan. Having received a promise of the Malwa Government in addition to a sum of thirteen lakhs of Rupees, he again opened negotiations with Samsam-ud-daulah in the capital. [Ashob 125a.]

With a view to draw the Mughals behind me, get them under control [lit. restraint] and thus defeat them, I began my [retreat] march. I have come by way of Rewari, Kot Patili and Manoharpur. All the Mughals [i.e., the Wazir and the three Khans] are encamped from Allahwirdi to Jhil-talao." [J. S.]

SEC. 94.—CAMPAIGN OF 1150-51 H.—20TH YEAR OF MD. SHAH.

(1st October 1737—30th June 1738)

By this time the opinion prevailed that Nizam-ul-mulk was the only man who could save the monarchy and stem the on-coming flood of Mahratta invasion. Hitherto he had been kept away from Court by Samsam-ud-daulah who "brooked no rival near the throne." Qamar-ud-din Khan, the chief minister, was so quiescent as to provoke little or no jealousy, but Nizam-ul-mulk was a different sort of man. He was also suspected, with some reason, of protecting his own territories in the Dakhin against the Mahratta inroads by diverting them instead into the country north of the Narmada, to which end he had agreed to their claims to one-fourth of the Dakhin revenues [*Ahwal-i-khawāqin*, 240b]. Even Samsam-ud-daulah at last began to think that affairs were in a condition with which he was no longer able to cope, and he became an advocate of a reconciliation with Nizam-ul-mulk. The Emperor was soon brought over to the same view and pressing letters of invitation were sent to the Dakhin governor.

Apparently Nizam-ul-mulk still retained the ambition of directing the Mughal Empire as its chief minister, a position that in name at least was far greater than that of a provincial governor however powerful, and was thus not unwilling to accept the invitation of Muhammad Shah in spite of the arguments to the contrary addressed to him by his counsellors. The Nawab who was at Burhanpur was for a time deterred from his purpose owing to trouble raised in Berar by some of Baji Rao's commanders, supposed to be acting under the direct inspiration of that leader, who hoped thereby to keep Nizam-ul-mulk in the Dakhin, or to use his own expression 'to put heel ropes upon him'. Sayyid Jamal Khan was sent off towards Berar, and in a few days crossing the Dewalghat entered that province with 1000 horse and 1500 foot. Goriya the Mahratta leader retreated before him and Jamal Khan encamped at Mangrul* where there is a shrine dedicated to Shah Badr-ud-

* *Dewalghat*, about 65 m. s. of Burhanpur and 5 m. from the western

din. When Jamal Khan reached the open country round Basim he was attacked by the Mahrattas whom he repulsed and pursued until they left the province. He then returned and made his report to Nizam-ul-mulk. [*Ahwal-i-khawaqin*, 241-246.]

Being re-assured as to the safety of his own dominions, Nizam-ul-mulk at length started from Burhanpur on the 17th Zul Hijja 1149 H. (17th April 1737), and after crossing the Narmada proceeded by way of Sironj. Yar Muhammad son of Dost Muhammad Khan of Bhupal and other local chiefs joined him. Pilaji Jadon also visited Nizam-ul-mulk and made a pretended submission, then left for his home in the Dakhin. The march northwards was soon resumed and after some difficult stages whence they suffered from scarcity of supplies the camp reached Gwaliyar. Passing through Agra they were soon in the neighbourhood of Dihli which was reached on the 15th Rabi I. 1150 H. (12th July 1737). [*Ahwal* 245a, *Mirat-us-saffa* 63a.]

At Hodal, 55 miles from the capital, Nizam-ul-mulk was met by the Wazir Qamar-ud-din Khan and all his Mughal troops. The Wazir's harem was also of the party, Nizam-ul-mulk being the head of the whole family by reason of age. After thirteen or fourteen years' separation his eldest son Ghazi-ud-din Khan Firuz Jang had now the pleasure of seeing his father, and presenting his newly married consort Qamar-un-nissa Begam (eldest daughter of the Wazir). Next day the progress to the capital was resumed stage by stage. The Wazir and Nizam-ul-mulk rode on one elephant followed by the Wazir's daughter who displayed all the state and retinue that she had brought from her father's house as part of her marriage outfit. She was attended by 50 to 60 young women servants, all of one age, of Turki, Qalmaq and Qarghiz race, dressed in cloth of gold and adorned with jewels. Over all they wore long cloaks of brocade trimmed with gold lace,—on their heads velvet or cloth of gold handkerchiefs, held on with chains and rings of

boundary of the Buldana district. *Mangrul* is 85 m. from it and 20 m. n. e. of Basim town in Berar.

gold, and over their faces veils sewn with pearls which left the face quite visible. They surrounded the Begam mounted on horses holding gold and silver sticks in their hand. At their backs hung a bow case with bow and arrows. [Ashob 126b.]

By the Emperor's express order Nizam-ul-mulk advanced with drums beating.* At short intervals the cortége was met by eunuchs and pages sent from the palace with presents and enquiries and pressing messages to hasten onward and relieve His Majesty of his anxiety. Nizam-ul-mulk caused his elephant to kneel and descending made obeisance for the honour thus done him. Crowds thronged the road and impeded progress. Within the city the roofs of the shops and houses were covered with sightseers; while mendicants "thicker than flies at a sweetmeat-seller's shop" gathered round the Nawab's elephant paying no heed to the sticks and bamboos with which the attendants tried to drive them off. His elephant could do no more than creep along and it was not till after midday that they reached the Dihli gate of the fort. Here Nizam-ul-mulk entered his litter, old and plainly fitted with broadcloth, while the Wazir used one fringed with pearls and covered with cloth of gold. The Wazir allowed Nizam-ul-mulk to be one or two paces in advance of him. At the Drum house they alighted and hand in hand looking neither to right nor left entered the privy audience-hall. On coming before the Emperor he made his offering and was honoured in return with a robe from the Emperor's own wardrobe and a jacket called a *charqab*, worn only by members of the Chaghatai house² descended from Timur. The highest title that a subject could bear, that of *Asaf Jah*, that is, equal in dignity to Asaf the minister of King Solomon, was also conferred upon him. The mansion built by Sadullah Khan, the finest in Dihli, had been prepared for his quarters, and at the close of the day trays of food were sent from the imperial kitchen by the hands of eunuchs, and this practice was continued daily. [Ashob 128a.]

* By the etiquette of the Court, no noble could beat his drums within 3 miles of the Emperor's residence.

SEC. 95.—NIZAM, BESIEGED BY BAJI RAO AT BHUPAL,
MAKES HUMILIATING PEACE.

About a month afterwards, on the 17th Rabi II. 1150 H. (13th August 1737), the Nawab's eldest son Ghazi-ud-din Khan Firuz Jang was appointed governor of Agra *vice* Rajah Jai Singh and of Malwa *vice* Baji Rao Mahratta. The condition attached to these appointments was that Nizam-ul-mulk should advance into Malwa against the Mahrattas. After the rains of 1737 were over, the march began, his troops numbering thirty thousand in addition to his train of artillery which was accounted the best in India. At Agra Muhi-ud-din Quli Khan, a great grandson of Sadullah Khan and therefore a cousin of Nizam-ul-mulk, was left as deputy governor. It was decided to abandon the direct route across the Chambal to Gwaliyar. In coming from the Dakhin great difficulties had been experienced by this route. For many miles the banks on each side of the Chambal are cut into deep ravines, full at the bottom of either sticky clay or stagnant water, the road allows of only one man at a time, and even that with difficulty, thus troops have to march in single file, there is great want of drinking water, the villages to be found here and there are the abode of dexterous thieves and robbers. To avoid this country the army crossed the Jamuna below Agra and marched eastwards through Etawa and recrossing the same river at Kalpi passed into the Bundela country, where several of their Rajahs joined. Proceeding *via* Dhamoni and Sironj the army at length reached Bhupal tank in Malwa. Orders were sent to the Nawab's second son Mir Ahmad Khan (Nasir Jang) to try and prevent Baji Rao from leaving the Dakhin. [Khush-hal 1082, Ashob 130b, *Sujan Charitra* of Sudam 4a.]

The attempt to hinder Baji Rao's march was a failure,* partly for want of time, and partly from the defection of Nasir Jang's Mahratta allies. Although Jaswant Rao Dhabariya the

* From this point to the end of the chapter Grant Duff alone has been followed. The Marathi materials on which Grant Duff's account is based have been printed in *Brahmendra S. Charitra*, letters 33-36, 132, and 134. Also Rajwade, vi. No. 117. [J.S.]

senapati and his officers and also Raghuji Bhonsla of Nagpur kept aloof from him, Baji Rao was still able to assemble an army of eighty thousand men with which he crossed the Narmada by way of Khargona near Punashah [in the Nimar district]. At that time Nizam-ul-mulk was at Sironj. In December 1737 the two armies came into contact near Bhupal. Instead of boldly advancing on his enemy Nizam-ul-mulk took up a strong position in the neighbourhood of the fort with the tank on his rear and a rivulet [or *nullah*] on his front. This excess of caution was fatal ; the Mahrattas had believed themselves to be overmatched ; but now they at once assumed the offensive.* They plundered up to the very lines of the army.

One division of the imperialists came out and offered battle on ground they had themselves chosen. The Mahrattas nothing loth attacked with vigour under the leadership of Ranuji Sindhia, Pilaji Jadon and Sayaji Gujar. On the imperialist side the defence was maintained chiefly by the Rajputs, the troops of Rajah Jai Singh of Amber led by his son, the Bundelas and the Hadas, (except the Hada Rajah of Bundi, who did not join Nizam-ul-mulk). The Rajputs lost about five hundred men and seven hundred horses ; the Mahrattas, principally from the artillery fire, one hundred killed and three hundred wounded.†

* Baji Rao writes, "The Nizam's army took refuge in Bhupal fort. I set off against him on 3rd Ramzan [24th Dec. 1737]. He has with him the son of Sawai Jai Singh, Sabha Singh Bundela, his own son Ghazi-ud-din, Jats, Ahirs, Rohelas, Rajputs.....[in all] 50,000 troopers. Saadat Khan's nephew and the Kota Rajah are coming to his aid with 20,000 more men....." "The Nizam is a great *amir*; his army is 30 or 40 thousand strong, furnished with many *hatn-nal*, *shutar-nal*, *barqandazes* and *rahkala*. And yet he hides himself in a fort! This is not creditable to him." [J. Sarkar.]

† Baji Rao writes that he fought this battle on 3rd Ramzan [*Brahm.* letter 34], but a letter in Rajwade vi. No. 117 gives 4th Ramzan [25th Dec.] as the date. As for the casualties, Baji Rao says, "The Rajputs lost 150 men in killed, we 50 or 60, while two or four hundred were wounded ; about 100 horses were killed and five to seven hundred were wounded..... The artillery of the Nizam did severe execution" [No. 331. Rajwade, vi. letter 117. gives a different account, but it is unreliable. [J. S.]

During the engagement Baji Rao stood two rocket flights from the Nizam's position waiting for a chance of cutting him off should he quit the strong ground on which he stood. No opportunity was offered; nor did the Mahrattas gain any decisive advantage. But the Nizam recalled his troops.

After this action the imperialists were hemmed in more thickly than ever, provisions and forage becoming in a few days exceedingly scarce. Safdar Jang, nephew of Saadat Khan governor of Oudh, and the Hada Rajah of Kota when marching to the relief of the beleaguered army were intercepted and defeated by Malhar Rao Holkar and Jaswant Rao Puar. Safdar Jang retreated and the blockade became still stricter. All supplies were cut off and the men kept on the alert day and night. The Rajputs were willing to desert, but Baji Rao would admit of no overtures, for the greater the numbers the sooner would be his triumph.* Baji Rao wondered how Nizam-ul-mulk could have allowed himself to get into such a difficulty. "He is an old and experienced man, I cannot comprehend how he got himself into this difficulty; it will ruin him in the opinion of all India."

Help was called for from Hindustan and the Dakhin. From the former nothing much could be hoped for; Samsam-ud-daulah was not altogether displeased at Nizam-ul-mulk's failure. The Emperor's order that no advance was to be made until he should march in person, was equivalent to saying that no march should be made at all. More was hoped for from the Dakhin; and thither messengers were sent to urge the utmost haste. The Nawab's son Nasir Jang, having collected what troops he could from Haidarabad and Aurangabad, moved out as far as Phulmari. On his side Baji Rao invoked the aid of Rajah Sahu,

* Baji Rao writes, "The Nizam is entrenched in the city of Bhupal. There is famine in his camp, grain is selling at four seers a Rupee. His elephants and horses are starving. The Rajputs and the Nizam are distrustful of each other. They cannot flee away as he has kept all their baggage in the city.....Malhar Rao Holkar, Ranuji Sindhia and Jaswant Rao Puar have defeated Mir Manu Khan, the faujdar of Shahjahanpur, who was coming to the aid of the Nizam, near *Dārāi Sarai* and killed 1500 of his men." [No. 33.] [J. S.]

by whom a peremptory order was sent to the senapati then at Songarh near Surat. Baji Rao's own earnest appeals to Raghuji Bhonsla at Nagpur met with no response. The Peshwa's brother Chimnaji Appa, however, took up a position on the Tapti ready to oppose the march of the Muhammadans from Aurangabad. Before the two forces could come to blows news came that Nizam-ul-mulk had made terms with Baji Rao.

Nizam-ul-mulk had made an attempt to move, but encumbered by heavy baggage and stores he was compelled to return ; his troops were driven under the walls or crowded within the fortifications of Bhupal. Having no artillery Baji Rao was unable to effect a breach, but his rockets and matchlock fire so quelled the Mughals that another attempt to break through was resolved upon. The baggage having been deposited in Bhupal and Islamgarh, the retreat began under cover of a powerful field artillery and numbers of swivel guns carried on camels. The Mahrattas charged, but failed to take the guns. But the retreating force covered no more than three miles a day and the Mahrattas continued to harass them. In time however the Mahrattas began to lose heart owing to the execution done by the other side's guns. At length Nizam-ul-mulk submitted to making terms and on the 26th Ramzan 1150 H. (16th January 1738) at Durai [Duraha] Sarai, 64 miles from Sironj, a convention was signed. In his own handwriting Nizam-ul-mulk promised to grant to Baji Rao (1) the whole of Malwa, (2) the complete sovereignty of the territory between the Narmada and the Chambal, (3) to obtain confirmation thereof from the Emperor, and (4) to use his best endeavours to obtain fifty lakhs of Rupees to pay Baji Rao's expenses.* Nothing could be got from the

* Baji Rao writes, "I fought the Nizam on 3rd Ramzan [24th Dec.] and then invested his army. Famine raged in his camp; grass could not be had. So, he sent.....to me to negotiate for terms. (Long negotiations)... On 15th Ramzan [5th Jan. 1738] I marched out and halted one kos off; the Nizam then came out and encamped beyond the lake.....Next morning he retreated to Bhupal, fighting with his artillery. But we have blockaded him as closely as we did Muhammad Khan Bangash." [No. 34.] "Leaving his baggage partly in Bhupal and partly in Islamgarh, and continuing the peace talk, he is marching away at the rate of a kos or 1½ kos a day."

Nawab himself, Baji Rao having already experienced six years before his unwillingness to part with his money. In Zul Hijja 1150 H. (April 1738) Nizam-ul-mulk re-entered Dihli, where already a new danger, the invasion of Nadir Shah, the new king of Persia, began to threaten the tottering Empire. [*Mirat-us-saffa*, 63 b.]

Our forces, hovering around him, have entirely cut off his grain grass and fuel supply. Rice is selling at one Rupee a seer in his camp, and even at that price many cannot obtain it. His horses are eating the leaves of the *Butea frondosa*. On 25th Ramzan [15th January] his Muslim troops ate up the artillery draught oxen, while the Rajputs were utterly fasting. Then he quickly settled the peace terms.....his agent being Aya Mal." Then follow the terms embodied in the text. (No. 35). [J. Sarkar.]

CHAPTER XI

INTERNAL CONDITION OF INDIA IN 1738— RISE AND PROGRESS OF NADIR SHAH.

[By the Editor]

SEC. 97.—DEGENERATION OF MUGHAL ARISTOCRACY.

The invasion of Nadir Shah involved the Mughal Empire in disgrace spoliation and dismemberment. It was, however, not a cause of the decline of the Empire, but one of the clearest symptoms of that decline. The Persian conqueror merely revealed to the world a fact accomplished long before. He broke the spell under which men had been regarding a gorgeously dressed corpse as a strong man.

How was the work of Akbar and Shah Jahan, Man Singh and Mir Jumla, thus undone? Why did the seemingly flourishing State of Aurangzeb fall down like a house of cards only 31 years after his death? In reviewing the history of these 31 years, we find first of all a startling decline in the character of the nobility and the efficiency of the army. For this the havoc of civil war was to some extent responsible. In the thirteen years following the death of Aurangzeb, seven bloody battles of succession* had been fought among his descendants in which large numbers of Princes nobles and the best soldiers had perished. Equally destructive of officers and men were the armed contests between rival nobles. For instance, the Nizam could confirm himself in the viceroyalty of the Dakhin only after defeating three rivals. For the governorship of Gujarat there were three ruinous encounters in which Shujaat Khan and Rustam Ali Khan fell and Sarbuland Khan was defeated.

* Bahadur Shah two, Jahandar Shah three, Farrukh-siyar one, and Muhammad Shah one.

The loss caused by domestic discord among the Mughals themselves was multiplied by the slaughter in operations against rebels like the Sikhs, Jats, Bundelas and Mahrattas and on two occasions against the Rathors. The gaps thus created in the ranks of the martial nobility were not filled by the natural succession of worthy offspring, nor by the rise of new men from the commonalty and recruits from abroad in sufficient number and of the right quality. To the thoughtful student of Mughal history nothing is more striking than the decline of the peerage. The heroes adorn the stage for one generation only and leave no worthy heirs sprung from their loins. Abdur-rahim and Mahabat, Sadullah and Mir Jumla, Ibrahim and Islam Khan Rumi,—who had made the history of India in the 17th century,—were succeeded by no son, certainly by no grandson even half as capable as themselves. In reading the huge biographical dictionary of the Mughal peerage (the *Masir-ul-umara* in 3 volumes of 900 pages each), one frequently comes across such entries as these: "This nobleman (naming a general or minister of the first rank) died in such and such a year; he left two sons who did not attain to much advancement" or that "he had three sons none of whom did anything worthy of being recorded here." Often, while the career of the founder of the family occupies eight or ten pages in this dictionary, his son's achievements are exhausted in half a page, and the grandson meets with a bare mention which he earns merely because he is his father's son.

Throughout the Mughal period, the best Muslim recruits for civil administration and war alike were foreign adventurers or converted Hindus. The strong and efficient exotics rapidly deteriorated on the Indian soil. Therefore, while the infusion of fresh blood into the nobility from the indigenous Muhammadan population and the foreign immigrants permanently settled in this country did not take place, the only hope of the continued life and vigour of the State lay in the regular flow of the right type of recruits from Bukhara and Khurasan, Iran and Arabia. When this flow stopped, the Empire shrivelled up like a tree cut off from its sap.

SEC. 98.—ALIENATION OF THE HINDUS AND SHIAS.

Akbar had guarded against this danger by making the first beginnings of the conversion of a military monarchy into a national State,—in effect, though not in constitutional form. He tried to range the Hindu warrior tribes behind his hired foreign troops, as the second and more reliable line of defence for his throne. Under him and his successors, Hindu Rajput soldiers had carried the Mughal banners to the banks of the Oxus and the Helmand in the west and those of the Brahmaputra and the Karnafuli in the east. They had garrisoned the Khaibar Pass, defended Garhgaon against the Ahoms and stormed Chatgaon from the Burmese. But Aurangzeb's attempt to annex Jodhpur on the death of his old servant Jaswant Singh, his invasion of Mewar, his incessant destruction of Hindu temples and his rigorous imposition of the hated poll-tax (*jaziya*), not only alienated the Rajput clans, but convinced all other Hindu races of India that they had no lot or part in the Mughal State and that for the preservation of their honour and liberty of conscience they must look elsewhere. This was the opportunity of the Mahrattas. This belief, rooted deep in the minds of the Hindu officers and vassals of Aurangzeb, made them indifferent or secretly hostile to their master's cause during his wars with Shivaji and his successors. To the Rajputs and Bundelas, who had so long been the staunchest supports of the Mughal cause, the Mahratta hero appeared as their heaven-sent deliverer,—a Rama slaying Ravana or a Krishna slaying Kansa. This feeling breathes in every line of the Hindi poet Bhushan's numberless odes on Shivaji. He really voices in smooth and vigorous numbers the unspoken thoughts of the millions of Hindus all over India. At the end of the 17th century they had come to regard the Mughal Government as Satanic and refused to co-operate with it.

By appealing to this feeling, Baji Rao I. easily entered Malwa and then made his hold upon that province good. He united the local Hindu chieftains as well as the neighbouring Rajputs of Jaipur and Mewar with the Mahrattas in an alliance against the oppressors of their common religion (*dharmā*).

This point comes out very clearly in Sawai Jai Singh's letter to Nandalal Mandaloi (the chaudhuri of Indor), after the latter had treacherously caused an immense slaughter of his master's troops by his collusion with the Mahrattas (October 1731): "A thousand praises to you, because you, in sole reliance upon my word and with a view to benefit your *dharma*, have destroyed the Muslims in Malwa and firmly established *dharma* there. You have fulfilled my heart's wishes." [Sardesai, ii. 369.]

In the brief space of thirty-one years after Aurangzeb's death, his successors had to wage war, and more than once, with the Sikhs, Jats, Bundelas, Rathors Kachhwahas, and Sisodias. Thus, no Hindu tribe of military value was left on the side of the Emperor. In addition to this, the Mahrattas were an open sore which drained the life-blood of the Empire and steadily reduced its size. The Hindus not only ceased to be loyal vassals of the Later Mughals, but became open enemies against whom large forces had to be diverted by the Emperor in his day of danger from foreign invasion.

The Persians are the cleverest race among the children of Islam. But they stand aloof from the rest of the Muslim world by reason of their belief in the hereditary right of the Prophet's son-in-law to his succession (*khilafat*). Their faith of Shia-ism is a heresy in the eyes of the immense majority of Musalmans, including those of Northern India, who are Sunnis. The liberal Akbar, the self-indulgent Jahangir, and the cultured Shah Jahan had welcomed Shias in their camps and Courts and given them the highest offices, especially in the secretariat and revenue administration, in which their genius naturally shone most. But the orthodox Aurangzeb had barely tolerated them as a necessary evil. In his reign the Shias felt that they were not wanted by him. Many striking examples of his anti-Shia bias are found in his letters and the anecdotes* about him compiled by his favourite Hamid-ud-din Khan. The populace were still more hostile to these heretics. The proposal of Bahadur Shah to read the *khutba* with a single Shia epithet,

* *Ahkam-i-Alamgiri*, ed. and tr. by J. Sarkar, sec. iv.

led to a riot at Lahor in 1712. Some years later, at Hasanabad near the capital of Kashmir, 2500 Shias were massacred by the Sunnis. [K. K. ii. 870.] Thus, to the ambitious and gifted Shia adventurers of Persia, India ceased to be a welcome home, or a field where the highest career was open to their talent.

SEC. 99.—WEAK CHARACTER OF LATER MUGHALS.

The decline of the Mughal nobility was mainly due to the decline in the character of the Emperor, because it is the first duty of a sovereign to choose the right sort of servants and give them opportunities for developing their talent and acquiring experience by instructing and supervising them during their administrative apprenticeship. In his private letters, Aurangzeb frequently complains of the lack of able officers during his reign as compared with the glorious days of Akbar and Shah Jahan: *az na-yabi-e-adam-i-ḡar ah ! ah !* But the following wise saying of the great Wazir Sadullah Khan, which Aurangzeb himself quotes with approval, is a deserved rebuke to such pessimism: "No age is wanting in able men ; it is the business of wise masters to find them out, win them over, and get work done by means of them, without listening to the calumnies of selfish men against them." [*Ruqat-i-Alamgiri*, No. 46.]

In fact, the deterioration in the character of the Emperors must be held to be the primary cause of the decline in the character of the nobility and the downfall of the Empire. The suspicious watchfulness of Aurangzeb and the excessive paternal love of his successors kept the Princes at Court or caused them to be over-chaperoned in their provincial Governments, thus preventing the development of any initiative or business capacity among them. The heirs to the throne of Dihli in the 18th century grew up utterly helpless and dependent upon others, without any independence of thought, fearlessness in assuming responsibility, or capacity to decide and act promptly. Their intellect and spirits were dulled and they found diversion only in the society of harem women buffoons and flatterers. When such Princes came to the throne, if they were wise they would leave the entire administration in the hands of able

Wazirs,—which provoked factious envy among the other ministers ; and if they were foolish, they constantly resorted to intrigue for subverting one too-powerful minister only to fall into the hands of another.

The *faineant* Emperor could not and would not govern the country himself, and yet he had not the wisdom to choose the right man as his Wazir and give him his full confidence and support. He was easily led away by the whispers of eunuchs and flatterers, and issued orders for the dismissal of old ministers and provincial governors in the vain hope of getting more money or greater servility from their successors.

Thus the nobles found that career was not open to talent, that loyal and useful service was no security against capricious dismissal and degradation, that their property and family honour were not always safe in such a Court. Their only hope of personal safety and advancement lay in asserting their independence and establishing provincial dynasties of their own. And such a course was also conducive to the good of the people of the province. They could enjoy peace and prosperity only under an independent local dynasty. For, so long as their rulers were sent from the distant imperial Court, every succeeding day a new favourite might beg or buy the viceroyalty, come with a new letter of appointment, and try to oust his predecessor. Whether these attempts succeeded or failed, the result was the same : the province was filled with war and the rumours of war, plunder, the withholding of taxes, and the closing of the roads. The history of Gujarat under Muhammad Shah graphically illustrates the point.

SEC. 100.—FORMATION OF FACTIONS AT COURT AND ITS EFFECT.

When Nadir Shah invaded India, the three highest ministers of State were Asaf Jah Nizam-ul-mulk (the *Wakil-i-mutlaq* or Regent Plenipotentiary), Itimad-ud-daulah Qamar-ud-din Khan (the *Wazir* or Chancellor) and Khwaja Asim entitled Samsam-ud-daulah Khan Dauran (the *Amir-ul-umara* and *Bakhshi-ul-mamalik* or Head of the Army). Among the provincial governors the highest (if we exclude the Nizam and the semi-independent subahdar of Bengal) was Saadat Khan Burhan-ul-mulk, the

subahdar of Oudh and most prominently in the running for a ministership at Court. Of these, we may leave Khan Dauran out, as he was a carpet knight and Court flatterer, without any administrative capacity or experience. The Nizam had been born in Samargand and had migrated to India in boyhood to seek his fortune under the Mughal banner. The same was the case with Qamar-ud-din Khan the Wazir, who was his cousin. Saadat Khan was a native of Khurasan and had entered India as an adventurer early in the 18th century. These men could feel no patriotism for India, because India was not their *patria*. They had nothing at stake in this country, no share in its past history traditions and culture, no hereditary loyalty to its throne. The Mughal Emperor was merely their paymaster, and if they could make better terms with his enemy, they were not such fools as to reject them out of a sentimental love for a land which merely gave them an excellent field for the display of their undoubted talents and promised them a rich reward. It was only in the succeeding generations that their families became rooted in the Indian soil.

When the Emperor was a sluggard or a fool, he ceased to be the master and guide of the nobility. They then naturally turned to win the controlling authority at Court or in the provinces. This selfish struggle necessarily ranged the nobles in factions, each group or *bloc* trying to push the fortunes of its members and hinder the success of its rival groups. The Dihli Court under the Later Mughals was divided between the Turani (or Central Asian) and the Hindustani parties,*—both Muhammadans, while the Hindu Rajahs sided with the latter. Each faction tried to poison the ears of the Emperor against the other, thwart its plans, stir up its discontented servants, and even engage in active hostility to it when at a distance from the Court. Rebels could not be opposed with all the armed strength of the Empire ; they could always count upon secret supporters or at least neutral make-believe opponents in the Imperial Court and camp.

* In the second half of the 18th century the division was between the Irani (Persian Shia) and Turani (Sunni) parties.

This moral degradation of the nobility was accompanied by the intellectual bankruptcy of the bureaucracy, and indeed of the entire governing classes. There was no far-sighted leader, no clearly thought-out and steadily-pursued scheme of national advancement as under Akbar. No political genius arose to teach the country a new philosophy of life, or to kindle aspirations after a new heaven on earth. They all drifted and dozed in admiration of the wisdom of their ancestors and shook their heads at the growing degeneracy of the moderns.

The Mughal Empire had aimed merely at being a police Government ; and therefore when it could not do its police function well, when it failed to maintain internal order and external peace, it lost its sole reason for existing. The life of the country had hitherto been held together by the Court. Hence, when the throne was filled by puppets, dissolution took place in the bond that held the people together and co-ordinated their efforts and ambitions. Government ceased and anarchy began.

On the eve of Nadir Shah's invasion, the Jats by their depredations had made the roads near the capital unsafe and hindered trade and traffic. The Mahrattas by their regular annual incursions at first and their permanent lodgment in the frontier provinces (Gujarat, Malwa and Bundelkhand) afterwards, bled the Empire to death. The production of wealth was stopped not only as the direct result of their extortion and ravage, but also indirectly through the discouragement of industry and thrift which such insecurity of property creates.

The frequent civil contests, whether among the Princes and nobles, or between the Government and rebellious subjects, spread a sense of insecurity among the taxpayers. The peasants withheld the land revenue, which was the mainstay of the Government, and the lower officials evaded delivering their collections. The victor in the contest might crush the defaulting ryots and peculating *tahsildars* and turn them out of house and hold ; but by doing so he ruined himself all the same, as his only source of income was gone ; he had only

swelled the number of desperate homeless roving brigands and reduced the area under tillage.

The profuse bounty of Nature to this country, its temperate climate which reduces human want, and the abstemious habits of its people, all combined to increase the national income of India throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The huge "annual addition to the national stock" ultimately made its way to the hands of the governing classes,—if we leave out the small portion that was intercepted by the trader and the revenue-farmer. The wealth of Ind was the wonder and envy of other nations. But the Mughal Court and Mughal aristocracy had not the sense to insure this wealth by spending a sufficient portion of it on efficient national defence and the improvement of the people's intellect and character by a wise system of public education. Their wealth only made their weakness fatal to them and tempted the foreign invader by assuring him of a success as easy as the booty was large.

A Government which could not maintain order at home was still less likely to command respect abroad. The weakness of the Central Government was soonest felt in the frontier provinces: Malwa and Afghanistan were not guarded in strength. The Mahratta occupation of Malwa brought Dihli within striking distance of their arms, and Baji Rao in 1737 insulted the capital, pillaged and burnt its suburbs and returned to his base with perfect immunity. The defencelessness of Afghanistan brought Nadir Shah to India.

SEC. 101.—DECLINE OF THE SAFAWI MONARCHY AND AFGHAN
USURPATION OF PERSIA.

The Safawi dynasty founded by Shah Ismail at the beginning of the 16th century, freed Persia from foreign rule and the wars of domineering nomad tribes. The new line of kings gave the country peace prosperity and extension of territory. The faith of the people, which had been persecuted by the former rulers as a heresy, now became the State religion. Wealth and civilization increased, and Persia again took her ancient position as one of the world's famous and independent

monarchies, the rival of Turkey and Hindustan in the eyes of the Muslim world.

For nearly a century and a half after the founder, a succession of wise warlike and active kings maintained the strength and glory of Persia. But about the middle of the 17th century began the inevitable decline in the monarchy from a continuous decline in the character of the monarch. In the words of the historian Sir John Malcolm, during the century following the death of Abbas the Great (1627), the Persian throne was occupied by "a succession of weak, cruel and debauched monarchs..... The lower orders became every day more unwarlike and..... ceased to be able to defend the State.....The nation may be said to have existed on the reputation it had acquired before." [*Hist. of Persia*, 2nd ed., i. 379.]

Shah Husain, the last of the Safawi line, who reigned from 1694 to 1722, was no doubt free from vice ; but he went to the opposite extreme of meekness and religious bigotry, and did still greater harm than his dissolute predecessors. He placed the administration entirely in the hands of the priests and thus alienated the old martial and official nobility. Under the advice of the keepers of his conscience the king persecuted and banished from the land the Sufi philosophers as heretics from Islamic orthodoxy, and thus enraged the intellectual classes. But the prestige of his worthier ancestors had given the State a momentum which made it continue to go on for nearly twenty years longer.

At last early in the 18th century the dissolution came, and from the hands of its Afghan subjects. Ever since Abbas I.'s conquest of Qandahar early in the 17th century, Southern Afghanistan had been a province of Persia. It was the home of the Ghilzai and Abdali tribes. The wise statesmanship of the earlier Shahs had left the subject races of the Persian Empire under their own laws, and often under their own magistrates. The turbulent character of the Afghan people, the wildness of their country and their position on the debatable land between the rival monarchies of India and Persia, enabled them to extort for themselves a considerable amount of local independence. Their submission to the Central Government was lax and

dependent on their own pleasure. In 1708, a new Persian governor of Qandahar, the converted Armenian Gurgin Khan, by trying to rule with a strong hand, caused an explosion. The Ghilzai tribe rose under Mir Wais, killed the governor, seized Qandahar and established their own rule there.

The successful rebel's son Mahmud gained the throne of Qandahar in 1717, and led his tribe on to the plunder of the effete king and people of Persia. The Safawi Empire now broke to pieces. Mahmud captured the capital Isfahan, and on 21st October 1722 Shah Husain Safawi resigned his ancestors' throne and the Afghan rule over Persia began. Mahmud was succeeded by his uncle's son Ashraf in 1725. But new dangers threatened the conquerors. Qandahar was held by Mahmud's brother, whom Ashraf could not oust from the fort. Thus the Ghilzai tribe became divided under two chiefs reigning at two distant places. The governor of Sistan annexed nearly all Khurasan and proclaimed his independence. But Ashraf's greatest enemy was Mirza Tahmasp, the son of the deposed Shah Husain, who had assumed the royal title and was trying to establish his power in the province of Mazendran. This Prince was a foolish effeminate and debauched youth, and could not have recovered his heritage by his own efforts. But he was now joined by Nadir Quli, the greatest Asiatic general of that age. [Malcolm, i. 401-465.]

SEC. 102.—NADIR DELIVERS PERSIA AND MAKES HIMSELF KING.

Nadir Quli was the son of Imam Quli, a poor Turkoman of the Afshar tribe long settled in Khurasan, who earned his bread by making coats and caps of sheepskin. Nadir was born in 1688 and passed his early years amidst great hardship and privation, which only called forth his extraordinary genius and energy. He was carried away to Tartary by the Uzbek raiders and kept there as a prisoner for four years. On returning home he served under some petty chiefs and finally took to a life of robbery with his own band of hardy and adventurous followers. The eclipse of Government during the Afghan usurpation of Persia enabled him to pursue such a career with safety and much profit in the ill-controlled frontier province of

Khurasan. Seizing the fort of Kalat by murdering his own uncle (who was its governor), he used the power thus gained to defeat the Afghan ruler of Khurasan and recover the city and district of Naishabur. This victory in the national cause secured his welcome by his lawful king Shah Tahmasp, whose service he entered in 1727. [Malcolm ii. 2-5, *M.U.* i. 823.]

The fame of Nadir drew the best recruits to his side and he became the centre of the Persian national effort to throw off the foreign yoke. His genius for war and diplomacy and his concentration of all authority in his hands led to his rapid and unbroken success. Persia was recovered from the Afghans, very few of whom returned to their own country from the slaughter on the battle-field or murder at the hands of the incensed peasantry. The Afghan domination had been a seven years' horror to the afflicted people of Persia. "Within seven years nearly a million of her inhabitants had perished, her finest provinces had been rendered desert, and her proudest edifices levelled with the dust ; and this by enemies who had neither the force nor the wisdom to maintain the conquest." [Malcolm, i. 472.] The national deliverance of Persia was the work of Nadir alone, and naturally the enthusiasm of the people for him was unbounded. The king showed his gratitude by granting to the general half the kingdom with a richly jewelled crown and the right of stamping coins with his own name.

But during Nadir's absence in the eastern provinces, the king, who had injudiciously conducted expeditions in the west, lost his general's gains in that direction and made a humiliating peace. The national indignation was very great. The officers of the army felt that if Shah Tahmasp were left at the head of affairs, he would only undo all their recent work and bring back national servitude: They with one voice urged Nadir to assume the crown. [Anandram, 34 ; Malcolm ii. 8-11.] But though Tahmasp was deposed, 26th August 1732, his general did not as yet venture to sit on the throne. Abbas, an eight-month old son of Tahmasp, was proclaimed king, and Nadir became his regent with full authority. Four years later the

infant died, and Nadir became king with the title of Shahan-Shah Nadir Shah, 26th February 1736.

He wrested Armenia and Georgia from the Turks, and made a peace with the Russians by which he gained the lost provinces bordering the Caspian. The island of Bahrain was recovered from the Arabs. Next, the predatory Bakhtiari tribe of the Shuster hills was vanquished and enrolled in his army,—thus diverting their energies into a useful channel and keeping them from disturbing the peace. [Malcolm ii. 11-18.]

Finally, early in 1737 Nadir Shah started with 80,000 men against Qandahar. So long as that centre of independent Afghan power was not destroyed, it would remain a menace to the safety of Persia and constantly disturb the peace and prosperity of Khurasan. Moreover, without the conquest of Qandahar the full heritage of the Safawis could not be said to have come into his possession. This fort stood on the route of his advance to the Mughal Empire and he wished to enlist the Afghans under his banners to assist him in his foreign conquests, as Mahmud of Ghazni had done seven centuries before.

Qandahar was now in the possession of Husain, the younger brother of Mahmud (the usurping king of Persia). The old city* stood on the eastern slope of a ridge, two miles west of the modern city. Its walls were of extreme strength and the garrison had made preparations for a good defence. The Persian army invested it on 30th March 1737, but the siege dragged on for a year, and the fort fell† only on 12th March 1738. The fort and city were dismantled by the victor. In its environs he built a new city with quarters for the governor and soldiers, which was named Nadirabad by him, but is now known as modern Qandahar. He treated the defeated Afghan tribesmen very kindly, released all the prisoners taken, bestowed pensions on the tribal chiefs, enlisted the clansmen in his army, and by transplanting the Ghilzais to Naishabur and other places in Khurasan (the former homes of the Abdalis) and posting Abdali chieftains as governors of Southern Afghanistan (Qandahar,

* For a description of the fort and its walls, see J. Sarkar's *History of Aurangzib*, i. 140-143.

† Anandram p. 7 says, to treachery.

Girishk, Bist and Zamin-dawar), kept his former enemies usefully employed in his service. His policy was to tempt the other Afghan forts to surrender to him by creating a reputation for himself as a merciful enemy and liberal master, and to enlist the Afghan soldiers under his banners as devoted supporters of his projected conquests of Central Asia and India. [*Jahankusha* 311-328, Malcolm ii. 20, Anandram 6-8.]

After the fall of Qandahar came the turn of the Mughal Empire ; and here Nadir made out a strong case for declaring war. He proceeded in such a way as to ensure that neutral States and lovers of international law would not be able to condemn his invasion of India as an act of wanton aggression and spoliation. Nadir was no mere soldier, no savage leader of a savage horde, but a master of diplomacy and statecraft as well as of the sword. The profoundness of his diplomacy was no less remarkable than the greatness of his generalship in war and the wisdom of his policy to the vanquished after his victories in the field.

SEC. 103.—CAUSES OF THE DIPLOMATIC RUPTURE BETWEEN THE
PERSIAN GOVERNMENT AND THE MUGHAL EMPIRE.

The conduct of the effete Court of Dihli towards Persia had been marked by violation of diplomatic usage and courtesy and even by unfriendly negligence. For several generations past there had been an exchange of envoys, presents and diplomatic courtesies between the Mughal Emperors of India and the Safawi Shahs of Persia. Abbas II. continued this practice even after he had wrested Qandahar from Shah Jahan and fought four campaigns against Mughal arms. At all events formal letters of congratulation used to be written by the one Court to the other at every new accession to the throne. But Muhammad Shah, forgetting this usage, neglected to felicitate Shah Tahmasp II. after he had overthrown the Afghan usurper and recovered the throne of his ancestors. Nay, the Dihli Government, no doubt out of a timid love of quiet, had kept up friendly relations with Mir Wais and his son Husain (the usurpers of Qandahar), though the latter had raided the province of Multan and ravaged the imperial territory.

After the expulsion of the Afghans from Persia, Nadir had sent Ali Mardan Khan Shamlu as ambassador to India to inform the Dihli Court that a campaign against the Afghans of Qandahar would be soon undertaken,* and to request that the Emperor would order his subahdar of Kabul to prevent these Afghans from escaping into his territory. Muhammad Shah replied that he had issued instructions to this effect and would reinforce the army in Kabul to have this work done.

After some time Nadir sent a second messenger, Muhammad Ali Khan with a similar request, and the Dihli Government replied in the same terms. When early in 1737 the Persians invested Qandahar and the local Afghans began to flee northwards into Mughal Afghanistan, Nadir despatched a force to Ulang Muragha, in the Qalat district, which was his last outpost on the Perso-Mughal frontier, to bar the path of the retreating Ghilzais. This detachment ravaged the country up to the end of the hills of Kalat, slaying about a thousand Ghilzais and capturing much booty and many prisoners. The rest of the tribe fled into Mughal territory, towards Ghazni and Kabul, there being no Mughal officer or army on the frontier to obstruct them. The Persian generals, not having received orders to cross the frontier, stopped there and reported the affair to their master. Nadir Shah then (30th April 1737) sent a third envoy, Muhammad Khan Turkoman to India by way of Sindh, to ask for an explanation of this breach of promise on the part of the Emperor. The messenger was ordered to spend not more than forty days in India but bring a reply within that period. The Dihli Court, however, would give him neither a reply nor the permission to return. Its imbecile policy is thus described by Ali Hazin: "As soon as this envoy arrived at Shahjahanabad, he delivered his letter and was told to wait; but they were silent as to any answer. Sometimes they were unable to agree in their own minds on the question of writing

* Ali Hazin says that Shah Tahmasp II. after recovering Isfahan sent one of his nobles to India as envoy to report his accession and to request Muhammad Shah to keep the Ghilzais out of his territory, and that after the accession of the infant Abbas III. a similar message was sent. But *Jahankusha* 331 shows that both these embassies were sent by Nadir.

any answer at all ; at other times they were perplexed [as to] what titles they should use to Nadir Shah.....Thinking the detention of the ambassador a stroke of State policy, they waited to see, if perchance Husain the Afghan with the troops besieged in Qandahar gained the victory over Nadir Shah, and destroyed him or put him to flight ; on which event there would be no need of writing any answer to his letter."

A year passed away in this way, and then after the fall of Qandahar, Nadir wrote to his envoy in India to return at once. The matter had passed beyond the stage of correspondence and discussion. Nadir had decided on invading India. [*Jahanqusha*, 331-332 ; Belfour's *Ali Hazin*, 281-287 (which is paraphrased in *Siyar* i. 93-94.)]

SEC. 104.—NEGLECTED AND DEFENCELESS CONDITION OF AFGHANISTAN AND THE PANJAB.

At this point it is necessary to stop the narrative of events, and look at the condition of the provinces forming the north-western frontier of the Mughal Empire. Afghanistan had been a precarious possession and source of weakness to the successors of Babar, but they had succeeded in occupying the country and keeping the passes from India open. The earlier Mughal Emperors had repeatedly visited Kabul. But during the long reign of Aurangzeb, the imperial authority there was seriously imperilled. The formidable rebellion, first of the Yusufzais of Peshawar (1667) and then of the Afridis of Khaibar (1672), was aggravated by a rising of the Pathan population along the entire North-western frontier against the ruler of Dihli. The resources of the whole Empire had to be concentrated under the Emperor's personal command against the tribesmen. After only a modified success Aurangzeb returned from the frontier where he had now spent two years, and peace of a sort was restored by profuse bribery to the border Afghans (1676). Next year Amir Khan* was appointed governor of Kabul and he held the post for 21 years with conspicuous ability and success.

* See J. Sarkar's *History of Aurangzib* iii. (2nd ed.) 243 and *Studies in Mughal India* 111-117.

Aurangzeb ascribes this viceroy's administrative triumph to his tactful dealings, practical skill, policy of keeping the hillmen usefully employed by enlisting them in the imperial army, and his judicious and economical management of the treasury, which enabled him to pay regular subsidies to the clansmen living near the passes.

When Amir Khan died (1698), he was followed by no worthy successor. After a short lull, trouble began to revive. But Shah Alam, who governed the province from 1699 to his father's death in 1707, kept order fairly well. He had a large and efficient army, and used to move about the country a good deal, passing the winter at Peshawar (which was then included in Afghanistan), and the summer at Kabul or Bamian; but he was forced to continue the policy of bribing the pass Afghans to maintain peace. In 1709 or 1710, Nasir Khan, formerly faujdar of Jamrud, was appointed subahdar of Kabul, and he continued to hold this post till his death, about 1719, when his son, also entitled Nasir Khan, succeeded him and was later confirmed in his office by Muhammad Shah (1720). This second Nasir Khan's mother was of the Afghan race and he was expected to succeed easily in ruling the province and keeping the passes open. [*M.U.* iii. 833.]

But he was a simple-minded and indolent man. His chief business was hunting, and when not engaged in it he spent his time in prayer. [*Siyar*, i. 93.] Thus, the peace of the country was left to take care of itself, and the roads became unsafe. His patron at Court was Roshan-ud-daulah, a favourite of the Emperor, and the imperial grant for payments to keep the passes open was sent to Nasir Khan through the hands of this noble. Roshan-ud-daulah's rival Khan Dauran accused him of embezzling the money, and induced the Emperor to stop this payment as useless. Nasir Khan's appeals were disregarded. About 1730 Roshan-ud-daulah himself fell out of favour and was dismissed. The result was that things in Afghanistan were left to drift without the least hope of remedy.

As Ghulam Husain writes, "Neither the subahdar nor the *Amir-ul-umara* [at Court] kept himself informed about the roads and passes of the country. No guards remained on the

roads. Owing to the weakness of the Government, the local officers lost all fear of being called to account. None cared for any one else, none feared, none sought instructions from any [higher officer]. Everywhere every one did whatever he liked. Any one who wished could come and go [through these frontier roads, unquestioned]; the Emperor and his nobles never heard of it. They never inquired why no news-letter was coming to Court from any province or outpost." [Siyar, i. 93.]

When we contrast this negligence and slothfulness of Muhammad Shah with the sleepless vigilance* of Aurangzeb in respect of the Persian frontier, we can realize the depth of inefficiency to which the Mughal administration had fallen on the eve of Nadir Shah's invasion.

The governor of Kabul had sent repeated applications to the Emperor for money to pay his troops ; but nobody paid any heed to them, as the faction opposed to him was now in power at Court and the Emperor never exercised his own judgment nor personally looked into any business. The soldiers posted in the province starved as their salary for five years was in arrears. Ill-fed, ill-equipped, ill-armed through poverty, they pressed the subahdar to pay them at least one year's dues out of the five, so that they might satisfy their creditors to some extent and have a little left over for the expenses of marching. Nasir Khan used to reassure them by saying "Friends! why this anxiety? I have written to the Emperor and also to my agent at Court, and the money is sure to come to-morrow if not to-day." When his agent presented the application to Khan Dauran the Amir-ul-umara, and in fear and trembling described the alarming situation in Afghanistan, that noble replied in derision, "Do you think that I am a petty simpleton that I shall be impressed by such a tale as yours? Our houses are built on the plain ; we do not fear anything except what we can see with our own eyes. Your houses stand on lofty hills, and therefore you have probably sighted Mongol and Qizilbash armies from the roofs of your houses! Reply to

* Striking illustrations in Hamid-ud-din's *Ahkam-i-Alamgiri*, § § 49-52, translated by J. Sarkar as *Anecdotes of Aurangzib*.

your master that we are writing for money to the governor of Bengal; and when the Bengal revenue arrives after the rainy season, the money due will be quickly sent to Kabul."* [Anandram, 11-12.]

Those people of Dihli who bore testimony to the defenceless condition of Afghanistan, were sneered at as fools. Khan Dauran's friends even suggested that the deputation of Kabul citizens with this report had been stage-managed by the Wazir and the Nizam, (the leaders of the Turani faction), in order to discredit Khan Dauran and induce the Emperor to transfer his confidence to the former party! [Siyar, i. 96.]

The result is best described in the words of Ghulam Husain: "It was impossible for Nasir Khan to prevent Nadir Shah's entrance into India. The Government was rotten, the Emperor was powerless. No money was sent to maintain the administration in Afghanistan. The subahdar, therefore, sought his own comfort and lived at Peshawar, entrusting the fort of Kabul to a *qiladar* with orders to control and watch the passes leading into India." [Siyar, i. 94.]

Equally neglected and defenceless was the next gateway of India, the province of the Panjab. Zakariya Khan (son of Abdus-samad Khan) was the governor of Lahor and Multan. His family had come from Ahrar in Central Asia, and therefore he was regarded as "a strong pillar of the Turani party." His mother was a sister of the late Wazir Muhammad Amin Khan's wife, and he naturally excited the bitter opposition of the Hindustani party under Khan Dauran.† Zakariya Khan was a brave and active soldier and good administrator; he gave peace and prosperity to the province in his charge by repeated

* On this Anandram rightly remarks, "If the Afghans had been set to guard the frontier with their whole hearts and customary bravery, they could have stopped the advance of the Persian army long enough to enable reinforcements to reach them from Dihli, and then India would not have been sacked."

† An astonishing example of this party rancour is supplied by the historian Shakir Khan (an Indian Muhammadan of Panipat), who asserts that Zakariya Khan at the instigation of the Nizam and Saadat Khan, who wanted to overthrow Khan Dauran, disloyally admitted Nadir into Lahor!

campaigns against rebels and robbers. [M. U. ii. 106 ; Anandram 138.] But the Hindustani party who possessed the Emperor's ears, opposed all his applications to Court, misrepresented his character and motives and prevented money and troops from being sent to him when Nadir's invasion was imminent.

Thus, in the Emperor's hour of supreme need, factious jealousy and foolish distrust prevented any real attempt being made to repel the invader from the frontier, or even to check him there long enough to enable defensive preparations to be completed at Dihli and the army of the Empire marshalled in the Panjab. The 'gateways of India' fell into Nadir's hands at the first touch, and yet the foolish Emperor and his advisers delayed their own preparations for defence in the vain hope of the enemy not being able to force the passes of Afghanistan and the rivers of the Panjab.

Such was the condition of the north-western marches of India when the storm burst on them.

SEC. 105.—NADIR CONQUERS NORTHERN AFGHANISTAN FROM THE MUGHALS.

On 10th May 1738, the Persian monarch began his march into Northern Afghanistan to make an end of his Afghan enemies. Crossing the Mughal frontier at the Mukhur spring, he halted at Qarabagh, 36 miles s. w. of Ghazni. A powerful detachment was sent under his younger son Nasr-ullah to operate against the Afghans of Ghorband and Bamian in the north-west of Kabul. When Nadir reached Qarabagh, Baqi Khan the Mughal governor of Ghazni fled away in terror ; the qazis scholars and rich men of the city waited on the invader with presents and offer of submission. So, he entered Ghazni in peace, 31st May, and treated the people well.

Two other detachments had been operating against the Hazaras or hill Afghans south-west of Ghazni, who had defied Nadir's troops. All who made timely submission were pardoned. But the men who resisted were put to the sword, their women dragged into captivity and their houses destroyed. Thus securing his flank and Rear, Nadir advanced on Kabul. The

chief men of the city tried to avert the storm by advancing two marches to welcome him on the way, and he sent them back with robes of honour presents and reassuring words. But Sharza Khan, the commandant of the citadel, with the soldiers of the garrison decided to offer resistance, and shutting the fort-gates prepared for defence.

On 10th June, Nadir's advance-tents arrived near the fort, but a part of the garrison sallied out and made a hostile demonstration. The porters were not prepared for resistance, and therefore declining the challenge they quietly set up the tents at a safe distance from the walls, at Ulang, half a league to the east of the city. Nadir arrived here on the 11th, and next day he rode out towards the Black Rock to view the environs of the city and the defences of its citadel. The garrison issued in force and began to discharge their fire-arms at him ; but a charge of the Persian escort drove them back to the foot of the wall. Nadir now began an investment of the city. His guns and mortars, dragged up to the neighbouring heights, played upon the walls. On the seventh day (19th June) the tower of Aqa-bin collapsed from the shock of a big gun fired from it, and a part of the wall* fell down ; the citadel capitulated, and the imperial treasury horses elephants and stores at Kabul passed into Nadir's possession. [*Jahankusha* 333—335.]

Here he passed forty days to settle the affairs of the province, and here he was joined (1st July) by his son Nasr-ullah who had returned after subduing Ghorband and Bamian. In the meantime, a letter had been received from his envoy at Dihli reporting that the Emperor would neither reply to his letter nor give the ambassador his *congé*. At this Nadir Shah wrote a strong protest to the Emperor and sent it with a fast courier accompanied by some leading men of Kabul, who offered to explain the real state of things in Afghanistan to the Mughal Court. In this letter, Nadir Shah charges Muhammad Shah with

* Anandram 10. He tells the incredible story that the breach thus caused was large enough to let 500 horsemen gallop through it abreast. The recoil of a single gun could not have overthrown a quarter-mile of stone-wall. Hanway (ii. 359) says that Nadir massacred the greater part of the garrison, including Sharza Khan and his son, after the fall of Kabul.

the violation of his promise, delay in replying to embassies and detention of the last Persian envoy for more than a year, in violation of the usage of nations. He points out how the Afghans had done even greater havoc to India than to Persia, and therefore in crushing them he was really doing a service to the Mughal Empire. He explains how the hostility of the imperial garrison in Kabul and their alliance with the Afghans had forced him to fight them, but that after their submission he had guarded them from harm, as his sole intention was the punishment of his Afghan enemies. The party entrusted with this letter left Kabul on 3rd July. On their reaching Jalalabad, the Kabuli notables were forced by the local governor to go back, while the courier and his nine guards were robbed and murdered by a neighbouring chieftain, the son of Mir Abbas.*

Meantime Nadir Shah had left Kabul (19th July) on account of scarcity of provisions there, and moved into the more fertile and populous hills of Chahar-ek-kar Najrad and Safi. The hill-crests occupied by the local clansmen were stormed and the vanquished were forced to submit and enter the Persian military service. After passing 22 days here, he started for Gandamak on 25th August.

Then came the news of the murder of the courier. The Persian advanced guard made a sudden dash on Jalalabad and seized the grain stored there. The governor fled, the chief men submitted and yielded up the fort (7th September). But the city was subjected to a massacre in punishment of the attack on Nadir's courier. The hill-fort of Mir Abbas's son was stormed, the men were put to the sword, and the women (including his sister and wives) were brought away to the Persian camp as captives. [*Jahankusha* 337-339, Ali Hazin 289.]

After spending some days in regulating the administration of the country, the Persian king advanced to Bahar-Showlani† to the south of Jalalabad. In view of his expected long absence in India, the distance of Dihli from his base in Persia, and

* *Jahankusha* 335-337, Ali Hazin 288.

† Bahar 17 m. s. w. of Jalalabad; Showlani (spelt Safli in *Jahankusha*) 8 m. e. of Bahar.

probably also the accidents of war, Nadir Shah invested his eldest son Mirza Raza Quli with the crown of the deputy-king or regent of Persia (3rd November), and sent him back to that country amidst great pomp at the head of a strong force.

CHAPTER XII

NADIR SHAH'S INVASION OF INDIA.

[*By the Editor*]

SEC. 106.—NADIR SHAH CAPTURES PESHAWAR AND LAHOR.

On 6th November 1738, the march towards India was resumed. The main army under Nadir Shah passed Jalalabad on the 12th and halted a mile beyond it. From this stage a vanguard of 12,000 picked cavalry proceeded ahead, followed by another body of 6,000 men to guard the royal tents. Then came the Centre and the Rear.

Nasir Khan, the Mughal governor of Afghanistan, was, according to his usual custom, living at Peshawar when he heard of Nadir's conquest of Kabul and projected invasion of India. He assembled some 20,000 Afghans of the Khaibar and Peshawar districts and blocked the pass between Ali Masjid and Jamrud,—the last outpost being 12 miles west of Peshawar. His half-starved soldiery and hastily-raised tribal levies were in no condition to oppose the Persian veterans flushed with a hundred victories and led by a heaven-born general.

In the afternoon of 14th November, after the *asar* prayer, Nadir Shah left his camp and baggage at Barikab (20 m. east of Jalalabad) under Nasr-ullah Mirza and made a rapid march with light kit by the Seh-chuba route. Though the path was steep and extremely rough, he covered fifty miles before eight o'clock next morning, and fell upon the Indian army in the Khaibar Pass most unexpectedly from the flank. One charge of the Persians scattered Nasir Khan's raw levies ; but he resisted with his regular troops for some hours ; in the end he and several other nobles were captured ;* the rest of his army

* Mahdi says that Nasir Khan drew up his troops in line of battle and resisted the Persians for some time. *Siyar* (i. 95) says that this general was captured wounded and then revealed his name and rank. Anandram (13) asserts that Nasir Kh. was surprised while asleep in bed, and fled in

fled, leaving their entire camp and property in the hands of the victors. [*Jahankusha* 341-342, Ali Hazin 290.]

Three days after the victory, the Persian camp and rear-guard arrived there by the regular road. On 18th November Nadir entered Peshawar without opposition and occupied the governor's palace. On 12th December the advance was resumed. A strong column under Aqa Muhammad was sent ahead to raid and ravage the country and build a bridge over the Indus at Attock. During this onward march the other five rivers of the Panjab were crossed on foot, as they were all fordable in that season. The Chinab was crossed at Wazirabad about 60 m. n. w. of Lahor, (8th January, 1739).

Zakariya Khan, the governor of Lahor, though unsupported by his master, had made what defensive arrangements he could with his own limited resources. Some five thousands of his men, under Qalandar Khan, held the fort of Kacha Mirza* at Yaminabad, 30 miles north of Lahor as an advanced post, while the governor himself stood with the bulk of his army (probably ten or twelve thousand men) ten miles south, at the Bridge of Shah Daula. The Persian vanguard† took the fort, killed Qalandar Khan, and drove his troops away. At the news of it, Zakariya Khan fell back on Lahor, and Nadir advanced to the Bridge of Shah Daula, 20 miles north of that city. From this place, Abdul Baqi Khan, the Persian Wazir, wrote to Zakariya Khan advising him to submit and thus avoid useless bloodshed. [*Jahankusha*, 343 ; Hanway, ii. 365-66 ; Anandram 16-20.]

confusion with Chiragh Beg Khan and a few other attendants. Hanway (ii. 362) tells us that Nadir bought over the pass Afghans whom the Dihli Court had kept in arrears for 4 years, and thus he could cross the pass easily and unopposed. Nasir Khan, deserted by his raw levies at the unexpected approach of Nadir, entrenched himself near Peshawar with 7,000 men, and fought for some hours; but his lines were stormed and his men slain or captured. Ali Hazin (290) says that an immense crowd of the Afghans and of Nasir Kh.'s troops were cut to pieces in the valley.

* There is a *Kot Mirzagan*, a little east of Yaminabad, in the *Indian Atlas*.

† Led by Nasir Kh., acc. to Hanway. Zakariya's total army is put by Ali Hazin at 14 or 15 thousand regular horse and his own militia.

The bank of the Ravi north of Lahor had been entrenched by Zakariya Khan and big pieces of artillery mounted there to oppose the Persian advance. On 10th January 1739, Nadir marched from the Bridge of Shah Daula, made a wide detour round Lahor, leaving the Mughal defences a long distance on his left, forded the river further downstream and encamped in the Shalimar garden, five miles east of the city. All that day Zakariya Khan succeeded in repulsing the attempts of the Persians to enter Lahor. The fighting was resumed next day (11th January), but early in the morning the governor's son with a handful of men left the field and made his way to Dihli by long marches. A large force of Indians under the zamindar of Adina-gar were coming to reinforce Zakariya Khan, when they were overtaken by the Persian skirmishers at Mulkpur, 12 miles from Lahor and dispersed, losing some captives.*

Zakariya Khan found resistance vain. No aid could come from Dihli. So, in the afternoon he sent Kifayat Khan, his agent, to Nadir's camp to offer submission and beg for safety. Next day (12th January), he himself went to the victor, delivered the keys of the fort and presented some large elephants and rare commodities. Nadir treated him kindly, but fixed a contribution of 20 lakhs of Rupees on the city, part of which was paid out of the Government treasury and the balance assessed on the rich people. On the 14th, the Khan visited the Persian king a second time, paid the money and thus saved the city from the horrors of a sack.† He was received graciously, presented with a robe of honour, an Arab horse with a gold embroidered saddle and costly trappings, and jewelled sword and dagger, and retained in the governorship

* The *Jahankusha*, p. 344, is obscure, and the lithographed text is corrupt. Adina Beg was faujdar of Sultanpur, 66 m. s. e. of Lahor, at this time [Tilok Das's poem]. I do not know any *Adina-gar*. There is a *Narowar* 14 m. e. of Lahor, but no *Mulkpur*. *Pur* may be *Haibatpur—Pati*. The text of the *Jahankusha* may also mean that these Indian troops forced their way to Lahor.

† Anandram 23; *Jahankusha* 344; Ali Hazin, 293. But Tilok Das says that Lahor was plundered after Nadir's entry into it, and that the Persian king, though, appealed to, did nothing to restrain his soldiers. At Lahor the invaders first saw the wealth of a large Indian city.

of Lahor. But his second son, Haiyat-ullah Khan, was kept in the Persian king's train at the head of 500 retainers, evidently as a hostage for his father's fidelity.

Nadir spent sixteen days at Lahor. Fakhr-ud-daulah, the dismissed governor of Kashmir, who had been living here in great poverty and neglect, was reappointed by Nadir to his post. Nasir Khan was released from captivity and restored to the viceroyalty of Kabul and Peshawar. A Persian force was detached to guard the ferries and seize the boats on the rivers of the Panjab and see that travellers to and from the Persian army during its stay in India could easily pass. Thus the flanks and Rear of the invaders were completely secured.

At Lahor it was definitely learnt that Muhammad Shah had decided on war and was assembling his troops from all sides of his kingdom to oppose the Persians. Nadir then wrote a letter to the Emperor, saying that as he was a Turkoman and of the same race as the house of Timur, his intentions were entirely friendly to the Emperor of Dihli. He repeated his former assertion that he had crossed the Mughal frontier solely to punish the Afghans who were as much the enemies of India as of Persia, and he again complained that Muhammad Shah had treated all his three envoys in violation of friendship and diplomatic usage. Lastly, Nadir warned the Mughal Court of the consequences of going to war, though he held forth hopes of his pardon should the Indian army chiefs, after their defeat, submit to him. [*Jahankusha*, 345-346.]

Nadir's invasion spread ruin and disorder throughout the Panjab. A cavalry screen was by his order sent ahead to make swift raids (*turk-tazi*) and plunder the cities and richer villages of the province and at the same time reconnoitre the country 30 or 40 miles in advance of his army. At Attock he had instructed his vanguard to plunder and ravage without mercy. "Cities like Wazirabad, Yaminabad, Gujarat &c. and big villages (each like half a city) were reduced to black ashes. All over the land property was plundered and women outraged." [Anandram, 16 and 21.] Tilok Das bears witness to the plunder of Lahor Jalandhar and evidently other towns on his route. But this was not the only misery of the province.

A foreign invasion gives the wished-for opportunity to the lawless ; oppressors and predatory classes, so long controlled by Government, raise their heads when they see the Government engaged in self-defence. Shaikh Ali Hazin, who was travelling from Lahor to Sarhind at this time, thus describes the state of things (p. 292): "The whole province was in complete revolution. Every person put forth his hand to plunder and pillage, and some thousands of robbers beset the public roads. The whole of that time, whether on the road or at the [halting] stations, passed in fighting and contention."

SEC. 107.—NADIR MARCHES FROM LAHOR TO KARNAL.

Leaving Lahor on 26th January 1739, Nadir Shah reached Sarhind on 5th February. Here he learnt that Muhammad Shah was encamped with his army at Karnal, eighty-two miles from him. A force of 6,000 cavalry was sent ahead to reconnoitre the country up to the imperial camp and report on the enemy's strength and dispositions. Next day the main army reached Rajah Sarai [modern Rajpura], 16 miles south-east of Sarhind, and on the day following (7th February) Ambala, 13 miles further east. Here the Persian king left his harem and heavy baggage under a strong escort, while he himself marched out on the 8th with a mobile fighting force and light artillery carried on camels, and reached Shahabad, 17 miles east of Ambala, at the end of the day. This place was only 36 miles north of Karnal.

Meantime the Persian scouts had reached the outskirts of the Mughal camp in the night between the 7th and the 8th. They had fallen upon the artillery, killed some men and taken some others captive, and finally retired to Sarai Azimabad,* 12 miles north of Karnal. The following night these captured Indians were produced before Nadir who questioned them about the Mughal army. The party at Azimabad was strengthened and warned to scout cautiously without precipitating a battle.

* Azimabad is placed in the map accompanying Thorn's *Memoir of the War* and also Lett's Atlas about 3 miles north of Taraori and 10 miles south of Thanesar. The *Chahar Gulshan* gives it as the stage next to Thanesar on the Dihli-Lahor road. (*India of Aurangzib*).

On the 10th Nadir resumed his march from Shahabad and reached Thanesar (13 m. south) that evening and Sarai Azimabad (10 m. further south) an hour and a half after sunrise on the 11th.

This Sarai was a big stone and brick house, in which the faujdar and chief men of Ambala had taken refuge. But as soon as the Persian artillery began to play upon it, they cried quarter. Here full information was obtained about the imperial encampment at Karnal, which was only twelve miles off. We must now turn to the doings of Muhammad Shah and his advisers. [*Jahankusha* 346-348.]

SEC. 108.—PROCEEDINGS OF THE IMPERIAL COURT DURING
NADIR'S INVASION.

The proceedings of the Dihli Court during Nadir's invasion form a tale of disgraceful inefficiency, amounting to imbecility. The news of the loss of Kabul (19th June 1738) must have reached Dihli in the first week of July, but for several months nothing was done to guard the frontiers. When Nadir crossed the Khaibar Pass (15th Nov.), his motive could no longer be mistaken, and yet for two months afterwards no energetic step was taken to meet a danger now manifest to all. True, on 2nd December 1738 the Emperor had formally given leave to his three highest nobles, Itimad-ud-daulah Qamar-ud-din Khan (the *Wazir*), Nizam-ul-mulk Asaf Jah (the *Wakil* or Regent) and Samsam-ud-daulah Khan Dauran (the *Amir-ul-umara* and *Bakhshi* or the head of the military department), to set out against the invader, and one *kror* of Rupees had been granted to them for their expenses. They encamped outside Dihli in the Shalimar garden near Sarai Baoli and wasted full one month there.*

The news of Nadir Shah having crossed the river at Attock must have reached Dihli on 10th January, 1739. Then the imperial army was urged to hurry on. The Court still hoped

* Hanway (ii. 360) says that Khan Dauran stopped here owing to the Nizam's jealousy and discord. The *Dihli Chronicle* says that accountants for their armies were appointed as late as 14th and 20th December,—they took things so leisurely. No doubt this month (2-31 Dec.) was Ramzan or the month of fasting. But Aurangzeb had campaigned in Ramzan.

for much from the stand to be made by Zakariya Khan whom they had refused to reinforce. But when that poor governor proved no match for the world-conqueror, the cry of treachery was raised: the Hindustani party at Court falsely accused the Khan of having disloyally surrendered Lahor fort to the Persians, as he was a man from Khurasan like Nadir himself. [Shakir.]

At the first bruit of Nadir Shah's invasion, the imperial Court had discovered its incompetence and summoned the Nizam to give it counsel. He was the last survivor of the great age of Aurangzeb, a grey-haired veteran of many fights, a man rich in the experience of life, and an expert in diplomacy. But the Nizam was not given the supreme command and dictatorial authority which such a crisis required, nor did he enjoy the confidence of his master, whose ears were possessed by Khan Dauran and the Hindustani party. This Khan Dauran had a very high opinion of Rajput valour. He caused *farmans* to be sent summoning to the Emperor's aid his own protégés the Hindu Rajahs, especially Sawai Jai Singh. But Rajputana had been hopelessly alienated since Aurangzeb's time, and Jai Singh and other chieftains were now aiming at political salvation by declaring their independence and calling in the Mahrattas to help in dissolving the Empire. The Rajahs made excuses and delayed coming. Muhammad Shah even appealed to Baji Rao, as we learn from the following letter of the Peshwa to his general Pilaji Jadon:—

"I shall march to Northern India by regular stages. The Persian sovereign Tahmasp Quli has come to conquer the world. To help Muhammad Shah I am sending the Malwa force under Malhar Rao Holkar, Ranuji Sindhia, and [Udaji] Puar. It is a glory to this monarchy [*i.e.*, the Mahratta State] to help the Emperor of Dihli at such a time." [Raj. vi. No. 130.] But reliance on the Mahrattas, even if seriously contemplated, proved like leaning on a broken reed. No Dakhini force came to the Emperor's assistance at Karnal, or even in time to defend Dihli after the imperial defeat in the field. On the contrary, the Mahratta envoy in the Emperor's camp at Karnal was glad to make his escape by jungle paths on 25th February and seek safety by retreating as far south as Jaipur. Baji Rao himself,

in his next letter, is found contemplating the defence of the Narmada line to bar the southward advance of Nadir. A Mahratta defence of Northern India was not to be thought of.

The imperial forces passed the month of Ramzan [December 1738] outside Dihli in utter idleness. Then came the news of the Persians having crossed at Attock. So, at last, on 10th January 1739, the three nobles began to march towards Lahor, after urging the Emperor with one breath and extreme emphasis that he should join the army in person. On the 18th they reached Panipat, 55 miles north of Dihli.

On that day (18th January), Muhammad Shah himself issued from Dihli, and on the 27th he reached Panipat, where his generals had been halting for nine days in expectation of his coming! Nadir's capture of Lahor had already been learnt by the Court, and it was found too late to save that city. So, it was decided to encamp and wait for the enemy at Karnal, where there was an abundance of water from Ali Mardan's canal and the extensive plain around supplied opportunities for manœuvring large bodies of cavalry. A halt was also necessary to enable Saadat Khan, the governor of Oudh, to join with his 30,000 horsemen. Reinforcements were also expected from Rajputana.

The Emperor's advisers, particularly the Nizam, therefore, decided to entrench at Karnal instead of risking a battle. Under the direction of Sad-ud-din Khan, Mir Atash, the camp was enclosed with a mud-wall many miles in circuit. Along this line the guns were ranged side by side; soldiers were posted in the trenches to keep watch day and night. [Anandram, 25; Shakir 40; *Chronicle*; *Siyar*, i. 96; *Bayan* 32, *Jauhar-i-samsam* in Elliot viii. 74.]

SEC. 109.—THE RIVAL FORCES AT KARNAL; THE IMPERIAL
ENCAMPMENT.

The Persian army at Karnal is estimated by Rustam Ali at 55,000 horse. This number is nearest the truth. We know from Mirza Mahdi's history that Nadir Shah had started from Persia with 80,000 troops, and though he had enlisted Afghans on the way and possibly also received drafts from home, he had

to detach large forces to garrison the many conquered forts and guard the long line of communication in his rear, as well as to escort his eldest son on his return to Persia. Hanway says that Nadir reached Tilawri (*i.e.*, Taraori near Azimabad) with 40,000 men ; this was, clearly, exclusive of his vanguard and Rear. The entire Persian camp contained 160,000 souls, of whom one-third were servants, but these were all mounted and some of them completely armed, so that they could take part in plunder and the defence of their baggage. There were also more than 6,000 women, dressed with great coats (*barani*) of crimson cloth, like the men, and not to be distinguished from the latter at a distance. [Hanway, ii. 367.]

The imperial army is put by Nadir's secretary at three hundred thousand 'renowned soldiers',* 2000 fighting elephants and 3000 pieces of artillery. Rustam Ali's figures are two hundred thousand horse, innumerable foot, 1500 elephants and many guns. [Elliot, viii. 60.] The numbers are still further exaggerated by the later Lakhnau historian Ghulam Ali, who gives five hundred thousand horse and foot, 8000 pieces of artillery of all calibres, and 11,000 tents. [*Imad* 24.] Anandram who was a secretary to the Wazir and accompanied the army to Panipat, puts the number as 50,000 horsemen besides the personal contingents of the three nobles. We know that the Nizam had brought with himself only 3000 men. So, the total Indian fighting force at Karnal could not have exceeded 75,000 men.

But the number of non-combatants with it was excessive. Even at the end of the 18th century a modern European army operating in the same area carried nine non-combatants to one fighter. Lord Lake's camp contained three hundred thousand souls, out of whom only 30,000 were soldiers. As the Emperor himself with his harem and the luxurious grandees with their families were present, we shall not be wrong in estimating the population in the camp at Karnal at a million men.

The circuit of the Indian camp is said by one authority to

* So many could not have been all 'renowned' ! Hanway gives "nearly two hundred thousand, the great part of which was cavalry."

have been twelve miles. [Hanway, ii. 364.] But such an enormous length of wall could not be adequately defended against an active enemy with a very mobile cavalry and light artillery carried on camels. The result was that the Indian army from the very outset lost its mobility and aggressive power, and became helplessly beleaguered like the Mahratta army of Sadashiv Bhao in the town of Panipat 22 years later.

The wrong strategy of the Emperor became evident as soon as the enemy came into touch and made the neighbourhood unsafe for small parties. The Indian army, owing to its vast number,—a million souls, besides animals,—could scarcely find space to encamp on. The Persian horsemen made attacks from all sides, and carried off corn grass and fuel, so that the price of grain rose enormously in the camp.* [Rustam Ali.] Within four days of the battle of Karnal this huge mass of men had eaten up all their store of food, and then after five days of fasting the entire army surrendered.

SEC. 110.—NADIR COMES INTO TOUCH WITH THE INDIAN ARMY AT KARNAL, 12TH FEBRUARY.

The city of Karnal lies on the ancient highway from Dihli to Lahor, about 75 miles north of the Mughal capital, 20 miles north of Panipat, and nine miles south of Taraori, where so many historic battles for deciding the lordship of Northern India have been fought. Even Kurukshetra, the scene of the mythical warfare between the Pandavas and Kauravas, is only 22 miles north of it. Hence it was in the natural fitness of things that the decisive encounter between India and Persia took place at Karnal.

The canal of Ali Mardan Khan skirts the eastern side of

* Ali Hazin, then at Dihli, says the same thing: "The Indians having gathered their artillery around, were closely hemmed in by their own field-pieces, and as a division of the Qizilbashs had also formed a ring on every side of them, all intercourse with the outside was closed to them, and dearth and famine fell on that army.....Muhammad Shah and his innumerable multitude, finding the Qizilbash cavalry spread around them on all sides, were afraid to stir, and although they saw themselves unable to maintain their position, they remained on the spot."

the town. Between this canal and the river Jamuna east of it, there is a plain five to seven miles in breadth, fit for cavalry manœuvres on a large scale. Muhammad Shah had formed his entrenched camp along the western bank of the canal, with the walled town of Karnal immediately south of him. Sarai Azimabad, the last station of the invaders, stands 12 miles north of Karnal and some ten miles west of the canal. The first eight miles of the ground between Azimabad and Karnal were then covered with a dense jungle* with a single narrow path crossing it. The four miles immediately north of Karnal were a level plain free from jungles. Muhammad Shah's front and right were, therefore, naturally protected by the jungle and the canal respectively. The disposition of the Indian army was—the Nizam in the Van facing the north or slightly north-west with artillery on two sides of him, the Wazir in the left or west, the Emperor in the centre, and Khan Dauran in the right or east. [*Jahankusha* 346, 348 ; Hanway, ii. 364.]

Nadir Shah had arrived at Sarai Azimabad early in the morning of Sunday, 11th February, 1739. A force of 6,000 horsemen, composed of the best troops of Kurdistan, led by Haji Khan, divided into two bodies, had previously reconnoitred the country along both banks of the canal up to the very edge of the imperial camp. These scouts now reported on the state of the ground and produced prisoners captured outside the Mughal lines.

Learning the exact dispositions of the imperial army and the condition of the ground in its environs, Nadir Shah decided to avoid a frontal attack and make a wide detour along the east of Karnal, so as to keep touch with the Jamuna and its abundant water supply on his left flank and also to cut the Mughal line of communication with Dihli by seizing the town of Panipat in the rear. His strategy was intended to force Muhammad Shah to come out of his lines and accept battle on

* This jungle continued till the early years of the 19th century. Thorn (*Memoir of the War*, p. 480) writes in 1805 about the tract from Dihli to Sonapat, "The whole of this country, which was formerly fertilized by a canal dug by Ali Mardan Khan, is now overgrown with jungle, and is generally in a very desolate state."

a field chosen by Nadir or to remain helplessly shut up in Karnal while the Persians would march to Dihli unmolested. [*Jahankusha*, 348.] This plan succeeded admirably and much sooner than was expected.

Before sunrise on Monday 12th February, the Persian army marched out of Sarai Azimabad, crossed the canal some nine miles east of that town, and encamped on a level plain six miles north-east of Karnal, evidently a little north of Kunjpura and within sight of the Jamuna. While the main division halted here, Nadir with a small escort galloped to the neighbourhood of Muhammad Shah's position which was indicated by his standards and flags and the concentration of artillery round it. After reconnoitring the enemy's numbers and dispositions, he returned to his own tents.

In the evening a report was brought to him that Saadat Khan, who was coming from Oudh to the aid of the Emperor with 30,000 cavalry artillery and stores, had reached Panipat. Immediately a division of the Persian army was told off to intercept him. A second and very strong division was detached that very night to threaten the eastern flank of the Mughal camp, though small bodies of skirmishers had been already hovering round it at a mile's distance, cutting off stragglers. [*Jahankusha* 349.]

SEC. 111.—KARNAL : INDIANS ISSUE FOR COMBAT.

The fatal Tuesday, the 13th of February, 1739, dawned. The Persian army advanced from its position in three divisions along the plain between the canal and the Jamuna, a belt nearly five miles in breadth. Prince Nasr-ullah, in charge of the Centre, was ordered to march from the bank of the Jamuna* and take post north of Muhammad Shah's camp, facing the Nizam's division. Nadir Shah himself, at the head of the vanguard, first arrived opposite the Indian position on the canal, but learning on the way that Saadat Khan had joined the Emperor at midnight, he swerved aside to his left and pitched his camp on

* Mirza Mahdi says "from the northern side of the river Jamuna," which implies that the Prince's division had been thrown across the river the day before, in order to protect Nadir's left flank. Not likely.

a spacious field, three miles east of the enemy and a mile or two west of the Jamuna. Here his son joined him with the Centre. In these movements the forenoon was passed, and the sun had begun to decline from the meridian, when suddenly the Indians were seen coming out of their lines to offer battle.

To understand how this happened it is necessary for us to know the events in the imperial camp. On receiving his master's appeal for aid, Saadat Khan had left his province of Oudh at the head of 20,000 horse, artillery and materials of war, and made successive marches for one month to reach Karnal. He had arrived at Dihli on 7th February and halted there for one day only. The 55 miles between Dihli and Panipat were covered in three days, and then on the 4th day, the 12th of February, he made a supreme effort and passed the remaining 20 miles, reaching Karnal at midnight with the main part of his army, while his camp and baggage slowly straggled behind, in a long line insufficiently guarded, one day's march behind, as was the usual thing with Indian armies.

We have seen that on the 12th the Persian scouts had advanced 32 miles from their own camp and secured news of Saadat Khan's position at Panipat. But the intelligence department of the Indian army seems to have been hopelessly careless or inefficient. Saadat Khan had not found out the enemy's whereabouts, nor taken care to protect his baggage train against a possible attack. The Emperor himself at Karnal had been equally careless. As Ghulam Husain writes, "None in the imperial camp knew of the near arrival of Nadir from Lahor, till one day some men of the corn-dealers (*banjaras*) who had gone six or eight miles outside to bring in fodder, came back wounded and panic-stricken after a sudden encounter with the Persian scouts, and the cry ran through the encampment 'Nadir has come! Nadir has come!' A mortal fear seized the army and the longing for Saadat Khan's arrival became keener." [i. 96.]

About midnight, 12th February, Saadat Khan arrived near Karnal. He was welcomed a mile in advance by Khan Dauran and conducted within the lines. In the morning he

waited on the Emperor. After the usual courtesies had been exchanged, a council of war was held in the imperial presence and plans of operations were being discussed, when news arrived that the Persian advanced skirmishers had fallen upon Saadat Khan's baggage and were carrying off 500 loaded camels. [Harcharan.]

The Khan immediately took up his sword which he had laid down on the carpet before the Emperor, and asked for permission to depart and fight the Persians.* The Nizam counselled delay, urging that the Oudh soldiers were worn out by one month's incessant marching and required some days' rest to become fit again. Moreover, the sun had already begun to decline, and they would have only three hours of daylight left for fighting after reaching the field. Khan Dauran also pointed out that as the imperial troops had not been previously warned to be ready to fight that day, they would take a long time to assemble arm and form line of battle. It was (the two nobles urged) therefore better to fight the next day, when they would be able to advance in proper array with artillery and full preparations and to follow their accustomed tactics. One courtier even told Saadat Khan that 500 camels were nothing to a man like him, and that if he could defeat Nadir Shah,—as they hoped to do easily by a pitched battle the next day,—the entire Persian royal camp and its wealth would be their prey.

But he would not listen to this advice and insisted on going out to the rescue of his camp-followers. Sending out some heralds to proclaim in his camp that all his soldiers should

* Harcharan says that the Emperor distrusted Saadat Khan for being a native of Persia and made him swear fidelity on the *Quran* in his presence. *Siyar* asserts that Saadat had taken leave of the Emperor and was waiting for his baggage in the quarters assigned to him (behind those of Khan Dauran) when he learnt of the attack. But Shakir Kh. (then in the camp) Abdul Karim and Harcharan say that he heard the report in the Emperor's *darbar*. The *Dihli Chronicle* says that the Emperor ordered Saadat to go out and attack the Persians. Anandram says that the Emperor overruled Khan Dauran's objection to fighting on that day. All other authorities hold that the Emperor agreed with the Nizam to defer the action till next day.

assemble and follow him, he hastened to the point of attack with only his escort and the troops within call, amounting to a thousand horse and a few hundred foot, but without any artillery. The Indian cavalryman's employment depended upon the life of his horse, which was his own property, and therefore he was most reluctant to risk it or fatigue it too much. After a month of fast riding, they refused to stir out that day, saying that as their master had gone to visit the Emperor he could not possibly have issued for battle. Still, nearly 4000 cavalry and 1000 infantry joined him in the end. [*Bayan* 34, *Anandram* 27.]

As Saadat Khan came to the field, the Persian skirmishers pretended flight ; he gave them chase and was thus lured away to a distance of two miles from his camp. He sent off couriers to the Emperor begging for reinforcements to complete the victory. Muhammad Shah took counsel of the Nizam, who replied that as the fight was in the east of the imperial camp, Khan Dauran who commanded the division nearest to that point, *viz.*, the Right Wing, should go. Khan Dauran obeyed the order* and issued forth on an elephant without waiting to assemble his full contingent or drag out his artillery. As he was very popular with the soldiers, many of them, on hearing of his having issued to battle, armed and joined him of their own accord in successive drafts, till at last he had some 8,000 horse round him.

Later in the afternoon, the Emperor himself marched out of his tents with the Wazir and stood with marshalled ranks by the side of the canal, but more as a distant spectator of the battle than as a participator in it. The delay in the starting of the different divisions, the absence of a common pre-arranged plan of battle and the lack of one supreme director of operations on the Indian side, led to their three divisions being separated from one another by more than a mile's interval. Saadat Khan formed the Right Wing which was in the extreme east and near the Jamuna, Khan Dauran's division now became the

* Immediately (according to *Bayan*), or after some grumbling, according to *Anandram*..

Centre and stood in the middle of the plain, while the Wazir and the Emperor formed the Left Wing bordering on the canal. Gradually, by the end of the day, when the successive groups of imperialists had marched up to the field, they formed a vast concourse of men, filling the wide plain from their own camp to the place of conflict, with two intervals as described above. The Left Wing (under the Emperor) had dragged out field artillery from behind the shelter of the trenches and had also pitched small tents in the plain for its chiefs ; it did not however, engage the enemy at all.

But this army was a mob ; it lacked cohesion ; it had no animating soul, no unity of command nor indeed any leading at all. The main portion of it stood stock-still, far away from the point of impact, without contributing anything to the struggle, and their vast number only caused a vaster butchery during the retreat. The extremely mobile enemy, led by the greatest living general in Asia, struck the Indian host or evaded it as they found most advantageous to them. Nadir Shah's genius neutralized the superiority in numbers and the desperate valour of many of the Indian soldiers.

SEC. 112.—BATTLE OF KARNAL, 13TH FEBRUARY.

When, a little after midday, Saadat Khan's army was seen to come forth to the plain, news of it was at once carried to Nadir. He was highly elated to hear of it. He had been wishing for such a day, as his Court historian remarks, and it had come unexpectedly soon. The Indian army had been drawn out of its strongly entrenched position, and at last a battle of manœuvres was possible in which the Persian general could show his genius.

Nadir's arrangements were swiftly made, so as not to let the enemy escape through night-fall before his work of destruction was fully done. He left a division to guard his camp ; his Centre was placed in charge of his son Nasr-ullah with many noted warriors and a powerful artillery. The vanguard was under his own command. Three thousand of his best troops were formed into three different bodies and placed in ambush. Two small bodies, each consisting of 500 swift horse-

men, were sent against Saadat Khan and Khan Dauran in order to draw them further into the field.* Nadir himself, clad in full armour and wearing an ornamented helmet, mounted a fleet horse and marched into the fight with one thousand picked Turkish horsemen of his own clan (the Afshar), to direct the battle. The Persian army was entirely composed of cavalry, and their artillery consisted of *jazair*, i.e., long muskets or swivel-guns, seven or eight feet in length with a prong to rest on. In addition there were *zamburaks* or long swivels firing one or two pound balls; "each of these pieces, with its stock, was mounted on a camel, which lay down at command; and from the backs of these animals, trained to this exercise, they charged and fired these guns." [*Jahankusha* 351; Hanway, ii. 368, 153.]

In order to baffle the elephants, on which the Indians mostly relied for effect, he caused a number of platforms to be made and fixed each across two camels. On these platforms he laid naphtha and a mixture of combustibles with orders to set them on fire during the battle. The elephants were sure to flee away at the sight of the quickly approaching fire and put the Indian army behind them in disorder. [Hanway, ii. 369.]

The Persian skirmishers had effectively screened their main position where Nadir had stationed 3000 of his best troops, dismounted his swivels and ranged them along the front with their barrels resting on prongs,

The battle began a little after one o'clock in the afternoon, with a discharge of arrows on both sides. The Persian scouts pretended flight, turning back in their saddles and discharging their bows and muskets while galloping, in the manner of their Parthian ancestors. Saadat Khan gave chase and was thus drawn to the ambush three or four miles east of the imperial camp and the support of its artillery. Suddenly the cavalry

* *Bayan* differs: "Nadir's Right Wing was placed under Tahmasp Quli Jalair, Left under Fath Ali and Lutf Ali Afshar, Centre under Nasr-ullah, and the vanguard, consisting of 4,000 cavalry carrying *jazair*, under himself."

screen drew aside in front and Saadat Khan's army was assailed by the discharge of many hundred swivel-guns at point-blank range. [Harcharan.] The bravest of his troopers who rode foremost fell. After standing this murderous fire for a short while, the Indian vanguard fled. [Anandram.] But Saadat Khan maintained his ground for some time longer, amidst a band of devoted followers, who fought to the death. But early in the evening he was forced out of the field, and the fight in the extreme Right of the Mughal army ceased.

The same fate overtook Khan Dauran's division in another part of the field (the Centre), though he made a longer stand. The rapid fire of the Persian swivel-guns carried death into his ranks, without a chance of reply. The masterly tactics of Nadir, aided by the recklessness and utter want of generalship of the Indian chiefs, had separated the three divisions of the imperial army from one another by more than a mile's interval, so that the soldiers of each division merely heard the sound of firing in the other parts of the field, but could learn nothing of the plight of their brethren, much less hasten to their aid. Khan Dauran could not co-operate with his friend Saadat Khan, however much he wished it. The Nizam, though the ablest general on the Indian side, was absolutely inert throughout the day and gave no help to Khan Dauran or Saadat Khan, probably because he hoped (as Abdul Karim suggests) to take the places of these rivals at Court if they perished. The Emperor was imbecile and stood like a wooden figure in the extreme Left. At the points of contact the Indians had a numerical inferiority and were far away from the aid of their heavy artillery. Their generals mounted on tall elephants became targets for the enemy's fire, while the nimble Persian horsemen hovered round beyond the reach of the weapons of the Indians.

The murderous fire of Nadir's gunners continued for two hours. The Indians fought bravely, but gave up their lives as a vain sacrifice, because (in the words of Abdul Karim) "arrows cannot answer bullets." When the situation became absolutely hopeless and most of their officers had fallen, about 1000 of the bravest soldiers of Khan Dauran dismounted and,

in the Indian fashion, tying the skirts of their long coats together fought on foot till they all died. [*Bayan.*] Khan Dauran himself had been mortally wounded in the face and fallen down unconscious on his *howda*. But a party of devoted retainers, under his steward Majlis Rai, surrounded his elephant and by desperate fighting brought him back to the camp, near sunset, but only to die. [*Anandram.*]

SEC. 113.—DEFEAT AND CASUALTIES OF THE INDIANS.

Saadat Khan had been suffering for the last three months from a wound in the leg which prevented him from riding or walking, and he used to be carried about in a chair or on an elephant. Though he had received two wounds in this battle, he could have retired in safety but for an accident. His elephant was charged by the infuriated elephant of his nephew Nisar Muhammad Khan Sher Jang and driven into the Persian ranks, though his men stabbed it with sword and dagger to make it stop. Surrounded by enemies, Saadat Khan continued to shoot arrows from his seat, to resist capture, when a young Persian soldier of his native city of Naishabur boldly galloped up to his elephant, and addressing him by his familiar name, cried out, "Muhammad Amin! Are you mad? Whom are you fighting? On whom are you still relying?" Then driving his spear into the ground, and throwing the reins of his horse round it, he climbed up to Saadat Khan's *howda* by the rope hanging down from it. The Khan now surrendered and was taken to Nadir's camp. [*Siyar*, i. 97.]

At the disappearance of these two leaders, the Indian army melted away, pursued by the Persian horsemen with heavy slaughter. The Emperor with his other nobles stood in battle order by the side of the canal (in the extreme west of the field) expecting an attack. But Nadir Shah kept his men back from assaulting such a strongly fortified position and its heavy artillery; he had a surer and easier means of compelling the Emperor's submission. At sunset, Muhammad Shah retired to his camp, after having all that day done absolutely

nothing to save his throne and his people.* The battle was over in less than three hours: it had commenced at the time of the *zuhar* prayer and ended at the *asar* prayer. [*Jahankusha* 351.]

The slaughter in the Indian army was terrible. Nadir's Court historian gives the exaggerated figures of 100 chiefs and 30,000 common soldiers slain and a vast number taken prisoner. [*Jahankusha*, 353.] Hanway shortly afterwards heard in Persia of 17,000 Indians having been killed. Harcharan-das gives 20,000 and the Mahratta envoy in the imperial camp 10 to 12 thousand men in one account and seven to eight thousand in a later report. [*Brahmendra S. C.* No. 41.] Rustam Ali says that Khan Dauran alone lost 5,000 men, to which we must add at least 3000 for Saadat Khan's division, making a total of 8000 slain.

Among the officers slain were Muzaffar Khan (a younger brother of Khan Dauran), three sons of Khan Dauran (Ali Hamid, Muhataram and another), Aslih Khan (the commander of the Emperor's bodyguard), Ali Ahmad Khan,† Shahdad Afghan, Yadgar Hasan Khan (Koka), Ashraf Khan, Itibar Khan, Aqil Beg Kambalposh ("Blanket-wearer"), Mir Kalu (son of Mir Mushrif) and Ratan Chand (son of the historian Khush-hal Chand, who was office-assistant to the imperial Paymaster). Saadat Khan and his nephew Sher Jang, as well as Khwaja Ashura (a son of Khan Dauran) were captured alive.

The loss on the Persian side was 2500 slain and twice as many wounded, according to Hanway, who estimates the Indian casualties in slain as seven times the number of the Persians killed. This relative proportion seems to me to be nearest the truth, though the figures for both sides are exaggerated.‡

* I reject the absurd story told in *Bayan* p. 41. Hanway (ii. 369) says that in the night following the battle the Indian camp was so very thin that from the Emperor's own quarters to those of the Nizam, which was nearly two miles off, hardly any people were found.

† So called by Mahdi and *Bayan*, but spelt as Hamid Ali in Anandram and the *Chronicle*. *Bayan* and Anandram call him Koka.

‡ The bed-ridden invalid Ali Hazin, who is eternally cursing India.

The gains of the victor were immense. Of the elephants, field treasury, guns, baggage and stores of all kinds taken outside the entrenchment, nothing escaped. The booty was beyond count. As soon as Saadat Khan and Khan Dauran were seen to leave the field, their camps were plundered *by their own followers* and the miscellaneous rabble that accompanied Mughal armies. In a twinkling no trace of these two nobles' vast encampments, not even a tent, was left on their sites. [Shakir, *Siyar* i. 96.] When the half-dead body of Khan Dauran was brought back, his servants had to borrow a small poleless tent from elsewhere to shelter his head in.

A great terror befell the Indian army. All night long the remaining soldiers stood on guard along the camp enclosure, armed and with their horses saddled, ready to meet the enemy's attack. [Shakir; *Chronicle*.]

SEC. 114.—CAUSES OF THE INDIAN DEFEAT AT KARNAL.

The defeat of the Indians at Karnal was due as much to their being outclassed in their weapons of war and method of fighting, as to their bad generalship.

Nadir was not really a Persian, but a Turk of a tribe settled on the Persian soil for centuries past. His soldiers were Turks and other nomads (like the Kurds), and not Persians proper. He conversed with Muhammad Shah in Turkish. [Harcharan.] Indeed, the Persians themselves designated his army accurately by calling them *Qizil-bashes* or Red Caps,* from the scarlet broad-cloth caps worn by them,—the very caps which we see to-day on the heads of the Turks and their imitators in Egypt and India. The true Persians are an Aryan people, with a strong Semitic strain infused into them after the Muslim conquest, but they have little Turanian or Turkish racial admixture. Their language is not akin to Turkish, their manners are different from those of the Turks, and their

its climate and people, says that the Persians lost only 3 killed and 20 wounded! *Siyar* and Ghulam Ali blindly copy these figures.

* "The battle-field became a bed of poppies from the crowd of Qizilbash troops, all of whom wore Turk-like [?] caps of red *sqarlat*." [Anandram, 29.]

religion is the opposite of that Sunnism of which Turkey and the Turks are the orthodox champions. The Persians proper (the same race as the Parsis now settled in India) are very intelligent, refined, proud, and possessed of a delicate sense of humour, but no soldiers. Nadir's troops, the Qizilbashs, were men of the same race and same method of warfare as the so-called Pathan and Mughal conquerors of India, namely Turks and Turkomans from Central Asia, capable of making long and rapid rides and bearing every privation on the way.

In addition to this, Nadir's army contained a large proportion of men equipped with fire-arms, several thousands of *jazair-chis* or swivel-gunners. Their discipline was strict and their fire control was of the European type. They used to reserve their fire till the word of command and then deliver a volley. The effect on their enemy was as disconcerting as it was deadly. At Karnal, the Persian swivel-guns were planted in rows on the ground and kept ready for the Indians, who were lured there by the skirmishers, and then their rapid fire completely overthrew the enemy without giving them a chance to retaliate.

The Indian cavalry prided itself on its swordsmanship and cultivated sword-play and fancy riding, as if war were a theatrical show. They fought with the sword only and felt a contempt for missile weapons and those who used them. In describing the battles with the Persians for the possession of Qandahar in the middle of the 17th century, the Dihli Court historian sneers at the Persian troopers for declining sword-combats with the cavaliers of Hindustan. He taunts the Persians with cowardice pretty nearly in the same tone as the English writers employed during the last war in speaking of the German soldiers, who did not stand up to receive the bayonet charges of the British infantry.

The Indian Musalman and Rajput soldiers were very inefficient in the use of fire-arms. The only musketeers of any value in the Mughal army in the 17th century were the Hindus of Buxar, the Bundelas, the Karnatakis (of whom there were many in the service of the Bijapur Sultans, but none under the Later Mughals), and a small class of hunters called *Bahelias*.

usually recruited in the Allahabad province. The immense majority of the Indian soldiers did not fight with muskets, nor did they, as a rule, carry into the field portable light artillery of the *jazair* class in large numbers. The Indian ordnances were heavy cumbrous and of a more antiquated type than those of Persia and Turkey, and therefore the fire delivered by them was usually slow and inaccurate enough to be neglected. The Indian soldiers were trained to stake everything on the shock charge of heavy cavalry and hand to hand grapple. They had little mobility. Not so the Qizilbashes in the Persian service. Like their fellow-Turanians in Trans-oxiana or in the armies of the Usmanli Sultans of Constantinople, they formed the best cavalry in Asia,—hardy and fast horsemen, mounted on the fleetest and strongest breed of horses, and trained to the saddle from their childhood, as became a nomad race. They were also capital archers, accustomed to shoot from the saddle and fight while fleeing. They had a decisive advantage over the Indians, as men fighting with missiles have over those who can employ side-arms only.

The superior mobility of Nadir's soldiers enabled them to assume the offensive from the very beginning. They out-manceuvred the Indians and drove them to the place most advantageous to the attacking party; they fought or deferred engagement as it suited them.

The Indians' crowning folly was the employment of elephants in this modern age of muskets and comparatively long-range artillery carried on camels. Elephants had failed against mobile cavalry using missiles in the almost pre-historic times of Alexander the Great when fire-arms were unknown, and more recently against Babar's horsemen with their few slow and primitive guns. They were a sure engine of self-destruction when ranged against Nadir Shah in the year 1739.

SEC. 115.—NEGOTIATIONS FOR PEACE WITH NADIR SHAH.

When Nadir Shah returned to his camp from the battle-field Saadat Khan was brought before him, after the *isha* prayer (8 p.m.) The king spoke contemptuously of the Indian army as a 'host of beggars' and remarked of their general Khan

Dauran that he knew how to die but not how to fight. [Imad.] He then inquired about the resources and intentions of the Emperor. Saadat Khan diplomatically replied "The Emperor's resources are vast. Only one of his nobles came out to fight to-day and has gone back on being accidentally wounded by a shot. But there are many other *amirs* and brave Rajahs with countless hosts still left." Nadir Shah remarked, "You are my fellow-countryman and fellow-believer. Advise me how I can get a ransom from your Emperor and go home to fight the Sultan of Turkey." Saadat Khan then advised him to summon the Nizam who was "the Key of the State of India" and settle peace terms through him.* Next day, 14th February, Nadir Shah sent a man with the *Quran* to Muhammad Shah to take an oath on it as to his good faith, and call the Nizam. Saadat Khan also wrote to the Emperor, advising him to send the Nizam and make peace.

The Nizam was now the last of the great nobles at the side of the Emperor, and the latter was naturally alarmed at the thought of sending him away. He asked, "If any treachery is done to you, what steps should we take?" The Nizam replied, "The *Quran* is between us. If there is treachery, God will answer for it. Then your Majesty should retreat to Mandu or some other strong fort, summon Nasir Jang from the Dakhin with a strong force, and fight the Persians."

The Nizam then left for the Persian camp with full powers to negotiate. Nadir received him well and complained, "It is surprising that while there are nobles like you on the Emperor's side, the naked Mahrattas can march up to the walls of Dihli and take ransom from him!" The Nizam replied, "Since new nobles rose to influence, His Majesty did whatever he liked. My advice was not acceptable to him. Therefore, in helplessness I left him and retired to the Dakhin."

The reply pleased Nadir. Turning to the subject of peace, he complained of the unfriendly indifference of the Dihli Govern-

* This history of the negotiations is mainly based upon Harcharan-das (who is supported by Rustam Ali, Elliot viii. 62), with some useful points from the *Chronicle*, Mahratti letters, Anandram 35-36; *Jahankusha* 354, *Siyar* 97-98, *Bayan* 43-44.

ment during his struggles with his enemies, though the former sovereigns of Persia had often helped the Emperor's forefathers. The Nizam explained it by saying, "Since the death of Farrukhsiyar, the affairs of this Government have gone to rack and ruin owing to quarrels among the nobles, and therefore the ministers did not attend to Your Majesty's letters."

After a long discussion, it was agreed that the Persian army would go back from that place on being promised a war indemnity of 50 lakhs* of Rupees, out of which 20 lakhs were to be paid then and there, 10 lakhs on reaching Lahor, ten lakhs at Attock, and the remaining ten lakhs at Kabul. After making this settlement the Nizam took his leave. Nadir sent with him an invitation to the Emperor to dine with him the next day.

On Thursday, 15th February,† Muhammad Shah accompanied by all his nobles started for the Persian camp, the Nizam instructing him that he would have to converse with Nadir in the Turkish language. The Persian Wazir met the party on the way and vowed on the *Quran* that no treachery would be done to them. Outside the Persian encampment Prince Nasrullah welcomed the guest on behalf of his father. On their arrival, Nadir advanced to outside his tent, took Muhammad Shah graciously by the hand and leading him within seated him on the royal carpet by his own side. The Nizam, the Wazir and Muhammad Ishaq Khan were permitted to go inside, all others remained outside the tent.

As the two sovereigns were talking together, Ishaq Khan (Mutaman-ud-daulah) joined in the conversation. Nadir Shah in anger asked who the man was that had ventured to mingle his speech with that of kings. Muhammad Shah then introduced him as the tutor (*ataliq*) of his childhood. The Persian king put questions to Ishaq Khan and was so much pleased with his ready and intelligent answers that he pronounced him fit to be the Wazir of India. [Harcharan.]

* The *Sigar* (97) puts the figure at 2 krons. Not true.

† The *Dihli Chronicle* gives the date as 18th February, which is contradicted by Mahdi Harcharan and all other authorities.

The party then sat down to dinner. The Persian conqueror proudly remarked, "My practice is open war and not treacherous assassination," and then, in order to assure Muhammad Shah that his food was not poisoned, he exchanged his own dishes with those of the Emperor just as they were about to begin eating. [Harcharan.] As an act of courtesy, Nadir Shah himself handed the cup of coffee to the Emperor. The meeting ended happily, and about three hours before sunset Muhammad Shah took leave of his host and returned to his own camp. Here his family and servants, and indeed the whole camp, had been passing the hours of his absence in the greatest fear and anxiety, expecting his murder or at least captivity at the hands of Nadir. His safe return now, in the words of the historian, "restored to them the hearts which had left their bodies." [Anandram ; *Bayan*.] But the Persian investment of the Indian camp continued. [*Jahan*.]

Samsam-ud-daulah Khan Dauran, the head of the army (*Amir-ul-umara* and *Bakhshi-ul-mamalik*) died on the 15th. The story goes that when in the evening of the fatal 13th of February his senseless body was brought back to the site of his plundered camp, the Nizam, the Wazir and the Emperor's eunuchs came to inquire after his condition and offer condolences and prayers. Khan Dauran came to his senses for a while, opened his eyes and whispered in a very weak voice, "I have myself finished my own business. Now you know and your work knows. Never take the Emperor to Nadir, nor conduct Nadir to Dihli, but send away that evil from this point by any means that you can devise." [*Siyar*.] He then relapsed into unconsciousness and died after less than two days.*

The Emperor, on returning from his first visit to Nadir

* Anandram definitely asserts that he survived only one day after the battle. Mirza Mahdi says (p. 352) that he died the day after the battle, and *M. U.* (i. 819) supports this. Ghulam Ali (p. 25) makes him linger not more than one night. The Mahratta envoy's letter places his death 2 or 3 days after the battle. Harcharan-das makes the Emperor learn of his death four *gharis* after nightfall on the 15th. *Bayan* has the 3rd day after the battle. The *Dihli Chronicle*, however, gives 17th February as the date of his death, and the *Siyar* repeats it.

Shah, heard of the death of Khan Dauran. The Nizam immediately afterwards came to him and induced him to confer the deceased noble's office of Paymaster on his own son Firuz Jang, as a reward for his diplomatic success in turning Nadir Shah back [*Siyar.*] At this, Azim-ullah Khan, the son of the Wazir's brother, was filled with despair and envy and immediately started for the Persian camp with his own retainers to join Nadir, saying "I am older than Firuz Jang. Why has the Bakhshi's post been conferred on Firuz Jang, while I am available?"

The Nizam and the Wazir hastened after him and brought him back from the way. As the Nizam was older than Azim-ullah, he assumed the office of Bakhshi himself, and thus Azim-ullah was silenced. A truce was thus patched up at Court. But when Saadat Khan in the Persian camp heard of the Nizam's appointment as Bakhshi, the fire of his jealousy blazed forth, as he had long coveted this post and the Nizam had promised to help him in getting it. He now set to wreak vengeance on his successful rival and his ungrateful master. At his next audience with Nadir Shah, Saadat Khan told him how unwise he was in being satisfied with an indemnity of 50 lakhs, because if the conqueror went to Dihli 20 krons in cash and jewels and other valuable articles beyond estimate would be easily secured. "At present," Saadat Khan pointed out, "the imperial Court has no noble of eminence except the Nizam, who is a cheat and a philosopher. If this deceiver is entrapped, everything would happen as Your Majesty desired. If you order me, I shall call my troops and property from the imperial camp and place them in your camp." Nadir Shah agreed and it was done. [Harcharan.]

This plot took some time to mature. In the meanwhile the Nizam had paid a second visit to the Persian king on the 18th and the Persian Wazir had been feasted in the Nizam's tent the day after. [*Chron.*] Evidently these meetings were held for hastening the collection of the indemnity first agreed upon.

SEC. 116.—NADIR IMPRISONS THE EMPEROR AND NOBLES.

Nadir bided his time for striking his treacherous blow. His sure ally was famine. The agreement had been made on the 14th and verbally confirmed by the Emperor on the 15th ; but as the money was not paid the investment of the imperial camp had continued [*Jahan*. 354]. The condition of the vast population within this huge enclosure was most sad, as we can see vividly in the letter of the Mahratta envoy who was present there: "Five or six days passed and then no food could be had in the camp. Grain could not be procured even at six or seven Rupees* the seer. The country was a desert, nothing could be had [from the neighbouring villages]. For five days the men went without food." As early as the 19th, or only six days after the battle, the supply of ghee had become entirely exhausted in the camp. [*Chronicle*.]

But there was no escape. The Qizilbash cavalry patrolled the road to Dihli and cut down or carried into slavery all who left the Indian camp. The few who slipped through the cordon of the enemy's cavalry were murdered or robbed of their all by the peasantry on the way. [*Ali Hazin*.]

When famine and despair had thus seized the Mughal camp in their grip, Nadir Shah summoned the Nizam to discuss certain matters which had yet to be settled.

On Thursday, 22nd February, the Nizam in full reliance on the treaty made a week earlier and without any apprehension, went to the Persian camp, in response to Nadir's letter. When he reached Nadir Shah's ante-room, he was detained there. Nadir sent him a message demanding 20 krons of Rupees as indemnity and 20,000 troopers to serve under the Persian banners as auxiliaries. Asaf Jah was thunder-struck. He pleaded for abatement, saying, "From the foundation of the Chaghtai dynasty up to now, 20 krons of Rupees had never been amassed in the imperial treasury. Shah Jahan, with all his efforts, had accumulated only 16 krons ; but the whole of it had been spent by Aurangzeb in his long wars in the Dakhin. At present even 50 lakhs are not left in the Treasury."

* Anandram, however, says that the price of flour reached Rs. 4 a seer.

Nadir replied in anger, "These false words will not do. So long as you do not agree to procure* the sum demanded by me, you cannot leave this place." So, the Nizam was detained a prisoner in the Persian camp that day and the next.

Nadir pressed the Nizam to write to the Emperor to visit the Persian camp again. The Nizam protested, saying that no such term had been agreed to before. The Persian king, however, assured him that he did not mean to break his promise, he had only found it necessary to meet Muhammad Shah a second time. [*Siyar*, i. 97.] The Nizam had no help but to write to his master, reporting the exact state of affairs.

The unexpected failure of the Nizam to return the previous night had already created anxiety and rumours of treachery among the Indians ; and now when the truth became known from this letter, consternation and a sense of utter helplessness seized the Emperor's Court and camp. The Wazir was the only great noble left at his side, and naturally Muhammad Shah turned to him for counsel ; but he replied that he could do nothing in such a situation and that the Emperor should act as he thought best. Muhammad Shah was perplexed in mind and overwhelmed with grief. Some of the younger nobles counselled resistance and one more appeal to arms before yielding himself up to certain captivity. But the Emperor knew that a further struggle would only lead to greater misery and ruin. He decided to go to Nadir, leaving it to God to work His will.

On Saturday 24th February, the Emperor started from his own camp, accompanied by Muhammad Ishaq and some eunuchs and personal servants (*kḥawas*) and a retinue of 2,000 cavalry only. The other nobles who wished to bear him company were kept back by him. Arrived in the Persian camp, he was, according to the report that reached the Mahratta envoy at Karnal, welcomed by none, but left for a long time alone and uncared for, and at night joined by the Nizam and Saadat Khan. Then he alone was taken to Nadir's tent. With this visit of the Emperor, as the Persian State Secretary rightly says, "the key for opening the whole Empire of Hindustan came into

* Literally, 'point out where the money is.'

the hands of Nadir Shah." In fact the Emperor became a captive and a guard was placed over him. The nobles who had accompanied him or previously gone to the Persian camp were told to consider themselves under arrest, and Nadir gained composure of mind, so far as the chance of any Indian resistance was concerned. [Anandram 42, Raj.]

Next day, 25th February, the Emperor's wives, children, servants and furniture were taken away from Karnal, and he was lodged close to Nadir Shah's tents. The captive nobles also called to themselves their families and retinue from their former camp. Qamar-ud-din Khan, who was the last great noble in freedom, was carried by the Qizilbashs to their camp, along with the imperial artillery at Karnal. The Persian official historian throws the veil of hypocrisy over this treacherous *coup d'état* played by his master. He describes the incident in these words: "Out of respect for the honour of the august family of the Emperor, the tents for his residence and the screens for his harem were set up close to Nadir Shah's tents and Abdul Baqi Khan, one of the highest nobles of Persia, was appointed with a party of soldiers to attend on Muhammad Shah everywhere and engage in doing the duties of hospitality to the guest." [Jahankusha, 354.]

It was proclaimed in the imperial camp that the minor officers who had not been taken to the Persian encampment, and all the common soldiers and followers could either stay at Karnal or go back to Dihli and their homes as they liked. [Siyar, Harcharan, Raj. vi.]

Great terror and bewilderment now fell on the Indian camp. They were sheep left without a single shepherd, and surrounded by wolves. Even their last remaining chief, the Wazir, was now taken away from them. The road to Dihli was beset by roving bands of Qizilbashs who had now no fear of resistance, and by the peasantry who had risen in insurrection at the fall of the Government which had so long kept order.*

* Hanway (ii. 369): Flying parties of the Persian army within forty miles round the [imperial] camp cut off not less than 14,000 Indian marauders.

The vast camp broke up, and every one fled wherever he thought best, but comparatively few effected their retreat in safety. [*Siyar following Ali Hazin.*]

Their condition is graphically described in the letter of one of these fugitives. The Mahratta ambassador at the Mughal Court, Babu Rao Malhar, had accompanied the Emperor from Dihli to Karnal with his own escort and property, and stayed there through these days of growing alarm and anxiety. At last on Sunday, the 25th, he felt that all was lost. Mustering courage, or in his own words, 'making a fort of his breast,' he issued from the camp at about 3 o'clock in the afternoon. His elephants, camels, infantry and baggage and tents were sent towards Dihli by the royal highway, while he himself left it and plunged into the jungle for greater safety. Here he passed the night. Next day after riding some 80 miles along circuitous by-paths he regained the road near the imperial capital. Saadat Khan was coming along this highway with a strong Persian escort, and behind them the Mahratta envoy reached Dihli on the 27th. But that capital was no longer a safe abode. So, he left it that very day and halted for the night at Muhammad Khan's Sarai, some six miles south of the city. Thence, by way of Suraj Mal Jat's camp he reached Jaipur (on 6th March) without once halting on the way, and there he joined his colleague Dhondo Pant. His elephants and camels came, more slowly, from Dihli to Rewari. His feelings can be judged from his exclamation: "God has averted a great danger from me, and enabled me to escape with honour! The Chaghtai Empire is gone, the Irani Empire has commenced. Remain there in great caution!" [Rajwade, vi. No. 131.]

CHAPTER XIII

NADIR SHAH IN DIHLI: HIS RETURN.

[*By the Editor*]

SEC. 117.—STATE OF DIHLI CITY AFTER THE EMPEROR'S DEFEAT.

The people of Dihli had been as careless of the outer world as the imperial Court. They had not at first realized the character of the Persian menace, nor the genius of the upstart shepherd-brigand who was approaching their country. Confidence in the wardens of the marches produced a false sense of security, which was heightened by the magnificent display of the assembled forces of the three highest nobles sent from the capital on 2nd December 1738. When, on 19th January 1739, the secretary Anandram reached Dihli a day after the Emperor's departure to join the army, he found that every one, great and small, in the city had set his heart on accompanying the expedition. Some looked upon it as an opportunity for seeing the Panjab, others thought that a victory would be gained near the city and that they would return home very soon.

Then came the truth with startling suddenness. Early on the 15th February, news arrived at Dihli that two days earlier the enemy's forces had triumphed, the two largest divisions of the imperial army with their generals had been killed or captured, and the Emperor's camp invested. The population of Dihli was cosmopolitan and included a large miscellaneous body ever ready to engage in violence and plunder. The Gujars or pastoral brigands lived in the close vicinity of the city and might be expected to raid its rich bazars whenever they heard that the imperial authority was paralysed or temporarily weakened. [*Imad. 66.*]

But Haji Fulad Khan, the police prefect of Dihli, was a wise and energetic man. He kept the city safe by watching the streets day and night, and promptly pounced upon every creator of mischief. In the meantime the highways leading from

the city were totally closed by robbers ; life and property became insecure outside the walls. Private individuals like Anandram who lived beyond the fortified town hired armed retainers to guard their houses, barricaded the ends of their streets, and laid in stores of powder and shot for the defence of their homes and families. Twelve days passed in this kind of anxious watch, when on 27th February Saadat Khan arrived with 4,000 troopers and the lawless people were overawed. [Anandram, 38-41.]

The day after he had secured the Emperor's person Nadir Shah despatched to Dihli Saadat Khan as the Emperor's representative and Tahmasp Khan Jalair as his own plenipotentiary agent, with 4000 cavalry to take possession of the city and palace for the victor and make arrangements for keeping order, so that no part of the imperial property might be plundered or secreted during the change of masters and the necessary preparations might be made for receiving Nadir in the palace. The two nobles reached Dihli on 27th February. They brought two letters from Muhammad Shah and Nadir to Lutf-ullah Khan the governor of the city. The Emperor ordered him to hand over to Tahmasp the keys of the palaces and imperial treasuries and stores and to guard the Princes carefully. Nadir's letter praised Lutf-ullah for his honesty and devotion to his master and confirmed him in the government of Dihli on his own behalf.

Lutf-ullah Khan had talked of digging trenches round Dihli and making a defence. Therefore, Saadat Khan halted one march outside the city and wrote to Lutf-ullah advising him to make a peaceful surrender. Resistance was hopeless, and the governor yielded up the city to the agent of Persia. [Shakir.]

When the news of the occupation of Dihli reached the camp outside Karnal the two kings set out on 1st March. Muhammad Shah rode an arrow's flight behind Nadir, as courtesy required. The Emperor was accompanied* by only

* Harcharan. *Chronicle*. But Hanway (ii. 373) gives a different description of Nadir's march to Dihli with 350,000 men forming a column 12 miles long and 3 miles broad.

1000 horse and his Wazir by 10,000. The rest of the imperial army had dispersed to their homes immediately after the order of 25th February.

SEC. 118.—NADIR SHAH AND THE EMPEROR ENTER DIHLI PALACE.

The royal party arrived near the Shalimar garden north of Dihli on 7th March. Saadat Khan had advanced from the city a day earlier to welcome Nadir. On the 7th Luft-ullah went to the garden to wait on his master, who presented him to Nadir. The Persian king expressed great pleasure at Lutf-ullah's ready obedience, and taking off a costly coat from his own person invested the Khan with it with his own hands. [Shakir.] Nadir and his army halted in the garden on the 8th, while Muhammad Shah went into the city to prepare the palace for receiving his august guest.

The fallen descendant of Babar and Akbar rode into his capital on a portable throne (*takht-i-rawan*) in silence and humility ; no band played, and no banners were carried before him. [Chronicle.] A few nobles accompanied him,—Ishaq Khan, Bahroz Khan and Jawid Khan.

Next morning, Friday the 9th of March, the conqueror entered Dihli riding a grey charger. His troops lined the road from the limits of the Shalimar garden to the gate of the fort-palace of Dihli. The Emperor welcomed his conqueror, spread the richest carpets cloth of gold and other rare stuffs on the ground for him to set his foot upon (*pa-andazi*). Nadir Shah occupied Shah Jahan's own palace-chambers near the Diwan-i-khas, while Muhammad Shah lodged near the *deorhi* of the Asad Burj. [Anandram.] On this day the Emperor acted as the host and placed dinner before Nadir. The Persian army encamped, some round the fort, some on the bank of the Jamuna near the city, and some were quartered in houses throughout the city. [Ali Hazin, *Jahankusha* 355.]

Saadat Khan had been in attendance on Nadir the whole of this day. At night he was severely reprimanded by the Persian king for his failure to raise the promised ransom and was threatened with personal chastisement if he did not carry

out his word soon. It was too much for him. He retired to his own house and took poison.

The feast of Id-uz-zuha fell on Saturday 10th March. In the morning the name and titles of Nadir were proclaimed as sovereign from the pulpits of the Jama Masjid and other places of prayer. [*Siyar*, i. 98.] In the afternoon Nadir went on a return visit to Muhammad Shah's chambers and proceeded to his real business, the exaction of ransom. A little scene was now played in order to throw a veil of outward decency over the pre-arranged act of spoliation. We can easily detect the truth in reading between the lines of the following diplomatic narrative of the Persian king's secretary [*Jahankusha*, 355] :—

"Nadir Shah graciously remarked that the throne of Hindustan would be left to Muhammad Shah, in the terms of the agreement made on the first day, and that the Emperor would enjoy the support and friendship of the Persian monarch, because both were of the same Turkoman stock.

"Muhammad Shah bowed low in gratitude and gave profuse thanks to the victor for his generosity. He had received no small favour ;—it was the gift of a crown added to the gift of life. As a mark of his gratitude he laid before Nadir Shah the accumulated treasures stores and rare possessions of the rulers of Dihli as presents to Nadir and offerings for his health (*nisar*). But the gracious sovereign of Persia refused to take any of these things, though the piled-up wealth of all the other kings of the world did not amount to a tenth part of a tenth part of this immense hoard. At last he yielded to the importunity of Muhammad Shah and appointed trusty officers to take delivery of the money and other property."

SEC. 119.—DIHLI POPULACE RISE AGAINST THE PERSIANS.

While this peaceful meeting was being held in the palace, a scene of the opposite character opened in the city. Nadir's soldiers and camp-followers, mostly Turks, Kurds and Mongols, were wandering carelessly through the streets and bazars of Dihli as their king was in possession of the city. Suddenly, about four o'clock in the evening (Saturday, 10th March), some idle talkers and mischief-makers started the rumour that Nadir

Shah had been treacherously shot dead at the instigation of Muhammad Shah, by a Qalmaq woman-guard of the palace when he was returning from his visit to the Emperor.* [Anandram 44, *Siyar* i. 98.] As all had heard that Nadir would go to the Emperor's quarters that day, the story found ready belief. None cared to verify the news by a visit to the palace, though its gate was open and people were passing in and out of it on business. [Ali Hazin.] The rumour spread like wild-fire, and soon afterwards the hooligans and low people of the city armed themselves and began to attack the Persian soldiers and followers who were strolling through the streets alone or in groups of two and three. Their small number, their ignorance of the local language, and their unfamiliarity with the by-ways of the city put them at a disadvantage and they were slain. The rumour of the murder of their chief took the heart out of the Persians and they could not make any organized stand. The rising spread with the success of the rioters and the weak defence of the Persians. All night the murderous attack raged; it slackened after 3 o'clock next morning (no doubt owing to the exhaustion of the fighters), but revived with new energy at daybreak, which was the 13th bright lunar day of Falgun or the commencement of the *Holi* festival, when the lower classes of Hindus are particularly excited and often intoxicated. [*Chronicle* and *Raj.* vi. 131.]

Among the authorities Harcharan-das alone says that the citizens rose in tumult when they were driven to desperation by the violent attacks of the Persian soldiers on their property

* This was a familiar stage-device of the story-tellers of Dihli. The captive Shah Jahan was said to have formed a similar plot against Aurangzeb in Agra fort. Details of the alleged murder of Nadir Shah varied in the popular mouth. The following rumour reached Aurangabad, as we find in a Mahratti news-letter [*Raj.* vi. No. 134] :—"Nadir Shah breaking his oath faithlessly imprisoned the Emperor and his nobles, though the Pathans who had joined him urged him not to do it. At the time of Nadir's entrance into Dihli there was a rising of the Pathans round him. Qasim Khan Pathan and his brother, who were waving peacock feather fans over Nadir and his Wazir on their *howdas*, slew both of them with their daggers at the gate."

and women. This statement goes against the probabilities of the case, because the time was only one day after Nadir's arrival, when the amount of the ransom and the manner of levying it were still being discussed, and Nadir was not the man to allow a premature fleecing of the citizens or relax the discipline of his army in a foreign town. All other writers represent the Indian mob as the aggressors. The higher classes and all good men held aloof; but they took no active step to pacify or control the hooligans, because the old Government agency for maintaining order had been dissolved, the gentry were too much divided by caste creed race and profession to combine and organize a voluntary police at a moment's notice, and their centralized autocratic Government had not developed their powers of initiative and self-help by giving them any opportunity of corporate action and municipal self-government.

Hanway heard what seems to me to have been the most probable account of the origin of the riot, namely that Tahmasp Khan sent several Persian mounted military police (*nasaqchi*) to the granaries of the Paharganj ward ordering them to be opened and the price of corn fixed; that the corn-dealers not being satisfied with the rate, a mob assembled; Sayyid Niaz Khan and several other persons of distinction put themselves at their head and slew the Persian horsemen, and then the report was spread that Nadir had been murdered, which increased the tumult. [ii. 375.]

According to Ali Hazin, seven thousand Persians were slain that night. But Abdul Karim gives the more probable figure of 3,000.*

When early in the night the first reports of the attacks on his soldiers were brought to Nadir, he refused to credit them and censured the complainants by saying that the wretches in

* Ali Hazin says that some of the Indian nobles who had begged from Nadir Qizilbash guards for their mansions gave them up to the mob to be slain and even killed them with their own hands. But Abdul Karim tells the more probable tale that these guards were preserved and their presence saved those houses from the vengeance of Nadir's soldiery in the next day's massacre and even the poor householders in their neighbourhood escaped sack by appealing to them.

his army had brought this false charge against the citizens in the hope of getting from him an order to plunder and slay them and thus satisfy their wicked greed. But the reports persisted and gradually became more alarming. He now sent out a sergeant to find out the true facts. The man, on leaving the fort-gate, was killed by the mob. A second agent suffered the same fate. Then the Persian king ordered a thousand musketeers to enter the streets and disperse the mob. But by this time the disturbance had spread over too large an area for these few men to succeed in quelling it.

On learning this, Nadir ordered that his soldiers should remain collected in their respective posts for the rest of the night, without spreading out or sallying forth to punish the Indians. They were not even to fight unless their posts were attacked. The gates of the wards of the city were watched by strong Persian pickets, and the rioting bands were isolated in their respective quarters and prevented from combining or marching elsewhere. [*Jahankusha* 357, Harcharan, *Bayan* 46-47, Ali Hazin 298-299, Anandram 44.]

SEC. 120.—NADIR'S MASSACRE AT DIHLI.

At sunrise on Sunday 11th March, the tumult broke out afresh. Nadir dressed himself in armour, mounted his horse and girt around by spearmen carrying daggers also, rode to the Golden Mosque of Roshan-ud-daulah in the middle of Chandni Chawk, opposite the Police Station and close to the Jewel Market. There he ascertained from which wards and classes of men the crimes of the night before had proceeded, and then unsheathed his sword as a signal for the general massacre of the people of those wards.

His soldiers had so long held their hands back from retaliation solely in obedience to his command. They now hastened with drawn swords to wreak vengeance. Within the doomed areas, the houses were looted, all the men killed without regard for age and all the women dragged into slavery.*

* Hanway (ii. 376)—Many refugees from the neighbouring country, joined by jewellers, money-changers, and rich shopkeepers, headed by the Court physician, took arms in desperation, assembled in a body, and fought

The destroyers set fire to many houses and several of their victims, both dead and wounded, Hindus and Muhammadans, were indiscriminately burnt together. [*Jahankusha* 357-358.]

The slaughter began about 9 o'clock in the morning and raged unchecked till about 2 P.M. Then Muhammad Shah in utter humility sent his highest nobles, the Nizam and the Wazir, to beg the victor to abate his anger and pardon his erring subjects. [*Jahan* 359.] Nadir listened to the prayer, because he took no pleasure in wanton bloodshed, and had only ordered the massacre as a measure of self-defence in imaginary fear of a universal rising of the Indian population. [Harcharan.]

The *kotwal* was commanded to go through the city with the heralds of the Persian army, proclaiming to the men to cease their work of slaughter. They immediately obeyed.

Anandram (who was present in the Wakilpura suburb throughout Nadir's stay in Dihli) says that the houses in the Chandni Chawk, the Fruit-market Square, the Dariba Bazar and the region round the Jama Masjid were sacked. Harcharandas, too, speaks of only 2 or 3 *mahallas* near the Fort and the grain dealers' mahalla (Paharganj) which was at a distance from it, suffering havoc. Abdul Karim defines the portion of the city subjected to massacre and plunder, as extending from the fort-gate westwards to the old Id-gah, northwards to the wood market, southwards to outside the Dihli gate in the city-wall. In addition to this area, "in Paharganj where the rising had started, many men were arrested on the suspicion of having caused the tumult and they were brought and beheaded on the bank of the Jamuna." [*Bayan*.]

The number of persons slain was found, on a subsequent investigation by the *kotwal*, to be 8,000 according to my MS. of Abdul Karim's memoirs, but the copy of the same work used by Sir H. Elliot's translator, Lt. Prichard, reads 20,000. The Persian State Secretary has 30,000; and the Mahratti newsletters (based on distant hearsay) give the number of the

bravely for some time; but being so little accustomed to the use of arms, only died sword in hand.

victims as 50,000 in one place and 3 or 4 lakhs in another. Harcharan-das has one lakh ; Hanway adds ten thousand to this last figure, and says that 10,000 more committed suicide by throwing themselves into wells. [ii. 376.] All these are popular exaggerations due to distant bazar rumours. Considering the small area affected and the short duration of the havoc, 20,000 is the most probable number of those put to the sword.

We are told by more than one authority that many respectable Indian householders slew their own wives and daughters to save them from dishonour by the Qizilbash soldiery and then rushed on the enemy's swords or cut their own throats. Many women drowned themselves in the wells of their houses to escape a shame worse than death. But many more were outraged and dragged away as captives, though according to the Persian State Secretary Nadir afterwards ordered them to be restored to their families. [Hanway, *Jahan* 359 ; Rajwade vi. Nos. 133 and 167.]

During the night of the rising two Indian nobles named Sayyid Niaz Khan (the son-in-law of the Wazir) and Shah Nawaz Khan, with Rai Bhan, had attacked the elephant stables of Nadir, killed his superintendent of *mahuts* and taken away the elephants. They had afterwards shut themselves up in a fort outside the city and resisted capture. Azim-ullah Khan and Fulad Khan were now sent by the Emperor to arrest them. They were produced before Nadir with 470 of their armed followers and were put to death by his order. [*Jahan* 359.] Abdul Karim, however, holds them innocent of participation in the night's riot, but says that they had merely shot down a number of Qizilbash assailants in the defence of their property and family honour during the massacre. All other authorities represent these two nobles as aggressors. Hanway heard a different version of this incident. According to him [ii. 377], before the massacre of Dihli a party of the Persian forces had been sent to seize the cannon at the palace of an Indian lord. These had been treacherously set upon and murdered by a body of Tartar Mongols [of Mughalpura]. Nadir sent a large detachment who fell upon these people and slaughtered nearly 6000 of them. The Persians brought away the ordnance

together with 300 persons of the chief rank among them, who were beheaded and their bodies thrown away on the sand bank (*reti*) of the Jamunā.

For some days after the massacre the streets of the doomed quarters of Dihli became impassable from the stench of the corpses filling the houses, wells and roadside, none venturing to approach them in fear. At last the *kotwal* took Nadir's permission and had the bodies collected on the roads and other open spaces and burnt them. [Anandram 50, Ali Hazin 300.]

After the massacre Nadir ordered the granaries to be sealed up and guards set over them. He also set several parties of cavalry to invest the city and prevent ingress and egress. The city was in a state of siege; the roads were entirely closed. A famine broke out among the survivors of the massacre. Those who tried to leave Dihli and go to the neighbouring villages in quest of food, were intercepted by the cavalry patrols, deprived of their noses and ears, and driven back into the city. After some days a lamenting deputation waited on the Persian king and he at last permitted them to go to Faridabad to buy provisions. [Hanway, ii. 377-378; Rajwade, vi. No. 133.]

But even the villages were no safer. The Persians marauded for 30 or 40 miles round the capital, plundering the villages, laying the fields waste and killing the inhabitants who resisted. After the battle of Karnal a body of Persians had been sent to raid Thanesar, which they plundered, slaying many. During the Shah's advance to Dihli early in March, Panipat, Sonapat and other towns lying on the way were sacked. [Hanway, ii. 384, 372-373.]

SEC. 121.—EXACTION OF RANSOM FROM DIHLI.

Nadir spent two months in Dihli, secure in the occupation of the capital and engaged in the collection of the huge indemnity. On 26th March his younger son Mirza Nasr-ullah was married to an imperial Princess, a daughter of Dawar Bakhsh,* the grandson of Murad and great grandson of Shah

* Dawar Bakhsh's mother was a daughter of Aurangzeb.

Jahan. For one week before the ceremony, rejoicings on a grand scale continued day and night. The bank of the Jamuna opposite the Diwan-i-khas was illuminated with lamps every night, while combats of elephants, oxen, tigers and deer were held in the day.

The conqueror allowed himself some relaxation after his arduous campaigns. Dances and songs were performed before him. One Indian dancing-girl named Nur Bai so highly fascinated him by her musical powers and ode in honour of him that he ordered her to be paid Rs. 4000 and taken to Persia in his train. It was with the greatest difficulty that she could save herself from this last mark of his favour. [*Bayan* 56.]

The total indemnity secured by Nadir Shah at Dihli is estimated by his Secretary at nearly 15 *kror*s of Rupees in cash, besides a vast amount in jewels, clothing furniture and other things from the imperial store-houses. The above figure includes whatever was taken from the nobles far and near and the imperial treasuries. [*Jahan* 361.] The grand total from all sources is raised to 70 *kror*s by Frazer, according to the following estimate, which is clearly an exaggeration, as the State Secretary's figures are of the highest authority :

Gold and silver plate and cash ...	30	kror
Jewels	25	„
The Peacock Throne and nine other thrones, also several weapons and utensils all garnished with precious stones ...	9	„
Rich manufactures	2	„
Cannon, stores, furniture	4	„
	—	
Total	70	kror
	—	

In addition to these, 300 elephants, 10,000 horses and the same number of camels were taken away. [*Hanway*, 383, 389.] Anandram, who was attached to the Indian Wazir, however, gives—sixty lakhs of Rupees and some thousand gold coins, nearly one *kror* of Rupees' worth of gold-ware, nearly 50 *kror* worth of jewels, most of them unrivalled in the world ; the above included the Peacock Throne. [*Anandram* 51.]

The Emperor had to surrender all his crown-jewels, including the famous diamond Koh-i-nur and the Peacock Throne of Shah Jahan which had cost 2 kror of Rupees. In the public treasuries were found three kror of Rupees, but in the inner vaults, which had been shut during many reigns, a much larger amount was discovered. [Hanway, 383.] Abdul Karim says that the personal property of the Begams of Dihli was not robbed. This statement cannot be accepted, though it is a fact that no torture was applied to these ladies or their servants for their jewels.

While the Emperor and the nobles were being squeezed of their wealth, the general public did not escape. A contribution of one-half of their property was fixed on all the well-to-do citizens who had escaped the massacre and sack, and a total of two kror* was ordered to be raised from this source. [Shakir and Anandram.] Anandram, who was assessed five lakhs and had a Persian military guard placed at his door to enforce payment, describes the method of extortion thus :—

“Accountants were appointed to levy the indemnity from the inhabitants, under the guidance of Tahmasp Khan Jalair. But in order to save the citizens from utter ruin, nobles of both the Governments were directed to supervise the assessment of the ransom in the law-court in the presence of the public. Footmen (*piadas*) of the *kotwal* and *nasaqchis* (military police of Persia) were sent to take a census of the houses and prepare lists of the property in each and enforce the appearance of the citizens, so that the sum to be contributed by each individual might be in accordance with his means. Helpless people, high and low, rich and poor, were compelled day after day to attend at the law-court where they were kept from dawn to sunset and often till one *prahar* of night.....Without ascertaining the truth, the calumnies of Mir Waris and Khwaja Rahmat-ullah were believed.....The lists were prepared. The contribution of the capital totalled two kror of Rupees. The Shah appointed

* Hanway, 383, says “About the middle of April four kror was extorted from the merchants and common people.” But Anandram is a better authority.

the Nizam, the Wazir, Azim-ullah Khan, Sarbuland Khan and Murtaza Khan to collect the money. The entire city was divided into five sections, and lists of the different mahallas with the names of their inhabitants and the amount to be levied from each were given to these five nobles." [Anandram, 53.]

After every citizen had been assessed his exact contribution, pressure was put upon them to pay the amount. Delay or objection only led to insult and torture. The floors of the houses were dug up in search of buried treasure. [Rajwade vi. 133.] Anandram writes in his autobiography: "In the two mahallas where the collection was entrusted to the Nizam and the Wazir, the people were treated humanely, as the Wazir paid a great part of the money from his own chests. But in the other three mahallas, especially in that assigned to Sarbuland Khan (i.e., Anandram's own!) the sufferings of the people knew no bounds.....Whole families were ruined. Many took poison and others stabbed themselves to death." [Anandram 54.]

It is said that the Wazir Qamar-ud-din Khan was exposed in the sun and thus made to pay one krór of Rupees plus jewels and elephants. His diwan Majlis Rai was assessed a large sum and delivered to Sarbuland Khan to be tortured. His ear was cut off in open darbar, and retiring home in the depth of disgrace he committed suicide on 8th April. The Court agent of the governor of Bengal was beaten, and he took poison with his entire family. As Hanway says, "No barbarities were left unpractised. The tax imposed was strictly exacted. What numbers destroyed themselves with their own hands....." [Hanway, ii. 382, Frazer 199, *T-i-Mdi*, Tilok Das.]

All this time Nadir lived at Dihli as king. Coins were issued and the public prayer read in his name as sovereign, and the title of *Shahan Shah* ('king of kings') which the Mughal Emperors had borne was taken away from them and applied to him only. The governors of the provinces of India had to proclaim him as their suzerain and in some instances mint his coins in the provincial mints. Muhammad Shah lived in Dihli like a prisoner of state and his nobles in the same helpless and degraded condition.

The entire population of Persia shared their king's prosperity. The revenue of that kingdom was remitted for three years. The chiefs of the army were lavishly rewarded ; the common soldiers received 18 months' pay together, one-third of which was their due arrears, one-third an advance, and the remaining one-third a bounty. [*Bayan* 53.] The camp-followers received Rs. 60 per head as salary and Rs. 100 as bounty. [*Jahan.* 361.]

At Dihli Nadir Shah talked of making a pilgrimage to the tomb of Shaikh Muin-ud-din Chishti at Ajmer. This journey was really intended for the spoliation of the Rajput States, because Ajmer is in the heart of Rajputana. At the report of his intended movement, Sawai Jai Singh in alarm sent his family and those of his nobles to the mountain-fastness of Udaipur and remained alone at his capital ready to flee away at the first notice. Baji Rao the Peshwa, then at Burhanpur, began to form plans for holding the line of the Chambal to prevent a Persian invasion of the Dakhin. [*Rajwade* vi. 133 ; *Brahmendra* S. C. 42.]

SEC. 122.—NADIR'S DEPARTURE FROM DIHLI.

Nearly two months having been thus passed at Dihli and the contribution collected, Nadir Shah held a grand Court on Tuesday, 1st May, to which he summoned the Emperor and his nobility. These nobles, about a hundred in number, were presented with robes of honour, jewelled swords and daggers, horses and other gifts. With his own hands he placed the crown of Hindustan on the head of Muhammad Shah and tied a jewelled sword round his waist.

The Emperor bowed low in gratitude and said, "As the generosity of the Shahan Shah has made me a second time master of a crown and a throne and exalted me among the crowned heads of the world, I beg to offer as my tribute the provinces of my Empire west of the river Indus, from Kashmir to Sindh, and in addition the subah of Tatha and the ports subordinate to it." Thus, the trans-Indus provinces and Afghanistan were finally lost to the heirs of Babar. A considerable territory east of the Indus had also been seized by

Nadir by right of victory over the local subahdars before the battle of Karnal, and his right to their revenue was not disputed, though they continued to be governed by Muhammad Shah's officers. The governor of Lahor now signed an agreement to send Nadir 20 lakhs of Rupees a year on this account, to remove the reason for any Persian garrison being left east of the Indus.

At this *darbar* of 1st May, Nadir Shah urged all the nobles and officers of India to obey and please their Emperor. He also gave them and their master much valuable advice on the art of government, and decreed that henceforth *farmans* should again issue on Muhammad Shah's behalf, and the *khutba* and coins should bear his name and title. *Khutba* and coinage in Nadir's name, after having been current in India for two months, were now discontinued. [*Jahan.* 362.] On this day the Persian conqueror sent off four *farmans* of his own to Nasir Jang, Nasir-ud-daulah, Rajah Sahu and Baji Rao, urging them to respect the settlement he had made and to obey Muhammad Shah in future. [*Jahankusha* 361-362, *Rajwade* vi. 167, *Ali Hazin* 301, *Bayan* 57, *Anandram* 80-83.]

Then, laden with the plundered wealth of India and the accumulated treasures of eight generations of Emperors, he set out on his return home. From India he carried away 130 accountants familiar with the finances of the Mughal Empire, 300 masons, 200 blacksmiths, 200 carpenters and 100 stonecutters, to build a city like Dihli in Persia. Some goldsmiths and boat-builders were also forced to accompany him. These artisans were supplied with horses and other necessary articles and promised a large pay and permission to return to India after three years. But a considerable number of them contrived to escape before he reached Lahor. [*Hanway*, ii. 389.]

On 5th May 1739 he left Dihli after a stay of 57 days. Making a short halt in the Shalimar garden outside the city, he marched by way of Narela to Sonapat, where he overtook his army. The peasants rose in his rear and plundered stragglers and the hindmost part of his baggage train. It is said that he lost 1,000 transport animals (camels, horses and mules)

before reaching Thanesar. In anger he ordered massacres here and at some other towns on the way. [Hanway, 391.]

From Sarhind he swerved aside to the right and proceeded along the foot of the Himalayas, crossing the upper courses of the five rivers of the Panjab which were bridged for him. This he did in order to avoid the blistering heat of summer. On 25th May he reached the Chinab at Akhnur, 42 miles north-east of Wazirabad.* By that time the river had been swollen by heavy rainfall in the hills. When only half the Persian army had crossed over, the bridge of boats broke from the strength of the current and 2,000 Persians were drowned. A long halt had to be made, while a search was made far and near for boats. The other half of the army was ferried over slowly in boats and rafts at Kaluwal. After thus losing 40 days, Nadir himself crossed the river last on 3rd July and resumed his march.

By this time the heat had become intolerable even along the foot of the hills. Zakariya Khan, the subahdar of Lahor and Multan, had accompanied Nadir up to this point. He was now dismissed to his seat of government with many gifts and a recommendation for promotion addressed to his master. Nadir Shah had been pleased with his devotion and ability, and asked him to name any favour that he liked. The Khan very nobly begged for the release of the Indian captives taken away from Dihli by the Persian army. These were now set free by Nadir's order. [M. U. ii. 106.] Then, by way of Hasan Abdal and the Khaibar Pass the Persians returned to Kabul. [*Jahankusha* 363-365, Anandram 83-98.]

His return march through the Panjab was molested by the Sikhs and Jats who rose in his rear and plundered a portion of his baggage. The immense booty that he carried away from India did not remain long in the royal treasury of Persia. Eight years after this invasion Nadir Shah was assassinated, and in

* I here follow Anandram. Mirza Mahdi's words are, "He encamped on the bank of the river Chinab known as Wazirabad." This may mean that the Chinab was known as the river of Wazirabad and not that the Persians crossed at the town of Wazirabad.

the troubled times that ensued his hoarded treasures were plundered and dispersed.*

SEC. 123.—STATE OF INDIA AFTER NADIR'S DEPARTURE.

Nadir Shah's occupation of Dihli and massacre of its people carried men's memories 340 years back to a similar calamity at the hands of Timur. But there was a great difference between the results of these two foreign invasions. Timur left the State of Dihli as he had found it, impoverished no doubt, but without any dismemberment. Nadir Shah, on the other hand, annexed the trans-Indus provinces and the whole of Afghanistan, and thus planted a strong foreign power constantly impinging on our western frontier. Timur's destructive work and the threat of further invasion from his country ended with his life. But the Abdali and his dynasty continued Nadir's work in India as the heir to his Empire. With the Khaibar Pass and the Peshawar district in foreign hands, the Panjab became a starting point for fresh expeditions against Dihli.

Not only were Afghanistan and the modern N. W. Frontier Province ceded as the result of Nadir's invasion, but the Panjab too was soon afterwards lost. Throughout the second half of the 18th century, Ahmad Shah Abdali and his descendants who ruled over Kabul and Lahor, constantly threatened the peace of Dihli and even the eastern provinces of the Mughal Empire. Their least movements, their slightest public utterances were reported to Dihli and Lakhnau and sent a thrill of fear through these Indian Courts and caused anxiety and precautionary diversion of forces to their English protectors, Hastings and Wellesley. The hardy and trained warriors of Central Asia and

* The Peacock Throne consisted of a gold-plated frame capable of being taken to pieces, richly jewelled panels fitting into its eight sides and detachable pillars steps and roof. It used to be put together and placed in the darbar hall only at the anniversary of the royal coronation, but at other times it was stowed away in loose parts. When these parts were looted they were naturally dispersed to different quarters. The genuine Peacock Throne of Shah Jahan no longer exists anywhere in the world ; but a modern and cheap imitation of it, made by the later kings of Persia, is still preserved at Teheran.

Afghanistan could have captured Dihli by a few days' dash from Lahor.

The Panjab, as the defensive barrier of India proper on the west, passed out of the hands of the ruler of Dihli even before the Abdali annexed it. Before the coming of Nadir, this province had attained to much peace and prosperity as the result of Farrukh-siyar's successful extinction of the Sikh guru Banda and his followers, and later on the vigorous campaigns of Zakariya Khan against predatory local chiefs and rebels. He had also added to the wealth and beauty of the cities, as Anandram enthusiastically describes. But Nadir's invasion undid all this. The country was first sacked by the Persian soldiers under orders and then by the lawless natives. Everywhere robbery and murder took place ; gangs of robbers closed the roads to trade and peaceful traffic ; every one fought every one else. Utter desolation and disorder seized the province. The Sikhs began to assert themselves in ever-increasing strength, until, half-a-century later, they gained possession of the entire province. From the end of Muhammad Shah's reign they became an ever-present thorn in the side of the Empire. In the second half of the 18th century they used to make almost annual raids eastwards to the environs of Dihli, plundering, burning, massacring and destroying all traces of cultivation and habitation with ferocious cruelty. Sarhind, Saharanpur, Meerut, Shahdera and even Hardwar suffered from their ravages. Peace, prosperity and industry disappeared from the region north and west of the Mughal capital.

After Nadir's return, the Mahrattas established themselves in the southern and western provinces of the Empire in absolute security. The Dihli sovereign had no force, no general left to offer them the least resistance. Emboldened by the helplessness of the central Government, Mahratta bands began to penetrate repeatedly to Orissa, south-eastern Bihar and Bengal. The local governor was helpless against their hordes and the Emperor could think of no other means of meeting this danger than by begging the Puna Mahrattas to drive the Nagpur Mahrattas out of Bengal.

We are told by the Indian historians that after the depar-

ture of Nadir, the Emperor called his ministers together and devoted himself to re-establishing the administration and restoring the finances. But we know from history that he did not succeed, and that during the ten years that he reigned after Nadir's invasion, the Government grew weaker and weaker and matters drifted as before.

Indeed, there was no reason why there should be a restoration of the imperial power and prestige, while the character of the Emperor and his nobles continued to be as bad as before. The Nizam was the only able and honest adviser left ; but he was now an old man of 82 or 83, and in anticipation of his approaching death rebellion had broken out among his sons. His domestic troubles and anxieties drew him to the Dakhin and kept him busy there till his death. Thus the Emperor could not profit by the Nizam's wisdom and experience, even if he were inclined to follow his counsels—which was not the case.

The governors of Oudh and the Dakhin had no help but to declare their independence—in practice, if not in name,—as the subahdar of Bengal had already done. The struggle for the wazirship at the capital—i.e., for the post of keeper of the puppet Emperor,—continued more bitterly than before ; the factions among the nobility quarrelled and intrigued as hard as ever, and finally after the death of Muhammad Shah (1748) they came to blows in the streets and pitched battles on the plains outside Dihli, and the great anarchy, which is only another name for the history of the Mughal Empire in its last days, began, destined to be ended only by the foreign conquest of the imperial capital half a century later.

ERRATA

VOL. I

- P. 11, l. 14 for *sikkah* read *sikka*
 „ 51 „ 3 „ do. „ do.
 „ 159 „ 2 „ brothers „ brothers'
 „ 240 „ 15 read (1124 y. 1 m. 21 d.—1125 y. 0m. 16 d.)
 „ 240 „ 17 for *jar* read *zar*
 „ 243 „ 3 „ Surbuland read Sarbuland
 „ 279 „ 34 „ Qudrat- read If Qudrat-

VOL. II

- P. 25 heading for Bushanpur read Burhanpur
 „ 104 l. 2 for quite read quit
 „ 139 „ 9 „ do to Roshan-ud-daulah, and read do. Roshan-ud-daulah said
 „ 143 „ 26 „ horsemen ; read horsemen,
 „ 160 „ 18 „ years his read years of his
 „ 178 „ 21 „ fight read flight
 „ 229 „ 7 „ 1713 „ 1731
 „ 269 „ 31 „ little „ little [while]
 „ 281 „ 6 „ actively „ activity

ABBREVIATIONS

- Ali Hazin—Belfour's *Memoirs of Shaikh Ali Hazin* (O. T. F.)
 Anandram—*Tazkira* (Aligarh Col. MS.)
 Bayan—*Bayan-i-waqai* by Abdul Karim Kashmiri. [In ch. 11-13 the Lahor Public Library MS. is cited, elsewhere the Br. Mus. copy.]
 Burhan—*Burhan-ul-futuh*.
 Chronicle—*Dihli Chronicle*, a Persian MS. described by J. Sarkar in *Proceedings of Indian Hist. Records Commission 1921*.
 Hanway—*Travels*, 3rd. ed.
 Harcharan-das—*Chahar Gulzar-i-Shujai* (J. Sarkar's MS.)
 Imad—*Imad-us-Sadat* by Ghulam Ali (litho.)
 Jahan or Jahanqusha—*Tarikh-i-Jahanqusha-i-Nadiri* by Mirza Mahdi (litho, Bombay).
 Khizr Khan—*Siwanih-i-Khizri*.
 Mirat—*Mirat-i-Ahmadi* by Md. Ali Khan.
 Nadir Shah—Frazer's *Nadir Shah*.
 Raj.—*Marathachi Itihasachen Sadhanen* ed. by V. K. Rajwade and others.
 Shakir—*Tazkira* of Shakir Khan (J. Sarkar's MS.)
 Tilok Das—Hindi poem on Nadir Shah and Md. Shah in *J.A.S.B.*, 1897.

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